1. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 CAPT James Fraser MC USN CAPT James Fraser MC USN Naval Safety Center HUMAN FACTORS COUNCILS AND BOARDS in Naval Aviation

2. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 776 aircraft destroyed in 1954 Naval Aviation Mishap Rate FY50-97 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 5060708090 Angled decks Aviation Safety Center Naval Aviation Maintenance Program established in 1959 (NAMP) RAG concept initiated NATOPS Program initiated 1961 Squadron Safety program System Safety Designated Aircraft ACT ORM Fiscal Year 25 aircraft destroyed in 1997

3. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 All Navy/Marine Corps Mishaps CY 1977-92 CY 1977-92 Class A, B,& C Mishaps/100,000 Flight Hours 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 1977 1979198119831985198719891991 Year Mechanical Human

4. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 WHY DO WE NEED HFC/HFB? 4 Aircrew error is the leading cause of mishaps 4In many instances, mishap causal factors were previously known to supervisors or peers, but unknown to the CO 4The insidious nature of human factors requires that they be reviewed on a regular basis Human Factors Councils Human Factors Boards

5. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 WHAT ARE WE LOOKING FOR? 4Performance trends, training currency and proficiency 4Psychological, physiological, social and professional factors 4Medical conditions, emotional and interpersonal stressors Human Factors Councils Human Factors Boards

6. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 Human Factors Councils Human Factors Boards PURPOSE 4 To provide a formal mechanism of human factors feedback to the CO 4To provide the CO with the information necessary to make decisions regarding the mishap potential of personnel

7. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 Human Factors Councils Human Factors Boards GOALS 4Identify potentially hazardous factors before they become causal factors in a mishap. 4Assist aviators in the recognition and successful elimination of these safety hazards.

8. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 Human Factors Councils 4Informal and quarterly (USN) or monthly (USMC) review of all aircrew 4Chaired by the CO 4Recommended composition: CO, ASO, Flight Surgeon, Operations/Training Officer, Junior Officer, Leading Chief/MCPOC or enlisted aircrew 4No unrelated business shall be discussed

9. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 Human Factors Councils 4Strictly confidential and not to be used in disciplinary action 4CO may defer discussion of detailed sensitive, personal, or professional matters to a more appropriate forum

10. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 HFC Assessment Process 4Operations: Provide flight data for documentation as needed 4OPTEMPO 4Individual flight time summaries 4Training: Provide data to assess 4Aircrew qualifications and professional progress 4NATOPS/instrument/physiology survival swims quals/upgrades

11. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 HFC Assessment Process 4All members should discuss the following as related to each individual: 4Skills and Qualifications 4Systems Knowledge 4Aircrew Coordination Performance 4Professional Discipline 4Risk-taking Behavior 4Career Development

12. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 HFC Assessment Process 4Critical Assessment Process 4Declining performance: failure to meet required standards or qualifications process 4Known violations or instances of poor flight discipline 4Presence of major job or life stressors 4Recommended Action - shall not be disciplinary in nature

13. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 Human Factors Boards 4Convened for cause by the CO 4Focused reviews of an individual 4Shall provide a plan of action 4Composed of the Executive Officer (chairman), Flight Surgeon, ASO School graduate, and another experienced officer

14. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 Human Factors Boards 4If enlisted member is subject, a senior enlisted shall be a member 4Members from outside command may be used

15. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 HFB Assessment Process 4Notify individual that HFB will be convened 4Identify specific problem areas to be considered 4Presence of aircrew under review is required 4Document performance deficiencies and recommend to CO an appropriate course of action

16. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 THE FNAEB/FNFOEB 4Administrative Boards convened to evaluate performance, potential and motivation 4Convened by superior in command: 4Faulty judgement in flight situations 4Lack of general skill 4Habits, traits, tendencies that make his/her flight status questionable 4Minimum flying requirements not met 4Questionable AA 4FNAEB: Three pilots and FS 4FNFOEB: Three NFOs and FS

17. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 FNAEB/FNFOEB Outcomes 4Type A: Continuation in flight status 4A1: Retain in present duty assignment 4A3: Transfer to another activity not within same command operating same or different aircraft 4A4: Probationary flight status (with appropriate Type B associated) 4Type B: Termination of flight status 4B1:Retention of right to wear insignia 4B2:Revocation of insignia

18. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR 4 Below average nugget or New transition aviator New transition aviator

19. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR 4 Below average nugget or New transition aviator New transition aviator 4 Overconfident senior aviator

20. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR 4 Below average nugget or New transition aviator New transition aviator 4 Overconfident senior aviator 4 “Best pilot”

21. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR 4 Below average nugget or New transition aviator New transition aviator 4 Overconfident senior aviator 4 “Best pilot” 4 Persistent poor performer

22. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 THE “AT RISK” AVIATOR 4 Below average nugget or New transition aviator New transition aviator 4 Overconfident senior aviator 4 “Best pilot” 4 Persistent poor performer 4 Overstressed aviator

23. USMC Rotary Wing, 1997 “Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He...made a judgment. He believed in it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. That his judgment was faulty is a tragedy,... Every instructor, supervisor, and contemporary who ever spoke to him had the opportunity to influence his judgement, so a little bit of all of us goes with every pilot we lose.” Anonymous