International Relations Introduction to International Relations Realism vs. Liberalism II Jaechun Kim

REALISM VS. LIBERALISM – PART II   NEO-NEO DEBATE (NEO-REALISM VS. NEO-LIBERALISM) Prisoner’s Dilemma and Problem of Collective Action in Int’l Relations Assumptions of the game!!! Rationalist assumption One-shot game No communications between actors… Mancur Olson, Logic of Collective Action It is difficult to provide collective (public) goods in the absence of central authority… Introduction to International Relations

John Prisoner's Dilemma C D -3 -20 -10 C Jane D DC > CC > DD

Characteristics of collective goods? Non-excludability (transitivity of usage) Problem of “Free Riding”   Application in IR Cooperation between states is “quasi-public goods” e.g., international disarmament, free trade… How can we overcome this problem? How can we elicit cooperation among states in the absence of int’l government? Neorealist – states would seldom cooperate… Neoliberals – not necessarily… states can cooperate even in the absence of central authority… !! int’l institutions (or int’l regimes) can replace the role of central authority…

(aka., NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM also Regime Theory) NEO-LIBERALISM (aka., NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM also Regime Theory)   Emphasizes the independent role of int’l institutions… Uses realist assumptions anarchy assumption of unitary-rational actor; uses game theory Major arguments Pathology of anarchy can be mitigated (if not eliminated) by the role of int’l institutions (or international regimes)…Cooperation under anarchy is not easy, but int’l institutions (or regimes) can facilitate it… Therefore international institutions are independent actors that can compete with states!

Why do int’l institutions (or international regimes) matter? Reduce transaction costs of cooperation What is “transaction costs”? the costs and risks associated with carrying out an agreement.. Int’l institutions provide rules of agreement and coordination mechanism  lower transaction costs  induce cooperation Increase transparency Int’l institutions provide correct information  this will reassure states that they are not being cheated.. (increase transparency)  induce cooperation

Induce participants to make commitments through sunk costs… You invested a lot of money into a cooperative agreement, then leaving it would impose you additional costs…  induce cooperation Provide enforcement mechanism Make sure that defectors are penalized!! Make explicit threat of retaliation to defection…  induce cooperation Create and foster norms of reciprocity Make sure that the game is played as iterated game..

If the game is iterated… You can keep track of past behavior of other states… reputation matters!! This will create shadow of the future (promise of future gains) … states would not discount the future value of cooperation…  induce cooperation Neorealist’s answer to Neoliberalist? Relative gains matter more! Because “intl relations” is zero sum game!   (Neo)liberal Institutionalism  Third leg of liberalism

DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY An important liberalist theory First leg of liberalist paradigm of int’l relations (theory) Role of liberal political institution; liberal democracy cf. Second leg of liberalism? Role of liberal market economy and economic interdependence Democratic Peace finding is statistically very robust! Policy implication of DP?

Then why Democratic Peace? Institutional explanation Restraining effects of public opinion and the checks and balances of democratic political institutions.. Normative explanation Democratic norms and culture shared by democracies…