1. Agro-Terrorism Overview of Risks, Liabilities, and Assets Richie Farmer Commissioner Dr. Ed Hall Assistant Director of Animal Health Kentucky Department of Agriculture

2. This presentation is designed to help you better get acquainted with us at the Kentucky Department of Agriculture.

3. Agroterrorism and Bioterrorism  Is there a difference between the two? –Agroterrorism is included as a part of Bioterrorism. –From an agriculture standpoint we are more interested in Agroterrorism.

4. Agroterroism vs Bioterrorism  Agroterrorism - agents are primarily aimed at disrupting agriculture with human disease impact being secondary.  Bioterrorism - agents are primarily aimed at causing human disease, sickness, and/or death, with agricultural impact being secondary.  The ideal disease provides the worst of both worlds.

5. Bioterrorism  Many of the bioterrorism diseases are zoonotic but they have to be weaponized to be used in attacks. –Examples: Anthrax, brucellosis, Glanders, Plague, Q fever, Tularemia, Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis –All have occurred naturally in animal populations and is where the disease was isolated.  We have developed good control measures to combat the naturally occurring animal diseases.

6. Bioterrorism Agents  Bacterial Agents –Anthrax  Vaccine available for animals. –Brucellosis  Vaccine available for animals. –Glanders and Melioidosis  Antibiotics available –Plague  Antibiotics available for animals –Q Fever  Antibiotics available –Tularemia  Antibiotics available

7. Bioterrorism Agents  Viral –Small Pox –Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis  Vaccine available for horses –Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers

8. Bioterrorism Agents  Biological Toxins –Botulinum –Ricin –Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B –T-2 Mycotoxins

9. Human-Animal Relationships  With some bioterrorism agents we may see a disease in animals prior to human disease. –Anthrax: The death of exposed cattle and sheep could happen 2 days prior to human deaths. –West Nile: Although the outbreak is not seen as a terrorist attack the disease showed up in birds and horses first and then in people.

10. Human-Animal Relationships  It is possible for a veterinary diagnostic lab to identify an agent before a human diagnosis. –Veterinary Diagnostic Labs still routinely look for diseases that are not commonly looked for in humans anymore.  Example: Brucellosis –Because of 9/11, both Veterinarians and Physicians are getting refresher courses in bioterrorism agents.

11. Essential Elements of Agroterrorism  Need a target –economically important plants or animals  Need a group capable of attack who: –must select the appropriate agent –must acquire the agent –must be able to disseminate the agent  Need a group willing to carry out the attack. –they have have desire to use an agent

12. Agent Selection  Should be highly contagious to many species –transmitted by casual contact or aerosol  Should have a long incubation period –Animal will be carrying and/or shedding the disease and look totally normal  Should induce a high rate of sickness low rate of death –Diseases that kill too quick usually don’t spread as fast.

13. Agent Selection  Should be capable of severe socio- economic losses –loss of product into the marketplace –loss of export markets –loss of consumer base

14. Agent Acquisition  Many 3rd world countries have some technology provided by the World Health Organization to make vaccines for human and animal diseases.  In general to make a vaccine to a specific disease you need to have a seed stock of that disease. –That seed stock is a likely source

15. Agent Acquisition  Many 3rd world countries still have many of the bioterrorism diseases occurring naturally in the animal population. –Example: Pakistan has FMD  Some rudimentary veterinary knowledge and you could acquire a wild strain. –Blood collection tube, centrifuge, freezer, insulation, and an airplane ticket.

16. Those Who Would Attack Us  Single issue groups –Animal rights advocates  National Separatist  Religious  Lone offenders  Rogue regimes  State supported

17. Motivations  Revenge/Retaliation  Promote nationalist or separatist objectives  Protest government policies  Create a lack of confidence in the governments ability to protect and provide  Apocalyptic prophecy  Promote a social cause

18. Higher Probability of Attack  Single issue groups like the animal rights activist are an ongoing threat. –Believe animals have “rights” –Agenda set on influencing production agriculture or laboratory testing. –In some cases resort to criminal activity to release captive animals.  ALF has released mink on several occasions.

19. Higher Probability of Attack  State Sponsored and Rogue Regime –Primary or secondary attack bent on destroying the agricultural infrastructure to try to:  Cause widespread economic losses especially to the 10% who produce food for consumers.  Decrease the amount of food available in the food chain.  Cause panic

20. What do we risk to lose!

21. Two Types of Risk  We have the combined risk of: –Accidental Introduction  Regulatory policies mediate this risk, more on this later! –Deliberate Introduction  Let’s concentrate on this for a while…... –You can’t totally eliminate either risk!

22. Risk in Kentucky  Broken into three categories –Physical –Economic –Psychological

23. Physical Risks  Movement of crops –Most of our crops are exported to processing facilities or utilized as animal feeds. –Grain elevators are concentration points for marketed products

24. Economic Risk  Loss of revenue from export markets –405 million dollars from soybeans –456 million dollars from corn –2,226 billion dollars live livestock –680 million dollars (eggs and poultry) –3.5 billion dollars total commodities

25. Economic Risks  Loss of Jobs –Approximately 160,000 jobs directly or indirectly related to agriculture in Kentucky  89,000 Kentucky jobs related to the pork industry.  56,000 Kentucky jobs related to the cattle industry

26. Psychological Risks  Loss of confidence in a safe food supply –Example: If people even thought that the meat or milk supply was tainted, people would stop buying those products.  Loss of confidence in the governments ability to protect the food supply.

27. Psychological Attacks  Increased feelings of being vulnerable and less secure. –Look at the sniper incident and it’s effects on the local economy and peoples quality of life  Perceived shortage of food –Could lead to a run on stores and hoarding of food. –Look at what 9/11 did for gas, a run on the gas stations not to mention the price gouging that took place!

28. Agroterrorism Liabilities

29. Liabilities  Successful disease eradication programs –makes us more vulnerable to reintroduction –no immunity left in the animal population  Large concentrations of animals. –Some accessible from the road  Large concentration of crops. –Easily accessible from the road

30. Liabilities  Extensive movement of animals into and out of the state. –For breeding, feeding and slaughter  Extensive movement of products into and out of the state. –Corn, Soybeans, Milk, and Meat

31. Liabilities  Animal Concentration Points –38 Sale Barns in the State of Kentucky  Usually have 1 sale a week  Little to no biosecurity –State and County Fairs  109 Kentucky counties have one  Varying levels of biosecurity –189 Grain Elevators  Little to no biosecurity

32. My 2 cents!  10% of the US population is providing food for the other 90%. That makes food security a national priority.  In general we have become so comfortable in life and feel so secure that we are not near as self sufficient as we used to be.

33. Benefits of Rural Living  Better equipped to weather hard times by having tools to be self sufficient.  They have done it in the past –They have the land to produce food –They may lose some markets but they could still eat –Could go back to a barter system if necessary

34. The Trouble With Cities  Have a 5 day supply of food in stores  Many do not have many of the resources to be self sufficient.  Many don’t know where their food comes from much less how to process a chicken or can vegetables.

35. Assets to Fight Agroterrorism

36. Assets  Disease eradication programs –Procedures to prevent are written down for the diseases we have eradicated  Multi-agency disease response plans –Plans are developed to deal with animal disease disasters  850+ Veterinarians in Kentucky

37. Assets  Majority of poultry and swine are inside  Swine and poultry producers practice good biosecuirty.  Producers are pretty vigilant –generally know when a stranger is in the neighborhood

38. Assets  Producers use of veterinarians –This helps with quick diagnosis of disease  We have the farming infrastructure to be self-sufficient if needed. –We could shut down imports and still have an adequate food supply

39. Assets  Disease Surveillance and Detection Programs – Help speed up detection of disease.  Good diagnostic labs –Lab infrastructure is available to help diagnosis diseases.  National Animal Disease Center and National Veterinary Services Laboratory in Ames

40. Basic Disease Information

41. Some Quick History  Over the last 100 years States and the Federal Government have worked to eradicate the most dangerous human and animal diseases. –After we eradicate an animal diseases they are labeled Foreign Animal Diseases or FADs  The success in eradication of diseases leaves us vulnerable to reintroduction. Small pox ring a bell?

42. Disease Categories  Animal Diseases: Infect animals with little to no public health significance.  Foot and Mouth Disease, Hog cholera(classical swine fever)  Human Diseases: Infect humans with little to no animal health significance.  Small pox, Polio  Zoonotic Diseases: Infect both humans and animals.  Anthrax, Influenza

43. Diseases We Worry About? Diseases We Worry About?  There are many highly infectious animal diseases and each of them falls into one of the previous 3 categories.  Highly Infectious Animal Diseases –includes many of the foreign animal diseases but also includes diseases that have yet to be eradicated from the United States.

44. Highly Infectious Animal Diseases OIE definition:List A Diseases Transmissible diseases that have the potential for very serious and rapid spread, irrespective of national borders, that are of serious socio-economic or public health consequence and that are of major importance in the international trade of animals and animal products.  There is an international group, the Office of International Epizootic (OIE) that maintains a list of highly infectious animal diseases. http://www.oie.int  They define these diseases as List A diseases

45. Foreign Animal Diseases  Diseases that are not currently in the United States because they have been eradicated or have never been diagnosed in the United States. –Foot and Mouth Disease, Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera)  Not all foreign animal diseases fall in the highly infectious category. –However, they most likely have economic repercussions so we don’t want them here in the U.S.

46. Reportable Diseases  Every state has a list of diseases that are reportable by law to the State Veterinarian’s office. –Usually includes all list A diseases –Diseases that are significant to the state  West Nile and Pseudorabies –Not all diseases are reportable  common livestock diseases are excluded

47. Foreign Animal Diseases  From an economic standpoint we fear these diseases because they would cause us to lose our international export markets.  From a disease standpoint many of these disease are controllable and only a few would be extremely difficult to eradicate –Foot and Mouth would be the best example –Many of these diseases would not require a multi-agency response.

48. Foreign Animal Diseases  Vesicular diseases: –Foot and Mouth Disease –Vesicular Stomatitis –Swine Vesicular Disease –Vesicular Exanthema of Swine  Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera) and African Swine Fever

49. Foreign Animal Diseases  Capripox Virus Diseases  Rinderpest and Peste des Petits Ruminants  Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia

50. Highly Infectious Disease that are not FAD’s  These disease affect our export markets on a state basis. –Avian influenza –Newcastles disease

51. Plant Diseases  Rice Blast  Stem Rust –Wheat Stem Rust

52. The role of the USDA and the Kentucky Department of Agriculture

53. Role of the USDA  Protects the national agriculture through regulatory activities. –Regulations for importing animals and products –Eradication Programs –Surveillance Programs –Disease Diagnostics –Disease Research –Food safety

54. Role of Kentucky Department of Agriculture  Protects Kentucky’s agriculture through regulatory activities. –Kentucky Department of Agriculture is responsible for safeguarding animal health.

55. Kentucky Department of Agriculture  Develops rules for Kentucky covering animals and animal health.  Administers Regulatory Programs –Disease Eradication Programs, Pet Store, Sale Barn, and Boarding Inspections  Ensures Regulatory Compliance  Disease Investigations  Disease Surveillance and Detection

56. State Vets Office Assets  People –State and Deputy State Veterinarian. –2 Field Service Vets.  1 Foreign Animal Disease Veterinarian. –18 State Livestock Inspectors. –3 Branch Managers & 7 Supervisors –9 Compliance Investigators.  Small stockpile of equipment, disinfectant and PPE.

57. Animal Movement

58. In General  The USDA and State Departments of Agriculture try to work together as much as possible on animal health issues for each state. –The State sets the animal health regulations and intrastate movement rules that are to be followed. –The USDA sets foreign import regulations, international and interstate movement rules that are to be followed.

59. Background  Each State has a current health status when it comes to most animal diseases. –This status is usually known or can easily be found out with a phone call. –The states animal health status determines what regulations other states will put on them when animals are being imported. –Health status can change over night  Example: CWD

60. Animal Movement  Goals –Prevent the spread of disease  ensures only healthy animals are imported –Establish a “paper trail” of movement  vitally important when investigating disease outbreaks.

61. Rules of Movement  There are rules of movement for each species of animal moving into Kentucky. –As law enforcement you don’t need to know the rules just remember that the veterinarian who issued a health paper is responsible for making sure the rules are followed.

62. Foreign Imports  Importing Animals into the United States –Regulated by Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)  Primary role is to prevent diseases from entering into the United States. –All animals entering the US have to meet health requirements for that species. –Involves long periods of quarantine –Expensive and time consuming for the exporter and importer.

63. Reasons for Movement in Kentucky  Producer to producer with a change of ownership.  Producer to a Sale Barn –Sale barn to Slaughter –Sale barn to New Producer  Producer to slaughter

64. Foreign Animal Disease Investigations

65. Disease Investigations  Done by a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) –A Veterinarian that has gone to a special school to receive training in investigating possible Foreign Animal Disease outbreaks.  Training includes work with animals infected with the most devastating Foreign Animal Diseases.  This training is provided by the Federal government on Plum Island at a federal facility which is off the coast of Long Island, New York

66. Disease Investigations  General Outline –The producer or veterinary practitioner calls the State Vets office and/or the AVIC and reports a disease syndrome. –The State Veterinarian and AVIC will discuss the case and dispatch a FADD to the site to investigate. –At that point the FADD acts as the incident commander for this particular incident.

67. Disease Investigations  General Outline –The FADD reports the findings back to the State Veterinarian and AVIC who then make a decision as to what action to take. –There is a verbal quarantine issued followed by a written copy of that quarantine.  Producers cannot move animals on to or off of the premises. –Some form of biosecurity is established

68. Disease Investigations  General Outline –Tracing starts which determines the movement of animals on and off the premises over a specified time period. –Tracing will also include the movement of people on and off of the premises over a specified period of time.

69. Disease Investigations  General Outline –Producers are asked not to discuss the investigation and to follow all the rules and regulation placed on them and the premises –Most producers comply with little to no objections

70. Disease Investigations  Take home Message –Kentucky does 20 to 30 FAD investigations per year, as do other states. –In general the producer is cooperative and information in kept private.

71. Surveillance Activities  Surveillance –KDA constantly monitors the health status of other states and countries.  When necessary we can change rules regarding movement of animals from other states or countries. –.KDA monitors livestock congregation points –KDA inspects sale barns –Investigators monitor road movement of animals

72. Programs and Educational Activities  Programs –KDA has developed and participated in multiple programs for the eradication of certain economically important diseases.  Pseudorabies is an excellent example of a successful program.  Education –KDA has developed educational programs for producers and veterinarians to discuss important animal health issues.

73. Communication  KDA communicates with producers, veterinarians, federal counterparts and the general public to help provide reliable and accurate information as it relates to animal health issues.

74. State Plan Overview

75. In the Past  Prevention has been the main focus because for the most part the United States is free of Foreign Animal Diseases.  The Federal Government has developed response plans to certain foreign animal diseases that are updated periodically.  Up to a year ago most states had not developed a response plan to Foreign Animal Diseases.

76. Kentucky’s Response and Recovery Plan  Why is a plan important? –Kentucky did not have any plan that dealt with animal disease disasters resulting from highly infectious diseases like FMD. –The quicker Kentucky could react to a Foreign Animal Disease the better. A comprehensive plan will decrease reaction time.

77. A Successful Plan Would Allow For:  Rapid detection –The faster the better!  Rapid containment and eradication –Intense biosecurity and intense surveillance!  Rapid recovery –Limits socioeconomic losses

78. Planning Accomplishments  FMD Response and Recovery Plan  FMD Operations Manual  Dairy Industry Response Plan  IRVIN (Kentucky Rapid Veterinary Information Network)  Training Modules  Education

79. Foot and Mouth Disease Response and Recovery Plan  Defines the trigger points that would be used to determine the level of response to an FMD outbreak.  The plan is being rolled into an Infectious Animal Disease Disaster Plan.

80. FMD Operations Manual  Contains the Protocols and SOPs that would be used by IDALS in an FMD outbreak. For example: –Quarantine protocols, euthanasia protocols, cleaning & disinfecting protocols, animal movement regulations, animal product regulations, communication pathways.  Correlates to other agencies plans in the event of an outbreak.

81. Milk Industry Response Plan  Plan was developed with the dairy industry to address the special problems that FMD would present to the industry.  The plan describes SOPs and protocols that would come into play during an FMD outbreak to reduce the risk of spread of the FMD virus and continue to ensure milk safety.

82. Kentucky’s Rapid Veterinary Information Network (IRVIN)  It was determined that IDALS needed a way to quickly communicate information to Kentucky’s veterinarians during an FMD outbreak.  IRVIN uses burst e-mail technology to communicate with veterinarians who are on a list server maintained by IDALS on the ICN.

83. Training for Veterinarians  4 Continuing Education Meetings were offered to all Kentucky licensed veterinarians –Approximately 250 vets attended  More are planned for next year –We are hoping to continue to offer them on a yearly basis

84. Training For Other Agencies  Training modules must be developed to educate other state agencies that would respond to an infectious animal disease disaster.

85. Education is being provided for:  Producers  Producer Advocacy Groups  Industry

86. Next on the list!  Veterinary Response Teams –Veterinary Response Teams made up of private practitioners should be developed and trained. –Teams would be trained in biosecurity, euthanasia, surveillance and inspection. –These teams will decrease the response time to an animal disease disaster, which will be essential for containment.

87. Quick Overview of the Kentucky FMD Response and Recovery Plan  The state plan outlines who is responsible for what and when they are to act! –Each state agency involved has been assigned responsibilities to the Plan –Each agency then determines how they will meet their responsibilities to the plan

88. Who is Involved in Planning?  Governors Office, IDALS, IEMD, IDNR, IDOT, IDPS, IDPH, DPD/Guard.  Industry Groups  Kentucky University College of Veterinary Medicine

89. Foot and Mouth Disease Virus Why should we worry?  It affects the most number of economically important species.  It can spread by direct contact, indirect contact and aerosol.  100% of susceptible animals exposed will become infected.

90. There are 4 Action Levels that Could Activate the State Plan  Action Level 4: FMD in North America but not Kentucky  Action Level 3: Presumptive Positive case of FMD in Kentucky  Action Level 2: Confirmed Positive FMD case of FMD in Kentucky, local resources are sufficient  Action Level 1: Same as 2, but local resources are exhausted

91. Some Key Responsibilities  IDALS - Lead state agency  EMD - Communication pathways, resource location and allocation  DNR - Wildlife risk assessment, identification of disposal location  DOT - Burial equipment, organizes private contractors, enforces movement restrictions  DPS - Perimeter security, conflict resolution, perimeter decontamination

92. Federal Interface  The State Veterinarian and the Federal Area Veterinarian in Charge would work together to determine a course of action during an outbreak.  Federal resources would be available eventually, but states should be prepared to handle the first couple of cases using state resources.

93. Action Level 4 FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky  What will happen first! –The Kentucky Secretary of Agriculture will notify the Governor of a Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak. –The Kentucky Secretary of Agriculture will request a proclamation of disaster emergency.  This will clear the way to allow an expansion of state powers to enforce an embargo.

94. Action Level 4 FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky  Initial investigation! –The philosophy is to be tough in the beginning and lift restrictions later. Initially, you can’t be too careful when dealing with FMD.  The initial investigation may take in excess of two weeks!  All animal movement will either stop or be accounted for!  Don’t be surprised if there is a national shut down.

95. Action Level 4 FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky  Determining the restricted area! –Infected state and the contiguous states.  If FMD was found in North Carolina then North Carolina and bordering states would become a restricted area.  Embargo would include all animals, animal products and equipment coming into the state. –Kentucky will begin tracing to see if animals have entered the state from the restricted areas.  Veterinarians can help with this process by notifying the State Vet of knowledge of any movement.

96. Action Level 4 FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky  Major concerns during the initial investigation (prior to permit system)! –Animals and animal products already on the road to Kentucky.  This should not be a concern after the first 48 hours. –Tracing of animals and animal products that have entered Kentucky in the last 30 days.  Especially movement from the restricted areas.

97. Action Level 4 FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky  Animals and animal products already on the road to Kentucky! –IDALS would work with DOT and DPS to control movement.  There will be a need for veterinarians and inspectors to provide support to DOT and DPS to help determine origin and destination of animals.

98. Action Level 4 FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky  Animals and animal products already on the road to Kentucky! –If origin is from a non-restricted area then there are two options.  1. If destination is not Kentucky, then the vehicle will be given a permit to pass through Kentucky.  2. If destination is Kentucky, the vehicle will be given a permit to deliver. Any premises receiving animals will be under a 30 day movement and inspection quarantine.

99. Action Level 4 FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky  Tracing of animals and animal products that have entered Kentucky in the last 30 days! –Premises that have received animals from the restricted area will be quarantined and be placed on the State Inspection List. –Premises that received animals from the non- restricted areas will have a 30 day movement quarantine.

100. Action Level 4 FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky  Controlling movement of animals and animal products into the State! –A permit system will be implemented requiring permits for movement of all animals, animal products, and agricultural equipment into the State  Origin must be from the non-restricted areas or permit will be denied.

101. Action Level 4 FMD in United States /Canada/Mexico but not in Kentucky  Controlling movement of animals and animal products within the State. –Unless specifically quarantined, movement of livestock will be as normal. –Movement should be limited to welfare reasons.  Example: From a swine nursery to a grower.

102. Action Level 3 Presumptive Positive in Kentucky  Declaration will be based on: –Epidemiology –Serology –FADD Investigation  Duration of action level 3 will be short –Virus Isolation is Positive = Action Level 2 –Virus Isolation is Negative = Action Level 4

103. Action Level 3 Presumptive Positive in Kentucky  Behind the scenes! –Unified command notified. –Farm is quarantined.  Tracing starts  Contiguous premises determined, notified, investigated and given biosecurity instructions.  High risk zone, buffer zone determined.

104. Action Level 3 Presumptive Positive in Kentucky  Behind the scenes! –Gather necessary equipment. –Notify the players for IDALS responsibilities.  Appraisers  Euthanasia teams  C&D teams  Veterinarians

105. Action Level 2 Confirmed Positive in Kentucky  Viral isolation is positive for FMD! –Preparation work done prior to virus isolation during Action Level 3 is initiated. –Shut Down  Animal concentration points –Sale Barns –Buying Stations –Fairs –Zoo’s

106. So what would happen if we got FMD?  FMD in another State –Embargo the infected state. No movement of animals to Kentucky. –Initially embargo the contiguous states around the infected state. –Trace any animal movement into Kentucky from embargoed areas.  Any animals that were exposed to FMD will be humanely euthanitized.

107. What if we had FMD in Kentucky?  FMD in Kentucky –Close all sale barns, fair, livestock concentration points. –Suspend A.I. and Embryo Transfer –Initially stop all movement of susceptible animals, then institute a permit system to control movement. –Set up quarantine zones  Humanely euthanize all exposed susceptible animals –Trace animal movements

108. Containment  Trace, Trace, Trace –We must know if movement of animals, equipment and people have exposed other premises.  Tracing will be the most difficult and time consuming task! –If any premises are determined to be exposed then the Quarantine Zone will be set up.

109. Scenario

110. The Scenario: October 1st & 2nd  It’s late fall 2002, temperatures have been in the upper 50’s, lows in the upper 30’s and rainfall has been normal.  Kentucky’s State Vet’s office is busy with normal activities when a call comes to Dr. Schiltz from his counter part in North Carolina.

111.  The State Vet in North Carolina tells Dr. Schiltz that some swine samples sent into the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory in Plum Island have presumptively tested positive for FMD!  North Carolina has decided to activate their FMD Plan and is issuing a press release.  About the same time Kentucky’s Federal Area Veterinarian in Charge receives the same message from Plum Island.

112.  Dr. Schiltz notifies the Secretary of Agriculture as to the situation.  A meeting is held with the State Vet, AVIC and the Secretary to discuss options.  It is decided that the risk warrants notification of the Governor.  Kentucky’s Secretary of Agriculture requests a Proclamation of Disaster Emergency which activates the State Plan to Action Level 4.

113.  The Unified Command is notified of the situation.  The Animal Health Emergency Response Teams are notified. –Industry, producer groups, veterinary organizations.  The State Vets office begins intense tracing procedures to determine animal movements from North Carolina for the last 30 days.

114. October 2nd and 3rd  An embargo is placed on all live animals coming into Kentucky from North Carolina and contiguous states around it.  The DOT and Law Enforcement are asked to stop all vehicles carrying livestock to determine origin and species.  Kentucky’s Milk Industry Response Plan is activated.

115.  Kentucky Rapid Veterinary Information Network is activated and a notice is sent out detailing the situation to Kentucky Veterinarians.  Press releases are sent out to detail the situation to the public.

116. Meanwhile Back in Washington  After the appropriate declarations by the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States, there is a 72 hour moratorium on all animal movement across the United States.  Activation of the Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization (READEO)is underway.

117. October 2nd -3rd  During a trace of swine moving from North Carolina, it is determined that 1000 feeder pigs came into Kentucky 5 days ago from the same production facility that is quarantined in N.C.  The feeder pigs ended up in a facility in Chickasaw County outside of New Hampton.

118.  The production facility is called by the State Vet and told of the situation. A verbal quarantine is issued and a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) is sent to the premises.  The FADD examines the pigs and determines that some have clinical signs consistent with FMD. Samples are taken and are sent to Plum Island.  Veterinary inspections of contiguous premises is initiated.

119.  The farm is officially quarantined, secured, and biosecurity protocols are put in place.  IDALS starts trace outs on anyone who has come in contact with that farm.  With all the evidence available from the FADD, the State Vet, AVIC and Secretary of Agriculture agree that the State should proceed to action Level 3.  Unified command and AHERT are notified

120. October 3rd - 5th  DNR is given the 911 address and legal description of the premises.  DNR initiates a wildlife assessment of area.  Entry points and decontamination stations are determined and set up on the infected premises.  Perspective quarantine zone is determined and communicated to EMD.

121. Entry/Exit for Infected or Contiguous Premises

122.  Local sheriff’s office is briefed on the situation.  Sheriff is asked to prepare to set up a perimeter 6.2 miles out from the infected premises. –All roads that bisect the perimeter must be shut down and entry/ exit points are established  Law enforcement is asked to prepare to stop vehicles moving live animals in that county.  Requests are put out to local fire and HAZMAT to prepare to set up decontamination stations at the entry/exit points.

123.  Location of all necessary equipment for euthanasia, burial and disposal is determined.  Personnel responsible for those functions are notified.  Rules and regulations are prepared to be implemented and communicated to the Unified Command and AHERT  Tracing continues for more live animal shipments into Kentucky.

124. October 5th-6th  A confirmed positive case of FMD from the production facility in North Carolina is reported by Plum Island.  The State Vet, AVIC and Secretary of Agriculture agree, based on the evidence, that the state should progress to Action Level 2.  All Level 3 preparations are implemented.  Susceptible animals on the presumptive Kentucky farm are depopulated….why?

125. Rationale For Depopulation  North Carolina had a confirmed case.  The pigs that entered Kentucky from N.C. came from the same facility and had signs consistent with FMD.  Those animals are at an extreme high risk for having FMD.

126.  During the time between Action Level 3 and 2 the following will be happening. –DNR has used the GPS to locate a suitable burial site in the depopulation zone. –DNR has mobilized personnel to the site to do a burial assessment. –DNR should have finished a wildlife assessment for the quarantine area. –IDALS, EMD, DOT and DNR will be communicating to get the needed burial equipment to the site. –Access to the site will involve strict biosecurity procedures in and out of the premises.

127.  During the time between Action Level 3 and 2 the following will be happening. –Local law enforcement should have set up the perimeter and be providing personnel to man entry/exit –Local law enforcement should be stopping all vehicles carrying animals and checking health papers –Local law enforcement should be available to mediate conflict resolutions between producers and State Officials

128.  Expected biosecurity procedures. –There is only one entry to a premises. –Vehicles will remain off premises unless approved by IDALS. –A change of clothes into disposable coveralls prior to entering the premises. –Absolutely no contact with animals or areas where animals are housed. –Don’t bring on anything that can’t be dipped in disinfectant.  Watches, hearing aids, palm pilots etc.  Cell phones can be placed in plastic bags.

129.  Biosecurity procedures –When personnel are done with their assigned tasks they will go to the decontamination station on the premises. –After decontamination, personnel will not be allowed to come into contact with susceptible animals for 1 week, unless they are sent to another confirmed positive premises.

130. Disinfectants  The primary disinfectants that will be used are: –Citric acid at 1% or less dilution –Virkon S at a 2% or less dilution –Oxysept 333 (paracetic acid) –Sodium Hydroxide –Bleach

131. Back to the Scenario October 5th and 6th  Action Level 2 declared. –All sale barns, fairs, animal collection points, breeding facilities are closed and inspected by veterinarians. –All zoo’s, parks and animal attractions are closed and inspected by veterinarians. –All movement of animals in Kentucky stops unless movement is approved by IDALS, people caught moving livestock with out permission will be penalized.

132.  Tracing from the Kentucky premises determines that a feed truck, veterinarian, and one hired individual all were on the farm in the last 5 days. –All premises with susceptible animals that were visited by the feed truck, veterinarian and hired hand are now quarantined and investigated. –If proper biosecurity was not maintained by any of the above people. Any farms with susceptible animals will be depopulated and the process starts all over again.

133. Scenario October 6th - 7th  Kentucky results are positive for FMD. –Veterinarians will be inspecting premises in the quarantine zone on a regular basis to look for FMD. –Any farm that has susceptible animals showing clinical signs of FMD will be depopulated. –Once a farm is depopulated, a decontamination team will disinfect the farm and it will sit empty for 30 days or more.

134. Scenario October 6th - 7th Continued  Veterinary inspection, of a 300 head feedlot 10 miles down wind from the infected swine facility, determines that the cattle have clinical signs consistent with FMD.  The veterinarian calls in the premises to be depopulated  Unified Command is notified and the whole process starts over again……….

135. Comments  Implementation of new vaccines, new differential tests and new diagnostic tools will change the way we handle FMD in the future.  Until those methods are validated and available we will have to rely on what we currently have planned.

136. Conclusion  You can see how FMD could spread very rapidly!  If Kentucky got FMD our best chance to stop it is early in the infection.  If FMD gets a foot hold, our resources will quickly dwindle.  Lets hope we never have to use the plan!

137. The Quarantine Zone

138. Plan Changes  Initially we came up with the definitions for our zones, however as other state, regional and federal plans develop the definitions are going to change in order to provide continuity across all plans.  Rather that focus on names I want to address common concepts that will apply to all animal disease disasters.

139. Overview  Legal authority  Flow of information  Quarantine Zone  Zone Security  Incident command structure  Cleaning and Disinfecting  Personal Protective Gear

140. Legal Authority  The question of quarantine? –According to the Code of Kentucky, IDALS already has the ability to control the movement of animals and agricultural products. –The quarantine of people to their premises is a little more complicated.  We believe that after the Governor signs the proclamation of disaster emergency the ability to control the movement of people exists.

141. Flow of information  Two major routes of information –Directly from the Department of Agriculture officials.  Incident commander  Forward command post  Veterinarian on the premises –Via EMD and the EM 2000 system  Will help coordinate all activities of all involved state agencies

142. Quarantine Zone  Will be one of the only consistent features of any animal disease disaster that activates the state plan.  No two diseases are alike so: –Size will be variable. –Level of security will be variable. –Level of cleaning and disinfecting will be variable.  Within a Quarantine Zone there will be a perimeter set up.

143. QZ: The Perimeter QZ: The Perimeter  Focused area of security –Designated entry and exit points. –C&D units present at all entry/exits. –Entry and Exit by permission only.  Strict Movement Restrictions! –All animal movement by permit only. –Movement for Animal Welfare reasons only.

144. QZ: Security  The perimeter will have entry/exit points.  Once the perimeter is set up, patrols inside the premises should not be needed. –Established entry/exit points will control the movement of people, animals and vehicles.  Outside of the perimeter patrols may be needed to make sure movement rules are being followed.

145. QZ: Security  The DOT made mention of being able to provide ID’s for those involved in response.  In the first few days verbal approval will have to be sought until the ID system is implemented.

146. Incident Command Structure  The USDA has decided to use this during disease disasters.  All Federal and State veterinary officials will eventually be trained in ICS.  My next goal is to try to break down all of this planning into ICS verbiage.

147. Incident Command Structure  Based on the ICS model local law enforcement will be utilized first then regional, then state, then possibly the National Guard.  The fact is we won’t have enough people to enforce all the rules, so we have to prioritize.  Best illustrated via an example.

148. The Incident  An FADD is tripped to a farm where a Foreign Animal Disease my be present. –At this point the FADD is the Incident Commander –In most cases the incident will be resolved without involvement from other state agencies –If it is highly likely there is a disease like FMD present then things change.

149. The Incident  Note! –If for some reason in your normal duties you are the first to end up on a premises where there is a suspected animal disease outbreak, do not leave that premises. –The State Veterinarians Office should be contacted a soon as possible. (515-281-5305) –The State Veterinarian will advise you on what steps need to be taken.

150. The Incident  With activation of the State Plan the following should happen. –EMD or the State Veterinarian will contact the county sheriff to ask for assistance. –Information detailing the Incident will be given out along with instructions –At this point we will have a presumed positive case

151. The Incident  The infected premises –This is the first premises secured. In most cases a law enforcement person will not be needed, but it is a possibility.

152. The Incident  If you are tripped to the infected premises. –Do not park on the farm, park on the road. –Do not walk on to the farm wait for the FADD to give you instructions. –If it is a distress call then you can enter the premises. We can always disinfect you if we have to!

153. The Incident  The Contiguous Premises –The second premises secured –Again, you may not be needed to secure this premises. –Same rules of entry apply to the contiguous premises

154. The Incident  Setting up a Perimeter in the Quarantine Zone –This will be the most likely activity that you will be asked to do. –We will rely heavily on your expertise. You will have input. –Our major requirement will be that the perimeter must be a certain minimum distance from the incident depending on the disease.

155. The Incident  For example: –There is a farm in Story County that is suspect for FMD. –We would need a perimeter at least 6.2 miles from the Incident  All roads that enter the perimeter must be blocked off and entry/exit points established.

156. The Incident  Inside the perimeter, the movement of animals, animal products and wastes will be severely restricted. –This area should not have to be patrolled  Outside of the perimeter there will be movement restrictions. Nothing will move without permission and documentation. –Patrols would have to help enforce movement bans

157. The Incident  Trucks hauling animals without documentation will be sent back to the premises of origin.  That person should be reported to IDALS so we can put a quarantine on the premises.  If the movement infraction is serious enough the producer could face a loss of indemity on their animals.

158. The Incident  Once a forward command is established the Incident Commander will change.  The Veterinarian on the premises will still be in charge of activities on that particular premises.

159. Conflict Resolution  Obviously, if we are going to destroy the livelihood of a producer tensions may run high. –In England, officials were periodically threatened with guns or violence.  The same skills that you have now for resolving conflict may be required. –The only difference is you may have to be decontaminated after the problem is resolved.

160. Cleaning and Disinfecting  There will be C&D at each entry and exit point on the perimeter. –Provided by the local fire department or HAZMAT crew  There will be C&D on every infected premises, contiguous premises and contact exposed premises.

161. Cleaning and Disinfecting  If you have to go on a premises to investigate. –We will provide you with protective wear. –Don’t wear anything that can’t be dipped in disinfectant.  Watches, electronics, wallets, papers.  Radios and cell phones can be put into plastic bags

162. Cleaning and Disinfecting  Once you are done, you will be cleaned and disinfected on the premises.  You will not come into contact with susceptible animals or clean premises for 5 to 7 days. –However you may be utilized on other infected premises.

163. Personal Protective Gear  Depending on the disease present, you will be provided with necessary protective gear.  I don’t predict that the majority of deputies will have direct contact with disease agents.  If direct contact is necessary then we will provide what you will need. –Coveralls, respirators (if necessary), gloves, protective eyeware.

164. Investigations  In the event it is determined that the disease introduction is deliberate, an investigation is warranted. –Investigators will be briefed on the disease, biosecurity requirements and given personal protective gear by the FADD or other designated veterinary official.

165. Chain of evidence  Samples that are taken by the FADD can be used a evidence for that particular farm.  Any other evidence that investigators want can be taken but must be disinfected prior to leaving –Example: You want to take a document, then you place it in an evidence bag and the evidence bag is disinfected.

166. When in doubt  The best resource for you out in the field is the veterinarian.  Don’t hesitate to utilize them for all your questions on a situation.