1. The modern financial system Eurodad AGM 2008 Sargon Nissan nef (the new economics foundation)

2. Traditional function of the Financial System To transfer money from surplus to where there is a demand/need for it Banks are crucial to this process –Take in savings (Deposits) –Loan the deposits to firms & individuals at a higher rate of interest

3. Government Intervention Government control of the financial system, via: Interest rates –Reflect time value of money –Reflect risk of default (non-repayment) Fractional reserve banking –How much bank must held as proportion of deposits –$100 deposited in a bank with 20% fractional reserve requirement increases money supply by $400

4. The birth of the modern financial system

5. Features of the post-BW system Gradual end on the constraints of money creation Evolved from using a gold standard to $ pegs with a gold guarantee 1971 Nixon Shock –Gold link broken by Nixon due to domestic spending and costs of Vietnam war Fiat money system –Money could be created without underlying asset backing it

6. Bretton Woods-era gave way to freer flows of capital and floating exchange rates Volatility drastically increased –Contradicting expectations and orthodox economic predictions Volatility created need to hedge against fluctuating prices –New markets in volatility-management tools: derivatives –Created marketplace for speculative profits and amplified the use of these tools Assault on transparency –Vast majority of derivatives ‘OTC’ – over the counter and not traded on exchanges –Created mechanism to avoid supervision or regulatory oversight Features of the post-BW system

7. New markets in derivatives allowed huge profit opportunities via speculation on price movements that were disconnected from real economic activity Features of the post-BW system

8. The era of financialisation

9. Developed countries’ financial systems exploded relative to other parts of economy, particularly the role of banks Climate of greater general indebtedness and increased gearing (debt to equity ratios) Financial assets and debts become larger proportion of GDP Banks strategically became focused upon commissions business and speculative operation Financialisation

10. Bubbles Debt being used to inflate value of assets against which more debt is raised to re-start the cycle Financial innovation/Derivatives Also used to evade legislative oversight –e.g. 1999 Amendment to US Community Reinvestment Act which excluded banks’ mortgage investment in securities from scrutiny – then sub-prime lending doubled from 2001 to 2006 Policy Blame Ignored bubbles and stoked consumer spending via indebtedness Boom in mortgage lending, speculative price bubbles & Financial ‘innovation’

11. Growth in the Banking Sector

12. Real income levels did not follow growth Finance met gap in income levels Created climate for bubbles with loose monetary policy –US mortgages grew $2.1 to $3 trillion from 2001 to 2006 –The proportion of that which was sub-prime jumped from 8.6% to 20% Financialisation

13. Key features of international financialisation Liberalisation of capital account Capital flows increasingly taking form of FDI and portfolio investment Inflation targeting priority over growth, jobs, health or other social outcomes to protect value of investment capital Financialisation

14. Growth in Derivatives

15. Costlier Short Term borrowing Domestic financialisation Exposure of Short Term obligations (debts that have to be repaid in short term) as borrowing has dried-up Export and trade demand Implications for Developing Countries

16. The flow of money and the reserve currency “The exorbitant priviledge” (Giscard d’Estaing) How does the money system reveal the challenges of reform? GROUP EXERCISE

17. A Currency used as a reserve or store of wealth, as if it were an asset itself - the US Dollar Source of wealth for whoever has the priviledge to issue that currency Un-cashed cheque at everyone else’s expense Permits deficit financing –Vietnam and Iraq wars –Current US bank bailout An international reserve currency

18. No reserve currency has ever been permanent Drachma from 500 BC replaced by Roman aureus and denarius Reserve currency reflects political power and authority Gold coins in Genoa and Florence from 13th Century, then usurped by Venetian ducato by 15th Century Historic role of international currencies

19. Britain’s challenge to Dutch guilder overtaken by sterling by 18th Century Bank of England and Stock Exchange established included vibrant foreign currency exchange Stability of Britain’s economic strength sterling retained position for 100+ years By this point tokens (e.g. symbols of metallic value) and receipts (bank notes) had become symbols of money and value, not actually holding value Modern Era

20. Limited gold restrained creation of money ‘tokens’ Where gold was unavailable poorer countries began to hold financial assts convertible into gold Gold Standard Start of process of countries’ central banks holding foreign exchange reserves as part of normal practice

21. Nixon shock Tension of the consequences of exploiting reserve currency –When world demanded gold for dollars, France, UK, Nixon ended Bretton Woods system Valerie Giscard d’Estaing “The exorbitant priviledge” “Our currency but your problem” End of Bretton Woods

22. Nixon shock Tension of the consequences of exploiting reserve currency –When world demanded gold for dollars, France, UK, Nixon ended Bretton Woods system Valerie Giscard d’Estaing “The exorbitant priviledge” “Our currency but your problem” Who said this? End of Bretton Woods

23. Operating a reserve currency brings costs Euro area lacks political will for unity and avoids promoting Euro as reserve Euro area not de-coupled, but connected, to US crisis Flight to quality is thus benefiting dollar – where else is there to go? For the moment “The exorbitant priviledge” (Valerie Giscard d’Estaing)

24. China’s Dollar dependence Reserve accumulation over $1tn Power to destabilise US financial system but only at huge cost to itself Not just China, but Brazil, India, Russia and oil-exporting Gulf states all similarly attached to US situation A globalised system – no winners

25. What will change this? Maybe the current crisis US domestic economy transformed, like 19th C UK, to financial services while neglecting exports, manufacture and jobs Weaker dollar needed to stimulate US economy but counter-balanced against damage it does to its ‘Faustian’ partners US lacks surpluses given its economic weakness to sustain strong dollar as reserve No winners – for now

26. Assessing the impact on Developing Countries Eurodad AGM 2008, section II Sargon Nissan nef (the new economics foundation)

27. Emerging Markets falling more than Developed

28. Emerging Markets - 2008 Severe losses in equity and bond markets Corporate defaults in specific sectors, e.g. construction and real estate Local cost of funding much higher and likely to remain so – limiting investment Investment funds investing in EM debt have suffered outflows Economic expectations are for easing inflation, growing current account deficits

29. Risk Premiums and local costs of borrowing are going up

30. Capital flows – still going uphill Net capital flows have been negative due to reserve accumulation 2007 China $1.5 trillion Russia $455 billion Mid East $638 billion Africa $145 billion Sterilisation of exchange pegs by purchase of US Treasuries Provides Insurance

31. Liberalisation’s Logic Increased investment Stability Better targeted investment (efficiency) Growth

32. Emerging Markets fuelling the crisis Reserves from Current Account surpluses transferred into property bubble Exchange rate pegs are a crucial driver of reserve accumulation –Accounting for 75% of reserves accumulated by DCs since 2002 –Export expansion and import suppression, via exchange rates

33. Emerging Markets fuelling the crisis Countries also accumulate as self-insurance –Of reserves accumulated since 2002, 1/3 borrowed –India’s reserves 100% borrowed Why? Expensive but driven by desire to prevent currency appreciation and deficits, plus provides a cushion against shocks

34. Vulnerability to the crisis Consider factors which impact sovereign financial autonomy –Foreign banks’ involvement in Developing Countries (grown) –FDI restrictions in banking sector –Asset share of bank assets by foreign banks –Reserve accumulation ‘Fluidity’ of flows –Net private inflows vs gross outflows –FDI outflows, including from ‘non-official’ sources

35. Vulnerability to the crisis - Risks Financial contagion –Dropping stock markets, currency pressure Trade Remittances FDI and portfolio investment Lending Aid

36. Vulnerability to the crisis Exporters to most affected countries (e.g. Mexico) Countries with exports tied closely to global demand levels, or high income elasticity (commodities or tourism) Countries with significant remittance flows Very open economies where investment biased to FDI or portfolio investment (e.g. South Africa) High current account deficit countries – –increasing pressure for devaluation and inflation, also exacerbated by high government deficits (India)

37. Analysing Crisis Impact Reliance on exports Reliance on international finance –Some forms of reliance are inherently more precarious, e.g. extent of FDI accounted for by portfolio flows, bank lending… External penetration of the financial system –Home bias, lack of local knowledge, regulatory power of domestic authority, capital flight risks

38. Analysing Crisis Impact - Trade Trade openness Current account balance Export focus (to whom?) –South-south links –Extent of presumed ‘decoupling’ – looks like we’re all in it together Export vulnerability (Elasticity of demand for key exports)

39. Analysing Crisis Impact Reliance on international finance Openness of capital account –Capital inflows, Bank flows, Portfolio flows as % of GDP Domestic banking sector’s relative importance –% of domestic assets and liabilities in domestic banks’ portfolios, % of foreign currency denominated debt Reserves –Reserves to GDP - Ability to offset foreign shortfalls Currency denomination of foreign exchange reserves

40. Implications

41. Implications of Crisis Impact Regulation and Governance Potential for renewed emphasis on bilateral forms of influence versus multilateral structures of negotiation, such as collective trade or finance rules –Altered regulatory regimes de jure (e.g. Basle II) de facto (ratings agencies and other private actors) –Risk of a technocratic approach being taken

42. Implications of Crisis Impact Solidarity Different countries will be impacted differently, challenging in novel ways the capacity to develop a collective response from the South Vulnerability and agency (or lack of) reveal new cracks in collective bargaining positions

43. Implications of Crisis Impact Institutional power Potentially reinvigorating consequences for IMF and other BW institutions as political and economic actors. Governance issue had waned as their significance and centrality contracted but could once again be a crucial component of any new settlement

44. Implications of Crisis Impact Changing of the guard, not the system? New centres of financial power Too soon to proclaim the death of the old centres of finance? Will the name-plates change and nothing else?