1. AREA SECURITY
OPERATIONS

2. Military Police Functions
Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations
Area Security
Support River Crossing, Breaching Operations,
Passage of Lines
Straggler Control and Dislocated Civilian
Route Reconnaissance/Surveillance
MSR Regulation Enforcement
Reconnaissance Operations
Area Damage Control
Base/Air Base Defense
Response Force/TCF Operations
Critical Site, Asset, High-Risk Personnel Sec.
Force Protection/Physical Security
Antiterrorism
Police Intelligence Operations
Support Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Police Information Assessment Process
Active and Passive Role
Information Collection and Dessemination
Joint, Interagency, Multinational Coordination
Internment and Resettlement Operations
EPW/CI Handling
U.S. Military Prisoner Handling
Populace and Resource Control (PRC)
Dislocated Civilian
Law and Order (L&O) Operations
Law Enforcement
Criminal Investigations
US Customs Operations
Related Law and Order Training FM
PAGE 3-1

3. Outline Threat / Threat Purpose Rear Area Reconnaissance Operations
Area Damage Control
Base / Air Base Defense
Response Force / TCF Operations
Critical Site, Asset, High-Risk Personnel Security
Force Protection / Physical Security
Antiterrorism

4. AREA SECURITY INHERENT TASKS
Delay
HastyAmbush/Attack
Movement to Contact
Battle Handover to the TCF
Call for Fire

5. THREAT

6. THREAT PURPOSE
The purpose of the threat is to seize and maintain the initiative while degrading or eliminating the enemy’s flexibility and capability to sustain both close and deep fights. FM
PAGE 3-1

7. REAR OPERATIONS THREAT
LEVEL I: Those which can be defeated by Base or Base-Cluster self-defense measures.
LEVEL II: Those which are beyond base or base-cluster self-defense, and can be defeated by response forces, normally MP with supporting fires.
LEVEL III: Beyond Response Force Ability, must commit the TCF.

8. THREAT TARGETS Nuclear Storage and Delivery Systems
Command and Control Facilities
ADA Sites
Airfields
Critical Support and Logistics Facilities
Main Supply Routes
Reserves

9. REAR AREA

10. REAR AREA LAYOUT F E B A F L O T x COMMZ CORPS DIV BDE
MAIN BATTLE AREA X X X F E B A F L O T x X
X X X
COMMZ
CORPS
DIV
BDE X X X
COMBAT ZONE

11. RAOC

12. BASE/BASE CLUSTERS DESIGNATION
UNITS DESIGNATED BY RAOC AS:
Base
Units or multi-unit positions with definite perimeters.
Base Cluster
Grouping of bases based on mission and security requirements
Lacks clearly defined perimeter

13. BASE AND BASE CLUSTERS WOLF BASE BASE CLUSTER DRAGON WARRIOR BASE
LIGHTFIGHTER BASE
WARRIOR BASE
WOLF BASE
WARFIGHTER BASE
BASE CLUSTER DRAGON

14. Base Development Considerations Key Concerns: Mutually Supporting
Level I Defense
24 Hour Operations
Fratricide Prevention
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Execution
Survivability Measures
Event Mitigation Planning, I.e. Fire Fighting, Natural Disasters, Mass Casualty, Chemical-Biological Decontamination, Displacements

15. Area of Responsibility Defense Plan Development
72 Hours
Clusters
Develop
Cluster
Plan
RAOC approves
Rolls into AOR
RAOC AOR
Defense Plan
Corps
Order
24 Hours
48 Hours
Bases develop
Base Defense
Plan
CRCP

16. REAR OPERATIONS BASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANS
REAR CP DESIGNATES COMMANDER FOR EACH BASE OR BASE CLUSTER
SENIOR COMMANDER COMMANDS BASE CLUSTER
COMMANDERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR:
POSITIONING UNITS IN THEIR AOR
IPB OF THEIR AOR
DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF-DEFENSE PLAN

17. REAR OPERATIONS BASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANS
DEFENSE PLANS INCLUDE:
CLEAR DEFINITION OF DEFENSE C2
DETECTION OF THREAT
SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY
IDENTIFICATION OF UNIT RESPONSE FORCE
OBSTACLE PLAN
AREA DAMAGE CONTROL
INTERNAL ADA MEASURES
FIRE SUPPORT

18. REAR OPERATIONS BASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANS
FORWARDED TO MP CONDUCTING AREA SECURITY OR MMS IN THE BASE/BASE CLUSTER AO
FORWARDED TO QRF
FORWARDED TO REAR CP/RAOC/RTOC
COORDINATED WITH ADJACENT BASES OR CLUSTERS TO MAXIMIZE MUTUAL SUPPORT
COMMANDERS ESTABLISH 24 HOUR OPERATION CENTERS (BCOC/BDOC)
IN THE TA BASE DEFENSE COORDINATION TEAMS (BDCT’S) ASSIST IN REAR AREA DEFENSE PLANNING

19. Reconnaissance
Operations

20. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS/INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
Examples of PIR’s: Any Enemy Size Force, NBC Contaminated Area, Assassinations, Breach of Base Security measures, and Criminal Activity.
Examples of IR’s: Damage to roads, Locations of DZ’s/LZ’s, Possible Ambush Sites, Hospitals, External Fuel Sites, Water Sites, etc.

21. RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS
“As part of their area security mission, MP serve as the eyes
and ears of the battlefield commander by seeking out enemy
and reporting information obtained by recon patrols.”
FM PAGE 4-7
ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
AREA RECONNAISSANCE

22. FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE
REMAIN FOCUSED ON THE OBJECTIVE
REPORT QUICKLY AND ACCURATELY
RETAIN FREEDOM TO MANEUVER
GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT
DEVELOP THE SITUATION RAPIDLY

23. ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
Zone Reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning all route, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries.

24. ZONE RECONNAISSANCE BEST USED WHEN INITIALLY DEPLOYING INTO AN AREA
MOST TIME CONSUMING TYPE OF RECONNAISSANCE
COMMANDERS CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

25. 3 METHODS OF ZONE RECON
FAN
CONVERGING ROUTES
SUCCESSIVE SECTOR

26. FAN METHOD
ORP
ORP
RESERVE
PLANNED ROUTES
ORP

27. CONVERGING ROUTES
TO FRIENDLY
LINES
ORP

28. SUCCESSIVE SECTOR
ORP
RENDEZVOUS
POINT/ORPs

29. RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS ZONE RECON PATROL RECON ELEMENT RECON ELEMENTHQ

30. AREA RECONNAISSANCE
Area Reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area such as a town, ridge line, woods, or other feature critical to operations

31. AREA RECON GAIN SPECIFIC INFORMATION MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE
COMMANDER’S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENT
SIZE OF THE ELEMENT TO UTILIZE

32. AREA RECONNAISSANCE S SECURITY S RECON ELEMENT RECON OBJ ELEMENT S S

33. RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS AREA RECON PATROL RECON ELEMENT SECURITYHQ

34. Area
Damage
Control FM
PAGE 4-8

35. ADC Measures taken before, during and after
hostile action,man-made or natural
disasters to:
Reduce probability of damage
Regulate MSRs
Aid in continuation or reestablishment
of normal operations
Control refugees and provide local security

36. ADC Operations Panama LA Riots Hurricane Andrew West Coast Fires
Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo

37. Base / Air Base
Defense FM
PAGE 4-8

38. warning, and employment against enemy attacks. Base defense is the
BASE AND BASE CLUSTERS
“The MP is the base and base cluster commander’s link for detection, early
warning, and employment against enemy attacks. Base defense is the
cornerstone of rear security”.
FM PAGE 4-8
WARRIOR BASE
WOLF BASE
BASE CLUSTER DRAGON
LIGHTFIGHTER BASE
WARFIGHTER BASE

39. AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE (ABGD)
Local security measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify and reduce the effectiveness of the enemy ground attack directed against USAF bases and installations.

40. ABGD OBJECTIVE
The objective of ABGD is to prevent the degradation of sortie
generation by detecting and disrupting the enemy ground forces far
enough from the base to prevent the use of stand off or direct fire
weapons.
ABGD Requires:
MP to have special coordination with the USAF
MP to treat ABGD like any other base or base cluster

41. AIR FORCE AOR Air Base Perimeter and inside
3-5 KM out to include perimeter
METT-TC Driven

42. ARMY AOR 3-5 KM forward of Air Force AOR Deliberate Defense Measures
METT-TC Driven
Command Relationship

43. AVAILABLE FORCES ABGD FORCES (security forces) RESPONSE FORCES (MP)
TACTICAL COMBAT FORCES
TRANSIENT FORCES

44. USAF SECURITY FORCE WING CDR O-7 MSN SPT CDR O-6 GRP CDR CSP O-4/O-6
SQN X3 K9 X3
MORTAR X3
FLT X3

45. Response Force / TCF
Operations FM
PAGE 4-8

46. REAR OPERATIONS THREAT
LEVEL I: Those which can be defeated by Base or Base-Cluster self-defense measures.
LEVEL II: Those which are beyond base or base-cluster self-defense, and can be defeated by response forces, normally MP with supporting fires.
LEVEL III: Beyond Response Force Ability, must commit the TCF.

47. RESPONSE FORCES USUALLY MILITARY POLICE !! OTHER POSSIBILITIES
CHEMICAL
ENGINEERS
ELEMENT OF TCF
HN FORCES
RECONSTITUTING UNIT
TRANSITIONING COMBAT
FORCES

48. RESPONSE FORCES MISSIONS
Movement to Contact
Hasty Ambush
Hasty Attack
Delays
Call for Fire
Repel attacks against and defend Critical Sites

49. RESPONSE FORCE CONSIDERATIONS
Defense Capability at Each Base
Location of Obstacles and Mines
Communication Procedures
Deceptions Plan and Capability for Each Base

50. RESPONSE FORCE COORDINATION
Location and Type of Fire Support
Signals for FPF
Locations of Planned Fire Missions(TRPs)
Procedures for Contacting the BDOC
Locations of LPs/ OPs, Patrols and Contact Points
Location and Type of Aviation Support

51. TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE Designated by the G-3
Normally a Combined Arms organization
Normally the TCF receives fire support, aviation support and any other support needed
Once TCF is designated it establishes liaison with rear CP and response force (MP)
The TCF will develop its own IPB FM
PAGE 3-9

52. TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE and THE MP
Direct Coordination with MPs for Intelligence and Contingency Plans
TCF Commitment is a Command Decision
Command Relationship is OPCON to TCF CDR
Battle Hand Over, Blocking Positions, and Passage of Lines are ImpliedTasks
The Military Police Brigade is capable
of conducting TCF missions only when properly
augmented

53. Critical Site,
Asset, High-Risk
Personnel Security FM
PAGE 4-9

54. SECURITY OF CRITICAL SITES AND ASSETS
“MP performs their area security function across the entire designated AO. When
MP provides security around a critical site or asset they usually provide a mobile
security screen, taking advantage of its weapons/communications platforms.”
FM PAGE 4-9
TASKS
PATROLS, RECONNAISSANCE
CHECKPOINTS
LISTENING/OBSERVATION POST
ACCESS-CONTROL POINTS
RESPONSE FORCE OPERATIONS
IN-TRANSIT SECURITY FOR CP RELOCATION
CONVOY SECURITY

55. HIGH-RISK-PERSONNEL SECURITY

56. PSD Organization Principal and the Protective Service Detail
PSD Team * Detail Leader * Personal Security Officer (PSO) * Advance and Protective Team (Residence and Baggage Watch) -Individuals may be in several teams

57. PSD Fundamentals
Planning -- Two Stages * Written Personal Security Plan (Detail LDR) * On-site Survey (ADV TM)
Army Concept -- Based on “defense in depth” Principal Inner Cordon Middle Cordon Outer Cordon P

58. Planning Considerations
Threat Collection and Analysis
Principal’s Itinerary
Route Reconnaissance
Evacuation Plan
HN/Local Officials
Three Areas of Protection * On-foot, On-site, and during travel. (On-foot most critical!!!)

59. Force Protection /
Physical Security

60. Antiterrorism

61. QUESTIONS ?