1. Speciesism and the Idea of Equality
Bonnie Steinbock

2. Alternative view: all moral consideration of humans only; none to animals
Singer: equal consideration of interests of any sentient (being capable of suffering)
No matter what kind of being your are, your suffering should count for just as much as the suffering of a human
Steinbock: hierarchy of interests (humans more important than animals) but all interests are considered

3. Singers Arg
Singer is committed to the view that capacity to suffer is the only morally relevant capacity
Does not imply equal treatment
Suppose that an animal is going to kill you – then you are permitted to shoot it (since your life has more pleasure than his own)

4. Case
Catholic group – feeding starving dogs vs. children - spent their time alleviating suffering of refugees; spent their time constructing animal friendly farms
Both, on Singer’s view, are considered equally good acts – and there is no reason to say that one is important than another
Rejects that suffering is only relevant capacity
Rejects equal consideration of interests
Still, we should give consideration to animals

5. 1. Minimally Responsible, Rational, etc
Even though humans are not equal in intelligence, rationality, moral capacity, etc, they all are at least minimally intelligent, rational, moral
Animals are not (even minimally) intelligent, rational, moral
E.g. humans are held moral responsible because they are autonomous
It is in virtue of them that we are justified in regaing the interests of humans over animals
Compare to discrimination charge – still not allowed to discriminate against
Anynoe with these minimal capacities
But, ok not to consider equally the interests of animals (

6. 2. Humans Can Reciprocate; Animals cant’
Humans beings can be expected to reciprocate in a way that non- human animals cannot
Non-human animals cannot be motivated by altruistic or moral reasons
They cannot treat you fairly or unfairly (even thought they may be motivated by sympathy or pity)
Human have altruistic motivation – motivation due to the recognition that the needs and interests of others provide one with certain reasons for acting (e.g someone is in pain)
An animal cannot be motivated by this sort of reason or any entity not possessed of fairly abstract concepts.

7. Higher Order Thought
If rats invade ur house we cannot reason with them, to presuade them of the injustic
We can only attempt to get rid of them
And it is this that makes it reasonable for us to accord them a separate and not equal moral statuats, even though their capacity to suffer provides us wuth some reasn to kill them painlessly – if this can be done w/o too much sacrifice of human interests

8. 3. Desire for Self-Respect
A desire to be identified with what one is doing, to be able to realize purposes of one’s own, and not to be instruct of another’s will unless one has willingly accepted such a role
Desire for self-respect requires intellectual capacities for human beings
Slavery of human is affront to human dignitiy
Animal captivity is not; they have not desire for self-respect/ dignitiy

9. Both rats and humans dislike pain, so we have a prima facie reason not to inflict pain on either
But, if we can free human beings from crippling disease, pain and death through experimentation which involves making animals suffer (and if this is the only way) then such experimentation is justified.
Why? Because human lives are more valuable than animal lives.

10. Conclusion: argued that we are morally obligated to consider the interests of all sentient creatures, but not to consider those interests equally with human beings
What follows?
We ought to change factory farming?
Sport hunting?
Furs?
Unnecessary cruelty to animals?

11. If the boundary is drawn between humans and animals in any one of these ways, then what are we to say about the severely handicapped
She is horrified by the use of the severely handicapped on experimentation
Admits the sentiment is not morally relevant
But, Does not pose an insurmountable objection to the privilege status principle
It is certainly not wrong of us to extend special care to members of our own species, motivated by feelings of sympathy, protectiveness, etc.
If this is speciesism, it is stripped of its tone of moral condemnation: it is not racist to provide special care to member of your own race; it is racist to fall below your moral obligation to a person because of his or her race

12. How Should we treat Animals?
Is unnecessary torture of animals permitted? No. But it does not have to do with moral status.
What is unnecessary – depends on end
Animal torture is cruel because deriving enjoyment from seeing animals suffer is wrong
Allowing animals to suffer because of neglect or sake of large profit (unnecessary) and cruel
Animal experimentation – ought to be kept to a minimum