Setting Pay Levels: Monopsony Models

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Setting Pay Levels: Monopsony Models Chapter Seventeen Setting Pay Levels: Monopsony Models Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

Figures and Tables Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

FIGURE 17.1 Effects of Labor Supply Elasticity on the Profit-Maximizing Wage Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

FIGURE 17.2 Profit-Maximizing Pay Generosity: example with η = 1 Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

FIGURE 17.3 An example where “pay doesn’t matter”: any wage between w1 and w2 yields the same level of profits. Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

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