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The Cold War The Anxieties (and Stability) of a Post-Atomic, Bi-Polar World of Foreign Policy.

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Presentation on theme: "The Cold War The Anxieties (and Stability) of a Post-Atomic, Bi-Polar World of Foreign Policy."— Presentation transcript:

1 The Cold War The Anxieties (and Stability) of a Post-Atomic, Bi-Polar World of Foreign Policy

2 I. Background and the Presidency of Harry Truman Cold War is the central fact of U.S. diplomacy from 1945-1990 Pre-war and WWII tension with the Soviets Truman’s background Truman did not cause the Cold War, but his policies and attitudes contributed Truman is counseled to get tough with the Soviets

3 I. Presidency of Harry Truman (cont.) Truman ends Lend-Lease to USSR and stalls loan request Truman “chews out” Soviet ambassador Stalin’s paranoia contributed to the Cold War Stalin wants “total security” in Eastern Europe

4 II. Possible American Responses to the Cold War Tension Traditional Isolation Cooperate with the Soviets --Henry Wallace Turn the Cold War into a Hot War “Containment” --George Kennan -- “Long Telegram” (February, 1946) Containment hard to contain

5 III. U.S. Assumptions About Soviet Communism Communism is monolithic. Worldwide communism is centrally directed by Moscow. Communism is infinitely expansive. Communism is a threat to American trade. Communism is a threat to democratic institutions. Communism is evil morally. No room for neutrality in a bi-polar world. U.S. is militarily and diplomatically omnipotent.

6 IV. The Cold War in Europe Soviet pressure on Greece and Turkey The “Truman Doctrine” (March, 1947) The “Marshall Plan” (June, 1947) U.S. motivations in offering this aid

7 V. The Berlin Crisis and Airlift Soviet blockade of western Berlin Possible Soviet aims Possible U.S. responses “Operation Vittles” June, 1948-May, 1949: 1.5 million tons of supplies delivered

8 VI. The Creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Successful Soviet test of an atomic weapon (September, 1949) Nuclear proliferation NSC-68 NATO created (April, 1949) Soviet perception of this alliance Warsaw Pact (1955) Change in Soviet policy after Stalin’s death (1953)

9 VII. The Cold War in Asia U.S. Intervention in post-war Japan

10 A. China Civil War resumed after WWII between communists and nationalists The “Long March” of Mao Zedong No U.S. desire for a military commitment to China Possible U.S. responses to the situation in China

11 A. China (cont.) Containment apparently failed in China U.S. omnipotence is drawn into question Failure to recognize this war as one fought for nationalism Real reason for the “loss” of China U.S. relations with Communist China

12 B. The Korean War “Temporary” division of Korea into 2 zones No national security interest in Korea The call for free elections North Korean invasion of South Korea (June, 1950) United Nations’ sanction of the Korean War The “Pusan” perimeter

13 B. The Korean War (cont.) MacArthur’s landing at Inchon Threat of the introduction of Chinese forces on behalf of North Korea MacArthur calls for a “new war” against the Chinese and North Korea Rift develops between MacArthur and Truman

14 B. The Korean War (cont.) The “lesson” of Korea Peace talks (1951) and the Election of 1952 Eisenhower visits Korea and pressures the North Koreans for an armistice (July, 1953) Consequences of the Korean War --M*A*S*H* --South Korean spirituality

15 VIII. The Foreign Policy of Dwight Eisenhower Ike’s need to present a “tougher line” than containment Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles Ike’s foreign policy: -- “roll back” -- “New Look” -- “massive retaliation” -- “brinksmanship”

16 VIII. Eisenhower’s Foreign Policy (cont.) All of this talk appeared to be mainly campaign rhetoric Eastern European nations feel betrayed by tough- talking U.S. SEATO created (1954) METO created (1955) “Ring around the Soviet Union”

17 VIII. Eisenhower’s Foreign Policy (cont.) Ike’s “Open Skies” proposal (July, 1955) Traditional U.S. sympathy with Israel Ike tries to build bridges to the Arabs Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956 and Ike’s response The Eisenhower Doctrine (July, 1958)

18 VIII. Eisenhower’s Foreign Policy (cont.) CIA interventions abroad during the Eisenhower years Apparent “thaw” in the Cold War (1959) The U-2 spy plane incident (May, 1960) The “problem” of Fidel Castro in Cuba (January, 1959)

19 IX. Post-Eisenhower Foreign Policy Kennedy’s “tough talk” and the “myth” of the missile gap JFK’s interest in “flexible response” and special forces units The Bay of Pigs fiasco (1961) Soviets build the Berlin Wall

20 IX. Post-Eisenhower Foreign Policy (cont.) JFK perpetuates traditional containment policy Cuban Missile Crisis (October, 1962) After the Cuban crisis, JFK began to moderate his tough stand against the Soviets

21 IX. Post-Eisenhower Foreign Policy (cont.) LBJ and containment policy in Vietnam Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China (February, 1972) Wedge driven between China and the USSR Nixon’s visit to Moscow (May, 1972) --SALT talks and trade agreements

22 IX. Post-Eisenhower Foreign Policy (cont.) Reliance on Arab oil makes the Middle East a continuing problem for US foreign policy Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” Carter’s Camp David Accords (1977) Carter and Détente Reagan’s return to containment Post-Cold War realities

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