Layers of Protection Analysis

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Presentation transcript:

Layers of Protection Analysis ANGELA E. SUMMERS, PH.D., P.E. SIS-TECH Solutions, LLC We’re Proven-in-Use.

Defining risk tolerance Risk Matrix Risk Graph Quantitative - a 1 2 3 4 5 h 8 W1 W2 W3 6 7 C P F PFDavg= Ft/Fnp = Tolerable Frequency Process Demand Frequency

Independent Protection Layer (IPL) Analysis Objective Intolerable Risk Drive the consequence and/or frequency of potential incidents to an tolerable risk level Risk = frequency * consequence Tolerable Risk

Initiating Cause Process Deviation Initiating causes Equipment failures instrumentation pumps compressors human errors loss of mechanical integrity Initiating cause frequency

Consequence Based on detailed description of hazard scenario. Examine safety, environmental, and economic risks. Often considers the possibility of escaping the incident and the frequency of exposure to the potential incident. Assessment may be qualitative or quantitative (consequence modeling)

Unmitigated Risk Incident Frequency = Initiating Cause Frequency Consequence = Scenario Consequence Consequence Initiating Cause Unmitigated Risk IS IT TOLERABLE?

Risk Tolerance Compare unmitigated risk to risk tolerance. If unmitigated risk is greater than risk tolerance, independent protection layers are required.

What are IPLs? COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE Independent Protection Layers are often depicted as an onion skin. Each layer is independent in terms of operation. The failure of one layer does not affect the next. PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE MITIGATION Mechanical Mitigation Systems Fire and Gas Systems PREVENTION Safety Critical Process Alarms Safety Instrumented Systems Basic Process Control Systems Non-safety Process alarms Operator Supervision Process Design

Independent Protection Layer Restrictions Sufficiently independent so that the failure of one IPL does not adversely affect the probability of failure of another IPL Designed to prevent the hazardous event, or mitigate the consequences of the event Designed to perform its safety function during normal, abnormal, and design basis conditions Auditable for performance

IPL IPLs can provide Prevention (active – lower probability) Alarm with operator response Safety Instrumented System Mitigation (active – lower probability/consequence) Pressure relief valve Protection (passive – lower consequence) Dikes Mechanical design Barricades

Mitigated Risk – Reduce Frequency Only Unmitigated Risk = frequency * consequence IPL1 PFD1 IPL2 PFD2 Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * same consequence IPL3 PFD3 Key: Thickness of arrow represents frequency of the consequence if later IPLs are not successful Impact Event frequency

REDUCE FREQUENCY TO ACHIEVE TOLERABLE RISK IPL1 IPL2 IPL3 Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * same consequence Unmitigated Risk Scenario Consequence Preventive Feature Preventive Feature Preventive Feature REDUCE FREQUENCY TO ACHIEVE TOLERABLE RISK Success Safe Outcome Initiating Event Success Success Failure Failure Consequences exceeding criteria Failure Key: Thickness of arrow represents frequency of the consequence if later IPLs are not successful Impact Event frequency

Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * same consequence PFD=0.1 PFD=0.01 PFD=0.1 Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * same consequence Unmitigated Risk Scenario Consequence Preventive Feature Preventive Feature Preventive Feature Frequency = 0.9/yr Safe Outcome Frequency = 0.099/yr Frequency = 0.0009/yr Success = 0.9 Initiating Event Frequency = 1/yr Success = 0.99 Success=0.9 Failure = 0.1 Failure = 0.01 Frequency = 0.0001/yr Consequences exceeding criteria Failure= 0.1 Key: Thickness of arrow represents frequency of the consequence if later IPLs are not successful Impact Event frequency

Mitigated Risk – Reduce Frequency and Consequence Unmitigated Risk = frequency * consequence IPL1 PFD1 IPL2 PFD2 Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * same consequence CMS1 PFDN Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * reduced consequence Key: Thickness of arrow represents frequency of the consequence if later IPLs are not successful Impact Event frequency

Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * reduced consequence PFD=0.1 PFD=0.1 PFD=0.01 Unmitigated Risk Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * reduced consequence Different Scenario Consequence Occurs Preventive Feature Preventive Feature Mitigative Feature Frequency = 0.9/yr Safe Outcome Frequency = 0.09/yr Frequency = 0.0099/yr Mitigated Release, tolerable outcome Success = 0.9 Initiating Event Frequency = 1/yr Success = 0.9 Success= 0.99 Failure = 0.1 Failure = 0.1 Frequency 0.0001/yr Consequences exceeding criteria Failure = 0.01 Key: Thickness of arrow represents frequency of the consequence if later IPLs are not successful Impact Event frequency

One SIL Assignment Technique

Summary “A man is rich in proportion to the number of things he can afford to let alone.” Henry David Thoreau Industry will be judged on how it balances the preservation of life and the environment with the need for revenue and profits. Engineers are charged with achieving the balance.