1. De-Secularisation The Demographic Imperative

2. Demography in History Populations are generally stable over the longue duree Periodic population changes through technology, disease and invasion Demography as Effect: Technological advantage translates into expansion for some groups at others' expense through lower mortality (Europe) or military conquest (Europeans v. the rest; Bantu v. Khoi San) Demography as Cause: Role of demographic pressure in causing revolution (Goldstone) or innovation (Durkheim) Oft-cited role of demography in hastening decline of empires?

3. The Demographic Transition From High Fertility/High Mortality to Low Fertility/Low Mortality UK: Had slower fertility transition than France, had excess population growth for settlement which France did not. Geopolitical implications Second Demographic Transition: permanently below- replacement fertility for 30 years in Europe and E Asia. Little movement beyond 1.5. Population decline Who will replace? Values rather than economic status is most strongly linked to fertility With mortality declining and state boundaries stable, could values & fertility rather than technology now hold the key to group advantage?

4. The Rise of Demography Demographic Transition Uneven Democracy, Equality, Liberty enhance demographic impact Ethnic differentials have political ramifications Ethnic Makeover Accepted. What about religious makeover?

5. Demography and Modernisation Modernisation: urbanisation, education, wealth, secularisation Yet rural, uneducated, poor, religious have higher fertility Was not true before late 19 th c. Something has changed Modernity must now move forward to stand still No one wants to be poor and uneducated, but religion has a much stronger hold Modernity can take a 'European/East Asian' or American route

6. Religious Demography and Politics? Early Christianity, spread from some 40 converts in 30 A.D. to over 6 million adherents by 300 A.D. (Stark) Mormon church: same 40 percent growth in past century, widening fertility gap Evangelical Protestant growth in the 20 th c. US: ¾ demographic. 'Red states' have 12- point TFR advantage over 'Blue' in 2004 election

7. Secularisation and Religious Fertility "1. The publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations during the past fifty years. Nevertheless, 2. The world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before-- and they constitute a growing proportion of the world's population." (Inglehart & Norris 2004) Which will dominate: religious fertility or secularisation?

8. Data Based on 1981, 1990 and 2000 EVS, and 2004 ESS 10 Western European countries, in fixed proportions. 4 Scandinavian-Protestant, 4 mainly Catholic, 2 mixed EVS-ESS continuity on children and attendance only

14. Focus on 6 Early Secularizing Societies 5 Protestant Countries + France (Vanguard of secularization) Crosstab 'Raised Religious?' and 'Are You Religious?' questions (EVS 1991) to find apostates/converts Generate figures on apostasy/conversion by 5-year age group and sex for input into projection

17. Projection Uses People 3.0 software Cohort Component Projection Using Base Populations of Religious and Nonreligious for 6 Countries from the survey data Religious-Secular Fertility Gap of 1.8 v. 1.6 Late fertility Pattern, Standard Mortality 'Migration' for each 5-year age group is given by net apostasy/conversion figure derived from 1991 crosstabulation

19. Projections Under Fertility Convergence and Re-Secularisation Scenarios

20. The Role of Immigration Immigrants to Europe have higher religiosity and higher fertility Fertility behaviour trends toward host mean over the generations Religiosity seems to decline much more slowly – esp. for Muslims Immigration from Islamic sources will provide an increasing component of W. Europe's Population

23. 'No Religion' will age due to decline in apostasy and low fertility Muslims will grow through immigration, fertility and religious retention Christians will stabilize due to higher fertility, female religiosity and declining apostasy

24. Growth of European Islam Not 'Eurabia' as scaremongers suggest, but: Austria: assuming only 20k immigrants per year, projected to form 14-26 pc of population by 2051 (Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2006) W. Europe will be 10-20 pc Muslim in 2050, up from 3 pc today Age structure and urban concentration Note that religious revival in Europe is both a Muslim and Christian phenomenon Political implications – depends on nature of conservative political strategies

25. Conclusion: Secularisation In Europe, more religious (Catholic) countries are secularising faster; less religious (mainly Protestant) countries may have ceased to secularise Religious fertility and slowing of apostasy will lead to end of secularizing trend c. 2045-55 in Protestant western Europe even without immigration Immigration, especially of Muslims, will greatly hasten and enhance the onset of de- secularization

26. R2 =.071; N=7534 Religiosity and Ideology, 1981-2000

27. Political Implications An issue for the medium to longer term Religious are much more right-leaning Right-leaning voters vote for more conservative parties Religious conservatism (USA) vs Nationalist conservatism (Europe?) What of the future of Enlightenment modernity and the cultural project of modernism?

28. Future: Expand to Look at Middle East, South Asia and USA

29. IIASA, near Vienna

30. Project Website http://www.sneps.net/RD/religdem.html