The Hungarian foreign policy in 1939 Kollár Katalin

Hungary ’ s international situation at the beginning 1939 German Third Reich’s rising political power revision of the Treaty of Trianon maintenance of sovereignty Surrended by enemy countries

Hungary’s political dilemma pressure of Nazi-Germany In Teleki’s opinion Hungary must keep away itself from the war Italian view: localization of an additional German- Polish conflict Teleki: the conflict will lead unavoidable to world war

Foreign minister István Csáky said on 27th April 1939: "Whoever shall cross the Hungarian border without our consent will be considered our enemy (...) If Germans try to do it, it will lead to a disaster. Common sympathy between Polish and Hungarian nations have with centuries turned into an alliance, alliance that is not written on the paper but very much real and valid. "

Duality in the relationship with Nazi-Germany Horty’s speech: friendship with the Axis powers, but centuries old bonds of brothership with Poland in appearance came near to the Axis as a result of the geopolitical situation BUT: Teleki want to remain the sovereignty and neutrality Csáky: „Hungary will take up in any way arms against Poland”

The letters by Teleki to Hitler (24 July 1939) „in a general conflict Hungary would join to the politics of the Axis. It is beyond question that the joining to this politics couldn’t cast a slur on our sovereignty.”

From the 2nd letter “ From the Hungarian point of view, it is a matter of national honour not to take part in any kind of military action against Poland". “ In a name of Prime Minister of Hungary the foreign affairs minister Csáky ask Führer and the chancellor to disregard Teleki’s letters of 24 July.” Csáky to Ribbentrop, 9 August 1939

The Hungarian point of view after the Pact a shift in the balance of power policy of precaution after 1st September: Hungary didn’t published official statement of neutrality, but a neutral and careful policy

The German request “On September 7th, our Foreign Minister was again summoned before Ribbentrop, who asked him whether Hungary had any territorial claims against Poland. To this question Csáky naturally gave a reply in the negative. He had hardly returned to Budapest by air before Ribbentrop telephoned him to demand the use of the Kassa (now Kosice, Slovakia) railway for an attack on Poland from the south. With Mussolini's concurrence, this demand was refused.” The Annotated Memoirs of Miklós Horthy, Regent of Hungary

Ribbentrop’s call “The Germans asked military access through the Kassa railway in a very polite form on 9 September. They are waiting for our answer until tomorrow midday and held out the prospect of thanks. We are against the military access.” Telegram from Csáky to Frigyes Villani Hungarian ambassador to Rom, 9 September 1939

Hungary said NO “If we follow this request this could be mean a quasi neutrality-breaking and we would become right away 3 declarations of war: on the part of England, France and Poland... Against our wishes we wouldn’t like to get involved or become implicated into the World War. Especially we couldn’t take part in any action now, when the Polish are already defeated.” Session protocol of the Council of State, 10 September 1939

After the refusal The deepest point in the German-Hungarian relationship “Germans will not forget the refusal and the Hungarians will have to pay dearly for that.” Ciano, Italian foreign minister the meaning of the refusal

Polish refugees in Hungary common Polish-Hungarian border = „open door” the first refugges: on 10th September, after 17th in large numbers 18th September: Teleki instructed the border-guards to don’t prevent the Poles’s flow altogether Poles found shelter educational, medical institutions and cultural organisations Polish public education in Hungary: Polish High School and Lycée in Balatonboglár (October 1939-March 1944)