The Unsettling View from Moscow Russia’s Military Debate on a Doctrine of preemption Alexander Velez-Green

The Center for a New American Security does not take institutional positions on policy issues. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this brief should be understood to be solely those of the presenter.

As Seen From Moscow… The U.S. and NATO threat looms large in Russian minds. Washington is determined to impose its will on Russia. And, it might soon be able to. Russia’s military may soon be unable to defend Russia’s vital interests in the emerging threat environment. The United States may soon be able to neutralize Russia’s nuclear deterrent by destroying most of its strategic nuclear forces.

Rising Calls for Russia’s Adoption of a Doctrine of Preemption A growing number of Russia’s top military minds are calling for preemption. Proponents include: ...and senior Russian military strategists in Military Thought. 2007 Maj. Gen. Alexander I. Malyshev, Chief of the Strategy Department at the Russian General Staff Academy 2009 Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Security Council 2010 Gen. Makhmut Gareev, President of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences 2013 Gen. Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the Russian General Staff 2014 Cohort of unnamed senior Russian military official(s)

Rising Calls for Russia’s Adoption of a Doctrine of Preemption A doctrine of preemption would be fundamentally defensive. The doctrine would be intended to protect the territorial integrity and vital national interests of the Russian Federation. It would call for rapid escalation to strategic non-nuclear or limited nuclear force as soon as a U.S. or NATO attack on Russian vital interests appeared imminent. Preemption could occur in crisis or conflict as soon as Russian vital interests appeared at risk of imminent attack.

How Would Preemption Work? Deterrence by Cost Imposition Persuade U.S. and NATO policymakers and populations that the costs of war with Russia would exceed any plausible benefits. Deterrence by Denial Convince the United States and NATO that they can no longer defeat Russia in war. Preemption as a Defeat Mechanism Level the military playing field. Improve Russia’s ability to use its asymmetric advantages. Protect Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.

Why should this matter to the United States?

Tougher to Avert, Slow, or Contain Future Crises or Conflicts A doctrine of preemption would severely restrict time for crisis or conflict management, leading to: Increased risk of crisis or conflict due to misperception or miscalculation. Less time to identify and use opportunities for de-escalation. Heightened “first use” pressures that drive rapid, early escalation to strategic non-nuclear or even nuclear levels. A cycle of mutual fear that even further accelerates crisis or conflict decision-making. The result would be a substantially increased risk of war.

What is the Likelihood of Russian Preemption? Moscow has not endorsed preemption, yet. This is reason for optimism. But, the threats to Russia’s military defenses and strategic nuclear forces are only growing. The Russian Federation will face strong incentives to act asymmetrically. Preemption may be seen to offer Russia the best chance of ending a future war on favorable terms.

Policy Options Reduce the expected value of preemption. Devise “rules of the road” for cyber and space operations. Develop more resilient U.S. and NATO operational concepts. Use military exercises to highlight NATO shift towards resilience. Boost investment in cyber and space resilience. Bolster conventional deterrence in Europe (incl. 3rd Offset tech.). Reaffirm U.S. intent to respond forcefully to Russian aggression.

Policy Options Reduce Moscow’s perceived need for preemption. Restore U.S.-Russian military-to-military contacts. Sustain engagement with Russia on NATO ballistic missile defenses. Consider limitations on U.S., Russian, and Chinese conventional prompt global strike forces. Promote the responsible use of military autonomy. Clarify the United States’ preference against preemption.