1. Nuclear entanglement:
The growing threat to
command and control
James M. Acton

2. What is entanglement?
Nonnuclear threats (real or perceived) to nuclear forces and their C3I capabilities
Dual-use C3I capabilities
Dual-use weapons and nuclear weapons that are superficially similar to nonnuclear weapons
Co-located nuclear and nonnuclear weapons and C3I capabilities
Nuclear deterrence against nonnuclear threats

3. Drivers of entanglement
Increasingly capable nonnuclear weapons
Anti-space, high-precision conventional, and cyber weapons
Reduction in the redundancy of the U.S. nuclear C3I system
Some ageing capabilities scrapped without replacement
Greater standardization of components for different nuclear delivery systems
Increasing reliance on dual-use C3I assets
SBIRS
PAVE PAWS/UEWRs
Growing doctrinal emphasis on attacking C3I capabilities
China, Russia, and the United States

4. Incidental attacks
Entanglement is increasing the risk of “incidental attacks”
Attacks against SBIRS to enable nonnuclear regional ballistic missiles to penetrate missile defenses
Risk that nuclear C3I architecture is degraded over the course of a conventional conflict
Escalation risks
Crisis instability
Misinterpreted warning
Damage-limitation window

5. SBIRS vulnerability
SBIRS involved in both nuclear and nonnuclear operations
Early warning of a nuclear attack
SBIRS HEO detectors reportedly hosted by electronic-intelligence collection satellites
Nonnuclear ballistic missile defense
Even limited strikes could undermine nuclear early-warning capability
Polar early-warning represents a single-point vulnerability
Potential SSBN patrol in N Atlantic areas represent a dual-point vulnerability
Dual phenomenology means there is no redundancy at a systems level

6. Basic approaches to risk reduction
Reducing the likelihood of attack
Need to shape adversary perceptions
Necessarily acknowledged
Reducing the consequences of attack
No need to shape adversary perceptions
Possibly secret
These objectives can be in tension
Entanglement as a deliberate strategy
Counter example: Building more systems

7. Reducing the likelihood of attack
Disaggregation of early warning impossible
Dual-capable missiles
Dispersed supplements to SBIRS with capability limitations
Hosted system, cf AFSATCOM
Challenge of convincing adversaries about limitations
Risk of weakening deterrence of attacks against SBIRS
Small, low resolution, dispersed detectors
More useful for early warning than BMD or other missions
Exo-atmospheric missile detectors
Tuned to IR frequency that is absorbed by the atmosphere
Only able to detect long-range missiles

8. Reducing the consequences of attack
Medium resolution, dispersed detectors
Hosted system
Open alternative to SBIRS (trade redundancy for capability)
Secret supplement to SBIRS (challenge to keep secret)
Weather satellite back-up
Secret supplement to SBIRS
Probably need to build the right frequency band into future satellites
Allied weather satellites best placed