1. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Graham Brownbill Dstl Team Leader, Land Warfare Centre OA support to Land Operations: OP TELIC

2. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 History of Land OA WW 2 OA invented for front line commands. Post war concentrated on Procurement & Policy. Specialist teams supporting Northern Ireland and 1 BR Corps survived. 1982: Falklands War: Should have had OA. 1991: Gulf 1: Ad Hoc team taken from Scientific establishment. 1995-6: OA Branch Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) deployed to Bosnia as part of IFOR.

3. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Land OA 1996: OA Cell formed (2 people) at Wilton, Wiltshire 1998 & 1999: Deployed to Bosnia. 1999: Expanded to 4 people. 1999 & 2000: Deployed to Kosovo. 2001: Deployed to Oman for Saif Sareea 2. 2002: Deployed to Afghanistan. 2003 +: Deployed to Iraq. 2003: Moved to Warminster and expanded to 6 people.

4. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Land Warfare Centre OA branch Responsible for providing scientific and analytical advice to the whole of the front line army. This excludes the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and Northern Ireland which have their own teams. Deployable: –HQ Multinational Division South East, Basrah Iraq, –HQ 1 UK Armoured Division Herford Germany. –HQ 3 UK Division Bulford, Wiltshire. Static: –UK Operations Staff Wilton, Wiltshire. –Land Command, Wilton, Wiltshire. –Land Warfare Centre, Warminster, Wiltshire.

5. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Tip of the ICEBERG LWC OA Team 2 to 4 people in theatre Up to 5 people in UK Support to Ops Group, 60 people, 9 teams Dstl 3000 people Industry & universities Theatre UK Augmentation Reachback Augmentation pool, 30 people MOD

6. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Deployed Team features All MOD civilian teams: –No staff officers. –No contractors. All field trained including NBC, mine awareness, living in the field and Health and safety and must pass annual medical. When deployed fully integrated into Headquarters, wear combat clothing and treated like staff officers except: –Unarmed. –3 to 4 month tours of duty. –Right to say no!

7. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Deployed Team features If you cannot carry it you cannot take it. Very good military awareness and self confidence. Generalist OA skills, not specialist. Good basic statistics, database and IT skills. Anything else needs reachback.

8. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 OP TELIC TEAMS Jan 03:Pre war (Team 1). Mar 03:Warfighting (Team 1). May 03: Honeymoon period (Team 2). Jul 03: Sustained period (Teams: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8). The future (team 9 etc).

9. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Team 1 Warfighting OA Busiest pre-combat. Limited time during combat for OA. Questions were “fast” or “quick”, often to very short timescales - typically 2 - 48 hours before the answer will be used. Reachback - scope of questions very wide so analytical community need procedures for fast response.

10. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Team 2 Deployed shortly after the end of the war (according to President Bush) until the end of July. 2 people based in Basrah airport throughout. Main effort was Measures of Effectiveness surveys: Other effort included: –Electricity. –Crime statistics. –Fuel shortage. –Intelligence databases. –PSYOPs surveys.

11. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Honeymoon phase Population very friendly. Surveys said vast majority wanted Coalition to stay. In tests 9 out of 10 waved back. Able to travel freely: –Visited all brigades and battlegroups weekly or monthly. –Visited schools and the prison. –Went on infantry patrol. –Even Had a weekend break in Baghdad.

12. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Effect of security situation Situation deteriorated after the murder of 6 Royal Military Police. Did not have a blanket ban on travelling, However: –Each case taken on its merits. –Harder to find big enough escort. –Avoid certain areas and routes.. Still managed to travel quite a lot, but as units rotated corporate memory started to suffer. Subsequent teams visits reduced down from 3 trips a week to 1 trip a month.

13. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Measures of effectiveness

14. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 What did we WANT MOE to Achieve? Gain Impression of the overall situation. Counter ‘bad press’. Assist in Briefing VIPs/Politicians. See indirect effects of Coalition forces. Indicate potential difficulties before they arise. Prioritise areas for aid. Help with force protection - “Hearts and Minds”.

15. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Advantages British army experience in NI, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan encouraged a policy of soldiers relating to the locals and wherever possible communicating with them. OA had completed similar work in NI, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Within the Area of Operations (AO) coalition members were willing to follow UK style of patrolling. General population willing to give benefit of the doubt.

16. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Problems Very poor infrastructure and lack of pre war data. Shortage of interpreters and Islamists. Interim government overwhelmed by problems. Very high levels of crime and petty theft. Very limited data on what was happening on the ground.

17. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Strategy adopted Soldiers on patrol to conduct survey. Each company to conduct 1 survey per day. Survey was in two parts: –part 1 the soldiers completed themselves. –part 2 when the patrol had an interpreter they would choose a local and ask them to answer a few questions. Both parts would be handed into OA at the end of the week and OA typed them into a database. Extensive briefing of results.

18. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Example Results

19. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Data collected? Included: –Availability of: Food (staple food availability). Water (Drinking/Utility). Shelter (condition). –Local Area Stability: Attacks on Patrol/Civilians. Crime. –Public Reaction to patrols.

20. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Top Concerns of the Public – Total AO

21. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 MoE Patrol Interview Reports Do You Have Confidence in The Future of Iraq? Basrah + Maysan+ Muthanna + Dhi Qar

22. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Basrah + Maysan+ Muthanna + Dhi Qar Public Attitude to Patrols

23. Lessons!

24. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Lessons Need Commanders to buy-in. Few questions consistently. Not many ever-changing. Once you have a few results, advertise them. Let the story tell itself -avoid pre judging results. Chase all incomplete or badly filled results.

25. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 The right place at the right time Travelling to the military unit: –Adds credibility. –Avoids ‘ivory tower’ analysis. –Avoids chinese whispers. Variety of location and task adds interest and delays insanity. However, must be in touch with the security situation. If OA is not there the question is not asked.

26. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 Avoid Good news filter! Adding to the pressure on subordinate units to have ‘better’ statistics. Irrelevant or meaningless questions or questions that will take years to change. Assuming that the data collectors care or understand the problem! Explain - check - explain - check. Scrapping old measures every time the commander changes over.

27. © Dstl 2001 Dstl is part of the Ministry of Defence 12-Nov-04 General lessons Analysts must understand what is happening and who owns the data. Not all help given is genuine OA but often lead to a source of data or a more appropriate task. Do not try and collect to much data. Do not let the data drive the operation, instead paint a picture and let the military interpret it. Avoid Vietnam style statistics.

28. Above all KEEP IT SIMPLE!