1. A Bi-Modal Force for the National Maritime Strategy
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.
Naval Postgraduate School

2. Two Propositions
Since 1950 the national strategy has been a forward maritime strategy with several variations
The current variation should be supported with a “bi-modal” force

3. 1950s: Samuel P. Huntington’s Heritage
His “Transoceanic Navy” supported a national maritime strategy
Not a speculation on a “new direction.” He described what the nation was doing and the Navy role
America didn’t need border defenses and we had command of the sea
The national interest was served best by forward ops for containment
His strategy served the people. Visibly
It helped structure the armed forces

4. 1970s and 1980s: The Zumwalt-Turner Variation
Specified four “missions” of our Navy
Deterrence of nuclear war
Sea control to keep oceans safe for trade
Power projection overseas
Presence for peacekeeping
Why change? Because the SU wouldn’t tolerate US supremacy at sea
Continued the transoceanic strategy
To confront all enemies overseas
Prominently the Soviet Union
And for positive influence on our friends
Prominently NATO and Japan

5. 1990s: After the Soviet Union’s Collapse
Resulted in forces for two contingencies
Characterization: No peer competitor, small wars disregarded, sea control (still) assumed
Navy returned to simple Power Projection
Our large ships were cost-effective—in a sea sanctuary
Fewer ships (and military overall) after 1990—but with more activity
New capabilities: information technologies, long range detection, precision weapons

6. 2001: Regard for Terrorists and “Small Wars”
More awareness of stateless enemies
Tension and competition between high- and low-end force advocates
Enemies found ways to survive new US capabilities; and ugly ways to attack
Terrorists made the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine mostly irrelevant
Can a new doctrine replace it for stateless enemies?

7. Characterizing the Bi-Modal Force
Focuses on the emerging peer power at one end of the spectrum of conflict
And on “small” operations at the other end
The two compositions are quite different
A “50-50 budget split” is not my position
Tensions (mostly healthy) must remain between high and low end advocates

8. The Peer Competitor: China
US aim is to influence, not fight, the Peoples’ Republic
Also to affect China by influencing her neighbors
“Win” in the long term is by economic and political skills, not warfare. Or so we hope
Strategy should look beyond contemporary issues (Taiwan and Korea)
Does the PLAN’s growing sea denial force foreshadow sea control aspirations?

9. America’s China-Mode Force Elements
Continue strong Asian presence
Robust nuclear deterrent
Air and sea forces are central. We shouldn’t invade China
Our ISR advantage must be preserved
Our C2 advantage must be preserved
Logistics of forward support is expensive, but can be aligned against just one state

10. Small Wars and Peacemaking
Terminology (stability ops, irregular wars, counterinsurgency, humanitarian ops, etc.) indicates the first difficulty in force design
DoD forces for messy (often non-DoD) command, control, authority, and governance indicates the second difficulty (“The NCA is a hydra-headed monster”)
Force elements and command structures are different than for China

11. America’s Small Wars Force Elements
Nuclear “deterrence” is near-meaningless
Prevention of even one WMD attack is the aspiration
Ground forces are the central component
With air combat support
And air and sea sustainment
ISR will be more heavily HUMINT
But with high-tech scouts in distributed ops
Navy C2 will be with “hastily formed networks” and must connect to the “1,000 ship navy”
Logistics must be ready to move forces swiftly and sustain it in diverse places

12. War In Between
After “designing” bi-modal forces, next test them against a threat “in the middle”
We fought wars in Korea and Vietnam with forces designed for the Soviets
Starting the bi-modal force is low risk—assuming we don’t scrap existing “two contingency” forces

13. How to Transition Gracefully
Start with operational training and education for bi-modal operations
Exploits rapid personnel turnover
C2 comes close behind: proper networks and adaptive organizations
Bi-modal equipment (ships, guns, tanks…) will be in demand and follow

14. Affordability: China
We will try to influence, compete, or collaborate with China without a war
And keep our economy strong
Help our economy by keeping the military budget flat
Keep the seas safe and anticipate a PLAN try for sea control

15. Affordability: “Small” Operations
Small operations will be frequent
Some will be long lasting
Some will involve bloodshed
Force packages should be small, to distribute or aggregate on demand
Do I need to say, “Try to be selective”?

16. Affordability for Both
Transoceanic operations are costly
A uniquely American burden
Homeland security must blend domestic defense with overseas offense
Homeland security is an all-agencies thing that we don’t shape

17. In Conclusion
The National strategy has been and remains a maritime strategy
Still transoceanic, but with a new wrinkle of homeland defense
It has adapted to changes in the world
It is still expensive (especially logistically), but worthwhile
Another transition is underway
Respond with a bi-modal force
Describe it well to hasten the transition
Present forces (the legacy) will be with us for a decade or more
A safeguard against wars-in-the-middle
But same forces will play new roles
Pursue bi-modal force elements now—they take time