1. State, Power, and Authority: Case study on contemporary Afghanistan Afghan flag, 2003 Afghan flag, 1978

2. Map of Afghanistan

4. Afghan girls, 1977. Photo: Joanne Warfield.

5. Context of state failure Some points on the trajectory of state-building in Afghanistan

6. #1- “Rentier state”: Building an Afghan state from the outside Crossroads and buffer state: Crossroads and buffer state: –Est. of monarchy 1747-1973 –“The great game”: Russia and Britain No independent economic base (state resources from outside) No independent economic base (state resources from outside) Soviet invasion, Dec. 1979 (to prop up communist government) Soviet invasion, Dec. 1979 (to prop up communist government) –Soviet-supported government ($$, troops, new president) –Soviet weapons imports make Afghanistan world’s 5 th largest importer of weapons, 1986-1990

7. Sources of Government Income, some figures 1952: 74% domestic; 16 % foreign aid 1952: 74% domestic; 16 % foreign aid 1959: 48% domestic; 53 % foreign aid 1959: 48% domestic; 53 % foreign aid 1962: 22% domestic; 60 % foreign aid 1962: 22% domestic; 60 % foreign aid 1976: 62 % dom.; 29 % foreign aid; 10% natural gas 1976: 62 % dom.; 29 % foreign aid; 10% natural gas 1979: 40 % dom.; 36% foreign aid; 13 % natural gas 1979: 40 % dom.; 36% foreign aid; 13 % natural gas 1982: 37% dom.; 28% f.aid; 34 % n.gas 1982: 37% dom.; 28% f.aid; 34 % n.gas Source: Barnett Rubin

8. #2- Diverse society: competition for authority & control Social organization: Qawm (solidarity network) Social organization: Qawm (solidarity network) Ethno-linguistic groups Ethno-linguistic groups –Pashtun (40%), Tajik (30%), Uzbek (10%), Hazara (Shiite- 8%), etc. Afghan urban elite: Pashtun dominated Afghan urban elite: Pashtun dominated –Urban vs rural Little sense of unified Afghan nation Little sense of unified Afghan nation

10. #3- History of Afghan resistance to central & external authority (often aided by external powers for their own benefit) Uprisings against the British Uprisings against the British Uprisings and war against the Soviets Uprisings and war against the Soviets Soviet withdrawal 1988 Soviet withdrawal 1988

11. Early Resistance to the Communist government Original resistance (1978-79): mass-based, fragmented, diverse, locally funded Original resistance (1978-79): mass-based, fragmented, diverse, locally funded Islam & Jihad as mobilizing ideology Islam & Jihad as mobilizing ideology Ahmad Shah Massoud (center), an ethnic Tajik, in 1978. He rose to lead the Jamiat Islami. Photo: R. Depardon.

12. Under Soviet Occupation: the Mujahidin 7 main parties, all based in Pakistan; by 1990, at least 4,000 bases & an estimated 1 million fighters 7 main parties, all based in Pakistan; by 1990, at least 4,000 bases & an estimated 1 million fighters

13. Who gave what to the Mujahidin U.S.: U.S.: $3 billion covert aid (1980s); around $700 million per year official aid. Largest covert CIA op. in history. Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia: (reportedly) matches these funds Pakistan administers aid; supplies training and bases Pakistan administers aid; supplies training and bases 1986-1990 USAID gives $150 million for health, agriculture, food, to Mujahidin areas 1986-1990 USAID gives $150 million for health, agriculture, food, to Mujahidin areas

14. Effects of external aid on rebels and society Mujahidin become more autonomous from local populations; dependent on powerful sponsors Mujahidin become more autonomous from local populations; dependent on powerful sponsors Creation of refugee warrior communities in neighboring countries Creation of refugee warrior communities in neighboring countries Uzbek Warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum. Hezb-I Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

15. #3- The fragmentation of power Fragmentation Fragmentation –1988: Soviet withdrawal –Fight for Kabul, 1992- 1996 (division of the city) –50,000 die Afghanistan as mini- fiefdoms Afghanistan as mini- fiefdoms Youth sift through war ruins in Kabul. Photo: Muhammad Bashir.

16. Maps of power Map by Gilles Dorronsoro in Revolution Unending.

19. Who ruled where: Afghanistan’s mini-states, early 1990s

20. Effects of Civil War, 1978-1996 Afghan child with prosthesis, Kabul, 1996. Photo: David Turnley

21. Physical Destruction of Place and People “Rubble-ization” of Afghani countryside: 12,000 out of 24,000 villages and towns destroyed (mostly as part of Russian-led pacification campaign) “Rubble-ization” of Afghani countryside: 12,000 out of 24,000 villages and towns destroyed (mostly as part of Russian-led pacification campaign) Nearly 2 million people killed; around 2 million people injured or maimed Nearly 2 million people killed; around 2 million people injured or maimed Refugee crisis: nearly 6 million people flee to Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere. Refugee crisis: nearly 6 million people flee to Pakistan, Iran, and elsewhere. Landmines Landmines

22. Economic & Cultural Disarray Decimation of pre-war elites and its social system (royalty, leftists, intellectuals); replaced by new elites (mujahidin, Taliban) Decimation of pre-war elites and its social system (royalty, leftists, intellectuals); replaced by new elites (mujahidin, Taliban) Destruction of institutions of the state, especially the Afghan Army (replaced by militias) Destruction of institutions of the state, especially the Afghan Army (replaced by militias) Normalization of violence: “Kalishnikovization” Normalization of violence: “Kalishnikovization” Destruction of economic infrastructure (factories, power, transportation, agriculture): encourages rises of opium-heroin trade Destruction of economic infrastructure (factories, power, transportation, agriculture): encourages rises of opium-heroin trade

23. Rentier Effect: Why War Continued After the Soviet Withdrawal CIA and Pakistani intelligence (ISI) still want to overthrow Najibullah (transition president, leftist). Continued funding fighters, especially most radical ones. CIA and Pakistani intelligence (ISI) still want to overthrow Najibullah (transition president, leftist). Continued funding fighters, especially most radical ones. External “volunteers – Arab fighters and others joined Afghani mujahidin in late 1980s and linked to transnational Islamic movements External “volunteers – Arab fighters and others joined Afghani mujahidin in late 1980s and linked to transnational Islamic movements Warlordism: no sense of common interest Warlordism: no sense of common interest

24. #4- The Taliban revolution, 1996-2001 Taliban fighter in Kabul, 1996; Photo: David Turnley

25. Who are the Taliban? Began as movement out of Islamic schools in Pakistan & s. Afghanistan. Most run by conservative Islamist Pakistanis. Began as movement out of Islamic schools in Pakistan & s. Afghanistan. Most run by conservative Islamist Pakistanis. Emergence of rural religious elite. Leaders young (mid 30s to early 40s) Emergence of rural religious elite. Leaders young (mid 30s to early 40s) Dominated by Kandahari Pashtuns, especially Durannis (traditional Afghani royalty). Dominated by Kandahari Pashtuns, especially Durannis (traditional Afghani royalty). Afghan flag under the Taliban. Very narrow interpretation of Islam. Very narrow interpretation of Islam. Taliban fighters praying, 1996. Photo: David Turnley.

26. Taliban Takeover Kandahar 1994, capture southern border town & “rescue” Pakistani trade convoy Kandahar 1994, capture southern border town & “rescue” Pakistani trade convoy Herat 1995, Kabul 1996; Mazar 1998 Herat 1995, Kabul 1996; Mazar 1998 By 2001 controlled 85-90% Afghanistan By 2001 controlled 85-90% Afghanistan Taliban commander in Kabul, 1996. Photo: David Turnley.

27. Reasons for Taliban success Pakistani support, $$ from S. Arabia Pakistani support, $$ from S. Arabia Emphasis on piety and war-weariness of the population Emphasis on piety and war-weariness of the population security security Common Pashtun ethnicity Common Pashtun ethnicity Relative lack of corruption (in early days) Relative lack of corruption (in early days) Use of violence & force Use of violence & force

28. Life under the Taliban: Politics Mujahiddin commanders driven out of the country (Except Ahmad Shah Massoud) Mujahiddin commanders driven out of the country (Except Ahmad Shah Massoud) Afghanistan becomes more secure; roads more passable Afghanistan becomes more secure; roads more passable “Town” controls the center: Supreme Council of 30-40 members, headed by Mullah Mohammad Omar, based in Kandahar. “Town” controls the center: Supreme Council of 30-40 members, headed by Mullah Mohammad Omar, based in Kandahar. Civil service at regional levels virtually unchanged. Civil service at regional levels virtually unchanged. Application of hard-line Sharia law, modified by Pashtun tribal codes. Application of hard-line Sharia law, modified by Pashtun tribal codes. Afghan flag under the Taliban.

29. Post-2001 mistakes? (According to Thomas Barfield)

30. Explaining the weak state: mistakes and problems? “Light footprint” “Light footprint” process vs substance process vs substance Centralized vs decentralized state Centralized vs decentralized state Reconstruction vs nation-building Reconstruction vs nation-building Karzai Karzai Relying on Pakistan Relying on Pakistan

31. Explaining the insurgency: What does Seth Jones say? What is Jones’ puzzle? What is Jones’ puzzle? What two main arguments explaining the Taliban insurgency does Jones refute? What two main arguments explaining the Taliban insurgency does Jones refute? What is his main argument (answer)? What is his main argument (answer)? What two indicators suggest a “state of emerging anarchy,” according to Jones? Why do they contribute to insurgency? What two indicators suggest a “state of emerging anarchy,” according to Jones? Why do they contribute to insurgency? How does Jones define insurgency? What is it and what is it not? How does Jones define insurgency? What is it and what is it not?