2. The Yin / Yang Approach to Measures of Merit: Where does science end and art begin? Adam Siegel Senior Analyst Northrop Grumman Analysis Center August 2003

3. Introduction and Outline u Caveat: – –Briefing represents author’s personal opinions, not necessarily Northrop Grumman (or USG) – –Concept briefing, not ‘definitive’ analysis – –Goal: Spark discussion rather than impart results u Long-discussed Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) only part of the equation – especially for “effects-based operations” (EBO) u Complicted mix from MOPs to MoPEs u Each level of analysis requires different mix of tools, techniques, academic & intellectual skills and approaches u Questions: – –Reinforcing or conflicting approaches? – –What should be dominant?

4. Yin / Yang u Universe is run by a single principle, the Tao, or Great Ultimate u Principle is divided into two opposite principles u Universal explanatory principle: All phenomena can be understood using yin-yang u yin and yang represent all the opposite principles one finds in the universe

5. Layer within layer: Thinking about Measures of Merit u DP: Dimensional parameters u MOP: Measure of Performance u MOE: Measure of Effectiveness u MOFE: Measure of Force Effectiveness u Measures of Operational Effectiveness u MOPE: Measure of Policy Effectiveness DP MOP MOE MOFE MOPE MOOE Question: How does this relate to EBO??

6. Some “case studies” re “MOM” analysis u Patriot performance in Desert Storm u Operation Allied Force u 9/11

7. Patriots and Desert Storm u Background –Iraqi SCUD ballistic missile threat –Patriot developed for fixed-wing air defense Software modifications to deal with TBMs Deployed to Saudi Arabia and Israel u Operational experience –Initial claims of high-success rate in intercepts Undercut by later and more detailed analysis In the end, seemingly ineffective (potentially counterproductive) tactically –Critically important operationally and strategically Forces believed they were protected – aided force morale Israel and Saudi populations perceived active defense Critical to keeping Israel from retaliating against Iraq – which might have shattered coalition u Thus – tactical failure, operational /strategic / policy success

8. Operation Allied Force u Background – –Air campaign re Serbian activity in Kosovo – –Generally perceived before conflict that several days of exemplary bombing would suffice … 78 days later – –Strike operations against: Fielded Serbian forces and facilities directly supporting them “Strategic” target sets – –No allied ground forces (Importance of UCK / KLA?) u Operational experience – –Claims of successes in attacking fielded forces Undercut by later and more detailed analysis In the end, unclear tactical effects (at best) – –“Strategic” target sets Operators perceived stringent ROE restrictions Unclear links to adversary decision making – –Why did Milosevic surrender? Multiple theories from pressure of air campaign on Serbian public and/or cronies; demonstrated NATO willingness to stay the course; emerging threat of a ground offensive; Russian pressure u Thus – operational success (enemy surrender) with uncertain understanding as to why

9. 9/11 u Background –Al Qaeda suicide terrorist attacks using airliners as WMD –Uncertain Al Qaeda intent … potentially Tactically: kill many? ‘shock’ the world? Operationally: damage U.S.? gain recruits for Al Qaeda? Strategic: drive U.S. from Middle East? galvanize revolutionary Islam? weaken U.S.-Saudi relations? weaken Saudi gov / regime? u Operational experience –Tactical success: Aircraft caused massive destruction, potentially largest news event in history to date –Operational success: Massive economic –Strategic – mixed: Initial boost to al Qaeda, potentially undercut by U.S./world move into Afghanistan and improved anti-terrorist operations, U.S. forces departing Saudi Arabia, worsened U.S.-Arab relations u Thus, for al Qaeda – clear tactical ‘victory’, likely operational ‘success’, with uncertain link to long-term strategic objectives

10. CASE ‘LESSONS” u Tactical, operational, and policy success not necessarily clearly linked u “Predictive” ability uncertain –Extremely difficult to link technical, quantitatively measurable activity to decision-making processes –In these cases, what “DP” links to “MOPE” existed? u Quantitative and qualitative measures –Both relevant for understanding situations –But at different points of the MOM spectrum –Which provided path toward best support of (strategic) decision-making?

11. Layer within layer: Returning to Measures of Merit u DP: Dimensional parameters u MOP: Measure of Performance u MOE: Measure of Effectiveness u MOFE: Measure of Force Effectiveness u Measures of Operational Effectiveness u MOPE: Measure of Policy Effectiveness DP MOP MOE MOFE MOPE MOOE more qualitative more quantitative EBO requires full spectrum analysis combining ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ skills – or science and art. Contention: easier to teach artists science, than scientists art …