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0 How do civil conflicts end? Repression & surrender Separation of the parties 2/3 of civil wars end with one side surrendering to the other (usually to.

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Presentation on theme: "0 How do civil conflicts end? Repression & surrender Separation of the parties 2/3 of civil wars end with one side surrendering to the other (usually to."— Presentation transcript:

1 0 How do civil conflicts end? Repression & surrender Separation of the parties 2/3 of civil wars end with one side surrendering to the other (usually to the state) Often leads to recurring conflict later Repression could also be done by a 3 rd party More common in ethnic than in ideological conflicts More common after extreme violence Prioritizes immediate safety over peace Often included in peace settlements if ethnic groups are regionally concentrated Power-sharing pacts Fewer than 1/2 of civil conflicts historically make it to negotiations, and many of these negotiations fail Involves: joint control of government, proportional distribution of resources, group rights, or minority vetoes May not be democratic but can create an enduring egalitarian culture Which do you think lead to the best outcomes?

2 1 Advantages and disadvantages of separation outcomes Advantages Disadvantages Realistically recognizes that security dilemmas become severe as civil conflict persists Can stop violence right away Allows time for emotion to subside before engaging the other party Usually finds more political support than cross-national appeals Homogenous territory is defensible Assumes primordial traits and enduring hatreds that prevent cooperation Institutionalizes division between groups in the long run Makes rebellions for autonomy increasingly attractive Ethnic borders are never clearly fixed, creating the “beached diaspora” problem Works against equitable division of resources Usually requires 3 rd party military intervention vs.

3 2 Negotiations to end civil conflicts Challenges Solutions Negotiations are characterized by asymmetry, which works against agreement Negotiating groups often split over the advisability of negotiations Overtime, rebellion can become an end in itself, instead of a means Asymmetry can be partially overcome through an understanding of the costs of stalemate or finding an external partner –Insurgents can win by not losing –Insurgents can form cross-border coalitions Negotiate with moderate leaders with true insurgent credentials –Respected insurgent gone moderate –Often older leaders will have the incentive Highlight the potential for new roles for insurgents What are the risks of negotiated ends to conflicts?

4 3 Why do peace agreements often fail? Even after agreements have been reached they often fail Why? 1) Agreements are often made with uncertainty about the other group’s intentions 2) Disarming or giving up territory makes groups vulnerable 3) Monitoring of the other group’s compliance is difficult How can the guarantees in a peace deal be made credible?

5 4 Successful agreements require credible enforcement Enforcement will be more credible if: 1) Groups make commitments credible with costly and irreversible signals (“tie their own hands”) 2) Disaggregate political power across the government, bureaucracy, and territory 3) Eliminate anarchy during disarmament through neutral 3 rd party intervention 4) Use neutral 3 rd parties to monitor compliance with the agreement and publicize violations

6 5 Some success factors in securing enduring peace Commitments Public expectations State capacity Economic growth Self-enforcing Costly (credible) Public Expectations of peace Based in conflict history Create social and economic investment Military Financial resources Bureaucratic reach Raises opportunity costs of returning to war Strengthens states Civil society Cross-group (bridging) Social goods focus With funding and freedom Global interest Balanced international investment International monitoring

7 6 Security sector reform matters Military victories are more stable “Spoiler” problem Negotiated settlements likely to relapse into civil war Wars ended by victory 2x more likely to stay settled Rebel victories are the most stable outcomes Spoilers gain little from a peace deal and have incentives to defect Defections are hard to punish by most 3 rd parties Security sector options Fend for themselves Single-party control Joint control arrangements 3 rd party aid/monitoring

8 7 Issues in power sharing pacts Power sharing pacts Distributes power through inclusive, partitioned, or pre-set policy making Can constitutionally protect groups or create incentives to promote inter-group cooperation Limits individual democracy by enshrining group rights Politically reinforces group identity and ethnic cleavages Encourages radicals to challenge moderates on ethnic issues (outflanking) Creates rigid and inefficient government

9 8 Issues in decentralization pacts Decentralization pacts Provides autonomous territorial rights within a state framework Can help mitigate security dilemmas without full separation Offer of decentralization makes the commitment to peace more credible Customizes political rights within economies of scale Reinforces territorial identity and creates “beached diasporas” Decentralization arrangements are historically unstable, moving towards separation (Sudan, Iraq) or centralization (South Africa) over time

10 9 Challenges in building civil society When it works well, civil society should: Advocate for good policy Provide social goods when the state cannot The Challenges Advocacy is usually irrelevant in failed states that can’t produce or execute policy In civil war, individuals may stop elective group participation because of shifting priorities & declining social trust Recovering states can view civil society as a threat to their legitimacy


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