1. Seminar of European Ideas Network EIN Working Group on Innovation Demography and Immigration: Political Implications 2020 Immigration and its consequences David Coleman, University of Oxford david.coleman@spi.ox.ac.ukavid.coleman@spi.ox.ac.uk http://www.spi.ox.ac.uk/oxpop

2. Immigration and the rise of ethnic minority populations. Historically, Western Europe a region of emigration. Large-scale migration in peacetime mostly from 1960s: Guest-workers to some countries Easy entry from former colonies – for a time. Subsequent entry of dependants and new spouses Chain migration from non-European countries helped by ‘familist’ culture, large family size, revolutions in information, transport, rights. Renewed recent interest in skilled migration Policy important but erratic; most now restrictive.

3. Selected European populations, percent of residents born abroad, 2010. Source: Eurostat

4. US Census questions on race, Hispanic origin and ancestry

5. Contrasts of UK with Europe, US Near-absence of guest –worker or recruitment policies (unlike Germany, Netherlands, France) Therefore little immigration form Europe’s neighbours (Turkey, Yugoslavia, Maghreb) except asylum from 1980s. Inflows from Ireland substantial (part of UK until 1922; no controls). Inflow reversed in 1990s, now reversed again.. Family migration restricted to spouses, immediate dependants (not other family, as in US) Colonial and former colonial immigration from 1950s (West Indies, South Asia). Before that, non-European populations very small (perhaps 50,000 in 1950). Near-absence of provisions for return migration. Net immigration from Europe modest until 2004.

6. Recent UK migration situation Uneasy consensus on restriction since 1960s broken in 1997. Public dislike of large inflows contributed to Labour election defeat in 2010. Labour government policy 1997-2010: easier entry for labour and non-labour migration, family, students. New government 2010 promised to reduce net inflow to ‘tens of thousands’. Net inflow 2009 198,000; foreign +242k net, UK -44k. Net inflow since late 1990s historically high. Most net immigration not work related. Consequent inflow of 3 million immigrants since 1997; 2 million additional immigrant population. Fastest population growth since 1962. 16 million additional population projected up to 2051.

7. Some facilitating factors Unequal progress of economic development and demographic transition. Geographical proximity. Political / historical connections. Post-war ‘revolutions’ in transport, information and rights. State policy in sending and receiving countries. Expansion of EU and its powers International conventions. The ‘migration industry’ and trafficking.

8. Turkey and Western Europe

9. Migration flows to European Union and USA 1960 - 2011 n.b. about 40% of the EU inflow is from one EU country to another.

10. Gross migration flow to France 2005, by reason for admission (%).

11. Long-term migration trends to the United Kingdom 1967 – 2011.

12. Net migration to selected European countries 1997 - 2011

13. Net migration to Italy and Spain 1997 – 2011. Note: increase partly due to illegal immigration and regularisation of illegal residence through amnesties.

14. Migration can go down as well as up. Germany 1954 – 2011.

15. Ethnic change Continued migration from one population, into another with sub-replacement fertility, must eventually replace one with the other. If incoming populations have higher fertility, the process will be accelerated. Migration, not differential fertility, dominant effect.

16. TFR trends of UK ethnic minority populations 1965 – 2006 data from Labour Force Survey by own-child method, 7-year moving averages

17. Estimates of foreign origin and immigrant population, selected European countries. Sources: national statistical offices

18. Convergence in fertility: total fertility of Pakistani women in the UK by birthplace. Source: Coleman and Dubuc 2010.

20. Ethnic change in New Zealand

21. Ethnic change in the USA, projected 1999 - 2100

22. Sweden 1980 – 2020. Foreign-born and ‘foreign origin’ population, as percent of total population.

23. Comparison of results of European ‘foreign-origin’ projections

24. UK population projection 2051 by age, sex and origin Assumptions for total population as GAD Principal Projection 2006 (net migration 190K; TFR 1.84)

25. Other transformations: ethnic groups of mixed origin, England and Wales 2001. Source: 2001 Census.

26. The faces of the future?

28. An end to ‘ethnic’ categories? The rise of mixed populations. Probabilistic projections of the UK 2001- 2100, average outcome for major groups (percent).

29. Will all populations end up as diverse as Western countries? Many were always diverse – more like empires than nation states (India) Others became more diverse through 17th / 19 th century colonial policy (Brazil, Malaysia) Outside Europe, so far relatively small minorities from recent 20 th century immigration: 2% – 3% of populations born abroad. ‘West’ currently receiving most immigrants (60%+)

30. Conclusions Migration from developing world will be over in a century (?); but effects on ancestry permanent. Migration the key driver; in theory under policy control Significance for social and political change: religion, identity, segregation, language, law, foreign policy? (depends on numbers, pace, origins, policy). Integration / assimilation, or ‘community of communities’? And who adapts to whom? Is parity or majority important? Inter-ethnic union may change relative group size, eventually create a completely new mixed population. No ‘nature reserve’ for ‘natives’?