1. Who’s Really on First? A Domain-Level User, Task and Context Analysis for Response Technology Susanne Jul, PhD Pacific Disaster Center sjul@pdc.org

2. © SJul 20072ISCRAM 2007 the user their task the tool Who’s going to be using it? What are their abilities? What are their limitations? What do they know? What don’t they know? What are they trying to do? What are the goals? What can, can’t and must be done? When is it done? Under what circumstances are they doing it? Where are they? What resources are available? What are the conditions? When you design a tool, you must understand their context

3. © SJul 20073ISCRAM 2007 User, task, and context analysis Methodology for identifying user- and usage-centered design requirements Identifies different types and critical characteristics of target users, tasks and contexts Usually conducted at the application level

4. © SJul 20074ISCRAM 2007 Domain-level analysis Take advantage of domain-specific knowledge Identify broad types and critical characteristics of users, tasks and contexts Based on literature on disaster sociology

5. © SJul 20075ISCRAM 2007 Overview Discuss three dimensions of disaster that are linked to qualitative differences in response –Scale, kind and anticipability Discuss implications of these differences for response technology user interface design and research –Dimensions of users, tasks and contexts –Five domain-level design requirements for response technology

6. Dimensions of Disaster and Relationships to Response

7. © SJul 20077ISCRAM 2007 Sociological evidence Disaster sociology has been a field of systematic study since ~1950 Three dimensions of events correlated with response characteristics –Scale –Kind –“Anticipability” Literature predominantly reflects North American responses to natural disasters

8. © SJul 20078ISCRAM 2007 Scale A measure of the extent of the effects of an event Local EmergencyLocal DisasterDisasterCatastrophic Disaster Example1997 Paris traffic accident 2006 Mountain View apartment complex fire 9/11 Terrorist attack, 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake 1918 Flu Pandemic, 2004 US hurricane season, 2005 Hurricane Katrina Impact on community infrastructure Localized effects, if anyLocalized damage or lossExtensive damage or destruction Impact on response infrastructure Largely unaffectedLocalized damage or lossExtensive damage or destruction, and/or completely overwhelmed Adequacy of response measures Within local planningExceeds local capacity but within greater response capacity Exceeds all planning and capacity Organizational emergence Only established organizations mobilized Established and expanding organizations mobilized Established, expanding, extending and emergent organizations mobilized ScopeOnly part of single community and official jurisdiction affected Single community and official jurisdiction affected Multiple communities and official jurisdictions affected DurationHours-weeksWeeks-monthsMonths-years

9. © SJul 20079ISCRAM 2007 Organizational emergence Spontaneous involvement and behavior of individuals and organizations Tasks RoutineNon-Routine Operational Organizational Structure Same as pre- disaster I. Established (e.g., city emergency services) III. Extending (e.g., city council or church community) NewII. Expanding (e.g., American Red Cross) IV. Emergent (e.g., community group formed to collect donations) Limited disaster management knowledge and experience “DRC Typology”

10. © SJul 200710ISCRAM 2007 Scale A measure of the extent of the effects of an event Local EmergencyLocal DisasterDisasterCatastrophic Disaster Example1997 Paris traffic accident 2006 Mountain View apartment complex fire 9/11 Terrorist attack, 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake 1918 Flu Pandemic, 2004 US hurricane season, 2005 Hurricane Katrina Impact on community infrastructure Localized effects, if anyLocalized damage or lossExtensive damage or destruction Impact on response infrastructure Largely unaffectedLocalized damage or lossExtensive damage or destruction, and/or completely overwhelmed Adequacy of response measures Within local planningExceeds local capacity but within greater response capacity Exceeds all planning and capacity Organizational emergence Only established organizations mobilized Established and expanding organizations mobilized Established, expanding, extending and emergent organizations mobilized ScopeOnly part of single community and official jurisdiction affected Single community and official jurisdiction affected Multiple communities and official jurisdictions affected DurationHours-weeksWeeks-monthsMonths-years Austere context Unfamiliar tools Unfamiliar tasks Unfamiliar context Limited external assistance Limited disaster management knowledge and experience Collaboration and partnership formation

11. © SJul 200711ISCRAM 2007 Kind An indicator of the types of effects of an event Agency ConsensusConflict Affect Community disasterNatural hazard eventSocial conflicts Sector disasterTechnology failureSabotage Trans-system social rupture (TSSR) PandemicComputer virus

12. © SJul 200712ISCRAM 2007 Kind An indicator of the types of effects of an event Agency ConsensusConflict Affect Community disasterNatural hazard eventSocial conflicts Sector disasterTechnology failureSabotage Trans-system social rupture (TSSR) PandemicComputer virus Tasks requiring specialized skills and knowledge Collaboration and partnership formation

13. © SJul 200713ISCRAM 2007 Anticipability A measure of the possibility of preparing for a particular event Predictability EasyHard Influenceability Easy1. Conventional (e.g., 1986 Chernobyl) 2. Unexpected (e.g., 1979 Three Mile Island) Hard3. Intractable (e.g., 2005 Hurricane Katrina) 4. Fundamental (e.g., 9/11 Terrorist attack) Unexpected, novel tasks Unexpected contexts Gundel, 2005

14. Implications for Response Technology User Interface Design and Research

15. © SJul 200715ISCRAM 2007 Users, tasks and contexts Task-Relevant Knowledge Task-specificGeneral domainLittle Knowledge of Disaster Response Extensive Super-expertFunctional semi-expertFunctional inexpert Some ExpertSemi-expertFunctional inexpert Little SpecialistSemi-specialistInexpert Novelty ConventionalNovel Origin Agent-generatedBasicPhenomenal Response-generatedSustainingExceptional Austerity Infrastructure and Tools Infrastructure Only Tools OnlyLimited or none Familiarity VeryKnown normalKnown severeKnown harshKnown extreme SomewhatFamiliar normalFamiliar severeFamiliar harshFamiliar extreme UnfamiliarUnfamiliar normalUnfamiliar severeUnfamiliar harshUnfamiliar extreme the user their task their context

16. © SJul 200716ISCRAM 2007 Domain-level design requirements Response technology should 1.Support just-in-time learning of a.The primary task b.The needs and goals of the present operation, and, c.Disaster management practices in general 2.Aid response-driven tasks even when primary task is agent-driven 3.Actively nurture cooperation, collaboration and partnership formation 4.Impose standard structures and procedures, yet allow flexibility and deviation in their application 5.Aim for graceful augmentation

17. Future Work and Conclusions

18. © SJul 200718ISCRAM 2007 Future work Validate design principles Develop user, task and context characterizations into a more complete theory of design Extend analysis –Prevention, mitigation, preparedness and recovery phases of disaster management –Conflict situations –Cultures other than North American

19. © SJul 200719ISCRAM 2007 Conclusions First responders are often not First Responders User, task and context of any response technology may change suddenly and unexpectedly Technology must adapt to response -- disaster will not adapt to technology