De-Secularisation The Demographic Imperative

The Rise of Demography Demographic Transition Uneven Ethnic differentials have had political ramifications Ethnic Makeover Accepted. What about religious makeover? Are religious populations more resistant to transition than secular? Is liberal democracy and mixed capitalism the 'End of History' for mankind? (Fukuyama 1992)

Religious Demography and Politics? Early Christianity, spread from some 40 converts in 30 A.D. to over 6 million adherents by 300 A.D. (Stark) Mormon church: same 40 percent growth in past century, widening fertility gap Evangelical Protestant growth in the 20 th c. US: ¾ demographic. 'Red states' have 12- point TFR advantage over 'Blue' in 2004 election

Secularisation and Religious Fertility "1. The publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations during the past fifty years. Nevertheless, 2. The world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before-- and they constitute a growing proportion of the world's population." (Inglehart & Norris 2004) Which will dominate: religious fertility or secularisation?

Data Based on 1981, 1990 and 2000 EVS, and 2004 ESS 10 Western European countries, in fixed proportions. 4 Scandinavian-Protestant, 4 mainly Catholic, 2 mixed EVS-ESS continuity on children and attendance only

Focus on 6 Early Secularizing Societies 5 Protestant Countries + France (Vanguard of secularization) Crosstab 'Raised Religious?' and 'Are You Religious?' questions (EVS 1991) to find apostates/converts Generate figures on apostasy/conversion by 5-year age group and sex for input into projection

Projection Uses People 3.0 software Cohort Component Projection Using Base Populations of Religious and Nonreligious for 6 Countries from the survey data Religious-Secular Fertility Gap of 1.8 v. 1.6 Late fertility Pattern, Standard Mortality 'Migration' for each 5-year age group is given by net apostasy/conversion figure derived from 1991 crosstabulation

Projections Under Fertility Convergence and Re-Secularisation Scenarios

The Role of Immigration Immigrants to Europe have higher religiosity and higher fertility Fertility behaviour trends toward host mean over the generations Religiosity seems to decline much more slowly – esp. for Muslims Immigration from Islamic sources will provide an increasing component of W. Europe's Population Austria: assuming only 20k immigrants per year, projected to form pc of population by 2051 (Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2006)

'No Religion' will age due to decline in apostasy and low fertility Muslims will grow through immigration, fertility and religious retention Christians will stabilize due to higher fertility, female religiosity and declining apostasy

Conclusion: Secularisation In Europe, more religious (Catholic) countries are secularising faster; less religious (mainly Protestant) countries may have ceased to secularise Religious fertility will lead to end of secularizing trend c in Protestant western Europe even without immigration Immigration, especially of Muslims, will greatly hasten and enhance the onset of de-secularization We may find that demography powers religious revival even though secularization thesis is valid

R2 =.071; N=7534 Religiosity and Ideology,

Political Implications An issue for the medium to longer term Religious are much more right-leaning Right-leaning voters vote for more conservative parties Partly depends on how conservative parties craft their cultural appeal Religious conservatism (USA) vs Nationalist conservatism (Europe?)

Implications More conservative (American?) future for western Europe Growing ethno-religious conflict or growing religious v. secular conflict? Secularization integral to Enlightenment liberalism Is liberal democracy ('End of History') safe in the long run given the demography of religious v secular populations in a period of population decline

Project Website