Presentation on theme: "Expeditionary Operations"— Presentation transcript:
1 Expeditionary Operations in the 21st CenturyJim StrockDirector, Seabasing Integration DivisionCapabilities Development DirectorateMarine Corps Combat Development CommandQuantico, Virginia 22134
2 B.L.U.F. We are in a Long War with an adaptive enemy We are continuously evolving with changing character of war:Meeting guidance from QDR—shifting focus to both IW and maintaining conventional competenciesLearning from ongoing operationsAnticipating who, where and how we will fight in the futureFuture naval capabilities will provide CoCom’s with flexible capabilities via innovative conceptsExploiting operational maneuver from global commonsPhase 0: Contributing to maritime security and cooperationPhases 3 and 4: Decisive Ops and SASOIndustry input vital to bring these capabilities to fruition ASAP and at reasonable costsI WILL GIVE YOU THE CLIFF NOTE VERSION OR THE BOTTOM LINE UP FRONTWE RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE IN A LONG WAR WITH A COMMITTED AND ADAPTIVE ENEMY. WE CAN BEAT THIS OPPONENT AND HIS SPAWN, BUT IT WILL REQUIRE US TO CONTINUOUSLY EVOLVE AND ADAPT OURSELVES.SO PART OF OUR CURRENT OPS INVOLVES MEETING THE GUIDANCE OF THE QDR TO GET PAST SIMPLY TWO NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR COMBAT OPS AND TO SHIFT OUR AIM INTO IRREGULAR WARFARE.PART OF OUR CURRENT OPS IS LEARNING FROM CURRENT OPS AND CHANGING OUR INVESTMENTS IN R&D TO DEFEAT THE IED THREAT AND TO RAPIDLY ABSORB NEW INSIGHTS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD INTO OUR TRAINING AND EDUCATION SYSTEM.
3 Understanding the Future How to keep our Naval forces relevant and able toThreaten an asymmetrical enemyWhile maintaining dominance for the conventional fightPhase 0 requirementsCONPLAN GWOT demandsNaval emphasis in area denial and anti access environmentsTemporal nature of the battlespaceWorld-wide deployment support structure is on the declineForward Staging Bases: 38 to 12Strat Airlift: declining fleet numbers: 160 fewer than 1989; projected down to 250 by 2010Flexible, adaptable, self-sufficient, DO capable, seabased forces a must
4 Strategic GuidanceNaval forces need to establish steady state capability: Active Partnering and Tailored ShapingMust contribute to Long War & transnational/ regional deterrenceBuild Partner CapacityDeter or Prevail in Conventional Campaigns
5 CMC Planning Guidance“Working closely with our Navy and Coast Guard partners, we will advance the amphibious and expeditionary capabilities the Combatant Commanders rely upon to meet their emerging challenges.”CMC Planning Guidance
6 Traditional Naval Ethos Well Tailored for Non-Traditional Missions Naval in character“Packaged” command, ground combat, aviation, CSS capabilities in any size (not just ARG/MEUs)Commander designation is mission dependentJoint, Coalition, Interagency friendly in compositionComfortable and adaptable on non-traditional platformsMotherships can lighten the maneuver elementAdd or subtract “specialists” based on the missionAviation and Combat Service Support lily-pad as far forward as required on all ships/crafts afloatThis is the “how” in deploying and employing tomorrow’s “MAGTF Modules”
7 Adjusting Our Aim Irregular Catastrophic Traditional Disruptive RebalancedCapabilitiesIrregular & TraditionalPhase 0Naval emphasisTemporal natureRequires self-sufficiency early onIrregularCatastrophicTraditionalDisruptiveThough it is inherently difficult to gauge future security challenges with precision, today’s security landscape suggests that it will be perplexing and dynamically unstable. Recent combat operations suggest a shift towards the more complex Contested Zones. These zones include the dense urban jungles and the congested littorals where the majority of the world’s population and economic activity is centered. They also include other forms of complex terrain including mountain sanctuaries. Marines have faced adversaries in these environments in Mogadishu, the Tora Bora, and in Fallujah. Adversaries realize their relative impotence in conventional force-on-force operations, and are making a corresponding effort to draw U.S. forces into an arena where U.S. conventional capability and technological edge are blunted. A part of this dynamic is the presence of increasingly sophisticated opponents, able to employ sometimes crude but often highly effective unconventional tactics and techniques. As seen in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, these complex adversaries will adopt tactics and modes of operations in an attempt to offset their conventional disadvantages, and engage U.S. forces in the Contested Zones.“ …our national strategy calls for more widely dispersed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation, and global response to crises…”The Naval Operations Concept, 2006
8 76 Amphibious Operations in 23 Years The Naval Security Environment Across the Entire Range of National Security Strategy21 Forcible Entry Operations10 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations6 Amphibious Assaults3 Amphibious Raids2 Peace OperationsNaval Operations (40X)Naval Operations (21X)“Arc ofInstability”“IslamicCaliphate”This is the discussion on the Current Security Environment. Except for four HA/DR missions, all of these commitments occurred either in the Caliphate claimed by Islamic extremists or the wider area of economic, social and political instability referred to as the “arc of instability.”This data not only gives insight with respect to where and what Naval forces may do in the future, it also illustrates the utility of amphibious forces. Amphibious requirements are often discussed strictly in terms of large scale, “high end” forcible entry operations like Inchon.Most of these are “preventive maintenance,” not corrective.The United States Navy and Marine Corps conducted at least 76 amphibious operations between 1982 and 2005.Ongoing forward presence was not included in this data.These operations covered all five doctrinal types of amphibious operations:AssaultsWithdrawalsDemonstrationsRaidsOther operations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environmentEach of the 76 historical examples was assessed to determine:The doctrinal amphibious mission it exemplifiedThe degree of armed opposition anticipated, necessitating forcible entryResults: 21 of the operations can be classified as forcible entry operations.6 involved amphibious assaults3 were amphibious raids12 were “other” amphibious operations5 embassy security + NEO5 NEO2 peace operationsThe remaining 55 applications of amphibious capability involved peace operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, show of force, maritime interdiction operations, recovery operations, nation assistance, strike operations, or combating terrorism.Naval Operations (15X)76 Amphibious Operations in 23 Years
9 Crises and Conflicts Sunni Insurgency Shia Insurgency Micro-nationalistInsurgenciesStability and Support OperationsSmall Wars and CounterinsurgencyHumanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Nation BuildingPeace OperationsCombating TerrorismCounter-ProliferationCombating Drug Trafficking and CrimeNoncombatant Evacuation Operations#3#2#1Piracy#XThe brown areas are likely crisis regions with the likely missions identified in the MCIA Midrange Threat Estimate through 2015, which are very similar the NDS, QDR, and SPG projections.The likely insurgency areas and piracy are highlighted on the map and coincide with other projections.MessagesThe CNO’s view of the Future Threat is substantiated.The missions called out are coincident with those in the NOC – we keep seeing the same consistent picture.
10 Contributors To Crises 56874321910Top Ten Proven Oil Reserves 2004?Known Reserves?NuclearArmed States>20% PopulationUndernourishedHigh Earthquake Risk>35% PopulationUndernourished<50% Population HaveAccess to Clean WaterSignificantDrug RegionsLooking at our likely future, these conditions show that the demand for Naval Forces will probably not abate.Our view of the future has also been informed by a variety of sources and considerations. Independent sources such as the National Geographic Society provide useful data about environmental conditions that may lead to conflict.With a few exceptions, these overlays tend to reinforce the idea of an arc of instability.Crises Are Certain
12 Naval Response Patterns (By platform type and by decade)Source: CNA Study, US Naval Response to Situations , Dec. 2000Number of ResponsesOver the past 30 years, we’ve seen a decided shift in the demand signal for expeditionary warfare ships.We see this trend increasing as we posture our naval expeditionary forces to fight the “long war.”If anything, this demand signal for versatile, expeditionaryresponse has been extended even greater since 2001
13 Increasing Forward Presence Well Beyond Today’s ESGs and MEUs SPMAGTFESGDistributedOpsSPMAGTFESGDistributedOpsSPMAGTF
14 What Do We Need to Do? GWOT Operational Tasks Conduct Expeditionary OpsConduct NEOConduct Information OpsConduct ISRConduct Maritime InterdictionConduct Maritime Security OpsConduct Strike/Power ProjectionConduct Special OpsConduct Command And ControlMaintain SLOCsProvide Consequence ManagementProvide Force ProtectionProvide Log/CSS/Facilities MaintProvide Operational Air and Missile DefenseConduct Civil AffairsProvide Law Enforcement and prisoner handlingProvide staging for joint and combined forcesConduct coalition, interagency and NGO coordination and supportProvide Humanitarian AidConduct Maritime Domain AwarenessShare intelligence informationProvide support for Homeland SecuritySupport Proliferation Security Initiative“21st Century UNITAS”
15 The Anti-Access Challenge… OIF I Turkey: Access Not Granted, Even with $26B Offer Our nation was ready, willing, and able to offer up $26B for one-time access and passage.Yet, unanticipated political pressures prevented that access.Credible seabased force could have mitigated.
16 Enhancing Phase 0-1 Capabilities Via Expanded Naval Missions Global Fleet StationDistributedGlobally NetworkedAdaptive force packagingAggregate, disaggregate & re-aggregateCulturally awareTask focusedBuild partner capacityCross Fleet StandardizationSized, shaped, and globallypostured for:Forward Naval PresenceSecurity CooperationCounterinsurgency (COIN)CounterterrorismCivil-Military OperationsCounter-proliferationMaritime Security OperationsCrisis ResponseDeterrenceSea ControlAir and Missile DefenseExpeditionary Power Projection
17 Enhancing Phase 0-2 Capabilities Via Distributed Ops Capable SPMAGTFs Employed from platforms like LCS, riverine craft, destroyers…Counter-proliferationForward PresenceDeterrenceCounter-terrorismESG/MEU(SOC)Air & Missile DefenseCOINSecurity Cooperation at SeaMARSOC units forward-deployed with the ESG/MEU closely link our integrated support with SOCOM and capabilities ISO GWOT/7500Addresses three of four quadrants: catastrophic, irregular, traditionalDO at the operational levelPotential enabler for Global Fleet Station concept of employmentEnables a wide variety of SPMAGTFs to conduct missions across the full range of military operationsSecurityCooperationMaritimeSecurityCivil – MilitaryOperationsCrisis ResponseU.S. Navy…While supported by Amphib motherships
18 Enhancing Phase 2-3 Capabilities By Re-aggregating Naval Forces PowerProjectionSeaControl“1000 Ship Navy” will be important enablerForward PosturedCONUS Based
19 Marine Corps Amphib & MPF(F) Shipbuilding Requirements CapabilitiesAmphibious Warfare ShipsInherent survivability, self-defense, and Navy crewingMaritime forcible entry operationsForward presence, deterrenceMaritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F))Capable of at-sea arrival and assembly of forcesSelective offload of equipment sets to meet Seabasing mission requirementsSupports forward engagement and forcible entryMPF(F) by design is not assault echelon shipping; therefore, MPF(F) forces are not forcible entry capableShipbuilding RequirementsAmphibious Warfare Ships2.0 MEB AE per Strategic Planning Guidance; 15 Ao Ships per MEB AETotal 30 operationally available ships10 LHD/LHA(R)10 LPD-1710 LSD-41/49 (or equivalent replacement)Average availability is 85% (for planning purposes)Minimum 11/11/11 ships to meet 30 Ao requirementMaritime Prepositioning Force (Future)One squadron (per May 2005 Acting SecNav/CNO/CMC decision)Legacy Maritime Prepositioning SquadronsRetain two squadrons to maintain afloat prepositioned war reserve capacityMPF(F) Squadron CompositionNotional 15-Ship ATFFive LHD-1 (Wasp Class)Five LPD-17 (San Antonio Class)Five LSD-41 (Whidbey Island Class)2 LHA(R)Thus far, I’ve discussed what we see as the emerging GWOT/TSCP/Shaping requirement for future naval expediionary forces.This slide gives you a snapshot of our amphibious and maritime prepositioning force (future) shipbuilding requirements.Our amphib shipbuilding requirements are based on the Strategic Planning Guidance direction to consider options for a single 2-MEB forcible entry capability.That translates into 15 operationally available ships per MEB, meaning 5 big decks, 5 LPD-17’s, and 5 LSD-41/49’s.Our MPF(F) squadron composition is based on a formal decision made between the Acting Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in May of 2005.It’s key to point out that MPF(F) by design is not assault echelon shipping; therefore, MPF(F) forces are not forcible entry capable.3 MLP1 LHD3 T-AKE3 T-AKR2 LegacyT-AK
20 Marine Corps JHSV Shipbuilding Requirements JHSV Capabilities & CharacteristicsShallow draft (< 15’), high speed (> 35 kts loaded)Ability to enter small, austere/degraded ports unassistedSelf-deploying between theatersST payload, 1200 NM range, 35 kts, Sea State 3Smaller payloads = greater range, larger payloads = less rangeSeating for 312 Marines (Co (rein)); berthing for 104 Marines20-22,000 sqft mission deck/cargo bay (M1A2, MTVR compatible)Slewing ramp (astern to 40 degrees forward)Level I, Class 2 flight deck for H-60s, H-46s, UH-/AH-1 helicoptersFuel only, no services20 ST crane for TEU movement, small boat launch & recoveryNet Ready C4 system (plug and play)JHSV is not a combatant, operates in a permissive environmentMSC standard for ATFP capabilitiesJHSV Quantity and Basing8 JHSVs funded (5 Army, 3 Navy)Quantity funded does not equal quantity requiredAcquisition objective TBD by MS B (Mar ’08)PACOM, AoA, MCCDC studies suggest 16 JHSVs needed across DOD7 JHSV equivalents meet USMC requirementsBased on MARFOR TSCP, GWOT, intra-theater lift requirementsRequirement quantified in “vessel days per year” v. specific # of JHSVsAssumes 180 days operational availability (Ao) per year per JHSVDoes not explore overlap between USN, USMC requirementsNotional basing scheme (JHSVs swing between theaters as needed)PACOM = 3 (Hawaii, Guam, Okinawa)CENTCOM = 2 (Bahrain)EUCOM = 1 (Rota)CONUS = 1 (Norfolk)Possible JHSV CandidatesUSMC JHSV CONOPS (The “Intra-Theater Connector”)TSCPCOBRA GOLDBALIKITANThis slide shows you how we see Joint High-Speed Vessel capabilities, characteristics, quantities, and basing. While the Navy’s current 30-year shipbuilding plan has only three of these vessels in the program, COCOM demand signal is growing and will surely influence PR09 and beyond shipbuilding budgets.Seabasing SupportFIEAustal 126INCAT 112Sea BaseTSL - 140Adv BaseSelf-deployAustal 105NSEMDV-300MPFESGHA/DR
21 Seabasing Research and Development High Capacity UNREPSelective OffloadSkin-to-Skin TransferStabilized CranesHere’s an overview of the various seabasing-related research and development efforts currently ongoing.Our industry partners have been key players in these efforts, to include stabilized crane technologies, shipboard automated cargo handling and warehousing, air-skid technologies that permit moving heavy loads into heretofore non-accessible stowage locations, and at-sea equipment and personnel transfers between large vessels.In August and September of last year, the MPF(F) program office, supported by the Marine Corps operating forces, conducted a series of successful at sea skin-to-skin marriages between a mobile landing platform surrogate and an LMSR and performed equipment and personnel transfer between the two vessels, below-decks equipment movement and stowage operations on the LMSR, and LCAC and assault amphibian vehicle recovery operations on the mobile landing platform – all in a sea state 3 operating environment.We’re very pleased with the progress thus far as we mitigate anticipated risks associated with deploying and operating our new seabasing platforms.Joint ModularIntermodal Container (JMIC)Mobile Landing PlatformInterfaceAutomated Cargo HandlingAt-Sea Arrival, Assembly, Employment, Sustainment
22 Other Research and Development Opportunities Cultural Awareness and Tactical Language TrainingResponsive Naval and Joint Fires suitable for Restricted ROEC4ISR Interoperability and Intel Fusion Support TechnologyKey Equipment CharacteristicsWeightMobilityArmorPowerWe have much more R&D work to do, and that’s where we’ll need industry’s help.CMC has expanded our new Center for Advance Operational Cultural Learning to include other Irregular Warfare functions. There have been some limited successes in the S&T world in training technology brought to bear on language acquisition and cultural awareness.OAD and the Joint Fires AoA have both concluded that Naval Forces are lacking in firepower suitable for use when collateral damage must be minimized, as well as for moving targets and area targets. S&T Plan highlights RESPONSIVE fires., loitering munitions, selectable yield.C4ISR interoperability is prominent in the S&T Strategic Plan. Plan also hits automated intel fusion. Interoperability also very important, as is intelligent agent technology, multi-level security solutions, systems tolerant of intermittent connectivity.The Naval Research Advisory Council (NRAC) is conducting a “Lightening the Load” summer study. Advanced power solutions, advanced materials, robotic supports.One key area that is causing significant concern is weight. With all the armor we’re adding to our ground equiopment, we’re beginning to “weight out” our amphibs ships before they “square and cube out.”In other words, we’re leaving gear on the pier and sailing with partially loaded ships because ships alterations and MAGTF equipment loads are exceeding allowable ship loading characteristics.We need your help in finding light-weight, yet fully effective personnel, vehicle and equipment armoring solutions.
23 Conclusions Evolving security environment expands challenges we face Blurring character of war generates premium for agile forces with adaptive ethosSecurity context calls for greater maritime cooperation and interoperabilityInternational and interagency