1. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 1

2. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 2 Table of Contents The Strategic ContextThe Operation Hamas Tactics International Law One Year Later 2005 2006-2007 2008 Hamas Military Expansion The Strategic Directive Operation Stages Aerial Phase Ground Maneuver IDF Accomplishments Tactic Overview Rocket Fire on Civilians The Human Shield Abuse of Medical Facilities IDF Countermeasures Advance Warning Humanitarian Measures Supplies Transferred Fuel and Electricity Supplies Hamas Humanitarian Abuse The Investigation Process Investigation Status The General Staff Investigations The Palestinian Arena Israeli Deterrence Ongoing Hamas Buildup

3. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 3 The Gaza Strip – General Information Area: 360 sq. km (139 sq. m) Length: 41km (25m) Width: 6-12km (4-7.5m) Population: 1,400,000 [ 90% in urban areas] Population Density: 4,118/km 2 Terrain: Plateau [Sand and dune covered coastal plain]

4. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Operation “Cast Lead” The Strategic Context

5. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 5 The Disengagement 2008 2007 2006 2005 The Cast Lead Context However, following the withdrawal, rocket fire from the Gaza Strip sharply rose, with the amount of rockets which were launched at Israel 500% higher in 2006 than 2005 (179 to 946). Israeli Settlements Palestinian Settlements In August 2005, following 5 years of terror and over 2000 rockets and mortars, the Israeli government concluded a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, removing 21 Israeli settlements and relocating 8000 Israeli civilians. This effectively turned full control of Gaza over to the PA, provided them with the opportunity to take matters fully until their own hands.

6. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 6 Palestinian Elections 2008 2007 2006 2005 The Cast Lead Context In January, 2006, Palestinian elections provided the Hamas with a legislative majority (74/132 seats). The Hamas refused to accept the minimal conditions set forth by the international community: 1) Recognition of Israel; 2) Cessation of all hostility against Israel; and 3) Recognition of treaties signed between Israel and the PA. Hostile activity, including rocket firing, terrorist attacks and the abduction of Cpl. Gilad Shalit on June 25 th, continued. June of 2007 saw the completion of a Hamas coup of the Gaza Strip. In a few short days of fighting, the Hamas violently took control of all government facilities in the area, focusing its armed efforts on Fatah strongholds. International condemnation followed the wide-scale breach of international law. During the coup, the Hamas killed over 130 Palestinians. Hamas Coup

7. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 7 The Cast Lead Context In June 2008, the Israeli government accepted the Tahadiya, an Egyptian-brokered understanding in which the Hamas committed to cease rocket fire. This was violated numerous times and was accompanied by ongoing Hamas military buildup. In December 2008, the Hamas unilaterally concluded the arrangement and increased rocket fire on Israeli territory. State of Calm 2008 2007 2006 2005

8. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 8 The Cast Lead Context Hamas Military Expansion Massive smuggling, primarily through Sinai/Gaza tunnels Substantial support from both Iran and Syria Ongoing rocket fire and attempted terrorist attacks MAJOR IRANIAN SMUGGLING ROUTES Training and organization of combatants and military force ONE MILLION ISRAELIS IN ROCKET RANGE Hostile Hamas takeover of all Gaza Strip institutes and facilities Refusal recognize Israel and ongoing calls for hostilities

9. “ ” When someone is attacked from houses, family houses … there is a responsibility to protect oneself and protect civilians General Walter J. Natynczyk Chief of the Defense Staff, Canadian Armed Forces (20/10/09)

10. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Operation “Cast Lead” The Operation

11. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 11 Inflict severe damage to Hamas, short of toppling it Create conditions for an improved security situation Long-term cessation of rocket fire and terrorist attacks originating in Gaza Improve comprehensive response to arms smuggling Minimize damage to Israeli population At 1130 on Saturday, December 27 th, the IDF began operation “Cast Lead”, as directed by the Israeli government. The objectives of the operation were as follows: The Strategic Directive

12. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 12 GROUND MANEUVER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 AIR STRIKE 27/123/110/1 Surprise Attack Beginning of land maneuver Reserves mobilized 1 st humanitarian pause UNSCR 1860 Maneuver expanded Reserves activated Cabinet decision Operation Stages

13. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 13 Aerial Phase Command and control centers Underground launching sites Weapons stores Rocket manufacturing facilities Training camps Communications facilities At 1130 on December 27 th 2008, the Israeli Air Force launched a surprise attack in the Gaza Strip. This relied heavily on meticulously planned attacks, based on inter-agency cooperation First three minutes 180 targets attacked, including a training camp, O 2 center and C&C center Complete aerial phase Continuous air strikes, with over 950 sorties Targets Approximately 300 Hamas operatives killed Targeted strike on Nizar Rian Reliance on advance-warning methods

14. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 14 Ground Maneuver On January 4 th 2009, the aerial phase of the operation concluding, and was followed by the entrance of ground forces into the Gaza Strip. Environmental Challenges Guerilla combat Tunnels Concealment within population Rigged urban areas Plans for soldier kidnapping ALL-INT support of land brigades with real-time HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT for commanders 3D fire support (aerial, naval and ground) Enhanced C4ISR Technological Aids 2225 400 IAF sorties Hamas activists killed Reserve forces mobilized and activated Humanitarian efforts expanded Targeted strike on Said Seyam

15. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 15 IDF Accomplishments Rocket Fire during “Cast Lead” Average 60 Average 30 Average 20 5,650 IAF sorties 3,400 Targets struck 80% Attacks conducted w/precision ammunition 30,000 Reserves drafted 1,500 Humanitarian trucks 8 Army brigades ~700 Hamas members killed Terrorist (61%) Suspected terrorist (14%) Civilian (25%) Palestinian Casualties

16. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Operation “Cast Lead” Hamas Tactics

17. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 17 Hamas Tactics Before and during “Cast Lead”, the Hamas relied heavily on breaching the Laws of Armed Conflict, exploiting the Israeli commitment to international laws. This was manifested through multiple channels: Deliberate Rocket Fire on Civilian Targets Use of Civilian Sites as Cover for Military Operations Misuse of Medical FacilitiesHuman Shields

18. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 18 Rocket Fire on Civilian Targets Over one million civilians were in range of the Hamas rocket fire, which launched 820 rockets and mortars deliberately at civilian targets. Hamas boasts of this activity in posters and in the media, despite international condemnation. During “Cast Lead”, 3 Israeli civilians were killed by the rocket and mortar fire. ONE MILLION ISRAELIS IS ROCKET RANGE HAMAS POSTER CELEBRATING ROCKET ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

19. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 19 The Human Shield The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations. “ “ The Hamas systematically exploited the local population during its activities, operating from within hospitals, mosques, near schools and booby-trapping entire neighborhoods. This has two purposes: Taking advantage of IDF sensitivity to international law Exploiting civilian casualties as propaganda when Israeli attacks were required Rocket Launching from Residential/Protected Areas Civilian/Public Locations Used as Bases of Operation Protocol 1, Addition to the Geneva Protocol, Article 51

20. “ ” Accordingly, [Hamas] created a human shield of women, children, the elderly and the mujahideen Fathi Hamad Hamas Legislator (29/2/08)

21. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 21 Abuse of Medical Facilities The Hamas also violated international law on numerous occasions by abusing the special protection provided to medical facilities, vehicles and personnel. More importantly, this endangered medical personnel, as well as the sick and wounded. Smuggling of weapons in packages was also attempted. Abuse of Al-Shifa Hospital Rocket Launching Ambulances Ismail Haniyeh, the Head of the Hamas in the Gaza Strip, located his Southern Command center in a unit of the Al-Shifa hospital. Other Hamas leaders stationed themselves in another unit of the hospital. Rockets and outposts were positioned near both hospitals and schools, as well as UN positions. Ambulances and medical personnel were forced to facilitate Hamas movement and transportation.

22. “ ” The defender also has obligations. He cannot exploit these laws by deliberately commingling his fighters with civilians, as Hamas admits it did. MG (res.) Jim Molan Chief of Operations of the Iraqi Multinational Force, ’04-’05 (2/10/09)

23. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Operation “Cast Lead” IDF Compliance with International Law

24. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 24 IDF Countermeasures Target Selection As the Hamas attempted to deliberately exploit Israeli commitment to international law, the IDF took multiple measures in order to minimize damage to uninvolved civilians. This included: Target SelectionWeapon / Method SelectionSensitive Locations Review by multiple authorities MAG involvement in approval Cross-checked intelligence Target elimination due to insufficient or unreliable intelligence Re-assessment prior to attack Real-time int. during attack Diversion of in-flight missiles 80% precision guided weapons Timing modified to ensure minimal civilian presence Target destruction by ground forces when possible Collaboration on joint map, including 1,900 locations Use of map at all levels Civil Administration coordination center

25. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 25 Advance warning was provided in news and radio announcements, as well as through approximately 165,000 recorded calls which were placed. IDF Advance Warning Methods Radio & Phone Warnings Over 2,500,000 leaflets were dropped in the Gaza Strip, including: (1) Warnings to avoid certain buildings known to be military facilities; (2) Directions to leave specific areas prior to a specific time Leaflets Specific warnings were made immediately prior to the attack. If these were ignored, real-time surveillance was introduced in order to assess the situation. This was followed warnings shots with light weapons which would not cause harm. Only once the departure of all civilians was ensured was the target attacked. IDF Warning Procedure – Knock on Roof

26. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 26 Knock on Roof - Video Click Video to Start This video can be downloaded at: http://www.box.net/shared/4yejr2xgdh

27. “ ” The IDF did more to safeguard the rights of civilians in a combat zone than any other army in the history of warfare Colonel Richard Kemp Former Commander of British Forces in Afghanistan (16/10/09)

28. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 28 Humanitarian Measures Ongoing Supply Coordination Suspension Israeli continued to ensure during the course of the operation that humanitarian aid, including food, equipment and medical supplies, were transferred into the Gaza Strip. This frequently took place in spite of Hamas targeting of the crossings. Coordination centers devoted to ensuring cooperation with international organizations, medical evacuations and assistance and the preservation of critical infrastructure were established, allowing: 833 trucks passing between Gaza and Israel 186 ambulances passing between Gaza and Israel 85 movements of international staff in combat area 21 food transfers for immobile families Landing of 13 airplanes Evacuation of 1,246 Palestinians 382 medical evacuations Approval of 61 out of 62 donation requests Beginning on January 6 th, a unilateral three hour humanitarian ceasefire was implemented by Israel. This was later extended to four hours.

29. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 29 Supplies Transferred - Charts A total of 1,503 truckloads, 724 truckloads and donations (total of 37,159 tons) KarniTruckloadTones Animal feed411,638 Corn4162 Soy137 Wheat501,975 Barley284 Total983,896 Kerem ShalomTruckloadsTons Flour52514,208 Rice501,283 Sugar772,356 Oil561,305 Dairy products641,117 Legumes15477 Animals feed1193,495 Medical Equipment & Medications 1111,038 Blankets24160 Other3647,824 Total1,40533,263

30. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 30 CrossingFuel & GasTotal Nahal OzDiesel fuel for the power plant892,800 liter Nahal OzTransport diesel fuel for UNRWA188,000 liter Kerem ShalomDiesel fuel for the power plant642,950 liter Total diesel fuel1,723,750 liter Fuel and Electric Supply Electricity Capacity in the Gaza Strip

31. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 31 Hamas Humanitarian Abuse While Israel invested significant efforts in alleviating the situation in the Gaza Strip via humanitarian aid, the Hamas expanded its efforts to exploit the humanitarian efforts for its own purposes. This included: Tunnel Opening Between January 8 th and January 17 th, a total of 44 rockets and mortars were fired at Israel during the humanitarian lulls Over 40 mortars fired at the humanitarian crossings. Infiltration tunnel discovered near Nahal Oz crossing. Numerous reports of Hamas hijacking of humanitarian supplies (UNRWA supplies, foods…)

32. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Operation “Cast Lead” One Year Later

33. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 33 The IDF Investigation Process Investigation Policy The IDF investigation policy, affirmed by the Attorney General and presented to the Supreme Court of Justice, determines the following structure for investigations: Command Investigation Criminal Misconduct Allegation Criminal Investigation Severe allegation or non-operational Israel is committed to maintaining its obligation under the laws of armed conflict, even during the most complex and taxing situations, when fighting an enemy that internationally violates these laws and hides behind civilians. As part of this commitment, Israel investigates every credible allegation regarding violations of the laws of armed conflict. This effort is spear-headed by the MAG, which functions as an independent body in the course of its investigations.

34. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 34 Received Complaints Field Investigation General Staff Investigations Criminal Investigation 5 major investigations (25 incidents) Operational mistakes 25 ongoing criminal investigations 5 criminal investigations closed 1 conviction 14 cases 45 field investigations closed IDF-MAG Review of the MAG’s decisions Attorney General HCJ Judicial review LOAC Investigation Process 140 complaints 16 cases

35. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 35 Beyond the investigations conducted into specific incidents, five general staff investigation teams were created in order inspect broad topics. The Five Major Investigations 1 2 3 4 5 Subject: Examined damage to UN and international organizations facilities (13 incidents). Results: Numerous precautions and protocols were implemented to minimize collateral damage, in spite of Hamas attempts to the contrary. Disciplinary measures were taken against a colonel, a lieutenant colonel and a soldier.. Subject: Claims regarding IDF fire on medical facilities, vehicles or personnel Results: Five out of seven cases raised proved to be Hamas operatives who were fired upon. The other cases proved to be incidents which stemmed from improper demarcation or coordination Subject: Incidents in which uninvolved civilians may have been injured Results: No incidents in which IDF soldiers deliberately fired on civilians was found. While civilians were inadvertently injured during the operation, the injuries were primarily a result of intense warfare taking place in a highly populated area, exacerbated by Hamas exploitation of civilians. Subject: Usage of weapons with phosphorus components Results: Weapons containing phosphors used by the IDF were used mostly for smoke screening purposes, in accordance with international law. This reduced the need for the usage of other, more dangerous munitions. Subject: Damage to infrastructure and buildings by ground forces Results: The Hamas relied on civilian infrastructure for military positions and traps. The IDF was forced to destroy some infrastructure, but only after authorization by high-ranking officers and while taking full precautions. Investigations did not find any injuries for civilians stemming from these actions.

36. “ ” All of Palestine is our land, and it is occupied. It must return to its owners … resistance is our strategic option for liberating our land …” Khaled Mashal Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau (Al-Aqsa Television, October 9 th, 2009 )

37. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 37 The Palestinian Arena Military expansion Sporadic attacks West Bank: Limited progress Hamas: Deterrence While Palestinians in the West Bank continues to experience positive growth, due in part to Israeli restriction easing taken despite inherent security risks, continues to focus on ongoing military expansion, as well as attempts to strengthen its political status.

38. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 38 Established Israeli Deterrence Significant decrease in rockets and mortars fired into Israel Decline in Israeli victims of Palestinian terrorist attacks 2009 in Numbers 15 Israeli casualties of terror (9 in Operation Cast Lead) 0 Successful suicide attacks

39. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 39 Ongoing Hamas Buildup Primary Hamas Activities Massive weapon smuggling – relying primarily on Iranian and Syrian support Sporadic terrorist attacks Attempts to strengthen internal political power - including deterrence of local population Refusal of international community’s conditions Increased range and quality of weapons – extension of range to include Tel-Aviv Continued attempts to increase Hamas power in the West Bank

40. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 40 Concluding Remarks Hamas continues efforts to strengthen its political and military force within the Gaza Strip, all the while ignoring the international community’s conditions. The military expansion efforts rely heavily on massive smuggling of weapons, as well as financial support and training, by the Iranian-led Radical Axis. To prevent future escalations, to prevent the Iranian-backed Hamas from increasing its power in the West Bank and to maintain regional stability, the international community must: Refuse recognition of the Hamas as long as it refuses the international community’s terms Take determined action against Iranian and Syrian smuggling, the lifeline of terrorist organizations Ensure that humanitarian aid is not diverted to the Hamas and exploited to strengthen its regime

41. Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified || Slide 41 Sources This presentation was created by LT Eytan Buchman in the Military-Strategic Information Section of the Israel Defense Forces’ Strategic Division, with the assistance of the Strategic Division’s Regional-Strategic Department. Created by Sources  IDF // Strategic Division // The Regional-Strategic Department  IDF // Israel Defense Intelligence  IDF // The Doctrine and Training Division  IDF // Military Advocate General  Ministry of Defense // Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs  The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center  Israeli Security Agency