E. Michael Saleski PPS and BCS Systems Manager LCLS Personnel Protection System, Beam Containment System, (and misc. Safety Inspection Items) E. Michael Saleski PPS and BCS Systems Manager

LCLS: PPS-eye View

LCLS Injector Vault Layout

LCLS Injector WG Plumbing

Simplified PPS System Architecture

LCLS Injector Vault Under-Floor Searching

PPS Summary Diagnostic Panel has individual ‘A/B’ status for all items Allows for simpler micro-switch testing Equipment gate micro-switches are special safety switches – can only be actuated with special tabs on doors Ultimately will use similar to PEP-style BSOICs; stuck with SLAC Classic BSOICs for now Commissioning second or third week of January; much is invasive to PEP operations

BCS Definition and Project Scope Prevents radiation from ‘escaping’ the shielding enclosure Direct measurements of radiation or beam loss Protection of safety-critical collimators and stoppers Entirely ‘new’ LCLS BCS needed New gun = new shut-off mechanisms Support two simultaneous programs (LCLS & PEP) = new set of shut-off paths [Reduce mutual interference of programs as much as possible = desire targeted shut-offs if plausible –later]

BCS System Scope Original ‘Mode-switching’ BCS proposal has been sidelined for now Propose an ‘Interim BCS’ where conservatively “All BCS faults shut-off all Guns.” Mode-switching requirements are now better understood – move forward with second proposal for 2007 downtime implementation

LCLS Injector Shut-Off Mechanisms Laser Safety Stopper (LSS) Dedicated BCS LSS situated in Injector Vault, stops the production of primary beam Dark Current may persist Accelerator Sections move to Staggered Standby New injector sections L0A and L0B together will move to staggered standby with the rest of the Linac New Sub-Booster Interface needs to be developed, new high-stability Solid State Sub-booster is not compatible with old SBI Module Stops primary beam and dark current acceleration RF Gun moves to Staggered Standby RF Gun equivalent to removal of triggers at CID Staggered with respect to L0A and L0B Also uses new SBI

Interim BCS System Architecture

Configuration ‘Alpha’ CID beam to PEP, and A-Line or SABER; LCLS Beam to LCLS Linac Injector Spectrometer (SDMP) Power Supply for magnets BX01/BX02 will be locked off BSY BCS will be active as appropriate for parasitic program (common line, NARC/SARC, A-Line) and possible accidental LCLS beam delivery to BSY

Configuration ‘Beta’ CID beam to PEP; LCLS beam injected into Linac through TD11 or to the LCLS Linac Injector Spectrometer Dump TD11 will be disabled ‘IN’ Linac BAS II stoppers (BAS II Dump, ST950, ST960) administratively inserted 50B1 and B1/2 locked out; Common Line BSY BCS are active

Configuration ‘Beta-prime’ CID beam to PEP; LCLS beam injected into Linac past TD11 (or to the LCLS Injector Spectrometer) Dump TD11 will be allowed ‘OUT’ BAS II ‘inserted’ with air valve – not a safety item B1/2 remain locked out; Common Line and NARC/SARC BSY BCS are active

Safety Inspection Items (?) PPS: 3 BSOICs, 1 stopper (RST1) Locked Entry Module roof hatch BCS: 4 LIONs Spot Shielding: 21-1,-2,-4 have 24” of borax (also wider) SDMP has down-beam (4-inch thick Pb, 24”x26”) and aisle shielding (sliding 5-inch thick Fe, 43”x31”) TD11 has penetration shielding (1 ¾-inch thick Fe, 25”x40”) and aisle shielding (sliding 5-inch thick Fe, 43”x31”)