1. Federal Air Marshal Service Preventative Radiological Nuclear Detection: Threat and Mission FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL SERVICE TRAINING CENTER ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY

2. 2 Terminal Performance Objective Given the overview briefing, students will be able to describe the Radiological/Nuclear Detection mission, the current and historical nuclear threat and the likelihood of a threat occurring.

3. 3 Enabling Objectives 1.Explain the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) 2.Communicate the urgency of nuclear detection operations 3.Describe the likelihood of a nuclear/radiological threat 4.Describe the timeline of historical events which radioactive sources were considered for threat purposes 5.Describe the consequences of a breach of radioactive material based on a “case study”

4. Is There a Nuclear Terrorism Threat? 4 “[T]he gravest danger we face—nuclear terrorism.” [1] “In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black markets trade in nuclear secrets and materials. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one…. “[W]e must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” [2] [1] Remarks of Barack Obama: Summit on Confronting New Threats, West Lafayette, Indiana, July 16, 2008. [2] Barack Obama, Prague, April 5, 2009.

5. Is There a Nuclear Terrorism Threat? While it has been more than twenty years since the end of the Cold War, the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons continues to pose a serious global threat. The likelihood of a nuclear war between the United States and Russia has decreased, but the continued presence of large stockpiles makes the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons a persistent risk. Many of the countries with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, are actively engaged in regional conflicts, making the possibility of regional nuclear war a concern. North Korea illicitly acquired nuclear weapons, and other countries, including Iran and Syria, have violated their nuclear safeguards commitments and are suspected of covertly pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities. In the post-9/11 world, the potential for catastrophic nuclear terrorism is also a serious threat. A number of efforts by governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations are underway to attempt to mitigate the nuclear threat. 5

6. Threat “Despite halting progress towards denuclearization, North Korea continues to maintain nuclear weapons; Despite the halt through at least mid-2007 to Iran’s nuclear weapons design and covert uranium conversion and enrichment-related work, Iran continues to pursue fissile material and nuclear-capable missile delivery systems”. Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Armed Services Committee 27 February 2008 J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence 6

7. Current Situation Not long ago, we could have told you that there was no specific threat, however…  Lashkar-e-Tayyiba attacks in Mumbai India  Al Qaeda has a stated mission “to kill Americans and their allies, civilians, and military…”  On May 21, 2003 Sheikh al Fahd, a Muslim cleric, granted Osama bin Laden and other terrorists carte blanche permission to use weapons of mass destruction  Threat of a nuclear attack increases as more nation states develop nuclear capabilities –Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) –Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) aka “Dirty Bomb” –Radiological Exposure Device (RED) 7

8. Threat 8

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10. THADIAS: Theft and Diversion Incident Analysis System THADIAS: Theft and Diversion Incident Analysis System at Argonne National Laboratory

11. THADIAS: Theft and Diversion Incident Analysis System

12. Slide 12

13. Slide 13 Registered Excess/Unwanted Sources Remaining

14. The Role of Nuclear Detection Detection is one layer in a multi-layered, defense-in-depth strategy The layers are supported by a foundation of key cross-cutting capabilities and functions such as: -Intelligence -Law enforcement -Information systems -Science and technology -And others -Planning -Organization -Equipment -Training -Exercises -Operations Support 14

15. Coast Guard Inspection Border Protection Second Line of Defense Materials Protection, Control, & Accountability Port-of-Departure Screening Potential Source of SNM Potential Target At-sea Interdiction A multi–layered, international system offers opportunities for detection Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) 15

16. Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) Customs and Border Protection Coast Guard DOE RAP/SRT TSA VIPR Port Authorities Sheriffs Departments Police Departments Private Police Security Guards 16

17. Your everyday job utilizing RND training and equipment What Can I Do? 17

18. 1987: Iraq -- In February 1996, Iraq gave the United Nations a report that purported to cover an Iraqi program to develop and test a radiological weapon in 1987. The report, which was labeled "top secret," explained the design of the bomb and the steps Iraq took to develop it. Iraq had irradiated zirconium oxide in a nuclear research reactor, placed the irradiated material inside a cylinder made of lead, inserted the cylinder into a high-explosive aerial bomb, dropped the bomb on a test range, and measured the radiation that the bomb created after it exploded and dispersed the zirconium oxide into the air and soil. A timeline of events where radioactive sources were considered/used for threat purposes 18

19. 1995: Moscow, Russia -- Shamil Basayev, Chechnya's most notorious rebel military leader, announced on the Russian NTV television channel, that four cases of radioactive material had been hidden around Moscow. Russian emergency teams roamed the city with radiation detectors, and located several canisters of Cesium-137, which had been stolen from a hospital by Chechen militants. One was found in one of Moscow's biggest and most heavily used public parks - Izmailovsky Park in eastern Moscow. A timeline of events where radioactive sources were considered/used for threat purposes 19

20. A timeline of events where radioactive sources were considered/used for threat purposes 1996: New York -- John J. Ford was so obsessed with hatred for mainstream political figures, he solicited another individual, Joseph Mazzachelli, to spread radioactive material on the seat of one individuals car, in his food or in some proximity to him in the hope that over time he would contract an incurable disease and cause his death. When police entered Ford’s house, they found about 40 weapons, ammunition, a gas mask and a device used to sweep for land mines. They also discovered storage canisters for mortar shells. 20

21. A timeline of events where radioactive sources were considered/used for threat purposes 1998: North Carolina -- During a quarterly physical inventory of sealed sources at the Moses Cone Health Systems in Greensboro, NC, the Radiation Safety Officer noticed that the entire inventory of 18 cesium-137 (Cs-137) brachytherapy sources was missing from the locked storage safe within the Radiation Oncology Department. In addition, a new source that was still in its shipping container was also missing. The total activity missing from the facility was 604 mCi. A joint effort by the state, NRC, DOE, and FBI was undertaken. These sources have never been recovered. 21

22. A timeline of events where radioactive sources were considered/used for threat purposes 2006: London, U.K. -- Dhiren Barot, of north London, planned to use a radioactive "dirty bomb" in one of a series of attacks in the UK intended to cause "injury, fear, terror and chaos.” He also plotted to cause explosions at several US financial buildings (see right) "designed to kill as many innocent people as possible.” 1 In his RDD plan, it ended with the conclusion: "A few grams of cobalt 60 with several pounds of explosives are enough to close an area the size of Manhattan.” 22

23. A timeline of events where radioactive sources were considered/used for threat purposes 2008: Maine -- James Cummings accumulated an arsenal of weapons, bomb making materials, and radioactive materials. He had filled out an application to join the National Socialist Movement and declared an ambition to kill then President-elect Obama. (James Cummings was killed by his wife in December 2008.) According to the Bangor (Maine) Daily News reporting on the event... “radiological dispersal device components and literature, and radioactive materials, were discovered at the Maine residence of... James Cummings. 1 ” 23

24. A timeline of events where radioactive sources were considered/used for threat purposes 2012: In February, Shamikh or Shumukh al-Islam [Supremacy of Islam] - presently the most influential al- Qaeda-affiliated discussion board, showed regained jihadists interest in the possibility to produce and use RDDs. The revitalized discussion specifies how, when and where an attack using such a bomb should take place. The operational importance of the shared knowledge in the discussion is that it introduces the idea of a CBRN attacks to jihadists. 24

25. A timeline of events where radioactive sources were considered/used for threat purposes 2013: New York -- Glendon Crawford and Eric Freight accused of developing a truck-mounted radiation- emitting device that could “covertly emit” The device was intended to be mobile, designed to turn on remotely from some distance away, and would emit ionizing radiation strong enough to bring about radiation sickness or death. 25

26. IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database 125 participating states as of December 2013 2477 confirmed incidents from 1993 – 2012 –424: Unauthorized possession / related criminal activity –644: Theft or loss of material –1337: Other unauthorized activities and events 16 confirmed incidents involved unauthorized possession of high enriched uranium and plutonium Small number involved seizures of kilogram quantities of potentially weapons-usable material Majority involved gram quantities though indications were samples were from a much larger stockpile 26

27. Case Study: Goiania, Brazil 1987 When a hospital changed locations, a radiation therapy unit was temporarily left behind. Scrap metal hunters found the unit and dismantled it for scrap metal (~ Sept 18 th ). The 1.4 kiloCi Cs-137 source containment was breached during the process. Pieces of source distributed to family and friends. Everyone was impressed by “the glowing blue stones.” Children & adults played with them. Serious radiological accident recognized on Sept 29 th when Acute Radiation Syndrome symptoms were recognized by hospital staff. 27

28. Initial Response 112,000 people (10 % of Goiania’s population) were surveyed at an Olympic Stadium. –250 were identified as contaminated –50 contaminated people were isolated in a camping area inside the Olympic Stadium for more detailed screening –20 people were hospitalized or transferred to special housing with medical and nursing assistance –8 patients transferred to the Navy Hospital in Rio de Janeiro –Residential contamination survey was initiated 28

29. Early Consequences Widespread contamination of downtown Goiania 85 residences found to have significant contamination (41 of these were evacuated and a few were completely or partially demolished) People cross-contaminated houses 100 miles away Hot Spots at 3 scrap metal yards and one house 29

30. Radiation Injuries and Uptakes 4 fatalities (2 men, 1 woman and 1 child) 28 patients had radiation induced skin injuries (they held/played with the source for extended periods) 50 people had internal deposition (ingestion)) 30

31. Brazil’s Dirty Bomb Scenario Despite the accident in Brazil, sources of this strength are very difficult to obtain. This model assumes “worse case” in that: –The source was 100% aerosolized –Lots of explosive (~ 10 sticks of dynamite) –Presumes exposed populations “stood outside” during the exposure period. –Effects dependent on weather 31 1.4 kCi Cs-137 ≈ 21g of CsCl

32. Detectable Ground Contamination Could be Found Miles Downwind ≥ 0.2 μCi/m 2 (7.4 kBq/m 2 ) Can be detected with thin window G-M meter ≥ 2 μCi/m 2 (74 kBq/m 2 ) Can be detected with dose rate meter 32

33. San Francisco Example: Ground Contamination Could be Detected East of Berkeley Hills Release: 1.3 kCi Cs-137 RDD with 5 lbs HE Deposited Contamination Color Level (uCi/m 2 ) Area (km 2 )Description 205.4Take measures to prevent cross contamination. 259.04Detectable with “hot dog” GM 0.2409.34Detectable with “Pancake” GM HYPOTHETICAL Release location: San Francisco Police Department, 850 Bryant 37° 46’ 31” N 122° 24’ 15” W 100% Aerosolized release fraction Strong afternoon west winds 18-25 mph. Map size: 25 x 25 km 33

34. Risk Analysis of Resource Loss and Behavioral Effects of an RDD Attack Scenario – The Economic Costs The April issue of Risk Analysis, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2012 contains an original research article titled “Assessment of the Regional Economic Impacts of Catastrophic Events: CGE Analysis of Resource Loss and Behavioral Effects of an RDD Attack Scenario.” This research was, in part, supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE). It depicts the possible economic impact of a successful RDD detonation in a large urban setting, with consideration of fear and risk perception. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/risk.2012.32.issue- 4/issuetoc 34

35. Summary You learned: About the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) The urgency of nuclear detection operations The likelihood of a nuclear/radiological threat The timeline of historical events which radioactive sources were considered for threat purposes The consequences of a breach of radioactive material based on the Goiania, Brazil Case Study 35