1. Organization Theory and Nuclear Proliferation
History 5N: The Challenge of Nuclear Weapons

2. Assumption of Rationality
Government leaders may intend to behave rationally, but they are influenced by organizational actors and constraints
Organizational rationality is “bounded”
Organizations use standard operating procedures and routines
Organizations satisfice
Organizations siphon information
Members are heavily influenced by past experiences
“Goal displacement”

3. Bureaucratic Politics
Organizational actors are “self interested and competitive sub-units”
Policy sometimes reflects the narrow interests of individual organizations, not the national interests of the state

4. Offensive Doctrines
New proliferators may lack civilian control of stockpiles
Military organizations have strong proclivities toward offensive doctrines
See war as an inevitable end: the “better now than later logic”
Incentive to implement “standard scenario”
More likely to support preventive war

5. First Operational Requirement for Deterrence
First operational requirement for deterrence: “the first state to acquire weapons must not attack its rival in a preventive war now, in order to avoid the risk of a worse war after the second state has acquired a large nuclear arsenal.”
Evidence proves that even in the United States government there was strong support for preventive war
In the Truman Administration the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were in support of first strike doctrines
In the Eisenhower Administration key military officers supported preventive options
Other examples:
Russian military leaders considered a preventive war on China

6. Second Operational Requirement of Deterrence
The second operational requirement of deterrence is that both sides have invulnerable second-strike nuclear forces
The United States gained invulnerable forces only after civilians forced the production of new weapons systems
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) were opposed by US Navy leadership, hoping that Strategic Air Command would pick up the cost
Intercontinental Ballistic Missles (ICBMs) were not a priority in the Air Forces budget

7. Third Operational Requirement of Deterrence
The final operational requirement is that nuclear arsenals are secure from accidents and unauthorized use
Unfortunately, organizations change standard operating procedures after the threat has been noticed
Evidence from US experience
Test missile fired from Vandenberg Air Force base during Cuban Missile Crisis
Staff at a Montana silo gave themselves independent ability to launch missiles
New proliferants will choose an “opaque” path to proliferation, which is even more unstable
Furthermore, new proliferants will not have the same time security that the US and USSR had

8. Conclusions
The spread of nuclear weapons will make the world less secure
Realists such as Kenneth Waltz have “confused what rational states should do with predictions of real states will do.”
Organizational theory yields a troubling outlook on nuclear proliferations
Three policy implications:
US should maintain its non-proliferation policy
The international community should be convinced that non-proliferation is not only in US interests but for global security
If proliferation does occur, the US should consider helping organizations develop the safety mechanisms to help them achieve deterrent capability and secure systems