Persons and Morality Pt. 2 Philosophy 224 Persons and Morality Pt. 2

What we saw from Dennett was an analysis of personhood into a set of conditions. As we’ve reviewed the history of the discussion of the concept, we’ve seen the value of this type of analysis, as well as some of its limitations. One important limitation to consider is how difficult it can be to draw a line around a set of conditions that is consistent with our intuitions. In the excerpt “Persons and Non-Persons,” Mary Midgely highlights this problem. Are Dolphins People?

Midgley reviews elements of the case against Kenneth Le Vasseur, charged with theft for participating in the liberation of a pair of dolphins used for experimentation by scientists at the Institute of Marine Biology. In response to a ‘choice of evils’ defense, the judge in the case ultimately held that the dolphins were property, not persons. Here comes the judge.

In order to rule in this matter, the judge had to specify what makes something a person. Reviewing a number of possible person-making features, the judge ultimately rejects the possibility that intelligence is the relevant feature. His conclusion is that the feature that counts is biological humanity. Property or Persons?

Midgley considers and rejects this account for a number of reasons. We use the term ‘person’ to describe a number of things that are clearly not human (God, Corporations). It is employed in a range of contexts where the aim is to distinguish individuals from the groups to which they belong. It ignores the original sense of the term. Humans=People?

All the World’s a Stage… The term ‘person’ has its origin in drama (dramatis personae) where it refers to the characters in the play. Etymologically, it’s origin is the word for the masks used in early dramas. Midgley uses this analysis of the term as a starting point for a consideration of the way in which it has been used as a principle of evaluation and exclusion, particularly of slaves and women. All the World’s a Stage…

To develop this historical criticism, Midgley turns to Kant. Kant’s account of personhood in terms of free rationality has become the generally accepted account of moral personhood. The clear advantage of this account is that it allows us to extend personhood, and thus moral consideration, to entities that do not share our biology, but intuitively deserve moral consideration. They are among us.

Where do we draw the line? The problem with this approach is that rationality is not an all or nothing thing. It admits of degrees. The consequence is that we are required to arbitrarily draw a line in the spectrum of rationality, reserving personhood for just a subset of the whole. Where do we draw the line?

The tradition’s answer to this problem is to redefine the criterion of personhood. Rather than rationality, these critics point to sentience: the capacity to feel. Bentham, ‘The question is not…Can they talk? But Can they suffer?’ Sentience

Building on an account like Bentham’s Midgley goes on to argue that, “What makes creatures our fellow beings, entitled to basic consideration, is surely not intellectual capacity but emotional fellowship” (319c2). This concept of ‘emotional fellowship’ refers to what Midgley identifies as “social and emotional complexity” (Ibid.). The virtue of this approach is its consistency with our conscience, which is troubled by mistreatment of the animals we share our lives with, but which an account like Kant’s has difficulty accounting for. Another Possibility

Does this answer the question? Does Midgley’s account resolve all of the issues? Is there still a line drawing problem? So dolphins are in? Does this answer the question?