1. Reciprocity at Work: Gift Exchange, Implicit Contracts, and Trust
Chapter Ten
Reciprocity at Work: Gift Exchange, Implicit Contracts, and Trust
Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics
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2. Figures and Tables Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics
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3. TABLE 10.1 Share of Agents Choosing the Punish, Cool, and Reward Actions in Offerman’s Hot Response Game
Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics
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4. TABLE 10.2 Fraction of Agents Selecting More than Xmin Units of Effort Level in Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) Experiment, by Treatment
Source: Figures are approximated from Figure 1 in Falk and Kosfeld (2006).
Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics
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5. TABLE 10.3 Average Profit of Principals in Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) Experiment, by Treatment:
Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) numbers are multiplied by 2 to convert them to measures of firms’ profits.
Source: Figures are taken from Table 1 in Falk and Kosfeld (2006).
Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics
Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press