1. The Purges

2. What do Historians say? Lee: These were essential stage to the Russian revolution & necessary to ‘protect the dictatorship of the proletariat’ He argues that Stalinism was the logical continuation of Leninism, with the non-violent purges under Lenin setting a precedent for Stalin’s policies. Carr: Presents a similar argument to that of Lee, stating that there was a definite continuity between Lenin and Stalin.

3. What do Historians say? Nove: Argues that even though Lenin had originally established the organisational and ideological weapons utilised by Stalin during the purges. Stalin abused them in a manner that would have horrified Lenin. Post-glasnost liberals: believe that Stalin betrayed the revolution for his own personal gain. Medvedev: States that the huge scale of the Purges can be partly attributed to Stalin’s paranoia. Phillips: Believes that given the huge scale of the purges and the complexity of circumstances, a more detailed analysis is required.

4. Already existed Phillips argues that non-violent purges already existed in the party from 1917. With the death of Kirov (1934) Stalin increased the scale and violence of the purges, with the use of coercive methods such as show trials and forced confessions in the party. Nove states that this reign of fear was soon widened to encompass artists, engineers, scientists and officials, as well as peasants and workers under schemes such as de-Kulakisation.

5. Already existed C&F state that the purges wiped out an entire generation of old Bolsheviks. It is impossible to judge just how many died during this period, but Volkogonov suggests around 7 million and Conquest says it was closer to 20 million. Lee suggests that to gain an understanding of this, one must look at Stalin’s personality.

6. Stalin Radzinsky emphasises the negative impact of Stalin’s violent and abusive father. C&F suggest these early beatings made him dismissive of human lives. Tucker argues that his harsh upbringing could account for his paranoia in later life. Laver believes that Stalin possessed a vengeful personality which could account for his treatment of those who opposed him.

7. Stalin Bullock wrote that Stalin saw enemies everywhere. He told Khrushchev ‘I trust nobody, not even myself’. Gill suggests that Kirov’s resistance to Stalin in 1934, combined with his popularity made Stalin increasingly aware of potential opposition. Gill believes that Kirov’s murder was used as a pretext to eliminate any internal threats, thus securing his own position.

8. Support for Purges Laver suggests that a large proportion of Russian society actually believed that their country was riddled with internal enemies and therefore believed that Stalin was acting in their best interests. Yet, Stalin failed to define exactly who these enemies were, indicating an overwhelming fear of instability in Russia, rather than any real threat. This is supported by Gill’s observation that the purges lacked any coherent structure, indicating that Stalin was not entirely sure who his true enemies were. Any criticism of Stalin’s widely unpopular policies of rapid industrialisation and collectivism was seen as ‘sabotage’ and was punishable by death. This enabled Stalin to present the party purges as an attempt to protect the revolution.

9. Economic Benefits Lee suggests that the Purges provided economic benefits to Russia, and indeed Stalin himself argued that the terror was essential in order to ensure that industrialisation continued at the necessary pace, especially given the threat of war and depression in the west. C&F say that the mass imprisonment of thousands of supposed ‘internal enemies’ provided the labour force for dangerous jobs e.g. gold mining. There were economic downsides to the Purges, as de-Kulakisation removed all the most successful and enterprising of the peasants, who could have had the ability to make a success of collectivisation. Phillips emphasises the targeting of ‘bourgeois specialists’ and their replacement with less skilled but more loyal communist party members. With hindsight this appears to have been an illogical move, as it drastically reduced the quality and efficiency of industrial production.

10. Economic Benefits Nove believes that without the purges Russia would not have been able to create a sufficient industrial base to ensure victory in WWII, although he concedes there was a huge human cost. Medvedev takes the opposite view however, arguing that industrialisation could have been achieved through the continuation of the limited market economy of the 1920s although the process would undoubtedly have been slower.

11. Fear of foreign invasion Nove states that Stalin’s greatest fear was of foreign invasion before his industrial plans were complete. This helps to explain the signing of the Nazi-Soviet aggression pact in 1939 in an attempt to delay war long enough to complete industrialisation. Determinists believe that Stalin also feared the possibility of an internal revolt sparked by foreign invasion. Nove suggests that this explains Stalin’s purging of leading military personnel as he feared they would have the authority to lead such a rising. In this context, the purges can be seen as an attempt by Stalin to remove internal threats before the outbreak of war.

12. Personal Gain Getty emphasises the idea that the Purges were not the result of a ‘top down’ approach. Instead, the party members and the general population were engulfed by the desire for personal gain. Fitzpatrick describes how many Russians denounced their superiors and rivals in order to advance their own positions, with suspicion spreading like a plague. Manning agrees with this, stating that Stalin rapidly lost control of the purges. C&F suggest that the terrible excesses of the purges were an attempt by the NKVD to ensure their continuation following the slowing down of industrialisation, with many operating their own fiefdoms in the provinces.

13. Summary Tucker and Conquest have been forced to abandon their traditional views due to the opening of the Soviet archives. Phillips views the terror as a means of protecting Russia from both internal and external threats. Pipes emphasises the argument that Stalin was the inheritor of the revolution, and that Stalin’s show trials and executions were the logical conclusion of Lenin’s non-violent purges. Fitzpatrick believes that during the later Yezhovshchina period (worst purges, ‘37-’38) the purges gained a momentum of their own fuelled by ordinary citizens pursuing their own personal vested self-interest.