10CFR50.69 – Approaches/Impacts on Configuration Management Configuration Management Benchmarking Group Summer 2018 Conference Chattanooga, TN Glen.

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Presentation transcript:

10CFR50.69 – Approaches/Impacts on Configuration Management Configuration Management Benchmarking Group Summer 2018 Conference Chattanooga, TN Glen E. Schinzel STPNOC, Design Engineering geschinzel@stpegs.com

Overview 10CFR50.69 offers a significant strategic opportunity for current operating stations Enhanced safety benefits Substantial economic savings available Benefits available for PWRs / BWRs Requires a commitment of senior leadership and staff Investment in the future viability of your station Considerations for managing CM impacts must be factored in

10CFR50.69 Background 10CFR50.69 is an approved regulatory rule that allows safety-related SSCs determined to have Low safety significance to be removed from the scope of a number of regulatory requirements SSCs must be categorized using an NRC-approved methodology 50.69 is not a new rule The proto-type was piloted by STP beginning in 2001 Rule published on 11/22/04

10CFR50.69 Background 10CFR50.69 is a scoping rule in that regulatory requirements are NOT eliminated, but the scope of components subject to these regulatory requirements is changed Licensees can choose the degree and timing of treatment changes – can categorize 1, 2, 5, 12, etc. systems Adoption of 10CFR50.69 is VOLUNTARY Recent economic challenges within the industry has renewed and broadened interest to pursue 50.69 Delivering the Nuclear Promise Efficiency Bulletins were issued to encourage use A number of licensees have submitted (or will submit) a License Amendment to adopt 50.69

Low Safety Significant Treatment Changes Safety Related High Safety Significant Non Safety Related High Safety Significant Low Safety Low Safety Significant RISC 1 RISC 2 RISC 3 RISC 4 RISC = Risk Informed Safety Class Confirm treatment for beyond design basis functions Confirm treatment adequate for risk-significant attributes Apply Owner-Controlled Alternate Treatment No additional treatment necessary RISC-1 or RISC-4 SSCs: no change to treatment occurs RISC-2 SSCs: an assessment is performed of current applied industrial practices Licensee to determine if additional treatments should be applied RISC-3 SSCs: these components are largely removed from the scope of regulatory special treatment requirements SSCs remain classified as safety-related Applied treatments largely mirror robust industrial practices – must have reasonable confidence that design functional requirements still satisfied

Regulatory Rules Affected by 50.69 Local Leak Rate Testing [10 CFR 50 Appendix J] Quality Requirements [10 CFR 50 Appendix B] In-service Inspection [10 CFR 50.55a(g)] Deficiency Reporting [10 CFR Part 21] Maintenance Rule [10 CFR 50.65] In-service Testing [10 CFR 50.55a(f)] Environmental Qualification [10 CFR 50.49] Event Reporting [10 CFR 50.55(e)] Seismic Qualification [Portions of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100] ASME XI repair & replacements, applicable portions, with limitations [10 CFR 50.55a(g)] Applicable Portions of IEEE standards [10 CFR 50.55a(h)] Notification Requirements [10 CFR 50.72, 50.73]

Some CM Considerations for 50.69 50.69 does not change the design of the Station: The safety classification of the SSC does not change However: Alternative industrial parts/SSCs can be installed in RISC-3 applications (no change to safety classification) Updates to MEL may be needed as parts are changed out May involve updates to specifications, designs, drawings, etc. Will result in changes to how RISC-3 SSCs are treated MOVs - test frequency extensions implemented AOVs/SOVs - test frequency extensions implemented Check Valves - test frequency extensions implemented - performing needed testing to satisfy basis of reasonable confidence Relief Valves - continuing to test on a 10 year frequency, but scope expansion not required if lift test failure noted (CR written) Pumps - test frequency extensions implemented

Categorization vs. Treatment The categorization process is separate from treatment adjustments Involves different teams of personnel Only categorized systems/components are available to have alternate treatments applied All SSCs within a selected system must be categorized 50.69 eliminates many special treatment requirements for RISC-3 applications – however, 50.69 also defines requirements to be applied to RISC-3 applications and for obtaining "reasonable confidence" in performance of design basis function(s) MOVs - test frequency extensions implemented AOVs/SOVs - test frequency extensions implemented Check Valves - test frequency extensions implemented - performing needed testing to satisfy basis of reasonable confidence Relief Valves - continuing to test on a 10 year frequency, but scope expansion not required if lift test failure noted (CR written) Pumps - test frequency extensions implemented

Keys to Successful Implementation Sponsorship from senior leaders is essential Strategically determine up-front what you want to accomplish with 50.69 Verbalize clearly and translate into an effective Business Case Understand the scope and pace you wish to pursue Business Case needs to lay out a realistic schedule with supporting resources (personnel and budget) Engage affected organizations Ensure understanding and the sound basis for process changes

Keys to Successful Implementation Dedicate resources to support implementation A strong project manager is needed Don’t rely on individual organizations ‘getting it’ and self-implementing the allowances Establish milestones and indicators to reflect progress Establish clear means of defining ‘savings’ Capture soft and hard dollar savings Collaborate with others PWROG/BWROG 50.69 Alternate Treatment Teams have been established Certain implementation details are being worked out Don’t ‘go it alone’ – actively make use of industry expertise

Breakout Material

In-Service Testing (IST) Overview Per 50.69, the scope of SSCs subject to In-service Testing (IST) requirements could be reduced for RISC-3 SSCs: MOVs, AOVs/SOVs, Check Valves, Relief Valves, Pumps For SSCs removed from scope, it is required that: Periodic inspection and testing activities be conducted to determine that these SSCs will remain capable of performing their safety-related functions under design-basis conditions MOVs - test frequency extensions implemented AOVs/SOVs - test frequency extensions implemented Check Valves - test frequency extensions implemented - performing needed testing to satisfy basis of reasonable confidence Relief Valves - continuing to test on a 10 year frequency, but scope expansion not required if lift test failure noted (CR written) Pumps - test frequency extensions implemented

In-Service Testing Program (Example) For STP, RISC-3 SSCs available to be removed from IST scope totaled 251 valves and 8 pumps STP initially focused on frequency extensions for RISC-3 SSCs STP performed assessments on each affected test group Basis for test group frequency extensions were documented on a formal engineering evaluation – approved and controlled Periodic test data collection/trending of results still occurs No increased failure rates noted based on test frequency changes MOVs - test frequency extensions implemented AOVs/SOVs - test frequency extensions implemented Check Valves - test frequency extensions implemented - performing needed testing to satisfy basis of reasonable confidence Relief Valves - continuing to test on a 10 year frequency, but scope expansion not required if lift test failure noted (CR written) Pumps - test frequency extensions implemented

In-Service Testing Overview & Status With full implementation, differences in treatment for RISC-3 SSCs removed from scope vs. RISC-1 SSCs include: test frequencies extended based on past performances and reasonable confidence for successful future performance testing occurs under a Preventive Maintenance (PM) task vs a Surveillance Test (ST) trending still validates expected successful operation until the next test performance if a test fails to meet expected criteria, a Condition Report will be written rather than documenting a failed surveillance test

Regulatory Inservice Testing vs. RI-IST Licensees can still pursue a Risk-Informed IST (RI-IST) program in addition to 50.69 Graded approach can be applied to those SSCs remaining within the regulatory IST scope At STP, for those SSCs still within the regulatory IST scope (RISC- 1), the additional opportunity includes: 178 valves and 7 pumps that could be determined to be RI-IST Low and could have their frequency of testing extended

Local Leak-rate Testing Overview Per 50.69, Type B and Type C Local Leak Rate Testing (LLRT) is not required for safety-related valves determined to be RISC-3 and that satisfy one or more of the following criteria: Containment penetrations are 1” in size or less, or are continuously pressurized (Type B) valve is open with mass flow during accident scenarios valve is normally closed in a closed water-filled system valve is in a closed piping system which has a crush pressure greater than that of Containment and is not connected to the RCS the valve is 1” in size or smaller

Local Leak-rate Testing Implementation (Example) LLRT Program procedure modified to reflect scope adjustment Each penetration which contained RISC-3 valves was evaluated against scoping criteria Evaluation results documented on a formal engineering evaluation – approved and controlled For valves that satisfy scoping criteria, annotated that LLRTs are no longer required in the Surveillance database Training provided to Performance Techs and Operations

STP Local Leak-rate Testing Implementation 43 penetrations were removed from regulatory-required Type C LLRT testing – scope reduced by 57% - also applied insights to Integrated Leak-Rate Test in Unit 2 LLRTs may still be performed if deemed prudent to perform the test LLRT STs have not been deleted - frequency of performance changed to an Inactive status No substantive performance degradation has been noted to date due to reduced scope of LLRT testing

Parts Procurement Approach at STP RISC-3 replacement parts are assessed on an as-needed basis - no large-scale procurement approach pursued Evaluations are initiated by Procurement personnel and forwarded to Engineering for evaluation Procurement personnel provide the initial screening for potential to exercise the RISC-3 allowances If industrial part is available and appears economically beneficial, a Condition Report is generated for Engineering to evaluate acceptability of the proposed industrial part

STP Parts Procurement Overview Examples of industrial parts that have been installed in RISC-3 applications: Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger discharge valve flow guide Radiation Monitor sample pumps Safety-related vent and drain valves HVAC analog-to-digital flow controller change out Capacitors on computer card rebuilds No adverse performance trends noted to date for industrial parts in RISC-3 applications No adverse warehousing issues noted to date with RISC-3 industrial parts No adverse warehousing issues noted to date with the receipt/handling of RISC-3 industrial parts

Insights on STP Parts Procurement Available safety-related stock in the warehouse must be depleted before actual use of commercial replacement parts are considered Delay in actual recognition of parts savings Could assess warehousing approach for RISC-3 SSCs Some potential commercial part replacements are not economically viable - in these cases, safety-related parts continue to be procured and installed Cultural issues are a challenge for Engineering, Procurement, and Maintenance organizations

STP Maintenance Rule Approach RISC-3 SSCs can be removed from the scope of 10CFR 50.65 (but not (a)(4)) For each MR-scoped system where the entire system is RISC-3 or RISC-4, the system is removed from MR scoping Some significant MRFF contributors have been removed from scope Radiation Monitoring, Emergency DC Lighting In addition, STP has made the business decision that if a system is plant generation significant, it will be administratively tracked against the Maintenance Rule failures not counted as MRFFs RISC-3 SSCs can be removed from the scope of 10CFR 50.65 does not apply to (a)(4) aspects required to monitor performance on a plant/system/train level as appropriate components affecting HSS functions will be monitored and assessed in accordance with plant, system, and/or train performance criteria Maintenance Rule (MR) Basis Document to be revised to reflect the scope change allowances

Environmental Qualification Overview Per 50.69, the scope of RISC-3 SSCs subjected to 10CFR 50.49 requirements can be reduced Qualification requirements imposed under 50.49 not required Design functional requirements still need to be satisfied; however, the rigor required to meet this is reduced (i.e., qualification testing, test report generation/retention, etc.) Can take credit for current qualified conditions Qualified life extensions much more straight-forward

STP Environmental Qualification Approach STP’s initial EQ Program included 2,533 SSCs: 1931 of these SSCs were determined to be RISC-3 Total number of SSCs in EQ Program is now 602 (a reduction of 76%) Implementation benefits take a number of forms: Qualified life extensions using formal engineering evaluation Commercial parts procurements Reduction in testing rigor Reduction in test report processing

Tool-Pouch Maintenance Overview Tool-Pouch Maintenance (TPM) is a means of resolving simple deficiencies which are within the skill sets of the available craftsmen no documented work planning is needed no work implementation scheduling is needed TPM process is procedurally controlled TPM process permits minor deficiencies on RISC-3 SSCs to be corrected in an expedited fashion safety benefit to restore RISC-3 SSCs to a reliable, fully-functional condition

Tool-Pouch Maintenance Overview, Status Procedures modified to permit use of TPM on RISC-3 SSCs TPM previously was only permitted on non-safety related SSCs A Condition Report is still generated to document the RISC-3 SSC deficiency The craftsman documents the correction electronically in the CAP database - no paperwork generated or vaulted PMTs are still performed, if required, to validate that the SSC is satisfying its design functional requirement Since revision of the TPM procedures, no adverse SSC performance trends have been attributed to TPM implementation

Additional Uses of Categorization Insights Categorization insights afford many opportunities to enhance station decision-making – other uses include: Strategically determining which design changes should be prioritized for safety enhancements Preventive Maintenance optimization efforts to revise scopes and frequencies of performance Used as a ‘risk-informed evaluation process’ to establish what constitutes ‘covered work’ within the NRC Work-Hour Rule System Engineering Health Report focus Corrective Action Program apparent cause and root cause evaluation criteria

STP Implementation Overview STP chose to pursue a cautious, deliberate implementation approach Based on stakeholder support and available baseline resources, STP pursued program and process changes in the following areas first: IST (10CFR 50.55a(f)) LLRT (Appendix J) Parts procurement (Appendix B, 10CFR 50.49) Tool-Pouch Maintenance (Appendix B) Maintenance Rule (10CFR 50.65)

STP Implementation Process Periodic feedback to the IDP is important to ensure that categorization results remain well founded and defensible A periodic assessment is done of all categorized systems once every three years – looks at overall equipment performance changes (operating experience trends) PRA Model updates are communicated to the IDP – main driver for categorization changes System Engineer feedback is provided to overview changes to system health Feedback is gathered from Operations, Licensing, and Quality for changes to procedures and processes that might affect categorization outcomes

Keys to Successful Implementation View implementation as a key ingredient to station survival 50.69 definitely reduces regulatory burden Enhances nuclear safety while reducing costs Permits more effective ways of accomplishing change Adds efficiency into well-established processes