1. Political sociology Focusing on power or political realm

2. Micro-level Politics - voting studies and political attitudes – Phil Converse: nature of belief systems in mass publics and role of opinion leaders and local influentials – Bill Gamson: how media affects attitudes and how groups (as opposed to mass media) frame issues

3. Organizational/Institutional Politics Pluralism: Dominant Theory of Decisionmaking in U.S. Government – Competing leaders Compromise Logrolling: helping out Greatest good for greatest number Protection of minority interests – Multiple interests Multi-faceted: class, status, party Issue specific Cross-cutting

4. Weber's Theory of Interests Class: life chances: education and property Status: life style: Goths or Metrosexuals or Hip Hop Players/Gangsters or stay-at-home moms Party: power – ability to get what you want despite resistance – might be class based, status based, both or neither – tends to be more status based when economy is stable; class based during economic upheavals

5. Cross-cutting soldidarities bfe wfe bme wmewfw bfw bmw

6. Party Systems Organizational and Institutional Anthony Downs: Effects of Two Party System: convergence liberal party conservative party Distribution of Constituent Political Attitudes

7. Integrated Political Theory of 1970 Mass society: Macro Level/Institutional – accessible elites: lack of intermediate buffers between masses and elites – available masses: lack of integration into local associations and collectivities Available Masses swept into mass movements that threaten accessible elites

8. Kornhauser's Mass Society Available Non-elites: Lack of secondary, voluntary associations: mal-integration Accessible Elites: Vulnerability to non-elite influence, direct or mediated Availability of Non-Elites Accessibility of Elites LowHigh Low Communal Society Totalitarian Society High Pluralist Society Mass Society

9. Collective Behavior: Organizational and Group Level Theory Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, – mass movements begin with breakdown of social control – milling and gossip conducive to generalized beliefs need for immediate action sense of empowerment utopian goals

10. Frustration-Aggression: Social Psychological Theory Ted Gurr: intolerable "want-get" gap – literature on reference groups – relative deprivation James Davies – "J" curve of declining rewards/expectations – intolerable gap (like Gurr)

11. Davies J Curve of Rising Expectation Leading to Frustration Rewards High Low Time Early Late expected obtained intolerable want-get gap

12. Political Theory in 1970 Masses were not politically informed or rational in political attitudes or actions (Converse) Pluralism required that elites remain accessible but masses must be integrated into intermediate associations (Kornhauser) Parties tended toward moderation, but masses were susceptible to extremist appeals (Downs and Smelser)

13. Political Theory 1970 Predictions nonroutine political action increased when times were hard and social integration and social control broke down nonroutine action increased as routine action declined nonroutine participants were socially isolated and politically uninvolved/uninformed nonroutine action was ineffective/expressive (emotional rather than rational)

14. Viewed From Functional Theory Routine action indicated value consensus and integration Non-routine action was indicative of "anomie" and malintegration Protests, demonstrations, marches, and riots of 1950s and 1960s were dysfunctional society was out of balance/equilibrium, moving toward anarchy and chaos

15. Viewed From Conflict Perspective Sociologists sympathetic with movements of the Fifties and Sixties: Civil Rights, Students, Anti-War Challenged Functional theory Argued that protesters were as rational as people who studied them Celebrated the awakening of American democracy

16. Evidence Challenging Functional Theory Jeff Paige (Oct 1971, ASR) survey of 237 black men in Newark, NJ – riot participants had high efficacy and low trust of government – rioters were knowledgeable but distrustful – Rioters were knowledgeable but less trustful compared to civil rights activists

17. Percent Participation by Trust in Government Rioting

18. Evidence (continued) Feagin and Hahn, Ghetto Revolts (1973) – found rioters more likely to be long-term residents – rioters well integrated into ghetto community – targets were chosen rationally—absentee landlords rather than local residents

19. Bill Gamson, Strategy of Social Protest (1975) Historical Analysis of “Political Challengers,” 1800-1940 – Roughly half were at least modestly successful in achieving their goals – Challengers with modest (reform) goals were not more successful – Challengers who used nonviolence were not necessarily more successful – Organized challengers were more successful

20. Outcome of Resolved Challenges New Advantages Acceptance FullNoneTotal ManyFull Response 38% (20) Pre-emption 11% (6) 49% (26) NoneCo-optation 9% (5) Collapse 42% (22) 51% (27) Total47% (25)53% (28)N=53

21. Charles Tilly Shorter and Tilly, Strikes in France (1974) – Strikes more common when times were good Low unemployment Economic growth Tilly, Mobilization to Revolution (1978) – Political violence and routine political action (e.g., voting) often go hand in hand

22. Evidence Summary Research accumulated in 1970s to challenge various pieces of the mass society, collective behavior, and relative deprivation theories of political influence Thus the integrated theory has been thoroughly critiqued and challenged both theoretically and empirically

23. Challenges to Pluralist Model of Decision-making While Mass Society, etc. was being challenged, a variety of studies challenged the pluralist model of decision-making These studies are generally guided by conflict theory and are might be called the “ruling elite” model of decision-making

24. Ruling Elite Studies Floyd Hunter’s study of Atlanta, Community Power Structure (1953) is the classic study of elite networks and elite domination of public policy Dorothy Nehil’s study of Boston indicates elite domination through networks of business and political elites Bachrach and Baratz (1962) classic on “nondecisions” promoted by elites

25. Ruling Elite Studies (continued) Matthew Crenson, Unpolitics of Air Pollution (1971) showed how pollution remained a “non-issue” in the most polluted cities Our own Robert Perrucci and Marc Pillisuk (ASR 1970) showed how inter-organizational leaders, who served on multiple corporate boards and linked these orgs – Had a reputation for local power – Had similar attitudes and interests in local politics

26. Pluralist Versus Ruling Elite and Functional versus Conflict Models Methodological distinctions – Pluralist focus on public policy decisions and public meetings – Ruling elite focus on inter-organizational networks and reputation for power/influence

27. Debate (continued) Theoretical arguments – Liberals argue that poor people or non-elites have to fight their way into the polity – Elites promote non-decisions/status quo – Political challenges predicted by Interests Organization opportunity – Political challenges produce social change

28. Tilly’s Mobilization Model OrganizationInterest Mobilization Repression/ Facilitation Power Opportunity/ Threat Collective Action Source: Tilly (1978), p. 56

29. Tilly ’ s (1978) Interests Marxist: use class as “ predictors of the interests people will pursue in the long run ” (p. 61); these are objective class interests Subjective/expressed interests: Tilly uses these to predict what people will do in the short run Marx roots interests in the relations and modes of production and the relations between and within classes — the relations of life and work Weber distinguishes class, status, and party interests, which may or may not predict collective action.

30. Tilly ’ s (1978, p. 63) Organization in Terms of Categories and Networks Catness Netness high low high low Casual Crowd Friendship Networks All Brazilians Printers Union Local organization

31. Tilly (1978, p. 112) on Government Response to Challengers Small Facilitation Scale of Toleration Claim Repression Large WeakStrong Power of Group

32. Tilly ’ s Model of Collective Action Predicted by Power, Mobilization, and Opportunity/Threat ∞ 0 Collective Goods Obtained Resources Expended LowHigh opportunity break even threat mobilization

33. Power, Mobilization, and Opportunity/Threat: Tilly (1978) Power results from relations with others, including governments. Facilitation or repression are the extreme reactions to collective action, decreasing or increasing the cost/benefits of collective action. Graphically, power is represented by the shape of the S curve that describes the return on collective actions (collective goods obtained/resources expanded). The steeper the curve the greater the power. Mobilization limits the potential return, however, since the resources expended cannot exceed mobilization (mobilization is defined as resources controlled by constituents * probability that these will be committed). Opportunity is "the extent to which other actors, including governments, are vulnerable to new claims which would, if successful, enhance the contender's realization of its interests." (p. 133) Threat is "the extent to which other groups are threatening to make claims which would, if successful, reduce the challenger's realization of its interests." (p.133)

34. Resource Mobilization Theory Resource Mobilization Theory: Gamson, Tilly, McCarthy & Zald – is now the dominant perspective on social movements and social change – it has been challenged by conservatives and radicals and has been tweaked by friendly critics McAdam: political processs theory Tarrow: political opportunities

35. Challenges to Resource Mobilization Theory State centered theory: Skocpol, Evans – Bringing the State Back In – need to focus on ability of governments to effect policy innovations to manage constituent discontent to accommodate other governments

36. New Social Movement theory Focus on difference between labor movement rational materialist self-interested And new social movements (e.g., anti-nuclear) community building versus policy status (versus class) more expressive

37. Social Movement Theory Today Some cynics suggest return to 1950s But new theories are different from 1970 Tilly's model of interests, organization and opportunity is an interactive contingency model of political influence Skocpol and Goldstone and other state- centered folks offer similar model of state capacity

38. State-Centered Model Skocpol, et al. view state in world system – relations with other states affect capacity help from friends problems with enemies – state has similar relations with constituents possibilities for support threat of opposition state other states constituents

39. Political Process Model Sid Tarrow and Doug McAdam developed this model to accommodate both – Constituents and – The State Tarrow (1994): waves of political protest occur in response to political opportunities – “increased access, influential allies, divided elites, and unstable alliances” (pp. 86-89)

40. Political Process (continued) Tarrow argues that – Organized interests Seize opportunities To gain new advantages – New interests emerge take advantage of already be-leaguered authorities Until elites are able to re-establish alliances, close ranks, and close off political opportunities

41. Political Process (continued) Tarrow explains: at the end of a wave/cycle – Challengers and elites attempt to Consolidate gains Minimize losses – What remains is the “residual of reform” (p. 186)

42. Political Process (conclusion) Political process theory is, essentially – A liberal, interactive, contingency model – That focuses on the relations between governments and their challengers – This is a friendly amendment to Resource Mobilization theory: the dominant perspective in political sociology – It is being challenged by conservatives and radicals – Piven and Cloward are among the radicals

43. Poor People’s Movements Piven and Cloward argue that “institutional conditions … create and limit the opportunities for mass struggle” Furthermore, “not formal organizations but mass defiance … won in the 1930s and 1960s” “organizations that were developed … tended to blunt the militancy” (p. xv)

44. Poor People’s Movements (cont.) “formal organizations collapsed as the movements subsided” (p. xvi) “John L. Lewis and the Congress of Industrial Organizations did not create the strike movement of the industrial workers; it was the industrial workers who created the CIO” (p. 153)

45. Piven and Cloward vs. Resource Mobilization theory Piven and Cloward argue against the idea that organizations produce collective action or political protest They argue that collective action or protest produces the organizations Political protest Political organization

46. Questions Where do rights come from? – government? – political challengers? Do rights matter?

47. Questions (continued) Consider rights movements – Bill of Rights – Right to unemployment compensation – Right to collective bargaining – Civil rights – Welfare rights

48. Where Did These Rights Come From? All of these rights were promoted by political challengers – Anti-federalists – Unemployed workers – Workers – Blacks – Welfare recipients

49. Rights (continued) All of these rights were granted by the state – Federalist concessions: Bill of Rights – FDR/Wagner: Wagner Act – JFK/LBJ So rights are both demanded and granted

50. Piven and Cloward (and Hogan) Political Opportunities, interests, and organization are all rooted in institutional structure Crises in republican capitalism – Depression of 1930s – Destruction of Southern cotton economy – Rise of post-industrial or postmodern economy