Presentation on theme: "A Bi-Modal Force for the National Maritime Strategy"— Presentation transcript:
1 A Bi-Modal Force for the National Maritime Strategy Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.Naval Postgraduate School
2 Two PropositionsSince 1950 the national strategy has been a forward maritime strategy with several variationsThe current variation should be supported with a “bi-modal” force
3 1950s: Samuel P. Huntington’s Heritage His “Transoceanic Navy” supported a national maritime strategyNot a speculation on a “new direction.” He described what the nation was doing and the Navy roleAmerica didn’t need border defenses and we had command of the seaThe national interest was served best by forward ops for containmentHis strategy served the people. VisiblyIt helped structure the armed forces
4 1970s and 1980s: The Zumwalt-Turner Variation Specified four “missions” of our NavyDeterrence of nuclear warSea control to keep oceans safe for tradePower projection overseasPresence for peacekeepingWhy change? Because the SU wouldn’t tolerate US supremacy at seaContinued the transoceanic strategyTo confront all enemies overseasProminently the Soviet UnionAnd for positive influence on our friendsProminently NATO and Japan
5 1990s: After the Soviet Union’s Collapse Resulted in forces for two contingenciesCharacterization: No peer competitor, small wars disregarded, sea control (still) assumedNavy returned to simple Power ProjectionOur large ships were cost-effective—in a sea sanctuaryFewer ships (and military overall) after 1990—but with more activityNew capabilities: information technologies, long range detection, precision weapons
6 2001: Regard for Terrorists and “Small Wars” More awareness of stateless enemiesTension and competition between high- and low-end force advocatesEnemies found ways to survive new US capabilities; and ugly ways to attackTerrorists made the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine mostly irrelevantCan a new doctrine replace it for stateless enemies?
7 Characterizing the Bi-Modal Force Focuses on the emerging peer power at one end of the spectrum of conflictAnd on “small” operations at the other endThe two compositions are quite differentA “50-50 budget split” is not my positionTensions (mostly healthy) must remain between high and low end advocates
8 The Peer Competitor: China US aim is to influence, not fight, the Peoples’ RepublicAlso to affect China by influencing her neighbors“Win” in the long term is by economic and political skills, not warfare. Or so we hopeStrategy should look beyond contemporary issues (Taiwan and Korea)Does the PLAN’s growing sea denial force foreshadow sea control aspirations?
9 America’s China-Mode Force Elements Continue strong Asian presenceRobust nuclear deterrentAir and sea forces are central. We shouldn’t invade ChinaOur ISR advantage must be preservedOur C2 advantage must be preservedLogistics of forward support is expensive, but can be aligned against just one state
10 Small Wars and Peacemaking Terminology (stability ops, irregular wars, counterinsurgency, humanitarian ops, etc.) indicates the first difficulty in force designDoD forces for messy (often non-DoD) command, control, authority, and governance indicates the second difficulty (“The NCA is a hydra-headed monster”)Force elements and command structures are different than for China
11 America’s Small Wars Force Elements Nuclear “deterrence” is near-meaninglessPrevention of even one WMD attack is the aspirationGround forces are the central componentWith air combat supportAnd air and sea sustainmentISR will be more heavily HUMINTBut with high-tech scouts in distributed opsNavy C2 will be with “hastily formed networks” and must connect to the “1,000 ship navy”Logistics must be ready to move forces swiftly and sustain it in diverse places
12 War In BetweenAfter “designing” bi-modal forces, next test them against a threat “in the middle”We fought wars in Korea and Vietnam with forces designed for the SovietsStarting the bi-modal force is low risk—assuming we don’t scrap existing “two contingency” forces
13 How to Transition Gracefully Start with operational training and education for bi-modal operationsExploits rapid personnel turnoverC2 comes close behind: proper networks and adaptive organizationsBi-modal equipment (ships, guns, tanks…) will be in demand and follow
14 Affordability: ChinaWe will try to influence, compete, or collaborate with China without a warAnd keep our economy strongHelp our economy by keeping the military budget flatKeep the seas safe and anticipate a PLAN try for sea control
15 Affordability: “Small” Operations Small operations will be frequentSome will be long lastingSome will involve bloodshedForce packages should be small, to distribute or aggregate on demandDo I need to say, “Try to be selective”?
16 Affordability for Both Transoceanic operations are costlyA uniquely American burdenHomeland security must blend domestic defense with overseas offenseHomeland security is an all-agencies thing that we don’t shape
17 In ConclusionThe National strategy has been and remains a maritime strategyStill transoceanic, but with a new wrinkle of homeland defenseIt has adapted to changes in the worldIt is still expensive (especially logistically), but worthwhileAnother transition is underwayRespond with a bi-modal forceDescribe it well to hasten the transitionPresent forces (the legacy) will be with us for a decade or moreA safeguard against wars-in-the-middleBut same forces will play new rolesPursue bi-modal force elements now—they take time
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