1. “Why Single Naval Battle” Ellis Group June 2012
UNCLASSIFIED

2. Inputs from the Ellis Group
Capability Development
DOTMLPF
Experiments, Wargames, Exercises
CONOPS,
Architecture &
Analysis
Strategy
Concepts
Educate &
Stratcom
Innovation

3. Ellis Initiatives Develop How We Fight Center for Naval Analysis:
Single Naval Battle
Littoral preparation of the battlespace model
Littoral Warfare CONOPs w/ supporting connector strategy
Develop force aggregation and command arrangements
Naval/SOF: Tri-Service Concept for Engagement & Crisis Response
Center for Naval Analysis:
Detailed wargame and assessment
Single Naval Battle and Littoral Maneuver Strategy series
Enhance the Naval Board
Support Air Sea Battle: Expeditionary Operations Concept
GCCs’ Operational Challenges

4. Evolution of Littoral Maneuver...
Sea as Maneuver Space…Begins over the horizon
Vertical & surface maneuver via multiple entry points
Exploit gaps, avoid obstacles & gain landing site superiority
Sustained force…the measure of expeditionary
I wanted to take a moment to talk about World War II because I think there's a couple of lessons learned we should recall when we deal with today's challenges. Not only from the perspective of concept of operations but also the defense reductions following World War II.
While today's environment is a little bit unique in the sense that we're already starting to see the decline in DoD resources, even before the war is over, this is certainly not the first time in our nation that we've faced great pressure to reduce the Defense Department's budget.
It happened after World War II. It happened after Korea. It happened after Vietnam. It happened after the Cold War and Desert Shield and Desert Storm. And of course, the most drastic cuts were probably seen after World War II, where we experienced an almost historic reduction in demobilization.
The Marine Corps was close to 450,000 strong the day that they landed on Iwo Jima. So the Secretary of Navy at the time, Secretary Forrestal, is standing there on a ship, standing next to Howlin' Mad Smith, and he's looking at the Marines raising the flag on Suribachi, and he says, "Howlin', that flag raising will guarantee a Marine Corps for another 500 years."
A little over a year later, the Marine Corps was fighting for its existence. By 1949, the Marine Corps wasn't exactly gone, but our endstrength was about 65,000 and heading south.
That particular debate about the existence of the Marine Corps ended in 1950, with the assault of the North Korean People's Army across the 38th parallel into South Korea. The United States at that time became engaged in a major land war in an unexpected time, in an unexpected place. And the initial results were absolutely disastrous.
However I wanted to make another point. Projecting forces ashore in the 21st century bears little resemblance to what we did in WW II. Given the nature of the objectives and technology of the day, in WWII we had little choice but to land multiple regiments abreast to reduce fixed fortifications through an overwhelming frontal assault. Even then, however, we were looking for alternate approaches…The bottom line is we don’t land like that because...[Next Slide}
UNCLASSIFIED

5. UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
(U) US technical-overmatch will decline with the proliferation and advancement of A2AD threats
(U) New capabilities & strategies challenging U.S. interests warrant a new warfighting approach
(U) A2/AD challenges are not new, but they have evolved
(U) New A2/AD capabilities and strategies challenge U.S. ability to project power
(U) Combined Arms in Area Denial is a lattice rather than kill chain approach
(U) US technical-overmatch will decline with the proliferation and advancement of A2AD threats
(U//FOUO) The Air-Sea Battle Concept looks at the “High-Right” in the full-spectrum of operations within the ROMO. As seen on the slide ASB addresses A2/AD challenges to our Services. These challenges are not new to warfare, and there are examples throughout history. The Battle of the North Atlantic during WWII and Doolittle’s Raid on mainland Japan is yet another.
An increasingly adaptive adversary now integrates the A2 with area denial to increase the challenge. This is an integrated combined arms adversary using our own combined arms doctrine against us.
(U//FOUO) How do we meet the challenge: disrupt ; locally control ; Force the threat to react; Raise the adversary’s signature; complicate his targeting by: deception and littoral maneuver.
(U//FOUO) Understand and recognize the adversary’s patterns of operations
(U//FOUO) Disrupt and defeat
(U//FOUO) Attack across multiple and independent lines of operations across all domains 5

6. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
(U) US technical-overmatch will decline w/ advancement of threat weapons-systems.
(U//FOUO) Proliferation and advances in A2AD threats (supersonic, ballistic) push ships further from shore
~ 12 nm ACV / AAV
launch
~ 25 nm notional
Outer Sea Echelon
Connector Shuttle
> 25 nm notional
Potential Future
Not every amphibious operation requires forcible entry against A2AD.
Proliferation of modern A2AD capabilities to more threats, including non-state.
Within 12NM of shore, combined-arms threat increases risk to amphibs.
Shaping/reduction of ASCM threat can be accomplished to allow discharging landing force at 12NM, but at risk and cost imposition (DDG/PC/Air support.)
Crisis-response timelines may preclude/limit Joint shaping.
Maneuver from beyond 25NM reduces threats and increases operational surprise.
Conditions for entry vary depending on the means employed.
4/22/2017

7. Single Naval Battle…within the Joint fight
Joint Operational Access Concept
Air-Sea Battle Concept
Naval Operating Concept
Single Naval Battle
Marine Corps Operating Concepts
UNCLASSIFIED

8. Marine Corps Perspective on ASB
Operation Odyssey Dawn March 2011
USS Kearsarge and Ponce transit Suez 2 March
1st BN/2nd Marines embarks 5 March
USS Kearsarge on-station Gulf of Sidra 7 March
JFACC HQ
TACAIR AVIANO, ITALY
JFACC Decision Cycle 350 nm / hours
Distance to target area nm
JIC coverage of JOA (XI)
Acted as JIC/N2 for all embarked staffs
24 X 7 tracking of Libyan Naval/Coast Guard units
Provided all intel/targeting in support to strike on Libyan Coast Guard unit
Red Data Base Manager for entire JOA
Intel support to Coalition: pushed CIP/I&W via CENTRIX
Managed Common Intelligence Picture
Imagery/strike support to 78 Combat air sorties to include BDA
ELINT tracking of Libyan SAM threat iso MEU ACE mission ashore
Information Ops
Messaging:
Leaflets took time to develop
Regular shipboard transmitters able to conduct long range broadcasts
Broadcasts more flexible, able to keep pace with operational changes
PDU 5:
AV-8 had mechanical difficulties deploying PDU-5, drop was four hours past mission
Assessed to open over sea or leaflets blown out to sea
Armed helo: Excellent SSC platform / pouncer
PON AFSB
Second PR platform provides flexibility along with capability to perform multiple missions and greater coverage
Coalition Comms
Chat/messages: no issues; R/T: UHF/HF
Crypto: no problem with Coalition, but lacked USAF crypto
Coalition integration
Direct N2/LNO interaction with Coalition via CENTRIX (CDG/GAR)
MEU Decision Cycle 800 ft / minutes
Distance to target area nm
AV-8B Targets Destroyed:
35 T-72s
25 APCs
4 HET Vehicles
2 SP Arty
2 MRL
1 SCUD
Navy-Marine Corps Team provides premier Crisis Response…Buys National Leadership “Decision Space”
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY 8

9. Marine Corps Perspective on ASB Ship to Objective Maneuver in Libya
175nm
-Capable of direct insertion of ground forces to secure US national interest (people, sensitive/critical sites)
-MEU chosen by COCOM for its capability and capacity to execute 9 9 9

10. Single Naval Battle
A Single naval battle approach envisions the maritime domain as an indivisible whole, considering the actions and forces within the maritime domain as inherently integrated in effect.
It provides a unifying perspective for naval operations.
Develops and supports the interwoven nature of sea control and naval power projection into a cohesive whole.
The idea of single naval battle is a main theme and observation from the 2011 ACWG. SNB recognizes that the Navy/MC can’t be individually stovepiped– this isn’t new, but requires new focus.
If we recognize the definition of the littoral as having the characteristics of ashore and at sea, then there can be only one unified effort when conduction operations within that littoral battlespace. Single naval battle ignores the traditional sense of it is the Navy’s responsibility at sea and when ashore it is the Marine Corps. These two can’t be separated, they must be considered as a whole.
Example Opportunities:
How can we best create/use “Naval wargames”?
What are the USMC contributions to the at sea fight and Navy contributions to the ashore?
Naval Logistics Integration– existence since 2002/2003
Details: Pg of ACWG report
One fight: sea control, power projection & littoral maneuver!
UNCLASSIFIED

11. Single Naval Battle: integration & renewed focus
Opportunities
Integrated force development guidance, experimentation, & exercises
Marine Corps contribution to JFMCC
Forward Naval force posture
Force aggregation to meet crises
Scalable naval forces
Support assured access and enable Joint entry
The idea of single naval battle is a main theme and observation from the 2011 ACWG. SNB recognizes that the Navy/MC can’t be individually stovepiped– this isn’t new, but requires new focus.
If we recognize the definition of the littoral as having the characteristics of ashore and at sea, then there can be only one unified effort when conduction operations within that littoral battlespace. Single naval battle ignores the traditional sense of it is the Navy’s responsibility at sea and when ashore it is the Marine Corps. These two can’t be separated, they must be considered as a whole.
Example Opportunities:
How can we best create/use “Naval wargames”?
What are the USMC contributions to the at sea fight and Navy contributions to the ashore?
Naval Logistics Integration– existence since 2002/2003
Details: Pg of ACWG report
One fight: sea control, power projection & littoral maneuver!
UNCLASSIFIED

12. Single Naval Battle Not coordination, integration
At all echelons of command, we must enhance our ability to conduct integrated planning, execution, and assessment.
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
Single-battle is a unifying perspective of operations, which holds that actions anywhere in the operational environment can affect actions elsewhere.
MCDP 1-0 Marine Corps Operations
Not coordination, integration
Link Sea Control, Power Projection & Littoral Effects
Creates powerful capabilities within the Joint force
Effects of the naval force in the human domain
Thinking across the breadth of naval capabilities and across the whole of the maritime domain
Challenges:
Forward Deployed force posture
Force Aggregation
Command Arrangements
C4 Integration
JFMCC & Marine Corps
Shared Operating Concepts
Operational Cyber
Functional integration
SOF
Naval CAX
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13. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Aggregating the Force Beyond Amphibious Ships Requires A SNB Perspective
USMC in JFMCC
CWC
Come as you are!
3 Ships
AAV Plt
6 Ships
2 x AAV Plt
(U//FOUO) Immediate response will be conducted by forces aggregated from forward deployed MEUs & other readily available forces (e.g. MEUs in work-ups).
(U//FOUO) Within 20 days 9-15 amphibious ships may be available for forcible entry or crisis.
(U//FOUO) Reinforcement by AFOE, FIE, MPS (and lift alternatives) critical for MEF Ops.
(U//FOUO) A minimum surface assault echelon of 4 inf bns (2 per MEB) is the postulated minimum requirement to meet a MEF-level (2xMEB) JFEO.
(U//FOUO) Current inventory <30 ships (with timely availability of approximately 23 ships) generally limits the number of embarked amphibians that can be employed in a single ship- to-shore assault to approximately four AAV Co’s (4 inf bns).
(U//FOUO) APCs beyond those four AAV Co’s could come ashore by surface connector, MPS or pier-side, obviating the tradeoffs required to swim long distances in open ocean.
(U//FOUO) The MLP, LMSR, T-AKE revolutionize at sea transfer opportunities integration to provide ground combat power (vehicles, tanks, HIMARS), & logistics to support landing forces.
9 Ships
3 x AAV Plt
15 Ships
6 x AAV Plt
2 Battalions of Lift
19 Ships
Crisis response timelines will require ‘come as you are’ elements for timely response, with the assembled force aggregated from available amphibious ships, MPS, AFOE, FIE and other platforms or connectors.
4/22/2017

14. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
SNB: Bringing Reinforcing Capabilities to Support Operations in the Littorals
At Sea Arrival,
Assembly & Transfer
Dynamic Positioning-Skin to Skin
Dedicated Connectors
Personnel Transfer
Flight / Well Decks
Transfer Systems
MV-22
CH-53K
(Sustainment)
Quay Wall
or Pier
LPD
LSD
LCAC
LCU
One enabler to our response capability is viewing the all capabilities as part of a Naval Expeditionary System.
Linking JHSV, connectors, and MPS into a supporting or reinforcing capability offsets our limitations in a crisis.
However continued development as augmentation or complementary capability is essential.
MLP
JHSV
LHD
JHSV
INLS
FIE Pax
RRDF
MV-22
CH-53K
MLP
LMSR
T-AKE

15. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Seamless From and Through the Littorals to Gain Landing Site Superiority
Enables maneuver to exploit gaps or weakness
Exploit advantage of MV22B / UH1Y
Self deploying amphibious vehicle secures landing site
Develop small craft capability to secure landing sites or provide escort
Improved landing craft secure landing site w/LAV/Tank
Landing craft (LCU 2000 or new program) deploy amphibious vehicle near shore & enable amphib vehicle
Small craft escort landing craft carrying ACV/MPC from >25NM
There are multiple means available to achieving landing-site superiority (Vertical insertion, clandestine delivery, small-craft and land maneuver).
(U//FOUO) Littoral maneuver crosses the sea/air/land seam at a landing site. Without the presumption of dominance, the naval force must create landing site superiority at the HLZ or CLZ. There are multiple means available to achieve this.
(U//FOUO) The service has eschewed direct forcible entry (frontal assault from the sea) since the 1950s.
(U//FOUO) Precedent for infiltration and maneuver to overcome static linear defenses in the face of advanced technology (WWI: machineguns, indirect fire; Modern: A2AD.)
(U//FOUO) USMC operating concepts are designed to avoid tracked amphibians fighting their way ashore against a defended beach.
(U//FOUO) Modern ACE allows exploitation of the depth of the battlespace.
(U//FOUO) Joint shaping (precision, mass) overcomes conventional linear defenses.
(U//FOUO) Integration of complementary SOF and MAGTF capabilities supports entry.
(U//FOUO) Unmanned systems have potential in breaching, suppression, deception.
(U//FOUO) Tracked amphibians are useful where conditions allow, but there are multiple means available to the MAGTF to execute our operating concepts.

16. Continuos SNB Perspective
Connectors
Assault
Amphibians
Aviation Delivered
Small Craft
A Littoral Maneuver CONOPS is needed to provide …

17. U) Summary Applying the lessons of the last decade Single Naval Battle
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
U) Summary
Applying the lessons of the last decade
Single Naval Battle
Enhancing littoral maneuver
Sea-based
CAS
MEB OBJ
ANGLICO
Connectors
BLT OBJB
MEU/ARG
BLT OBJ A
 Assumption: Littoral maneuver, practiced through multiple means, is the principal enabler for modern amphibious operating concepts. Combined with the ability to achieve landing site superiority, it allows the amphibious force to dictate the terms of the fight.
Rationale:\Littoral maneuver (codified in OMFTS and STOM) relies on creating and leveraging opportunities to avoid enemy surfaces, off-balance the enemy and strike gaps.
The maneuver logic of the LV(A), AAAV, EFV, LCAC, and MV22 (means) emphasizing range, speed and at-sea maneuverability remains sound in the 21st century security environment.
A sea-based force capable of littoral maneuver has a unique ability to redefine the battlespace geometry and control tempo.
Littoral maneuver is achieved by amphibious ships, aviation, small-craft (boats), amphibians and high-speed surface connectors – the means must be compatible with the ways.
The current MAGTF relies on surface connectors to deliver up to 85% of its vehicles and sustainment (breaching, tanks, arty, LAVs, MTVRs, C2, JLTV, sustainment)
High-speed connectors are essential to MAGTF littoral maneuver but the programmatic strategy does not reflect their importance – Platforms, Crew, Endurance, Range
LCAC inventory must be stabilized to provide 60 operationally available LCACs supporting amphibious operations and MPS reinforcement – connector bathtub from FY17-FY27.
Future landing craft should increase the payload required by LCAC replacement from 74 tons to 80 to 90 tons to ensure maneuver capacity.
LCU (R) must be realized.
Connectors
MEU/ARG
MPF