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Mission Analysis Brief 20 August 2002 Mission Analysis Brief 20 August 2002 BLUE SINGA.

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Presentation on theme: "Mission Analysis Brief 20 August 2002 Mission Analysis Brief 20 August 2002 BLUE SINGA."— Presentation transcript:

1 Mission Analysis Brief 20 August 2002 Mission Analysis Brief 20 August 2002 BLUE SINGA

2 Purpose The purpose is to brief the commander on the results of the staff’s mission analysis, propose a restated mission and commanders intent.

3 Agenda CTF Area of Operations (AO)CTF Area of Operations (AO) Threat SituationThreat Situation Facts / Assumptions / LimitationsFacts / Assumptions / Limitations Strategic/Operational Centers of GravityStrategic/Operational Centers of Gravity Tasks (Specified, Implied, Essential)Tasks (Specified, Implied, Essential) Force Structure AnalysisForce Structure Analysis Risk AssessmentRisk Assessment End states (Operational/Strategic)End states (Operational/Strategic) Proposed CCTF Restated Mission and Intent StatementsProposed CCTF Restated Mission and Intent Statements Proposed CCIRProposed CCIR CCTF Feedback / GuidanceCCTF Feedback / Guidance

4 CTF OPERATIONAL AREA TINDORO AUSTRALIA SAMAGALAND Land mass of Tindoro, including its territorial waters Area of interest will include the sea and air lines of communication to Samagaland

5 CTF AREA OF OPERATIONS

6 THREAT SITUATION uThreats –Terrorism l Operating from Displaced persons (DP) camps in Queenstown and the Fingal enclave. –Poor law & order (Banditry) l Direct impact on relief operations –Aggression from opposing military forces l Still deployed along border –Poor humanitarian conditions l May be exploited by terrorists & bandits l Cause low morale –Economy affected by war

7 C2 Estimate C2 Estimate uKey considerations –Geography – mountainous & wet l Good terrain for bandits & terrorists –Low morale - difficult to gain support l Economy – unemployment & poverty –Well established terrorist cells l Existing terrorists’ infrastructures –Disposition & readiness of North & South Tindoro forces

8 C2 Estimate C2 Estimate uAO –Mountainous –Network of lakes & rivers –Coastline generally rugged –Heavy rainfall –Coastal areas exposed to strong winds –Jan-Feb: warmest mths (18-21C) –Jun-Jul: coldest mths (average: 10C)

9 HIGHER’S MISSION Coalition Task Force GOODWILL will commence deployment of a multinational force no earlier than 28 August 02, to conduct peacekeeping operations in North and South Tindoro, in accordance with UNSCR 147, in order to create conditions necessary for a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro.

10 HIGHER CDR’S INTENT I intend for CTF GOODWILL to conduct peacekeeping operations in support of UNSCR 147, by providing a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro, so that the inhabitants can rebuild their lives, economies, and social institutions in peace.

11 HIGHER’S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS Singapore, as lead nation, will form CTF GOODWILL, utilizing the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Ninth Division Headquarters as the core CTF HQ, augmented by military planners from the various troop contributing countries. The CTF HQ will exercise OPCON over CTF multinational forces. CTF GOODWILL will provide a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro by maintaining separation of hostile factions and facilitating humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons. Coordination of efforts with UN Special Representative of the Secretary General is imperative to mission Success

12 uArmy –Division HQ –1 x Bde HQ with 3 x Inf Bns –1 x Medical Team uAir Force –2 x C-130 –2 x CH-47D –2 x SPs SINGAPORE uNavy –1 x LSL –1 x LST FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

13 uArmy –1 x Air Evacuation Platoon –1 x Civil Affairs Bde HQ uAir Force –4 X C-130J –1 X KC 135R –2 X C-5B –2 X C-17 –1 X Air Mobility Support Sqn UNITED STATES uJoint –1 X Psyop Ops Coy –1 x JPOTF HQ –1 X JPOTF PDC –1 X TPD 980 HQ –1 X Special Ops Det –1 X Special Force Group –1 x Joint Spec Ops HQ –1 X MSQ 126 ( for 60 days) FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

14 UNITED STATES uNavy –1 x LHD-2 –1 x LPD-10 –2 x LSD –1 x LST uUS Marine Corp (for 60 days) –1 x Marine Air Group –1 x Marine Inf Bn uUS Marine Corp (for 60 days) –1 x Bn Landing Team l Inf Bn l LAV Plt l AAV Plt l Arty Bty –1 x Medium Helicopter Sqn (Reinforced) l 12 x CH-46E l 4 x CH-53E l 3 x UH-1N l 4 x AH-1W l 6 x AV-8B –1 x MEU Service Support Group l 1 x STINGER Sect FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

15 uArmy –1 x Infantry Bn –1 x Engr Coy –1 x Field Log Spt Staff –1 x Medical Team –1 x ROWPU Unit uNavy –1 x LSH –1 x LPA AUSTRALIA FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

16 uBangladesh –1 x MP Coy –1 x Medical Team –1 x ROWPU unit uBrunei –1 x Provost Coy uCanada –1 x Army Logistic Coy –2 x C-130E Fiji -- 1 x MP Coy France France –1 x Army Surgical Unit – 3 x C-130H India –2 x IL-76MD Indonesia –1 x Infantry Bn FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

17 uJapan –1 x Surgical Team –1 x Engineer Bn –1 x ROWPU Unit –2 x C-130H uKorea –1 x Engineer Coy uMadagascar –1 x Civil Police Unit Malaysia – 1 x Infantry Bn – 4 x C-130H – 2 x LST Mauritius - 1 x Engr Plt Nepal –1 x Infantry Coy FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

18 uNew Zealand –1 x MP Coy uPhilippines –1 x Infantry Bn –1 x Medical Team uRussia –1 x Infantry Coy Thailand – 1 x Infantry Bn – 1 x Special Forces Detachment – 1 x Army Support Grp Sri Lanka - 1 x MP Coy Tonga - 1 x Infantry Coy FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

19 2 x C-130J 2 x C-17 4 x HC3 Helo 1 x FFG UNITED KINGDOM FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING

20 FACTS CTF is working with two sovereign states who have agreed to UN mandate North and South Tindoro have Offensive Capabilities 40,000 DP’s in 10 camps UN NGO/IO already working in AO The CTF will require re-supply within 5 days. Engineer support is sufficient for road repair and maintenance of the force. Host nation support is limited in South Tindoro Security problems are hindering HA efforts

21 FACTS (con’t) The CTF will require re-supply within 5 days. Engineer support is sufficient for road repair and maintenance of the force. No effective law enforcement in North/South Tindoro

22 FACTS (Maritime) uNorthern Tindoro Port –Launceston; harbor is 100% –Bicheno –Bridport –Davonport (road conditions 40% flooded) –Marrrawah –Smithton –Stanley (road conditions 75% flooded) –Ulverstone –Wynard uNorthern Tindoro Port –Launceston; harbor is 100% –Bicheno –Bridport –Davonport (road conditions 40% flooded) –Marrrawah –Smithton –Stanley (road conditions 75% flooded) –Ulverstone –Wynard –Southern Tindoro Port l Hobart; harbor is 100% l Dover l Dunalley l Macquarie Harbour l Port Arthur l St. Helens l Strahan

23 FACTS (Medical) South Tindoro health system is near collapse Large and growing displaced population with urgent humanitarian needs: - Cholera outbreaks in 4 camps Presence of medical NGOs/IOs in the AO (main offices in Hobart)

24 FACTS (Special Operations) ( CSOTF) Known Facts Terrorist activities Fengal and Queenstown Suspected operating base – displaced person camps Denouncement of terror activities by both governments Assumptions Disruption of restoration efforts by terrorist Commanders intent Anti terror, force protection Security plan Limitations – “CTF will not Conduct Counter Terrorist Actions”

25 ASSUMPTIONS The government of both countries will continue to support the peace process and accept the UN Sanctioned MNF All Sea Port Of Debarkation/Aerial Port Of Debarkation (SPOD/APOD) will be available throughout the operation MNF will be able to move freely within AO Existing IO and NGO can continue to provide assistance

26 LIMITATIONS LIMITATIONS CONSTRAINTS Execute handoff with UNMOG Forces must be able to be self-sustained for 6 months Forces must be able to self deploy/redeploy Must deal with two sovereign governments RESTRAINTS TCC cannot deploy before 28 Aug NZ cannot be used as Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) USMC must re-deploy by sea after 60 days Cannot conduct any direct counter-terrorism Host Nation support in South Tindoro is limited

27 STRATEGIC CENTERS OF GRAVITY CRISIS Belligerents/host nation belief that MNF/CTF is impartial in the application of the mandate Belligerents capability/willingness to use violence to achieve means FRIENDLY Credibility of the MNF/CTF APOD/SPOD Access Public Consent

28 OPERATIONAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY Phase I (Pre-Crisis Response) CRISIS Consent of all parties to the mandate Well-being of displaced persons FRIENDLY Legitimacy and credibility of the CTF Sea and air lines of communications Phase II (Lodgment) CRISIS Acceptance of the general population FRIENDLY Deployment flow/ Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD)/ Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD)

29 OPERATIONAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY, con’t OPERATIONAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY, con’t Phase III (Mandate Enforcement) CRISIS Host nation forces FRIENDLY Integration and liaison with all parties CTF credibility Phase IV (Stabilization) CRISIS Local population acceptance of the settlement FRIENDLY Sustainment of mandate Capability of NGO/IO to provide humanitarian assistance

30 OPERATIONAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY, con’t OPERATIONAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY, con’t Phase V (Post Crisis) CRISIS Host nation ability to provide secure environment FRIENDLY Complete transition to host nation

31 SPECIFIED TASKS SPECIFIED TASKS Facilitate reintegration of DPs to respective communities Facilitate transition of HA to host nations Execute mission handoff from UNMOG to MNF Separate hostile factions Facilitate humanitarian assistance Conduct Information Operations Execute handoff to host nations Develop media campaign plan Create conditions for a secure and stable environment on Tindoro Coordinate with UN SRSG Establish border regime Conduct peacekeeping operations

32 IMPLIED TASKS IMPLIED TASKS Provide security/presence at Displaced Persons (DP) camps associated with militia and terrorist activity Establish buffer vicinity disputed border areas Establish/monitor cantonment areas Provide support to Host Nation Police forces Establish/monitor border regime and checkpoint control Integrate with Host Nation Police/Mil coordination mechanisms Integrate with NGO/IO/PVOs coordination mechanisms

33 IMPLIED TASKS Emergency infrastructure development Secure and establish storage facilities for distribution of HA supplies Establish SPODs and APODs Facilitate external news media coverage Conduct air-mobility operations Develop Main Supply Routes (MSR) and their security Assist in the development of DP routes and their security Assist in the transport DPs as necessary Establish Command and control (C2) arrangement within the CTF Provide communications to supporting forces as required

34 ESSENTIAL TASKS ESSENTIAL TASKS Create conditions for a secure and stable environment Conduct Information Operations Facilitate reintegration of DPs to respective communities Execute handoff to host nations Execute mission handoff from UNMOG to MNF Separate hostile factions Facilitate humanitarian assistance Conduct peacekeeping operations Coordination and liaison with NGOs/IOs/UN SRSG

35 INITIAL FORCE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS Sealift – sufficient Airlift – sufficient Communications – shortfall of communications equipment and inter-operability

36 RISK ASSESSMENT RISK ASSESSMENT Risk is minimal

37 OPERATIONAL END STATE OPERATIONAL END STATE CTF successfully hands over security and HA support responsibilities to Host Nations’ Armed Forces and Civil Authorities, when; hostile forces are separated, border regime is in place, displaced persons are reintegrated, HA missions are transitioned to civil authorities.

38 STRATEGIC END STATE STRATEGIC END STATE A secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro. A secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro.

39 PROPOSED CTF RESTATED MISSION Coalition Task Force GOODWILL will deploy a multinational force no earlier than 28 August 02 (C- Day), to conduct peacekeeping operations in North and South Tindoro, in accordance with UNSCR 147, to create the conditions necessary for the governments of North and South Tindoro to maintain a secure and stable environment.

40 Intent is to form a multinational force to help create conditions necessary to establish a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro. All of our actions in keeping hostile forces apart, assisting with HA and return of DPs, must be focused towards this end. PROPOSED COMMANDER’S INTENT INTENT

41 PROPOSED INITIAL CCIR Do the Militia and terrorists receive tacit support from host governments The CCTF requires notification of impending terrorist/militia activity Does the host nation have the ability/intent to perform Counter Terrorism in support of CTF operations and defense.

42 COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE

43 CPG-1 Guidance Minimum Military Footprint uHeavy SOF, CMO, and involvement of smaller regional nations uHeavy HA, IO, PA, media campaign uEstablish functional composite subordinate Task Forces (TF) - (TF med, TF LOG, TF Security, etc.) uStrong border regime or Military Exclusion Zone (MEZ) - CPG make recommendation uCritical infrastructure repair & CA projects on Tindoro uFull integration of Multinational Forces

44 CPG-2 Guidance Heavy Military Footprint uEstablish MEZ along TEMASEK Agreement border uDemilitarization uHeavy mil-police security uFull integration of MNF uEstablish CCMOTF to conduct HA & NGO support, Civil Military Operations (CMO) and support to SRSG

45 CPG-3 Guidance Sector Establishment uSector assignment of participating forces uPlan for smooth coordination of NGO / HA support uSecurity patrols / demilitarization uCoordinate reintegration of DPs across sectors and borders uStrong border regime or MEZ - CPG make recommendation uMinimize inefficiencies created by force structure uDetermine optimum logistic support


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