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I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Headquarters U.S. Air Force Air Force CONOPS & Capabilities Based Planning Lt Col Nathan Titus.

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Presentation on theme: "I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Headquarters U.S. Air Force Air Force CONOPS & Capabilities Based Planning Lt Col Nathan Titus."— Presentation transcript:

1 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Headquarters U.S. Air Force Air Force CONOPS & Capabilities Based Planning Lt Col Nathan Titus Resource Analyses Directorate Air Force Studies & Analyses Agency 19 Mar 04 UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

2 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Overview Capabilities Based Planning Background Challenges to Implementation Recent Efforts in Air Force Capabilities-Based Planning Observations/Recommendations UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

3 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Capabilities-Based Planning Background Focus on “possibilities” vs.. “specific validated threats” Central question must be “What do I need to do to achieve desired effects?” vs.. “How many of each system do I need?” Goal is to plan for robust, flexible forces, capable of meeting a wide variety of threats, rather than an “optimal” force for a narrow set of threats “[P]lanning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that necessitates choice.” Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation, MR-1513-OSD UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

4 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Challenges to Implementation Fundamentals: Defining terms: Effects and Capabilities Understanding the role of scenarios Analytic Issues: Proficiency vs. Sufficiency What do we mean by “Risk”? What does it cost? Determining priorities Organizational Challenges UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

5 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Fundamentals Defining effects and capabilities Effects are associated with a desired Outcome or Result Capabilities are Non-solution Specific – Describe What must be done to achieve Effects Fix the level to create common perspective Avoid overlaps, redundancy Identify relationships Role of scenario Scenarios needed to provide context for capability assessment Suite of scenarios/vignettes must span the range of potential conflicts in all dimensions (political, geography, intensity, etc) In resource constrained environment, best solution is robust across all scenarios – not an optimal solution to a point scenario which may never occur UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED

6 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Fundamentals: Defining Effects and Capabilities  Builds on Master Capability List  Links capabilities to effects  Explicitly identifies crosslinks and interdependencies between capabilities  Highlights “enabler” capabilities Sub- Capability Effect Capability Sub- Capability Sub- Capability Sub- Capability Sub- Capability Master Capability List Effects Construct  Functional decomposition of capabilities  Collectively Exhaustive and Mutually Exclusive  Provides a “menu” from which all CONOPS can choose required capabilities Capability 1Capability 2 Sub- Capability Sub- Capability Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- CapabilityUNCLASSIFIED

7 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Risk is derived from two independent assessments Our capability to deal with events or to provide effects (y axis) The severity of impact of the event if we fail to provide the capability (x axis) Analytic Issues: Defining Risk Risk concept not strictly ORM No attempt to determine the probability of adverse event (no validated data exists, this is left to senior leadership judgement) Measures capability to achieve required effects C4 C3 C6 C5 C8 C7 C2 C1 Severity of Impact CapabilityUNCLASSIFIED

8 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Analytic Issues: Capability Proficiency vs. Sufficiency Answering questions like “How much capability do we have?” or “How much capability do we need?” leads to two different looks at capability Proficiency – “how well” e.g., radar detection range Sufficiency – “how many” Force Structure Proficiency Key scenario elements are adversary and location Amenable to subjective or objective analysis techniques Sufficiency Key scenario elements are time related – how fast to arrive and how long to sustain Best addressed with an objective, quantitative analysis technique UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

9 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Gen Jumper’s “Sight Picture” Concepts of Operations (CONOPS)... will guide our planning and programming, requirements reform, and acquisition....make warfighting effects, and the capabilities we need to achieve them, the drivers for everything we do. …Air Staff designed a new review to replace the ‘Quarterly Acquisition Review Program’--we call this new approach a Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA).... shift from a program review to a review of how our programs contribute to warfighting capabilities and effects.UNCLASSIFIED

10 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Using the MCL Example Data Collection ToolUNCLASSIFIED

11 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Using the MCL Example Activity Diagram (Time Sensitive Targeting) Deconflict target Assess Cue(s) Determine Sensor Availability Task Sensor Collect Data Detect Target Determine Environment Track until Stopped ID Target Geolocate Target Update Target List Assign weapon to target Update Mission Plans Issue Execution Order Support Weapon Flyout DDD Target Collect BDI / BHI Assess BDI / BHI Remove from Target List Task BDI / BHIUNCLASSIFIED

12 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Using Value Functions When More is Better Elicitation - in units of the measure Is more of this good or bad? When can’t you do it with less? What is good enough? When does more not matter? Can’t do it with less Good Enough More doesn’t matter Example – More is better Measure: Detection range Units of measure: NMI Can’t do with less than 250 NMI Good enough is 500 NMI Over 1000 NMI doesn’t matterUNCLASSIFIED

13 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Air Force CONOPS Construct Focus for Planning & Programming Agile Combat Support Global Reach Global Power Global Vigilance Joint Vision Global Persistent Attack CONOPS Global Persistent Attack CONOPS Global Mobility CONOPS Global Mobility CONOPS Nuclear Response CONOPS Nuclear Response CONOPS Air & Space Expeditionary Forces Space & C4ISR CONOPS Space & C4ISR CONOPS Global Strike CONOPS Global Strike CONOPS Homeland Security CONOPS Homeland Security CONOPS USAF Vision UNCLASSIFIED

14 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Integrated CRRA Analysis Process Overview Product: Capability Performance Framework Product: Focus Areas List Product: Candidate Courses of Action Product: Prioritized Courses of Action Phase 1 - Foundations Phase 2A – Analysis (Subjective Assessment) Phase 2B – Analysis (Leveraging Existing Efforts & New Focused Work) Phase 2C – Analysis (Characterization and Optimization of Solutions) Phase 3 – Apply Professional Military Judgment Product: Planning and Programming Guidance to MAJCOMS (APPG) Define Scenarios Define Master Capability Library Define CONOPS Activity Models Assess Proficiency Pair-wise Comparisons Characterization of Warfighting Effects Optimization of Alternatives Characterization of Resource Constraints Define Metrics Assess Impact Assess Sufficiency Warm Database Mining CONOPS- Specific Analyses Architecture- Based Thread Analyses CRRA Briefing TrailUNCLASSIFIED

15 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e RAT Teams RAT View Global Strike Global Persistent Attack Space & C4ISR Nuclear Response Homeland Security Global Mobility Air Force View Surveillance & Reconnaissance Intelligence Command & Control Communications Force Application Force Projection Protect Prepare & Sustain Create the Force CONOPS View Relationship of AssessmentsUNCLASSIFIED

16 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e CONOPS MCL Connection to Joint Functional Concepts 1.0 Surveillance & Reconaissance 1.0 Surveillance & Reconaissance 2.0 Intelligence 3.0 Command & Control 3.0 Command & Control 4.0 Communications 5.0 Force Application 6.0 Force Projection 8.0 Prepare & Sustain 8.0 Prepare & Sustain 7.0 Protect 9.0 Create the Force Battlespace Awareness Force Application Joint Cmd & Ctrl Protection Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concepts AF CONOPS CapabilitiesUNCLASSIFIED

17 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Observations/ Recommendations Measuring individual capabilities is not difficult; comparing the value/worth of different capabilities is the hard part Scenarios are still important! Maybe even more important than in threat-based planning Difficult to measure DOTLPF solutions vs. M solutions – need techniques to help do this Definitions are important – build consensus early! Rigorous application of a framework is necessary but not sufficient for success UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

18 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Summary The USAF is moving forward to establish Capabilities Based Planning as the foundation for how we conduct business in the future A constant communication between HQ/AF and MAJCOMs essential to understand contributions to warfighter, investment strategies to mitigate shortfalls and capability priorities Our task: make warfighting effects, and the capabilities needed to achieve them, the drivers for everything we do UNCLASSIFIED

19 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Back Up

20 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Analytic Issues: Cost Linking capabilities to cost demands a discussion of solutions – Should you even talk about costs? Decision makers need the input, but leads to other questions: What cost to use? NPV, LCC, Acquisition, O&M? How are currently owned systems valued? Will this approach stifle innovation? Bottom line is that we need to analyze solutions and costs, but do the capability analysis up front to ensure we are solving the most important problems

21 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Analytic Issues: Determining Shortfall Priorities Determining “Importance” of capability shortfalls How extensive is the shortfall? What is the impact if not fixed? How much of the Air Force is affected? No well-defined set of tools/models exists – need objective & subjective tools as well as military judgment Determine Weights Prioritize d Shortfalls C4 C3 C6 C2 C1 C5 C8 C7 Combine with Risk Assessment Scores Sensitivity Analysis Multiattribute Utility Analysis Shortfall priority = f(shortfall importance, risk, cost) UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

22 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Methodology Build Master Capability Library for all CONOPS Each CONOPS describes desired effects and capabilities required to achieve these effects Capabilities drawn from MCL to facilitate later integration Interdependencies and linkages between capabilities are explicitly defined in each CONOPS From CONOPS descriptions (above), effects construct built to aid subjective determination of “effects drivers”: Effects linked to capabilities, sub-capabilities Weights associated with the contribution of a capability or sub- capability determined by SME or from quick-turn analysis tools Weights are developed in the context of an overarching scenario Risk Assessment Charts – Depicts capability assessment vs.. severity of impact for capability in the context of an overarching scenario Integration is straightforward extension when common capability definitions and overarching scenarios are used – Required additional assumption is that all CONOPS Effects are of equal value

23 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Master Capability List (1 of 2) 1.0 Data Collection 2.0 Intelligence 3.0 Command & Control 3.0 Command & Control 4.0 Communications 1.1 Surveillance (Un-Cued Continuous Collection) 1.1 Surveillance (Un-Cued Continuous Collection) 1.2 Reconnaissance (Cued Search, Focused Coll.) 1.2 Reconnaissance (Cued Search, Focused Coll.) 1.3 Collect Weather Related Information 1.3 Collect Weather Related Information 2.1 Process and Exploit Intel 2.1 Process and Exploit Intel 2.2 Provide Intel Assessments 2.2 Provide Intel Assessments 3.1 Planning 3.2 Execution Management 3.2 Execution Management 3.3 Provide Positioning, Navigation, Timing Information 3.3 Provide Positioning, Navigation, Timing Information 4.1 Exchange Information 4.1 Exchange Information 4.2 Provide for Data Storage and Retrieval 4.2 Provide for Data Storage and Retrieval 4.3 Provide Network Damage Assessment & Reconstitution 4.3 Provide Network Damage Assessment & Reconstitution

24 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Master Capability List (2 of 2) 6.0 Full Spectrum Threat Response 6.0 Full Spectrum Threat Response 8.0 Mobility 7.0 Combat Support 6.1 Protect the Force 6.2 Provide Support for Civil Authorities 6.2 Provide Support for Civil Authorities 6.3 Defensive Information Operations 6.3 Defensive Information Operations 8.1 Airlift 8.2 Air Refueling 8.3 Space Lift 7.1 Establish Operating Locations 7.1 Establish Operating Locations 7.2 Generate the Mission 7.2 Generate the Mission 7.3 Support Mission and Forces 7.3 Support Mission and Forces 7.4 Posture Responsive Forces 7.4 Posture Responsive Forces 7.6 Public Affairs 7.5 Sustain Mission and Forces 7.5 Sustain Mission and Forces 5.0 Force Application 5.1 Countermeasures 5.2 Neutralize Air Threats/Targets 5.2 Neutralize Air Threats/Targets 5.3 Neutralize Space Threats/Targets 5.3 Neutralize Space Threats/Targets 5.4 Neutralize Surface Threats/Targets 5.4 Neutralize Surface Threats/Targets 5.6 Offensive Information Operations 5.6 Offensive Information Operations 5.5 Neutralize Sub-Surface Threats/Targets 5.5 Neutralize Sub-Surface Threats/Targets 5.7 Combat Search and Rescue 5.7 Combat Search and Rescue

25 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Global Mobility CONOPS: Notional Example (1 of 2) 1.0 Data Collection 2.0 Intelligence 3.0 Command & Control 3.0 Command & Control 4.0 Communications 1.1 Surveillance (Un-Cued Continuous Collection) 1.1 Surveillance (Un-Cued Continuous Collection) 1.2 Reconnaissance (Cued Search, Focused Coll.) 1.2 Reconnaissance (Cued Search, Focused Coll.) 1.3 Collect Weather Related Information 1.3 Collect Weather Related Information 2.1 Process and Exploit Intel 2.1 Process and Exploit Intel 2.2 Provide Intel Assessments 2.2 Provide Intel Assessments 3.1 Planning 3.2 Execution Management 3.2 Execution Management 3.3 Provide Positioning, Navigation, Timing Information 3.3 Provide Positioning, Navigation, Timing Information 4.1 Exchange Information 4.1 Exchange Information 4.2 Provide for Data Storage and Retrieval 4.2 Provide for Data Storage and Retrieval 4.3 Provide Network Damage Assessment & Reconstitution 4.3 Provide Network Damage Assessment & Reconstitution

26 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Global Mobility CONOPS: Notional Example (2 of 2) 6.0 Full Spectrum Threat Response 6.0 Full Spectrum Threat Response 8.0 Mobility 7.0 Combat Support 6.1 Protect the Force 6.2 Provide Support for Civil Authorities 6.2 Provide Support for Civil Authorities 6.3 Defensive Information Operations 6.3 Defensive Information Operations 8.1 Airlift 8.2 Air Refueling 8.3 Space Lift 7.1 Establish Operating Locations 7.1 Establish Operating Locations 7.2 Generate the Mission 7.2 Generate the Mission 7.3 Support Mission and Forces 7.3 Support Mission and Forces 7.4 Posture Responsive Forces 7.4 Posture Responsive Forces 7.6 Public Affairs 7.5 Sustain Mission and Forces 7.5 Sustain Mission and Forces 5.0 Force Application 5.1 Countermeasures 5.2 Neutralize Air Threats/Targets 5.2 Neutralize Air Threats/Targets 5.3 Neutralize Space Threats/Targets 5.3 Neutralize Space Threats/Targets 5.4 Neutralize Surface Threats/Targets 5.4 Neutralize Surface Threats/Targets 5.6 Offensive Information Operations 5.6 Offensive Information Operations 5.5 Neutralize Sub-Surface Threats/Targets 5.5 Neutralize Sub-Surface Threats/Targets 5.7 Combat Search and Rescue 5.7 Combat Search and Rescue

27 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e 1.3 Collect Weather Info 4.0 Comm Global Mobility Effects Construct Rapid Projection of Joint Power 6.0 FSTR 3.0 Command & Control 3.1 Planning 3.2 Execution Management 3.3 Nav, Pos, & Timing 4.1 Exchange Information 4.2 Data Storage 4.3 Network Damage Assess Data Collection 8.0 Mobility 7.0 Combat Support 7.1 Establish Operating Location 7.2 Generate the Mission 7.3 Support the Mission 7.4 Posture the Force 8.1 Air Lift8.2 Air Refueling8.3 Space Lift Defensive Countermeasures 6.1 Protect the Force

28 I n t e g r i t y - S e r v i c e - E x c e l l e n c e Sub-Capability 1.1 Capability 3 Crosscutting Analysis: Using the Effects Construct Effect A Capability 4Capability 5 Effect BEffect CEffect D Capability 6 Capability 2Capability 1 Sub-Capability 2.1 Sub-Capability 2.2 Sub-Capability 3.1 Sub-Capability 4.1 Sub-Capability 4.2 Sub-Capability Determination of contribution weights for each node can be done by separate pairwise comparisons or by M&S Contributions to each node sum to one to keep scale consistent


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