Operational Analysis Support to the RAF During Op TELIC Presentation to the Defence Study Group Dstl Farnborough 18 Nov 04

Air Warfare Centre Operational Analysis Element Paul Stoddart Scientific Advisor Operations RAF Waddington 18 Nov 04

Air Warfare Centre

[dstl]

OA in support of air operations

This presentation will be at UNCLASSIFIED CLASSIFICATION

Commandant AWC Strike Command Air Warfare Centre DevelopmentOperations Operational Analysis Element (OAE) Ops Support

AWC Mission “To Provide Timely Integrated Mission Support at the Operational, Tactical and Technical Levels of Warfare.” “To Provide Timely Integrated Mission Support at the Operational, Tactical and Technical Levels of Warfare.”

Operational Analysis Element Provide scientific and technical expertise to AWC… for essential and timely mission support to the front line…

Operational Analysis Element for essential and timely mission support to the front line… An 80% solution now is better than the 100% solution tomorrow Timescales can be very short

OA Deployments  Jan 91 - Operation GRANBY  Jun 95 - Op DELIBERATE FORCE  Mar 99 - Operation ALLIED FORCE  Feb 03 - Op TELIC / IRAQI FREEDOM

OAE on Op TELIC  10 analysts deployed to theatre  One to National Component HQ  One to UK Air Component HQ  2 to Coalition Air Component HQ  6 to deployed attack squadrons (3 bases)  Home team for reachback support

OAE Tasks in Op TELIC National Component HQ  One OAE analyst (+ other analysts)  Collateral damage estimation  Advice to Targets office  Advice on weapon effects to RE for repair  Generic wpns advice to UK NCHQ staff

OAE Tasks in Op TELIC UK Air Component HQ  One OAE analyst  Scientific adviser to UK Air Component Cdr  Questions: varied, operational & tactical  Coalition counter-IADS campaign  Urban Close Air Support

OAE Tasks in Op TELIC Coalition Air HQ  2 OAE analysts ‘embedded’ (10+ US staff)  Part of Coalition OA Team (principally US)  Campaign Assessment  Data compilation (major task)

OAE Tasks in Op TELIC Deployed UK attack squadrons  5 (later 6) OAE analysts to 3 bases  No analysts left for early changeover  Advice: weapon and system performance  Data collection/compilation  IT support

Support to UK Attack Sqns  Weapon-system performance  Laser guided bomb ballistics  Weapon delivery modes  Weapon to target matching  Laser designator/seeker performance

Support to UK Attack Sqns Database/tool development  Reporting Program: Input data once  3 x reports output  Mission; LGB, RAF Historical  Air Tasking Order parser  Auto break out of sqn missions  Killbox mapping  Mapped no-strike and restricted strike targets in specified killbox

Reachback & Support to AWC  Reachback  From deployed HQs and Sqns to AWC- based analysts Storm Shadow performance Storm Shadow performance Weapon applications Weapon applications  OAE support to AWC  Capability measure: Iraqi military systems

Post Conflict Analysis  CWEAT Combined Weapons Effect Assessment Team  In country assessment: ‘boots on the ground’  Target inspection  Damage assessment  Weapon suitability

We like bridges but...

...success can be elusive

Lessons  OA/scientific/IT support to HQs and especially sqns is definitely valued by the military customer  Especially to have it ‘on location’  Invited on Afghanistan holiday (Harrier)

Lessons General  Training and preparation of analysts  Risk assessment: difficult for war zones  Medical  Military training/kit - availability  Tools, Techniques, Models : usage currency  Communications for reachback  Standard data collection methods/formats  Must understand operational context  80% answer now >> 100% tomorrow

Lessons contd  Locate analysts with customers  ie with operators at HQs and operating bases  Be active: get out and speak to people  Explain what OA can and cannot achieve  Get to know them before op deployment  Develop relationship before the op starts  Get to know people personally  Avoid (most) non-OA tasks  be helpful but do not be an admin drudge

Lessons contd  Operational timescales can be very short  < one hour  Be accurate, be clear, be right  OA output must be useful to the military customer  Being correct is not enough; be relevant  Avoid lengthy, academic studies that have no conclusion“Further studies are necessary”

Context  To Achieve 90% P k on a 60’x100’ Target (dumb bombs)  WWII (B-17): 9,070 Bombs  Korea/Vietnam (F-84/F-105): 176 Bombs  Desert Storm (F-16): 30 Bombs  Desert Storm (F-117): 1 LGB

Op TELIC  Op GRANBY  81% dumb weapons  19% guided weapons  Op TELIC  16% dumb weapons  84% guided weapons

Op TELIC OA Results  Op TELIC Air domain data  > 4 Gb of data(Secret)  > 10,000 files  > 1,000 images & weapon system videos  Summarised, analysed and reported:  weapon numbers  hit rates  sortie rates (abort numbers and types)

Bombing Tonnage

Numbers - OIF  Coalition combat ac ~786  20,733 sorties  19,948 guided munitions launched  9,251 unguided munitions launched  Leaflets Dropped 31,800,000  120,454 rolls of toilet paper

So What?  What do all the numbers mean?

Iraq - Op IRAQI FREEDOM  Combat Assessment plan initiated early  Detailed plan  α Operational Objectives  4 α Tactical Objectives  15 α Tactical Tasks  3-5MoEs per Tactical Task  Total data requirement = HUGE !

Lessons  Campaign Assessment (CA)  Very challenging: short, high intensity war  Data and analysis ‘hungry’  How to measure ‘effect’ True EBO or kinetic result: crater counting? True EBO or kinetic result: crater counting?  CA: early input to planning essential

Lessons  Beware the temptation of Powerpoint  Glossy slides are not a substitute for analysis and advice  In Op IRAQI FREEDOM, the Coalition had Powerpoint supremacy  Air Component Cdr: 200-slide briefings!

Thoughts for the future  Campaign/Operation Assessment  How well am I doing? Measures of Effectiveness Measures of Effectiveness  How do I know when I have succeeded? Success Indicators Success Indicators  Measure effect and progress  Effort does not equal progress

Conclusions  OA support to ops works  but must be quick and relevant  Technical & tactical areas well covered  Campaign Assessment: a capability gap

QUESTIONS