Session III: Prospects for Conventional Arms Control Daniel A. Pinkston International Crisis Group 8 November 2011

Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula What is to be done? (V.I. Lenin, 1902; Oh Young-hwan, 7 November 2011; Pinkston, 8 November 2011) – Northern Limit Line – Chemical weapons disarmament as a confidence- building measure 2

Northern Limit Line Korean War Armistice did not address maritime demarcation, but prohibits blockades NLL drawn unilaterally by UNC Commander in August 1953 – Military utility in protecting 5 NW islands – ROK legal claims that NLL delimits ROK territorial waters weak – Probably most serious flash point 3

Northern Limit Line 4

Yellow [West] Sea Peace Zone Proposed in October 2007 inter-Korean communiqué ROK opposition planning to revive proposal Public opinion shifting against ruling GNP – Opposition victories in 2012 ROK elections could bring shift in North Korea policy – Plan is to change the zero-sum nature of demarcation line position to positive-sum joint management of West Sea area Environmental protection; sustainable development; joint resource extraction; eco-tourism; expansion of Kaesŏng Industrial Complex; Haeju port development Resolution of NLL issue 5

Yellow [West] Sea Peace Zone Practical steps – Cease fire in disputed waters (between NLL and KPA’s MDL extended); but don’t compromise security of 5 NW islands – Scientific surveys and data sharing Environmental maritime peace park? – Inter-Korean coast guard? Patrol maritime demilitarized zone (role for NNSC? U.S. and China?) Port security and container security (Haeju and Inch’ŏn; expand) Customs cooperation – Establish joint fishery management Separate fishing zone? ROK technology and DPRK manpower? 6

CW Disarmament as an Inter-Korean CBM DPRK has not signed CWC, but claims no CW arsenal; asserts ROK and U.S. threaten DPRK with CBW ROK signed CWC in 1993, but later signed confidentiality agreement with OPCW Began to destroy stockpile in 1999; finished in July 2008, becoming second member state to complete CW disarmament obligation; achievement mostly unnoticed ROK inter-agency disagreement on disclosure 7

Benefits of Disclosure ROK sets example that security can be achieved without WMD Discredits DPRK assertions that ROK maintains CW, which justifies DPRK stockpile KPA officers can be reminded that the use of CW violates international law, and that ROK is poses no WMD threat to DPRK CBM to stimulate more arms control? 8