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What can we learn from MH17 Disaster? What has changed since? Joe Sultana Director Network Manager 12 th November 2015.

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Presentation on theme: "What can we learn from MH17 Disaster? What has changed since? Joe Sultana Director Network Manager 12 th November 2015."— Presentation transcript:

1 What can we learn from MH17 Disaster? What has changed since? Joe Sultana Director Network Manager Email: joe.sultana@eurocontrol.int 12 th November 2015

2 Contents  The context before July 2014  The immediate reaction after the shooting down  The air traffic management consequences  Have things changed, can it happen again? 2

3 3 The Network Manager - Connecting the Network to deliver Improved Performance, even in abnormal circumstances

4 European Traffic - Jan 2014 4

5 5 European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell (EACCC) Coordinate management of response to the network crisis affecting aviation in Europe Activated when circumstances beyond normal environment of ops are evident Members EACCC … Airlines ANSP Military Airports State focal points

6 Coordinating Europe’s response in times of crises and disruption to air traffic management 6 Role of EACCC

7 7 EACCC Regulatory Framework Recovery Sustainability Coordinating Supporting Requirement NM IR EACCC Network level Mitigation Measures Member State level State focal points Contingency Plans

8 8 Events in Ukraine Feb – Apr 2014 FFeb 14 – indication that closure of Simferopol may be imminent MMar 14 110 - Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk ACCs assume control of Simferopol ACC 228 - Russian Federation (RF) issues several NOTAMs changing location indicators UK  UR & announcing start of svc provision by RF as of 3 Apr 229 - NM telecon with ICAO, AOs and ANSPs on latest events including how to deal with NOTAMs issued by RF without jeopardising network safety 22 Apr 14 IICAO issues a State letter drawing attention to possible safety risks in the Simferopol FIR NNM advice on Headline News to AOs to avoid the airspace and circumnavigate Simferopol FIR due to safety concerns NNM telecon with AOs and ANSPs on the situation SSome AOs chose to route North of Black Sea, some route south avoiding Ukraine 33 Apr 14 - EASA issue Safety Information Bulletin (SIB 2014-10)

9 9 Events in Ukraine Jun – Jul 2014 JJun 14 55 - Ukraine issue NOTAM closing some routes in Dnepropetrovsk FIR from 06/06/2014 till 01/07/2014 between SFC - FL260 229 – Ukraine issue NOTAM closing routes in Dnepropetrovsk FIR from SFC-FL260 from 01/07/14 till 29/07/14 JJul 14 114 - Ukraine issue NOTAM closing routes in Dnepropetrovsk FIR from FL260 – FL320 (resulting in closing ATS routes from SFC- FL320) 117 Jul – MH17

10 10 MH17 Crisis – Network Manager’s role 17 July (all times UTC) ~~15.00 request for info on MH17 from KLM UUkSATSE confirmation - flight plot disappeared from radar screens 119.00 - EACCC telecon – dealing with crisis coordination response and political aspects 220.00 - NM Ops Centre (NMOC) telecon with ANSPs and AOs – tackling ops aspects: AAirspace closures RRe-routings via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania in south / Poland in north

11 Immediate Network Manager Actions in MH17  Applied the national NOTAMS published by Ukraine  Processed the MH17 flight plan against the valid airspace organisation  Responded to request from KLM on information about MH17  Gathered info about what might have happened and made assessment as to immediate risk  As Chairman of the EACCC activated the Crisis cell  Closed Ukrainian airspace as decided by Ukraine  Managed the impact of the re-routing of flights with support of Ukraine and neighbouring ANSPs 11

12 The aftermath  Major traffic flow impacts, looking at solutions at network level  Address questions from EU Parliament, media, whether Network Manager could have done more beforehand  Full participation in ICAO TF on Conflict zones  Easy-to-access portlet on airspace closures and warning with H24 ops response service  Support to safety case for partial re-opening of 4 routes over the Black Sea  Heightened crisis in Lebanon, Syria/Iraq and now Egyptian airspaces 12

13 Complementing ICAO and European activities on Aviation Risks due Conflict Zones Key areas  ensuring sharing of relevant information  assessment of risk locally and regionally Network Manager  Operational input on context  Flight Plan processing  Up-to-date situation picture with online Closure and Warnings Map for Europe and beyond  Providing AOs with an interpretation of complex network situation  Monitoring of network operations  Ability to react in real time 13

14 List of published information through NOTAM, EASA-SIB, ICAO letters and national AIC/AIP…. ….Illustrated on a map. Geographical coverage is NM area + adjacent Data are updated 24/7 NM portal protected area

15

16 Daily Flights in European NM Area NE Asia 140  SE Asia 415  1463    Russia C Asia 1460    NM area internal traffic 26548  Gulf 578 923   590 

17 Impact of crises in 2014 on traffic flows 28 November 2013 27 November 2014

18 Current situation in the South-Eastern Europe and the Middle East 18 FPL TRAFFIC 07 AUG 2015

19 19 ICAO Task Force on conflict zones NNM member of Task Force on Risks to civil aviation arising from Conflict Zones (TF RCZ) established by ICAO end Jul 2014 ssafety and security aspects to civilian aircraft operating to, from and over conflict zones hhow relevant info can be effectively collected & disseminated tthree meetings: two in Aug and one in Dec 2014 cconclusions to ICAO High Level Safety Conf (HLSC), Feb 15 HHLSC conclusion – establish a repository of risk assessment info OOperational as of Apr 2015 NNM conflict zones portlet

20 Aviation risks  Threat to airspace usability assessment – security, operational expertise, political awareness  Mitigation measures – adequate?  Safety risk assessment methodology – still the basis  Enough information/access to threat analysis for those who have responsibility to make decision fly/no fly  Manage the situation and the consequences in particular impact of re-routings of major flows 20

21 Managing a « risk » airspace  Risk factors monitored, risk mitigation plans updated  Ability to react timely to changes at network level – impact beyond region  Coordination at right level between ops stakeholders  Top-down decisions must be unambiguous  Systems can be fooled by « creative » flight planning  Support those who have to make judgement calls in a complex environment 21

22 MH 17 Report of Dutch Safety Board Main Air Traffic Management and Airspace conclusions:  Flight routes – none of the parties involved adequately identified the risks to civil aviation brought about by the armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine  Given the risk, the airspace should have been closed  Malaysian Airlines (and others) should not have selected this particular route 22

23 Dutch Safety Board Recommendations Improvements at 3 Levels:  Management of airspace in states dealing with armed conflict in their territory – safety improvement  How states and operators assess risks of flying over conflict zones – safety improvement  Accountability of operators regarding their choice of whether or not to fly over conflict zones – better risk assessment 23

24 Obligation of the State  States must ensure that the airspace used by flights is safe  Any information about risks and threats should result in advice or warnings  Recommendation  Be prepared to close airspace,  coordinate with ANSP,  info 3 rd parties  What if  there is no functioning,  no ability to make risk/threat assessment,  politics get in the way 24

25 Obligation of the airline  Operators have to do all that is possible to operate the flight safely  Airlines rely on states to provide them information about risks and threats to flying  Recommendation  Operators need to make risk assessment for whole route,  gather and share info,  timely and structured process in place for info from state,  unpredictability of armed conflict is increased risk 25

26 Recent experiences  Missiles from Caspian Sea to Syria  Loss of Russian MetroJet over Sinai  Potential closure of Afgan airspace Network Manager preparation:  Sharing of available info  Scenarios prepared with ANSPs in region and others affected  Extensive briefings\teleconf with airspace users  Await decisions of states/safety risk assessments of airlines 26

27 Thank you for your attention Happy to take questions Joe Sultana Director Network Manager Email: joe.sultana@eurocontrol.int 12 th November 2015


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