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Expeditionary Operations

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1 Expeditionary Operations
in the 21st Century Jim Strock Director, Seabasing Integration Division Capabilities Development Directorate Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia 22134

2 B.L.U.F. We are in a Long War with an adaptive enemy
We are continuously evolving with changing character of war: Meeting guidance from QDR—shifting focus to both IW and maintaining conventional competencies Learning from ongoing operations Anticipating who, where and how we will fight in the future Future naval capabilities will provide CoCom’s with flexible capabilities via innovative concepts Exploiting operational maneuver from global commons Phase 0: Contributing to maritime security and cooperation Phases 3 and 4: Decisive Ops and SASO Industry input vital to bring these capabilities to fruition ASAP and at reasonable costs I WILL GIVE YOU THE CLIFF NOTE VERSION OR THE BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT WE RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE IN A LONG WAR WITH A COMMITTED AND ADAPTIVE ENEMY. WE CAN BEAT THIS OPPONENT AND HIS SPAWN, BUT IT WILL REQUIRE US TO CONTINUOUSLY EVOLVE AND ADAPT OURSELVES. SO PART OF OUR CURRENT OPS INVOLVES MEETING THE GUIDANCE OF THE QDR TO GET PAST SIMPLY TWO NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR COMBAT OPS AND TO SHIFT OUR AIM INTO IRREGULAR WARFARE. PART OF OUR CURRENT OPS IS LEARNING FROM CURRENT OPS AND CHANGING OUR INVESTMENTS IN R&D TO DEFEAT THE IED THREAT AND TO RAPIDLY ABSORB NEW INSIGHTS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD INTO OUR TRAINING AND EDUCATION SYSTEM.

3 Understanding the Future
How to keep our Naval forces relevant and able to Threaten an asymmetrical enemy While maintaining dominance for the conventional fight Phase 0 requirements CONPLAN GWOT demands Naval emphasis in area denial and anti access environments Temporal nature of the battlespace World-wide deployment support structure is on the decline Forward Staging Bases: 38 to 12 Strat Airlift: declining fleet numbers: 160 fewer than 1989; projected down to 250 by 2010 Flexible, adaptable, self-sufficient, DO capable, seabased forces a must

4 Strategic Guidance Naval forces need to establish steady state capability: Active Partnering and Tailored Shaping Must contribute to Long War & transnational/ regional deterrence Build Partner Capacity Deter or Prevail in Conventional Campaigns

5 CMC Planning Guidance “Working closely with our Navy and Coast Guard partners, we will advance the amphibious and expeditionary capabilities the Combatant Commanders rely upon to meet their emerging challenges.” CMC Planning Guidance

6 Traditional Naval Ethos Well Tailored for Non-Traditional Missions
Naval in character “Packaged” command, ground combat, aviation, CSS capabilities in any size (not just ARG/MEUs) Commander designation is mission dependent Joint, Coalition, Interagency friendly in composition Comfortable and adaptable on non-traditional platforms Motherships can lighten the maneuver element Add or subtract “specialists” based on the mission Aviation and Combat Service Support lily-pad as far forward as required on all ships/crafts afloat This is the “how” in deploying and employing tomorrow’s “MAGTF Modules”

7 Adjusting Our Aim Irregular Catastrophic Traditional Disruptive
Rebalanced Capabilities Irregular & Traditional Phase 0 Naval emphasis Temporal nature Requires self-sufficiency early on Irregular Catastrophic Traditional Disruptive Though it is inherently difficult to gauge future security challenges with precision, today’s security landscape suggests that it will be perplexing and dynamically unstable. Recent combat operations suggest a shift towards the more complex Contested Zones. These zones include the dense urban jungles and the congested littorals where the majority of the world’s population and economic activity is centered. They also include other forms of complex terrain including mountain sanctuaries. Marines have faced adversaries in these environments in Mogadishu, the Tora Bora, and in Fallujah. Adversaries realize their relative impotence in conventional force-on-force operations, and are making a corresponding effort to draw U.S. forces into an arena where U.S. conventional capability and technological edge are blunted. A part of this dynamic is the presence of increasingly sophisticated opponents, able to employ sometimes crude but often highly effective unconventional tactics and techniques. As seen in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, these complex adversaries will adopt tactics and modes of operations in an attempt to offset their conventional disadvantages, and engage U.S. forces in the Contested Zones. “ …our national strategy calls for more widely dispersed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation, and global response to crises…” The Naval Operations Concept, 2006

8 76 Amphibious Operations in 23 Years
The Naval Security Environment Across the Entire Range of National Security Strategy 21 Forcible Entry Operations 10 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 6 Amphibious Assaults 3 Amphibious Raids 2 Peace Operations Naval Operations (40X) Naval Operations (21X) “Arc of Instability” “Islamic Caliphate” This is the discussion on the Current Security Environment. Except for four HA/DR missions, all of these commitments occurred either in the Caliphate claimed by Islamic extremists or the wider area of economic, social and political instability referred to as the “arc of instability.” This data not only gives insight with respect to where and what Naval forces may do in the future, it also illustrates the utility of amphibious forces. Amphibious requirements are often discussed strictly in terms of large scale, “high end” forcible entry operations like Inchon. Most of these are “preventive maintenance,” not corrective. The United States Navy and Marine Corps conducted at least 76 amphibious operations between 1982 and 2005. Ongoing forward presence was not included in this data. These operations covered all five doctrinal types of amphibious operations: Assaults Withdrawals Demonstrations Raids Other operations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment Each of the 76 historical examples was assessed to determine: The doctrinal amphibious mission it exemplified The degree of armed opposition anticipated, necessitating forcible entry Results: 21 of the operations can be classified as forcible entry operations. 6 involved amphibious assaults 3 were amphibious raids 12 were “other” amphibious operations 5 embassy security + NEO 5 NEO 2 peace operations The remaining 55 applications of amphibious capability involved peace operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, show of force, maritime interdiction operations, recovery operations, nation assistance, strike operations, or combating terrorism. Naval Operations (15X) 76 Amphibious Operations in 23 Years

9 Crises and Conflicts Sunni Insurgency Shia Insurgency
Micro-nationalist Insurgencies Stability and Support Operations Small Wars and Counterinsurgency Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Nation Building Peace Operations Combating Terrorism Counter-Proliferation Combating Drug Trafficking and Crime Noncombatant Evacuation Operations #3 #2 #1 Piracy #X The brown areas are likely crisis regions with the likely missions identified in the MCIA Midrange Threat Estimate through 2015, which are very similar the NDS, QDR, and SPG projections. The likely insurgency areas and piracy are highlighted on the map and coincide with other projections. Messages The CNO’s view of the Future Threat is substantiated. The missions called out are coincident with those in the NOC – we keep seeing the same consistent picture.

10 Contributors To Crises
5 6 8 7 4 3 2 1 9 10 Top Ten Proven Oil Reserves 2004 ? Known Reserves ? Nuclear Armed States >20% Population Undernourished High Earthquake Risk >35% Population Undernourished <50% Population Have Access to Clean Water Significant Drug Regions Looking at our likely future, these conditions show that the demand for Naval Forces will probably not abate. Our view of the future has also been informed by a variety of sources and considerations. Independent sources such as the National Geographic Society provide useful data about environmental conditions that may lead to conflict. With a few exceptions, these overlays tend to reinforce the idea of an arc of instability. Crises Are Certain

11 Recent Examples . Date Unit Location Mission Dec 01 15th & 26th MEUs
Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom Fall 04 22nd MEU COIN ops Dec 04/Jan 05 15th MEU Sri Lanka/ Indonesia Tsunami relief June 05 24th MEU New Orleans, LA Hurricane Katrina relief July 06 Beirut, Lebanon NEO .

12 Naval Response Patterns
(By platform type and by decade) Source: CNA Study, US Naval Response to Situations , Dec. 2000 Number of Responses Over the past 30 years, we’ve seen a decided shift in the demand signal for expeditionary warfare ships. We see this trend increasing as we posture our naval expeditionary forces to fight the “long war.” If anything, this demand signal for versatile, expeditionary response has been extended even greater since 2001

13 Increasing Forward Presence Well Beyond Today’s ESGs and MEUs
SPMAGTF ESG Distributed Ops SPMAGTF ESG Distributed Ops SPMAGTF

14 What Do We Need to Do? GWOT Operational Tasks
Conduct Expeditionary Ops Conduct NEO Conduct Information Ops Conduct ISR Conduct Maritime Interdiction Conduct Maritime Security Ops Conduct Strike/Power Projection Conduct Special Ops Conduct Command And Control Maintain SLOCs Provide Consequence Management Provide Force Protection Provide Log/CSS/Facilities Maint Provide Operational Air and Missile Defense Conduct Civil Affairs Provide Law Enforcement and prisoner handling Provide staging for joint and combined forces Conduct coalition, interagency and NGO coordination and support Provide Humanitarian Aid Conduct Maritime Domain Awareness Share intelligence information Provide support for Homeland Security Support Proliferation Security Initiative “21st Century UNITAS”

15 The Anti-Access Challenge… OIF I Turkey: Access Not Granted, Even with $26B Offer
Our nation was ready, willing, and able to offer up $26B for one-time access and passage. Yet, unanticipated political pressures prevented that access. Credible seabased force could have mitigated.

16 Enhancing Phase 0-1 Capabilities Via Expanded Naval Missions
Global Fleet Station Distributed Globally Networked Adaptive force packaging Aggregate, disaggregate & re-aggregate Culturally aware Task focused Build partner capacity Cross Fleet Standardization Sized, shaped, and globally postured for: Forward Naval Presence Security Cooperation Counterinsurgency (COIN) Counterterrorism Civil-Military Operations Counter-proliferation Maritime Security Operations Crisis Response Deterrence Sea Control Air and Missile Defense Expeditionary Power Projection

17 Enhancing Phase 0-2 Capabilities Via Distributed Ops Capable SPMAGTFs
Employed from platforms like LCS, riverine craft, destroyers… Counter- proliferation Forward Presence Deterrence Counter- terrorism ESG/MEU(SOC) Air & Missile Defense COIN Security Cooperation at Sea MARSOC units forward-deployed with the ESG/MEU closely link our integrated support with SOCOM and capabilities ISO GWOT/7500 Addresses three of four quadrants: catastrophic, irregular, traditional DO at the operational level Potential enabler for Global Fleet Station concept of employment Enables a wide variety of SPMAGTFs to conduct missions across the full range of military operations Security Cooperation Maritime Security Civil – Military Operations Crisis Response U.S. Navy …While supported by Amphib motherships

18 Enhancing Phase 2-3 Capabilities By Re-aggregating Naval Forces
Power Projection Sea Control “1000 Ship Navy” will be important enabler Forward Postured CONUS Based

19 Marine Corps Amphib & MPF(F) Shipbuilding Requirements
Capabilities Amphibious Warfare Ships Inherent survivability, self-defense, and Navy crewing Maritime forcible entry operations Forward presence, deterrence Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) Capable of at-sea arrival and assembly of forces Selective offload of equipment sets to meet Seabasing mission requirements Supports forward engagement and forcible entry MPF(F) by design is not assault echelon shipping; therefore, MPF(F) forces are not forcible entry capable Shipbuilding Requirements Amphibious Warfare Ships 2.0 MEB AE per Strategic Planning Guidance; 15 Ao Ships per MEB AE Total 30 operationally available ships 10 LHD/LHA(R) 10 LPD-17 10 LSD-41/49 (or equivalent replacement) Average availability is 85% (for planning purposes) Minimum 11/11/11 ships to meet 30 Ao requirement Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) One squadron (per May 2005 Acting SecNav/CNO/CMC decision) Legacy Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons Retain two squadrons to maintain afloat prepositioned war reserve capacity MPF(F) Squadron Composition Notional 15-Ship ATF Five LHD-1 (Wasp Class) Five LPD-17 (San Antonio Class) Five LSD-41 (Whidbey Island Class) 2 LHA(R) Thus far, I’ve discussed what we see as the emerging GWOT/TSCP/Shaping requirement for future naval expediionary forces. This slide gives you a snapshot of our amphibious and maritime prepositioning force (future) shipbuilding requirements. Our amphib shipbuilding requirements are based on the Strategic Planning Guidance direction to consider options for a single 2-MEB forcible entry capability. That translates into 15 operationally available ships per MEB, meaning 5 big decks, 5 LPD-17’s, and 5 LSD-41/49’s. Our MPF(F) squadron composition is based on a formal decision made between the Acting Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in May of 2005. It’s key to point out that MPF(F) by design is not assault echelon shipping; therefore, MPF(F) forces are not forcible entry capable. 3 MLP 1 LHD 3 T-AKE 3 T-AKR 2 Legacy T-AK

20 Marine Corps JHSV Shipbuilding Requirements
JHSV Capabilities & Characteristics Shallow draft (< 15’), high speed (> 35 kts loaded) Ability to enter small, austere/degraded ports unassisted Self-deploying between theaters ST payload, 1200 NM range, 35 kts, Sea State 3 Smaller payloads = greater range, larger payloads = less range Seating for 312 Marines (Co (rein)); berthing for 104 Marines 20-22,000 sqft mission deck/cargo bay (M1A2, MTVR compatible) Slewing ramp (astern to 40 degrees forward) Level I, Class 2 flight deck for H-60s, H-46s, UH-/AH-1 helicopters Fuel only, no services 20 ST crane for TEU movement, small boat launch & recovery Net Ready C4 system (plug and play) JHSV is not a combatant, operates in a permissive environment MSC standard for ATFP capabilities JHSV Quantity and Basing 8 JHSVs funded (5 Army, 3 Navy) Quantity funded does not equal quantity required Acquisition objective TBD by MS B (Mar ’08) PACOM, AoA, MCCDC studies suggest 16 JHSVs needed across DOD 7 JHSV equivalents meet USMC requirements Based on MARFOR TSCP, GWOT, intra-theater lift requirements Requirement quantified in “vessel days per year” v. specific # of JHSVs Assumes 180 days operational availability (Ao) per year per JHSV Does not explore overlap between USN, USMC requirements Notional basing scheme (JHSVs swing between theaters as needed) PACOM = 3 (Hawaii, Guam, Okinawa) CENTCOM = 2 (Bahrain) EUCOM = 1 (Rota) CONUS = 1 (Norfolk) Possible JHSV Candidates USMC JHSV CONOPS (The “Intra-Theater Connector”) TSCP COBRA GOLD BALIKITAN This slide shows you how we see Joint High-Speed Vessel capabilities, characteristics, quantities, and basing. While the Navy’s current 30-year shipbuilding plan has only three of these vessels in the program, COCOM demand signal is growing and will surely influence PR09 and beyond shipbuilding budgets. Seabasing Support FIE Austal 126 INCAT 112 Sea Base TSL - 140 Adv Base Self-deploy Austal 105 NSE MDV-300 MPF ESG HA/DR

21 Seabasing Research and Development
High Capacity UNREP Selective Offload Skin-to-Skin Transfer Stabilized Cranes Here’s an overview of the various seabasing-related research and development efforts currently ongoing. Our industry partners have been key players in these efforts, to include stabilized crane technologies, shipboard automated cargo handling and warehousing, air-skid technologies that permit moving heavy loads into heretofore non-accessible stowage locations, and at-sea equipment and personnel transfers between large vessels. In August and September of last year, the MPF(F) program office, supported by the Marine Corps operating forces, conducted a series of successful at sea skin-to-skin marriages between a mobile landing platform surrogate and an LMSR and performed equipment and personnel transfer between the two vessels, below-decks equipment movement and stowage operations on the LMSR, and LCAC and assault amphibian vehicle recovery operations on the mobile landing platform – all in a sea state 3 operating environment. We’re very pleased with the progress thus far as we mitigate anticipated risks associated with deploying and operating our new seabasing platforms. Joint Modular Intermodal Container (JMIC) Mobile Landing Platform Interface Automated Cargo Handling At-Sea Arrival, Assembly, Employment, Sustainment

22 Other Research and Development Opportunities
Cultural Awareness and Tactical Language Training Responsive Naval and Joint Fires suitable for Restricted ROE C4ISR Interoperability and Intel Fusion Support Technology Key Equipment Characteristics Weight Mobility Armor Power We have much more R&D work to do, and that’s where we’ll need industry’s help. CMC has expanded our new Center for Advance Operational Cultural Learning to include other Irregular Warfare functions. There have been some limited successes in the S&T world in training technology brought to bear on language acquisition and cultural awareness. OAD and the Joint Fires AoA have both concluded that Naval Forces are lacking in firepower suitable for use when collateral damage must be minimized, as well as for moving targets and area targets. S&T Plan highlights RESPONSIVE fires., loitering munitions, selectable yield. C4ISR interoperability is prominent in the S&T Strategic Plan. Plan also hits automated intel fusion. Interoperability also very important, as is intelligent agent technology, multi-level security solutions, systems tolerant of intermittent connectivity. The Naval Research Advisory Council (NRAC) is conducting a “Lightening the Load” summer study. Advanced power solutions, advanced materials, robotic supports. One key area that is causing significant concern is weight. With all the armor we’re adding to our ground equiopment, we’re beginning to “weight out” our amphibs ships before they “square and cube out.” In other words, we’re leaving gear on the pier and sailing with partially loaded ships because ships alterations and MAGTF equipment loads are exceeding allowable ship loading characteristics. We need your help in finding light-weight, yet fully effective personnel, vehicle and equipment armoring solutions.

23 Conclusions Evolving security environment expands challenges we face
Blurring character of war generates premium for agile forces with adaptive ethos Security context calls for greater maritime cooperation and interoperability International and interagency

24 Questions?

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