1. Muqarrab Akbar PhD student, Glasgow School for Business and Society Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UK Muqarra.akbar@gcu.ac.uk

2. Drones Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) system Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) used for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) most modern technology with wide range of capability areas where American forces cannot operate overtly Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan First time in 2002 Yemen in 2002,Salim Sinan al-Harethi, suspected in 2000 USS Cole bombing in Aden

3. numbers increasing dramatically in 2001 almost 50 in 2002 167 in 2009 over 250 in 2011 7,000 Since summer 2011, expanded in Somalia, Libya and Yemen Before September 11, US had criticised and condemned the Israeli policy of target killing.

4. one of the most dangerous and isolated region of Pakistan Mountainous barren and deep valley areas Almost 3.3 million population, only 2 percent of Pakistan poorest regions of the world per capita income about US $250 per year 60 percent living below poverty line code of conduct “Pakhtunwali” hospitality, generosity, honour, equality, pride, compensation and retaliation FATA and Drone Attacks

5. Sanctuary of Al Qaeda and Taliban training camps and recruitment centres exploiting the ideological and ethnical affiliations Pakistan military launched operations in FATA captured & killed many top leaders of Al-Qaeda and Taliban peace agreement to pardon local leaders US started Drone attacks in 2004 central element of defence and counter-terrorism strategy most appropriate response no prospect of negotiation or compromise Pakistani forces were not willing or unable to launch an operation US forces were prohibited to operate

6. first drone on Pakistan’s territory on June 18 2004 target Nek Mohammad an influential member of TTP Pakistani military credited itself fear of public retaliation Initially the covert drone -“personality strikes” Bush era High value target-senior Al-Qaeda members Only eight in 4 years from 2004-2007.

7. Success of drone caused the increase its number Last era of Bush Less signature strikes 33 in 2008 Entrance of Obama frequency of drone attacks proliferated further “signature strikes” based on “pattern of life” analysis. 43 in first ten month of 2009 Only one vital success -- Baitullah Mehsud

8. more than half of top ranking and high value targets without endangering American marines or pilots “the only game in town considered to be the most effective tool and weapon against Al-Qaeda in the war on terror by the intelligence community particularly in the areas across the Pakistani borders.” (Leon Panetta, director of CIA) From 2004 to 2010 60 to 1707 members of Al Qaeda, Taliban and affiliates groups targeted Drone: A Successful Campaign

9. attacks on the ISAF and the United States forces a plausible prima facie rationale to counter such Drone is effective because least obstructive and most precise mean greater surveillance capability greater precision to hit the target avoiding collateral damage

10. Drones only work and gather surveillance on the basis of ‘pattern of life’ information Their human operators distinguish terrorists from civilians accuracy, precision depends widely on human intelligence Killing rather the prosecuting the perpetrators Exact numbers of militants and innocents killed unknown Till June 2011-- 1,500 to 2,500 civilians on unknown killed Accidental killings -- collateral damage is increased Against Drone attacks

11. Tarnishing social fabrics of society in FATA During Obama regime less than 13% of drone killed a militant leaders only 2% are militant leaders in all fatalities from drone Pakistani sources –in last three years about 700 civilian causalities @ 2 percent with one militant for every almost 50 civilian UK failed to support drone openly Germany supports the Pakistani stance

12. Never been criticized before its expansion causing hostility, resentment across Pakistan provoking retaliation against the United States Undermining the Pakistan’s territorial integrity No transparency and accountability call of drones due to high civilian causality (David Kilcullen, a former counterinsurgency advisor to Gen. David Petraeus) Doubt about estimation of civilian causalities militants collect and buried the dead and told that all of them were innocent civilians

13. Initially no resentment Enhanced operation caused anti drone and anti US sentiments March 2009 – 61 % (International Republican Institute) 2010 – 75 % (New America Foundation) 2011 – 97 % (Pew research Center) 2012 17 % supports killing of militants by drones 94 % considers killing innocent civilians 74% unnecessary to defend Pakistan from extremist organisations (Pew research Center) Public Response

14. Opposition within US Anne Patterson (US Ambassador to Pakistan) Cameron Munter (US Ambassador to Pakistan) Adm. Mullen Andrew M. Exum (Center for a New American Security) David Kilcullen ( former Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General Petraeus) No empirical evidences on civilian and militant deaths Differences in media reports Killing of already killed Ilyas Kashmiri in 2009 and again in June 2011

15. Pak- US Drift From 2004 to 2007, Pakistan denied US involvement Shamsi Air Base was provided Wiki leaks cables revealed Pakistani tacit support Bilateral relations affected by Raymond Davis episode (January 27, 2011 ) Drone strike at Datta Khel ( 38 civilian deaths, March 17, 2011 ) Salala Check post attack on Pak Army US agreed to notify Pakistan if targeting more than 20 people. Pentagon and State department favour restrictions CIA wants to continue

16. Drone strikes as counter productive Suicide attack – retaliatory measure and revenge Emergence of “accidental guerrilla” Phenomenon survivors converting into suicide bombers (opinion of local people) Blowback to US forces NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan Suicide bombing by al-Balawi in Khost Attempt to explode in Times Square by Faisal Shahzad Pakistani civilians, army targeted Attacks on Naval base, military headquarters and Air base No empirical data only anecdotal evidence

17. Drone Strikes and Suicide Attacks

18. Deaths from Drone and Suicide Attacks

19. Drone attacks and International Law procedure, operations, criteria of target choosing secret “the worst kept secret in the history of U.S. foreign policy” (Micah Zenko, Council on Foreign Relations Fellow) legal and moral status under US domestic and international law Executive order 12333 prohibits the engaging in assassination No specific International Law describe about drones Drone similar as other weapons American government justifies attacks to eliminate threat to US security.

20. Violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations No use of force against political independence or territorial integrity of any state Two exemptions State give consent to use force on her territory or Presently not with Pakistan’s consent as objected repeatedly Host state unwilling to target the threat to attacking state Launched operation in Swat, Wana and FATA Even if Pakistan consented Illegal to kill suspected and innocents without prosecution

21. Violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) No threat to US from these people On domestic legal perspective Violation of Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) these elements are not involved in September 11 “whether killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in response to [events] in 2001.” (Christof Heyns, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions) “they undermine the essential foundations of human rights law”. ( Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions)

22. Conclusion Letter of 26 congressmen to Obama regarding drone Drones are Strategically important technical sound wisdom of using in the area not approachable easily Collateral damage of drones is Accelerating violence Instability in the region

23. Creating more enemies than eliminating Emergence of Islamic Pashtunistan Complicating US policy of withdrawal Fragile relationship between US and Pakistan Both partners must be eloquent on the issue Effective use Minimising the civilian or suspected deaths Trust building

24. References Ian Henderson, “Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the Use of Armed Drones.” In Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 13, edited by M.N. Schmitt, Louise Arimatsu and T.McCormack, 134-136. Hague:Springer, 2010. Michael J. Boyle, “Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency go together?”, International Affairs 86, no.2 (2010):342. Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens and Matt Flannes, “Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War”, Middle East Policy XVIII, no. 3(2011):123. Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the CIA’s Covert Drone Program? New Yorker, 2009, October 26: 5;

25. References cntd.... Avery Plaw and Matthew S. Fricker, “Tracking the Predators: Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan”, International Studies Perspectives (2012):1–22. M. E. O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan,” Notre Dame Legal Studies Research Paper 43, no. 9 (2009): 2-26. Brian Williams, “The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–10.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33: 871– 892. New America Foundation. International Republican Institute Pew Research Center