Conflict in the Years Ahead

Conflict in the Years Ahead
It will be protracted, bloody, and horrible. Martin van Creveld Conflict in the Years Ahead Chet Richards J. Addams & Partners, Inc. February 2006

Purpose To explore the course of conflict in the early-middle 21st century by comparing and contrasting the work of its more distinguished observers, including: Bill Lind, particularly “Strategic Defense Initiative,” and “FMFM 1-A” Martin van Creveld: The Transformation of War Col T.X. Hammes, USMC: The Sling and the Stone Thomas P. M. Barnett: The Pentagon’s New Map & Blueprint for Action Michael Scheuer (“Anonymous”): Imperial Hubris Antulio Echevarria: “Fourth Generation War and Other Myths” My purpose is not to critique these works, per se, but to consider, borrow, and sometimes reject what John Boyd called “appropriate bits and pieces” for constructing strategy. February 2006

Agenda Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg
Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict OODA Loops What they are not (and are) How to accelerate OODA loops Moral conflict & the prism of conflict Guerrilla warfare Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy Generations of war Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert, reorient, reharmonize 4GW according to Lind, van Creveld, Hammes, Barnett, Scheuer, but not Echevarria Moral isolation and interaction Theme for disintegration and collapse Grand strategy Theme for vitality and growth Ends and means Moral leverage What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer say about grand strategy Summary Tables Issues among the authors Neither Shall the Sword If I were emperor … February 2006

February 2006

Positive (constructive) elements
Pattern Positive (constructive) elements National goal Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment. Grand strategy Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success. Strategic aim Diminish adversary’s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope—while we can cope—with events/efforts as they unfold. Strategy Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary’s will to resist. Grand tactics Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or imagines, and those he must react to, to survive; thereby Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos ... and/or fold adversary back inside himself; Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him. Tactics Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere. 141 February 2006

Negative (destructive) elements
Pattern Negative (destructive) elements National goal Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment. Grand strategy Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success. Strategic aim Diminish adversary’s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope—while we can cope—with events/efforts as they unfold. Strategy Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary’s will to resist. Grand tactics Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or imagines, and those he must react to, to survive; thereby Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos ... and/or fold adversary back inside himself; Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him. Tactics Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere. 141 February 2006

Generalization Need fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy more quickly while outturning an adversary. In other words, suggests a fighter that can pick and choose engagement opportunities—yet has fast transient (“buttonhook”) characteristics that can be used to either force an overshoot by an attacker or stay inside a hard turning defender. Boyd’s study of strategy began as a fighter pilot and an instructor at the USAF Fighter Weapons School. February 2006 4

Idea expansion Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or, better yet, get inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle or loop. Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder among our adversaries—since our adversaries will be unable to generate mental images or pictures that agree with the menacing as well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are competing against. In other words, “faster tempo or rhythm” is not synonymous with “get inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action” loop. February 2006 5

Point of Patterns of Conflict:
Human nature Goal Survive, survive on own terms, or improve our capacity for independent action. The competition for limited resources to satisfy these desires may force one to: Diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action, or deny him the opportunity to survive on his own terms, or make it impossible for him to survive at all. Implication Life is conflict, survival, and conquest. Point of Patterns of Conflict: IF you find yourself in this situation, make sure you are the one who wins. February 2006 10

Impression In examining these many points of view one is bombarded with the notion that: It is advantageous to possess a variety of responses that can be applied rapidly to gain sustenance, avoid danger, and diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action. The simpler organisms—those that make-up man as well as man working with other men in a higher level context—must cooperate or, better yet, harmonize their activities in their endeavors to survive as an organic synthesis. To shape and adapt to change one cannot be passive; instead one must take the initiative. Put more simply and directly: the above comments leave one with the impression that variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative (and their interaction) seem to be key qualities that permit one to shape and adapt to an ever-changing environment. With this impression in mind together with our notion of getting inside an adversary’s O-O-D-A loop we will proceed in our historical investigation. February 2006 12

Historical pattern Sun Tzu The Art of War c. 400 B.C.
Theme Harmony and trust Justice and well being Inscrutability and enigma Deception and subversion Rapidity and fluidity Dispersion and concentration Surprise and shock Strategy Probe enemy’s organization and dispositions to unmask his strengths, weaknesses, patterns of movement and intentions. “Shape” enemy’s perception of world to manipulate his plans and actions. Attack enemy’s plans as best policy. Next best disrupt his alliances. Next best attack his army. Attack cities only when there is no alternative. Employ cheng and ch'i maneuvers to quickly and unexpectedly hurl strength against weaknesses. These represent potential asymmetries, that is, things we can exploit to gain an advantage leading to victory over our opponents. Throughout this presentation, keep asking yourself: What were the asymmetries? How did the winning side achieve these asymmetries? How did they use them in order to win? Sometimes Boyd will give you his answers; sometimes you will have to decide for yourself. Key point: All conflict is – or should be – “asymmetric”! Desired outcome Subdue enemy without fighting Avoid protracted war February 2006 13

Historical pattern Action Cheng and ch'i* Early commanders Alexander
Hannibal Belisarius Genghis Khan Tamerlane Impression Early commanders seem consistent with ideas of Sun Tzu Western commanders more directly concerned with winning the battle Eastern commanders closer to Sun Tzu in attempting to shatter adversary prior to battle Action Cheng and ch'i* * Cheng/ch'i maneuver schemes were employed by early commanders to expose adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses (a la cheng) for exploitation and decisive stroke (via ch'i). February 2006 14

Historical pattern Keeping in mind the ideas of Sun Tzu and our comments about early commanders, let’s take a look at an early tactical theme and some battle (grand tactical) situations to gain a feel for the different ways that the cheng/ch'i game has been (and can be) played. February 2006 15

Historical pattern Tactical theme (from about 300 B.C. to 1400 A.D.)
Light troops (equipped with bows, javelins, light swords, etc.) perform reconnaissance, screening, and swirling hit-and-run actions to: Unmask enemy dispositions and activities. Cloud/distort own dispositions and activities. Confuse, disorder enemy operations. Heavy troops (equipped with lances, bows, swords, etc.) protected by armor and shields: Charge and smash thinned-out/scattered or disordered/bunched-up enemy formations generated by interaction with light troops; or Menace enemy formations to hold them in tight, or rigid, arrays thereby make them vulnerable to missiles of swirling light troops. Light and heavy troops in appropriate combination pursue, envelop, and mop-up isolated remnants of enemy host. Idea Employ maneuver action by light troops with thrust action of heavy troops to confuse, break-up, and smash enemy formations. February 2006 16

Battle of Arbela* October 1, 331 B.C.
Mazeus Darius Bessus Chariots Alexander Companions *Also known as the Battle of Gaugamela Reserve Line February 2006 Parmenio 20

Battle of Arbela* (Phase II)
Persians Flee Persians Flee The heavy thrust, set up by all the other action on this page. Although outnumbered overall, at this point, Alexander manufactured a temporary but decisive advantage. Bessus Darius Mazeus Companions Alexander Reserve Line Parmenio Version March 2005 February 2006 21

Historical pattern Genghis Khan and the Mongols
Key asymmetries Superior mobility Superior communications Superior intelligence Superior leadership Theme Widely separated strategic maneuvers, with appropriate stratagems, baited retreats, hard-hitting tactical thrusts, and swirling envelopments to uncover and exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses. in conjunction with Clever and calculated use of propaganda and terror to play upon adversary’s doubts, fears, and superstitions in order to undermine his resolve and destroy his will to resist. Aim Conquest, as basis to create, preserve, and expand Mongol nation keep this in mind February 2006 25

Mongol strategic maneuver (1219-1220)
Chagatai Jochi Genghis Khan Jebe Aral Sea Caspian Sea Kizyl-Kum Khawarizm State Bokhara Samarkand (Modern Uzbekistan) Oxus River 500 miles February 2006 26

? Raises nagging question ?
Even though outnumbered, why were Mongols able to maneuver in widely scattered arrays without being defeated separately or in detail? February 2006 27

Historical patterns Genghis Khan and the Mongols
Message By exploiting superior leadership, intelligence, communications, and mobility as well as by playing upon adversary’s fears and doubts via propaganda and terror, Mongols operated inside adversary observation-orientation-decision-action loops. Result Outnumbered Mongols created impressions of terrifying strength—by seeming to come out of nowhere yet be everywhere. hence, Subversive propaganda, clever stratagems, fast breaking maneuvers, and calculated terror not only created vulnerabilities and weaknesses but also played upon moral factors that drain-away resolve, produce panic, and bring about collapse. February 2006 28

Historical pattern Napoleon’s art of war
Revolutionary army gifts to Napoleon Moral and physical energy of citizen-soldiers and new leaders generated by the revolution and magnified by successes against invading allied armies Subdivision of army into smaller self-contained but mutually supporting units (divisions) Ability to travel light and live-off countryside without extensive baggage, many supply wagons, and slow-moving resupply efforts Rapid march associated with “120” instead of the standard “70” steps per minute Discontinued adherence to 1791 Drill Regulations pertaining to the well regulated and stereotype use of column and line formations for movement and fighting Beneficial asymmetry Mobility/fluidity of force dramatically better than that possessed by potential adversaries. ? Raises question ? How did Napoleon exploit this superior mobility/fluidity of force? perhaps one reason why maneuver warfare is often confused with “speed” February 2006 33

Strategy of envelopment (idealized schematic)
corps of observation curtain of maneuver strategic barrier line of defense pinning force Cheng ch'i maneuver force LOCs I. The Envelopment March cavalry screen 35 curtain of maneuver strategic barrier line of defense pinning force secondary attack main attack corps of observation II. The Reversed Front Battle cavalry screen Source: David G. Chandler, Waterloo: The Hundred Days, 1980. February 2006

The strategy of central position (idealized schematic)
xxxx B xxx base N LOC I. Advance to Contact cavalry screen A xxxx B xxx base I LOC overnight forced march III. The Coup de Grace A xxxx B xxx base N LOC xx II. The Double Battle Source: David G. Chandler, Waterloo: The Hundred Days, 1980. February 2006 36

Early tactic “The action was opened by a cloud of sharpshooters, some mounted, some on foot, who were sent forward to carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect of his cannon by their dispersal. They were constantly relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they also received considerable reinforcement to increase their over-all effect … Once the chink in foe’s armour had been revealed … the horse artillery would gallop up and open fire with canister at close range. The attacking force would meantime be moving up in the indicated direction, the infantry advancing in column, the cavalry in regiments or squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy bullets or cannon balls began to slacken … The soldiers would begin to run forward, those in the front ranks crossing their bayonets, as the drums beat the charge; the sky would ring a thousand battle-cries constantly repeated: “En avant. En avant. Vive la Republique.” Later tactics “At the outset, a heavy bombardment would be loosed against the enemy formations, causing fearful losses if they failed to seek shelter, and generally lowering their power of resistance. Under cover of this fire, swarms of voltigeurs would advance to within musketry range and add a disconcerting ‘nuisance’ element by sniping at officers and the like. This preliminary phase would be followed by a series of heavy cavalry and infantry attacks. The secret of these was careful timing and coordination. The first cavalry charges were designed to defeat the hostile cavalry and compel the enemy infantry to form squares”, thereby reduce fire in any one direction and enable the columns to get to close grips before the enemy could resume his linear formation. The infantry (deployed or not) and accompanying horse artillery would then blaze a gap in the enemy formation and finally the cavalry would sweep forward, again, to exploit the breakthrough. other words to describe this: organic, formless, reconnaissance pull, surfaces-and-gaps Essential point Early tactics, without apparent design, operate in a fluid, adaptable manner to uncover, expand and exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses while later tactics emphasize massed firepower and stereotyped formations working formally together to smash adversary strength. 37 February 2006

Critique Napoleon exploited ambiguity, deception, and mobility at the strategic level, whereas, He increasingly emphasized formal battering ram methods and de-emphasized loose, irregular methods (e.g. skirmishers) at the tactics level—via a return to, and increasingly heavy-handed application of, the 1791 Drill Regulations. Why? Napoleon emphasized the conduct of war from the top down. He created and exploited strategic success to procure grand tactical and tactical success. To support his concept, he set up a highly centralized command and control system which, when coupled with essentially unvarying tactical recipes, resulted in strength smashing into strength by increasingly unimaginative, formalized, and predictable actions at lower and lower levels. Result Strategic maneuvers ambiguous and deceiving prior to tactical concentration; after concentration, “maneuvers” stereotyped and obvious. hence Tactical “maneuvers” could not easily procure the victory because of their obvious, predictable nature. February 2006 38

Technology and the art of war
The legacy of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini’s tactical regularity and the continued use of large stereotyped formations for tactical assault, together with the mobilization of large armies and massing of enormous supplies through a narrow logistics network, “telegraphed” any punch hence minimized the possibility of exploiting ambiguity, deception, and mobility to generate surprise for a decisive edge. In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated frightful and debilitating casualties on all sides during the: American Civil War ( ) Austro-Prussian War (1866) Franco-Prussian War (1870) Boer War ( ) Russo-Japanese War ( ) World War I ( ) Point Evolution of tactics did not keep pace with increased weapons lethality developed and produced by 19th century technology. ? Raises question ? Why were the 19th century and early 20th century commanders unable to evolve better tactics to avoid over a half century of debilitating casualties? February 2006 49

World War I Action Offensives conducted on wide frontages—emphasizing few, rather than many, harmonious yet independent thrusts. Evenness of advance maintained to protect flanks and provide artillery support as advance makes headway. Reserves thrown in whenever attack held-up—against regions or points of strong resistance. Reaction Defense organized into depth of successive belts of fortified terrain. Massed artillery and machine-gun fire designed to arrest and pin down attacker. Counter-attack to win back lost ground. Result Stagnation and enormous attrition since advances made generally as expected along paths of hardened resistance because of dependence upon railroads and choice of tactics of trying to reduce strong points by massed firepower and infantry. February 2006 55

World War I a way out Idea Authors Infiltration tactics
Guerrilla tactics Capt. Andre Laffargue Gen. von Hutier? Gen. Ludendorff T.E. Lawrence Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck Idea Authors February 2006 56

World War I infiltration tactics
cheng Key points Fire at all levels by artillery, mortars, and machine-guns is exploited to hold adversary attention and pin him down hence— Fire together with gas and smoke (as well as fog and mist) represent an immediate and ominous threat to capture adversary attention, force heads down and dramatically obscure view, thereby cloak infiltrators movements. Dispersed and irregular character of moving swarms (as opposed to well defined line abreast formations) permit infiltrators to blend against irregular and changing terrain features as they push forward. Taken together, the captured attention, the obscured view, and the indistinct character of moving dispersed/irregular swarms deny adversary the opportunity to picture what is taking place. Result Infiltration teams appear to suddenly loom-up out of nowhere to blow thru, around, and behind disoriented defenders. ch’i Note: This is the essence of maneuver warfare/3GW. Good discussions in Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics, and Stephen Biddle, Military Power. February 2006 59

Looming up (asymmetric fast transients)
OODA “loops” in action The Asian soldier is a master of the approach march. His tradition is to attack out of nowhere—to suddenly appear where he is least expected. John Poole, Phantom Soldier, 139 February 2006

Creation of the Blitzkrieg
Envelopment (Leuctra, Cannae) Flying Columns (Mongols) Blitzkrieg (Heinz Guderian) Tank Attack with Motorized Vehicles (J.F.C. Fuller) Narrow thrusts Armored recce Commanders forward Extensive communications net Air in lieu of (or with) artillery Infiltration (Ludendorff) February 2006 84

Blitzkrieg Action Intelligence—signal, photo, agent … reconnaissance (air and ground)—and patrol actions probe and test adversary before and during combat operations to uncover as well as shape changing patterns of strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions. Adversary patterns, and associated changes, are weighed against friendly situation to expose attractive, or appropriate, alternatives that exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence help shape mission commitment and influence command intent. Mission assigned. Schwerpunkt (focus of main effort) established before and shifted during combat operations to bypass adversary strength and strike at weakness. Nebenpunkte (other related or supporting efforts) employed to tie-up, focus, or drain-away adversary attention and strength (elsewhere). Special seizure/disruption teams infiltrate (by air or other means) enemy rear areas where, with agents already in place, they: seize bridges and road crossings, sever communications, incapacitate or blow-up power stations, seize or blow-up fuel dumps … as well as sow confusion/disorder via “false messages and fake orders”. Indirect and direct air firepower efforts together with (any needed) sudden/brief preliminary artillery fires are focused in appropriate areas to impede (or channel) adversary movement, disrupt communications, suppress forward defensive fires, obscure the advance, and divert attention. Armored reconnaissance or stormtrooper teams, leading armored columns, advance rapidly from least expected regions and infiltrate adversary front to find paths of least resistance. Armored assault teams of tanks, infantry, anti-tank guns, and combat engineers as well as other specialists, together with close artillery and air support, quickly open breaches (via frontal/flank fire and movement combinations) into adversary rear along paths of least resistance uncovered by armored reconnaissance or stormtroopers. When breakthrough occurs, relatively independent mobile/armored teams led by armored recce with air support (recce, fire, and airlift when necessary), blow-through to penetrate at high speed deep into adversary interior. Object is to cut lines of communication, disrupt movement, paralyze command and envelop adversary forces and resources. Motorized or foot infantry further back supported by artillery and armor pour-in to collapse isolated pockets of resistance, widen the breaches and secure the encirclement or captured terrain against possible counter-attack. Idea Conquer an entire region in the quickest possible time by gaining initial surprise and exploiting the fast tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored teams, with air support, as basis to repeatedly penetrate, splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out disconnected remnants of adversary organism in order to confuse, disorder, and finally shatter his will or capacity to resist. Note: maneuver warfare does not mean leaving intact and motivated enemy forces in your rear. 70 February 2006

Which lead to: 87 Essence of blitzkrieg
Employ a Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt maneuver philosophy to generate ambiguity, realize deception, exploit superior mobility, and focus violence as basis to quickly: Create many opportunities to penetrate weaknesses in the form of any moral or mental inadequacies as well as any gaps or exposed flanks that open into adversary’s vulnerable rear and interior, hence- Create and exploit opportunities to repeatedly penetrate adversary organism, at all levels (tactical, grand tactical, and strategic) and in many ways, in order to splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out isolated remnants, thereby generate confusion and disorder, hence - Create and exploit opportunities to disrupt his system for communication, command, and support, as well as undermine or seize those connections or centers that he depends upon, thus shake his will or capacity to decisively commit his back-up echelons, operational reserves, and/or strategic reserves, thereby magnify adversary’s confusion and disorder and convince him to give up. Intent Create grand tactical success then exploit and expand it into strategic success for a decisive victory. Implication Blitzers, by being able to infiltrate or penetrate or get inside adversary’s system, generate many moral-mental-physical non—cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as undermine or seize those centers of gravity adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, produce paralysis, and bring about adversary collapse. February 2006 87

Categories of conflict
Note: Boyd did not use the term “maneuver warfare” in his briefings. Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history we can imagine three kinds of human conflict: Attrition warfare—as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the Allies during World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners. Maneuver conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, General Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union General Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler’s Generals (in particular Manstein, Guderian, Balck, Rommel) and the Americans under Generals Patton and MacArthur. [we’ll come back to this bullet later] With these comments in mind let’s look into the essentials of each. Version March 2005 February 2006 111

Attrition observations
Firepower, as a destructive force, is king. Protection (trenches, armor, dispersion, etc.) is used to weaken or dilute effects of enemy firepower. Mobility is used to bring firepower to bear or to evade enemy fire. Measures of success are (now) “body count” and targets destroyed. Seize and hold terrain objectives replaces Napoleon’s dictum: Destroy enemy army. Key point: measures of success are (virtually all) quantitative and objective, and if what you’re doing isn’t working, you just haven’t done it enough. February 2006 112

Essence of attrition warfare
Note – moral purpose Create and exploit Payoff Destructive force: Weapons (mechanical, chemical, biological, nuclear, etc.) that kill, maim, and/or otherwise generate widespread destruction. Protection: Ability to minimize the concentrated and explosive expression of destructive force by taking cover behind natural or manmade obstacles, by dispersion of people and resources, and by being obscure using camouflage, smoke, etc., together with cover and dispersion. Mobility: Speed or rapidity to focus destructive force or move away from adversary’s destructive focus. Frightful and debilitating attrition via widespread destruction as basis to: Break enemy’s will to resist Seize and hold terrain objectives Aim Compel enemy to surrender and sue for peace Attrition – destruction – is the means, not the end. Note: “speed” February 2006 113

Observations regarding maneuver
Ambiguity, deception, novelty, mobility, and violence (or threat thereof) are used to generate surprise and shock. Fire and movement are used in combination, like cheng/ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt, to tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention and strength in order to expose as well as menace and exploit vulnerabilities or weaknesses elsewhere. Indications of success tend to be qualitative and are related to the widespread onset of confusion and disorder, frequent envelopments, high prisoner counts, or any other phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change. It’s the interpretation that’s important, not the quantitative data themselves. Unlike attrition warfare, one does not typically reinforce failure. February 2006 114

Essence of maneuver conflict
Create, exploit, and magnify Ambiguity: Alternative or competing impressions of events as they may or may not be. Deception: An impression of events as they are not. Novelty: Impressions associated with events/ideas that are unfamiliar or have not been experienced before. Fast transient maneuvers: Irregular and rapid/abrupt shift from one maneuver event/state to another. Effort (cheng/ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt): An expenditure of energy or an irruption of violence—focused into, or thru, features that permit an organic whole to exist. Payoff Disorientation: Mismatch between events one observes or imagines and events (or efforts) he must react or adapt to. Disruption: State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn asunder. Overload: A welter of threatening events/efforts beyond one’s mental or physical capacity to adapt or endure. Note: High tempo, not (necessarily) high speed. Aim Generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as disorient, disrupt, or overload those that adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse; or equivalently, Uncover, create, and exploit many vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence many opportunities, to pull adversary apart and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption. February 2006 117

why this is called “maneuver” conflict
It is true that the Russian can be superb in defense and reckless in mass attacks, but when faced by surprise and unforeseen situations he is an easy prey to panic. Field Marshal von Manstein proved in this operation* that Russian mass attacks should be met by maneuver, not by rigid defense. Panzer Battles, Major General F. W. von Mellenthin, p. 254 why this is called “maneuver” conflict * The Kharkov Counterstroke – February 1943 February 2006

Second impression … permits one to 132 Transients Intentions
Observe, orient, decide and act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity ... or put another way Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision action loops or get inside his mind-time-space. Intentions Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions. Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistrust with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty as basis to sever adversary’s moral ties and disorient ... Select initiative (or response) that is least expected. Establish focus of main effort together with other effort and pursue directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and threaten alternative objectives. Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success). Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions, and obsessions of adversary organism that interfere with his ability to cope ... Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary’s vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities ... in order to dismember organism and isolate remnants for wrap-up or absorption. Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, chaos ... to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse. Become an extraordinary commander. … permits one to February 2006 132

Agenda Conflict Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg
Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict OODA Loops What they are not (and are) How to accelerate OODA loops Moral conflict & the prism of conflict Guerrilla warfare Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy Generations of war Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert, reorient, reharmonize 4GW according to Lind, van Creveld, Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer Moral isolation and interaction Theme for disintegration and collapse Grand strategy Theme for vitality and growth Ends and means Moral leverage What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer say about grand strategy Summary Tables Issues among the authors Neither Shall the Sword If I were emperor … February 2006

This is not the OODA loop
Observe Act Orient Decide Boyd has only himself to blame, since he originally explained it this way. In his defense, it must be noted that he never actually put the circular version in any of his briefings. A scheme like this would be a “stage model.” The drawbacks of such models are well known – see for example, Gary Klein’s Sources of Power, pp February 2006

An OODA “loop” with power
Observe Orient Decide Act Implicit Guidance & Control Implicit Guidance & Control Unfolding Circumstances Cultural Traditions Genetic Heritage New Information Previous Experience Analyses & Synthesis Observations Decision (Hypothesis) Feed Forward Feedback Action (Test) Feed Forward Unfolding Interaction With Environment Outside Information Unfortunately, it is not as simple as “observe, then orient, then decide, then act.” In fact such a sequential model would be very ponderous and would not well describe how successful competitors operate. When Boyd talks about “faster OODA loop speed.” he means the entire loop – all 33 or so arrows. The key to qiockness turns out to be the two “implicit guidance and control” arrows at the top. In other words, most of the time people and groups do not employ the explicit, sequential O-to-O-to-D-to-A mechanism. Most of the time, they simply observe and act. There is data coming out to support this (see Gary Klein’s book, Sources of Power.) The question, of course, is, “What action?” A thinking opponent doesn’t provide us with a laundry list of his tactics so we can work out responses in advance. The mechanism which handles this uncertainty and makes the loop function in a real world situation is “Orientation.” As we suck in information via the “Observe” gateway, and particularly mismatches between what we predict and what actually happens, we have to change our orientation (and hence the implicit guidance and control flowing from orientation.) New actions flow from new orientations, if we have the proper training (what martial arts training is all about) to “meet the exigencies of the world.” Note that “OODA” speed is quite different from the speed of our actions. Doing something dumb, but doing it at high speed, may not provide much of a competitive advantage. J. R. Boyd, “the Essence of Winning and Losing,” 1995. “Orientation is the Schwerpunkt.” Organic Design, 16. “Emphasize implicit over explicit in order to gain a favorable mismatch in friction and time (ours lower than any adversary’s).” Organic Design, 22. “Interaction permits vitality and growth, while isolation leads to decay and disintegration.” Strategic Game, 29. February 2006

What OODA “loop” speed really means
Implicit Guidance & Control Know what to do Feed Forward Implicit Guidance & Control Observations Unfolding Circumstances Outside Information Unfolding Interaction With Environment Quickly understand what’s going on And be able to do it Unfolding Interaction With Environment Action (Test) Observe Orient Decide Act Key Points: When you’re doing OODA “loops” right, accuracy and speed improve together; they don’t trade off. The main function of leadership (“management” in business) is to build an organization that gets better and better at these things. Decision (Hypothesis) Feed Forward Feedback While learning from the experience IF action is flowing smoothly and (nearly) instantaneously from orientation, as it should the vast majority of the time, then the speed that counts is the speed to reorient in response to changing external and internal conditions. That speed is symbolized by the IBM Power PC 970 processor in its guise as the Apple Mac G5. There is no case where slower is better. You may not take any action (that is, no action may flow from your current orientation), but your internal processor should always be faster than those of your competitors. Note that in the “incorrect” concept of the OODA loop (the O to O to D to A variety), speed and accuracy of decisions will tend to trade off. That is, you improve one only by shortchanging the other. This doesn’t happen in the OODA loop that Boyd actually drew. February 2006

Prerequisites Fingerspitzengefühl
An ability to “feel” or sense the flow of events Often associated with Rommel Related to the implicit guidance and control link from orientation to action “When this unminding becomes your mind, you do not dwell on anything and do not miss anything. In your body it comes out when a need faces it, to fulfill that need.” – Zen Master Takuan (Thomas Cleary, The Japanese Art of War, 65) “You must practice all of your techniques until they become second nature … actual combat is extremely fast and demands that you act and react without thinking.” – Miyamoto Musashi, Book of Five Rings “A major difference between a military that can do maneuver warfare in combat and one that can only talk about it is excellence in techniques. Sloppy technique slows down your Boyd Cycle [OODA loops] and makes your actions ineffective. – Bill Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook February 2006

Blitz operating philosophy
Key point Each level from simple to complex (platoon to theater) has their own observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle that increases as we try to control more levels and details of command at the higher levels. Put simply, as the number of events we must consider increase, the longer it takes to observe-orient-decide-act. Idea This brings out the idea that faster tempo, or rhythm, at lower levels should work within the slower rhythm but larger pattern at higher levels so that overall system does not lose its cohesion or coherency. Raises question How do blitzers harmonize these differing tempos/rhythms so that they can exploit the faster rhythm/smaller pattern (of the lower-level units) yet maintain the coherency of the rhythm/pattern for the larger effort? Response Give lower-level commanders wide freedom, within an overall mind-time-space scheme, to shape/direct their own activities so that they can exploit faster tempo/rhythm at tactical levels yet be in harmony with the larger pattern/slower rhythm associated with the more general aim and larger effort at the strategic level. Shaping agents Shape overall scheme by using mission concept or sense of mission to fix responsibility and shape commitment at all levels and through all parts of the organism. Likewise, use Schwerpunkt concept through all levels to link differing rhythms/patterns so that each part or level of the organic whole can operate at its own natural rhythm—without pulling organism apart—instead of the slower pace associated with a rigid centralized control. These, along with Fingerspitzengefühl, form the essential prerequisites to employing blitzkrieg. Is the same true of 4GW? 72 February 2006

Overall mind-time-space scheme
Message According to General Gunther Blumentritt, such a scheme presupposes a common outlook based upon “a body of professional officers who have received exactly the same training during the long years of peace and with the same tactical education, the same way of thinking, identical speech, hence a body of officers to whom all tactical conceptions were fully clear.” Furthermore, a la General Blumentritt, it presupposes “an officers training institution which allows the subordinate a very great measure of freedom of action and freedom in the manner of executing orders and which primarily calls for independent daring, initiative and sense of responsibility.” Point Without a common outlook superiors cannot give subordinates freedom-of-action and maintain coherency of ongoing action. Implication A common outlook possessed by “a body of officers” represents a unifying theme that can be used to simultaneously encourage subordinate initiative yet realize superior intent. Boyd also used the German word, “Einheit,” to describe this common outlook. February 2006 74

Schwerpunkt (focus of main effort)
Message Schwerpunkt acts as a center or axis or harmonizing agent that is used to help shape commitment and convey or carry-out intent, at all levels from theater to platoon, hence an image around which: Maneuver of all arms and supporting elements are focused to exploit opportunities and maintain tempo of operations, and Initiative of many subordinates is harmonized with superior intent. In this sense Schwerpunkt can be thought of as: A focusing agent that naturally produces an unequal distribution of effort as a basis to generate superiority in some sectors by thinning-out others, as well as A medium to realize superior intent without impeding initiative of many subordinates, hence a medium through which subordinate initiative is implicitly connected to superior intent. Implication Schwerpunkt represents a unifying concept that provides a way to rapidly shape focus and direction of effort as well as harmonize support activities with combat operations, thereby permit a true decentralization of tactical command within centralized strategic guidance—without losing cohesion of overall effort. or put another way Schwerpunkt represents a unifying medium that provides a directed way to tie initiative of many subordinate actions with superior intent as a basis to diminish friction and compress time in order to generate a favorable mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances. February 2006 78

Auftragstaktik—missions and contracts instead of tasks
The concept of mission can be thought of as a contract, hence an agreement, between superior and subordinate. The subordinate agrees to make his or her actions serve superior's intent in terms of what is to be accomplished, The superior agrees to give the subordinate wide freedom to exercise his or her imagination and initiative in terms of how intent is to be realized. A few points: A “contract” implies a freedom to choose (to paraphrase Milton Friedman.) If there is no choice, then you have a “Befehl,” order, like “Right face!” Communication even after accepting the Auftrag is critical If the subordinate doesn’t ask questions, he/she may not be the right person for the job. February 2006

Auftragstaktik—what “commitment” means
As part of this concept, the subordinate is given the right to challenge or question the feasibility of the mission if: he feels his superior's ideas on what can be achieved are not in accord with the existing situation or he feels his superior has not given him adequate resources to carry it out. There are times, by the way when you don’t manage this way: With the members of your organization who aren’t ready (i.e., haven’t completed sufficient training – don’t have the common mind-time-space scheme.) This means that you have to lead different people in different ways. With people whom for whatever reason you don’t trust. If you’re dealing with nuclear weapons (really don’t want a lot of individual initiative with these things.) For most transactions involving money – strict financial procedures must be followed. Any other time that the law prescribes specific processes, procedures, or reporting Likewise, the superior has every right to expect his subordinate to carry out the mission contract when agreement is reached on what can be achieved consistent with the existing situation and resources provided. J. R. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, 76 February 2006

Auftragstaktik But once the attack is underway and the situation begins changing rapidly, the subordinate will again be expected to adjust his actions to the changes on his own initiative, with appropriate references to his superior’s intent. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 13-14 Advantages of Auftragstaktik: Leaders at all echelons are forced to analyze their own situations as well as that of the next highest command Transmission of orders from one command level to another is expedited Measures taken at the scene of action are in harmony with actual conditions General W. von Lessow, Bundeswehr, 1977 (in van Creveld, Fighting Power) It provides for the degree of cooperation necessary to achieve harmony of effort yet gives commanders at all levels the latitude to act with initiative and boldness … It is not more command and control that we are after. Instead, we seek to decrease the amount of command and control that we need. MCDP 6, Command and Control, Ch. 3 February 2006

In other words, you must earn the right to use Auftragstaktik.
Before you rush in … Mission command and control demands mutual trust among all commanders, staffs, and Marines—confidence in the abilities and judgment of subordinates, peers, and seniors. MCDP 6, p. 10 Such a system, of course, presupposes uniformity of thinking and reliability of action only to be attained by thorough training and long experience. More importantly still, complete confidence of superiors and their subordinates and vice versa is absolutely indispensable. van Creveld, Fighting Power, p. 36. In other words, you must earn the right to use Auftragstaktik. Version March 2005 February 2006

Idealized schematic The FESA climate
Common outlook II. Einheit I. (Individual) Fingerspitzengefühl IV. Auftrag III. Schwerpunkt People without Fingerspitzengefuehl would be shapeless blobs. (I’m still working on this one – it’s explained better in my book, Certain to Win.) February 2006

4GW organizational climate Hammes
F, E aggressive, well trained subordinates who have a network of trust hard, realistic unit training that ensures those who can thrive in the chaos of war are in leadership positions and enough time together to learn how each member of the team will react in a crisis forward thinking commander who provides clear, understandable, actionable guidance freedom at all levels to take the initiative (even to deviate from the plan) as long as it conforms with the commander’s overall intent E S* A Hammes’ thesis is that the same climate that enables maneuver warfare will be required for 4GW which requires F by the commander, too, of course February 2006

Categories of conflict
Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history we can imagine three kinds of human conflict: Attrition warfare—as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the Allies during World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners. Maneuver conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, General Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union General Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler’s Generals (in particular Manstein, Guderian, Balck, Rommel) and the Americans under Generals Patton and MacArthur. Moral conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, most guerrilla leaders, a very few counter-guerrillas (such as Magsaysay) and certain others from Sun Tzu to the present. With these comments in mind let’s look into the essentials of each. February 2006 111

Observations related to moral conflict Gen. Hermann Balck
Theme No fixed recipes for organization, communications, tactics, leadership, etc. Wide freedom for subordinates to exercise imagination and initiative—yet harmonize within intent of superior commanders. Heavy reliance upon moral (human values) instead of material superiority as basis for cohesion and ultimate success. Commanders must create a bond and breadth of experience based upon trust—not mistrust—for cohesion. How is this atmosphere achieved? By example leaders (at all levels) must demonstrate requisite physical energy, mental agility, and moral authority, to inspire subordinates to enthusiastically cooperate and take initiatives within superiors intent. What is the price? Courage to share danger and discomfort at the front. Willingness to support and promote (unconventional or difficult) subordinates that accept danger, demonstrate initiative, take risks, and come-up with new ways toward mission accomplishment. Dedication and resolve to face-up to and master uncomfortable circumstances that fly in the face of the traditional solution. Benefit Internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability. February 2006 118

Essence of moral conflict
Create, exploit, and magnify Menace: Impressions of danger to one’s well being and survival. Uncertainty: Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by events that appear ambiguous, erratic, centers of gravity, as well as subvert contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc. Mistrust: Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens human bonds among members of an organic whole or between organic wholes. Idea Surface, fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that adversary depends upon, thereby magnify internal friction. In order to breed these payoff Aim Destroy moral bonds that permit an organic whole to exist In other words, pump up these February 2006 122

Essence of moral conflict
May use a variety of tools: physical – movement or firepower mental – e.g., ambiguity via more rapid OODA loops or moral – propaganda, subversion & covert action, etc. Negative factors Menace: Impressions of danger to one’s well being and survival Uncertainty: Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by events that appear ambiguous, erratic, contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc. Mistrust: Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that loosens human bonds among members of an organic whole or between organic wholes Counterweights Initiative: Internal drive to think and take action without being urged Adaptability: Power to adjust or change in order to cope with new or unforeseen circumstances Harmony: Interaction of apparently disconnected events or entities in a connected way Aim Pump-up friction via negative factors to breed fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that adversary depends upon, thereby sever moral bonds that permit adversary to exist as an organic whole. Simultaneously, build-up and play counterweights against negative factors to diminish internal friction, as well as surface courage, confidence, and esprit, thereby make possible the human interactions needed to create moral bonds that permit us, as an organic whole, to shape and adapt to change. February 2006 125

Prism of Conflict Attrition Maneuver Moral Any actual conflict
Note: This is my interpretation - as far as I know, Boyd never used it. February 2006

World War I Guerrilla Warfare (a la T.E. Lawrence)
Action Gain support of population. Must “arrange the minds” of friend, foe and neutral alike. Must “get inside their minds”. Must “be an idea or thing invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas” (inconspicuousness and fluidity-of action). Must be an “attack-in-depth”. Tactics “should be tip-and-run, not pushes but strokes” with “use of the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place”. Should be a war of detachment (avoiding contact and presenting a threat everywhere) using mobility/fluidity-of-action and environmental background (vast unknown desert) as basis for “never affording a target” and “never on the defensive except by accident and in error”. Idea Disintegrate existing regime’s ability to govern. February 2006 64

Impression Infiltration tactics a la Ludendorff seem to be similar in nature to irregular or guerrilla tactics a la Lawrence. Why? Both stress clouded/distorted signatures, mobility and cohesion of small units as basis to insert an amorphous yet focused effort into or thru adversary weaknesses. February 2006 65

Major advances between World Wars I and II
Soviet revolutionary strategy Lenin, and after him Stalin, exploited the idea of crises and vanguards—that arise out of Marxian contradictions within capitalism—to lay-out Soviet revolutionary strategy. Result: A scheme that emphasizes moral/psychological factors as basis to destroy a regime from within. Lightning war (blitzkrieg) Infiltration tactics of 1918 were mated with: Tank Motorized Artillery Tactical Aircraft Motor Transport Better Communications Blitzkrieg to generate a breakthrough by piercing a region with multiple narrow thrusts using armor, motorized infantry, and follow-up infantry divisions supported by tactical aircraft. Guerrilla war Mao Tse-Tung synthesized Sun Tzu’s ideas, classic guerrilla strategy and tactics, and Napoleonic style mobile operations under an umbrella of Soviet revolutionary ideas to create a powerful way for waging modern (guerrilla) war. Modern guerrilla warfare has become an overall political, economic, social and military framework for “total war”. J.F.C. Fuller Heinz Guderian by February 2006 66

Blitzkrieg and guerrilla strategy
Note Infiltration and isolation Blitz and guerrillas infiltrate a nation or regime at all levels to soften and shatter the moral fiber of the political, economic and social structure. Simultaneously, via diplomatic, psychological, and various sub-rosa or other activities, they strip-away potential allies thereby isolate intended victim(s) for forthcoming blows. To carry out this program, a la Sun Tzu, blitz, and guerrillas: Probe and test adversary, and any allies that may rally to his side, in order to unmask strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions. Exploit critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions, etc., in order to foment mistrust, sow discord and shape both adversary’s and allies’ perception of the world thereby: Create atmosphere of “mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecisiveness, panic”... Manipulate or undermine adversary’s plans and actions. Make it difficult, if not impossible, for allies to aid adversary during his time of trial. Purpose Force capitulation when combined with external political, economic, and military pressures or Weaken foe to minimize his resistance against military blows that will follow. February 2006 69

Modern guerrilla campaign
Essence Capitalize on corruption, injustice, incompetence, etc., (or their appearances) as basis to generate atmosphere of mistrust and discord in order to sever moral bonds that bind people to existing regime. Simultaneously, Share existing burdens with people and work with them to root out and punish corruption, remove injustice, eliminate grievances, etc., as basis to form moral bonds between people and guerrillas in order to bind people to guerrilla philosophy and ideals. Intent Shape and exploit crises environment that permits guerrilla vanguards or cadres to pure-up guerrilla resolve, attract the uncommitted, and drain-away adversary resolve as foundation to replace existing regime with guerrilla regime. Implication Guerrillas, by being able to penetrate the very essence of their adversary’s moral-mental-physical being, generate many moral-mental-physical non-cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as subvert or seize those centers of gravity that adversary regime must depend upon, in order to magnify friction, produce paralysis, and bring about collapse. Yet, Guerrillas shape or influence moral-mental-physical atmosphere so that potential adversaries, as well as the uncommitted, are drawn toward guerrilla philosophy and are empathetic toward guerrilla success. Question: Are al-Qa’ida or the Iraqi insurgents accomplishing or even trying to accomplish these? February 2006 91

Guerrilla results Successful Successful Unsuccessful 1775-81 1808-14
1812 Philippines South Africa Greece Philippines* Malaya* American Colonies Spain Russia German East Africa Arabia China Yugoslavia Indochina Algeria Cuba South Vietnam 1812 Philippines South Africa Greece Philippines* Malaya* Guerrilla war is the war of the broad masses of an economically backward country standing up against a powerfully equipped and well trained army of aggression. Vo Nguyen Giap People’s War People’s Army Regime exercised particular care not to inflict casualties and to protect population. February 2006 97

Blitz and guerrilla theme
Essence Avoid battles—instead penetrate adversary to subvert, disrupt, or seize those connections, centers, and activities that provide cohesion (e.g., psychological/moral bonds, communications, lines of communication, command and supply centers ...) Exploit ambiguity, deception, superior mobility, and sudden violence to generate initial surprise and shock followed by surprise and shock again, again, again ... Roll-up/wipe-out the isolated units or remnants created by the subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure. Intent Exploit subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure to generate confusion, disorder, panic, etc., thereby shatter cohesion, paralyze effort, and bring about adversary collapse. February 2006 98

Another scheme – the generations of war
1GW: smoothbore weapons; line and column; rigid discipline with top down control. Training & élan could often close with and defeat enemy before absorbing debilitating casualties 2GW: rifled weapons, automatic weapons, indirect fire artillery; tactics still basically linear (esp. on defense), but firepower replaced manpower as predominant element. Attempts to use “élan” to overcome firepower were now suicidal 3GW: same weapons; but: non-linear tactics (infiltration/pull; surfaces & gaps); time rather than place as basis of operational art; emphasis on collapsing enemy rather than closing with and destroying him (AKA blitzkrieg, maneuver warfare, modern system) February 2006

Battle of Antietam September 17, 1862
February 2006

1 & 2 GW Battle of Antietam September 17, 1862 February 2006

Blitz vs. guerrilla Same basic themes (PISRR), collapse rather than overpower enemy Same emphasis on cheng/ch’i Differences include: Blitz/3GW Guerrilla Penetrate Enemy forces Target society Isolate Non-cooperative CoGs (e.g., penetrated units, fighting units from logistics, etc.) Government from people Subdue/Subvert Isolated remnants Elements of society, Reorient Ourselves for next objective Subverted elements Reharmonize Our forces (e.g., shift Schwerpunkt) Elements of society under our control Content High mental High moral February 2006

Clausewitz’s Trinity*: State vs. State
Other state The State Government 1, 2, 3GW/Blitz/MW People Army *simplified February 2006

Clausewitz’s Trinity: Insurgency
Allies of The State The State Government penetrate & isolate People Army Guerrilla 3GW penetrate & isolate February 2006

3GW restores maneuver Attrition Maneuver Moral 1GW 2GW 3GW Guerrilla
February 2006

Now, come with me into the fourth generation!
February 2006

4GW, according to Lind What defines 4GW:
“Crisis in legitimacy of the state”: The loss of the state's monopoly on war and on the first loyalty of its citizens and the rise of non-state entities that command people’s primary loyalty and that wage war. These entities may be gangs, religions, races and ethnic groups within races, localities, tribes, business enterprises, ideologies—the variety is almost limitless. A return to a world of cultures, not, merely states, in conflict; and The manifestation of both developments—the decline of the state and the rise of alternate, often cultural, primary loyalties—not only “over there,” but in America itself. February 2006

4GW, according to Lind The goal of 4GW is largely moral:
Fourth Generation war focuses on the moral level, where it works to convince all parties, neutrals as well as belligerents, that the cause for which a Fourth Generation entity is fighting is morally superior. It turns its state enemies inward against themselves on the moral level, making the political calculations of the mental level irrelevant. “What if we combined terrorism, high technology, and the following additional elements? A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or religion A direct attack on the enemy’s culture … Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media, particularly television news … “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Lind, et. al., 1989 February 2006

“collapse a state morally”
Moral strength: Mental capacity to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust. Moral victory: Triumph of courage, confidence, and esprit (de corps) over fear, anxiety, and alienation when confronted by menace, uncertainty, and mistrust. Moral defeat: Triumph of fear, anxiety, and alienation over courage, confidence, and esprit when confronted by menace, uncertainty, and mistrust. Moral values: Human values that permit one to carry on in the face of menace, uncertainty, and mistrust. Moral authority: Person or body that can give one the courage, confidence, and esprit to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust. When this happens, you just give up and quit. February 2006 121

“Fighting” 4GW Lind You can use either the de-escalation model or the “Hama”* (annihilation) model. If you fall in between, you’re doomed. The de-escalation model: stresses the moral level, understands the power of weakness, integrates troops with the local population, draws on that integration for good cultural intelligence. In fighting 4GW, “less is more.” Try to keep your physical presence small, if possible so small that you are invisible. If you can’t do that, then keep your footprint small in time – get in and get out, fast. Finally, if you have to take the least desirable route, invading and occupying another state, you must do everything you can to preserve that state at the same time you are defeating it. As we see in Iraq, if you destroy the state itself, there is a good chance nobody will be able to recreate it. *Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad quelled an insurrection in the city of Hama by leveling part of it with an artillery barrage on January 30, Estimates of the death toll run from 10,000 to 40,000. From “FMFM 1-A,” On War # 101, January 25, 2005 February 2006

Still “fighting” 4GW Lind
Other important pieces: 4GW is often light infantry/Jaeger (hunter) warfare “Out G-ing the G” – get better at guerrilla warfare than the guerrilla (quoting COL David Hackworth, USA, Ret.) Most important supporting weapon is cash “Force protection” is the enemy of “force integration” (with the local population) HUMINT is the only “int” worth discussing From “FMFM 1-A,” On War # 101, January 25, 2005 February 2006

Fourth Generation Warfare Hammes
It uses all available networks – political, economic, social and military – to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. Note: Neither Lind nor van Creveld totally agree with the objective Lind – focus is on moral level, so calculation of benefit is not dominant or sometimes even relevant van Creveld – “interests” or “policies” are not the primary cause of war February 2006

It is an evolved form of insurgency (208) practical people solving specific problems in order to defeat more powerful enemies (3) But, Lind: “Contrary to what a number of writers on 4GW have said, Fourth Generation war is not merely a new name for insurgency or guerrilla warfare.” (Social) networks will be employed to carry specific messages to our policy makers and to those who can influence the policy makers (208) Networks are exceptionally resilient and difficult to destroy. (183) Clausewitzian “decisive battles” and even 3GW maneuver campaigns are irrelevant (208) at least until Mao’s Phase III against a state government Too much central control can destroy the effectiveness of a 4GW force (209) February 2006

A state will not give up its right to exist as a result of 4GW techniques a final (Mao Phase III) conventional campaign will be required (211) can achieve less drastic goals with 4GW Successful 4GW organizations focus on the movement’s long term political viability, rather than near-term tactical effectiveness. (222) see themselves not as military organizations but as webs unified by ideas Must bring to bear full set of economic, social, intelligence & military capabilities of western states February 2006

4GW – non-trinitarian warfare van Creveld
Martin van Creveld doesn’t use the term “4GW” but has stated that the concept is basically the same as “non-trinitarian” warfare, as described in The Transformation of War (1991.) What changes in 4GW is who fights and what they’re fighting for. The state as we know it (government separate from ruler) became the dominant form of political organization in Europe only in 1648 In many parts of the world, states were only established in the 19th & 20th centuries through colonization/ decolonization and some parts of the world never developed functioning states at all Even where states were established, other organizations are coming to the fore and beginning to wage war not involving governments, people, and armies. February 2006

Why societies go to war van Creveld
States interests; policy (Politik): cost/benefit calculations, often disguised, implied, or backfilled Non-States (and sometimes states) grievances, objectives, glory of individuals/status in tribe obtaining the spoils of war: booty, slaves, territory, women, which override and complicate any pursuit of tribal/community “policy” obtaining prisoners for religious or culinary reasons (150) doctrinal differences other “will of God” reasons justice: avenge perceived wrongs; community honor (e.g., Trojan War) assist an ally (WW I and to some extent WWII) Everybody existence, either as a group (insurgency) or as a state February 2006

Predictions van Creveld
The side with the more rational interests will lose (149) Wars will be waged by groups we today call “terrorists” tribes, religious groups, commercial groups, criminal groups, insurgencies, etc. their home territories will not be continuous, impenetrable, or very large; no clear line on a map leadership will be along personal & charismatic lines Role of women in non-trinitarian warfare (4GW, but not 2/3GW!) will approach that of men, as it historically has in guerrilla warfare (180) February 2006

Predictions (II) van Creveld
Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will the difference between armed forces and civilians (194) Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm (208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211) Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological complexity (cost) of military forces Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today) (225) February 2006

War through the ages van Creveld
“It is not true that war is simply a means to an end, nor do people necessarily fight in order to attain this objective or that. In fact, the opposite is often true: people very often take up one objective or another precisely in order that they may fight.” (226) February 2006

4GW Barnett Guerrilla or insurgency-based warfare
Defeat enemy politically Not on battlefield but through years of LIC Incorporates notion of “war within the context of everything else” Military tactics subordinated to economic, political, and social pain inflicted upon opponent Focus is enemy’s “societal will to wage war” (Blueprint, 20) Could be precluded by a sufficiently large Sys Admin force (Blueprint, 17) Essentially a war against individuals; inside Core states, reduces to a law enforcement problem (Blueprint, 122, 123) February 2006

4GW Barnett Problems with 4GW:
Suggests a world in perpetual war with an “unredeemable and inexhaustible” supply of savages (Blueprint, 21 – citing Robert D. Kaplan) Envisions long, drawn out conflict with al-Qa’ida or its successor (Blueprint, 88 – citing Kaplan) “Addicted to notion of declining state” (on his blog 1/22/06) 4GW techniques possible in conflict between Core states, but hard to see the payoff (Blueprint, ) Discounts religion as a strong cause of the 9/11 attacks (Map, 285; Blueprint, 87 - citing Olivier Roy) “We seek to do unto al-Qa’ida what they did unto us: trigger a System Perturbation …” (Map, 285) February 2006

4GW Barnett But, system perturbation is risky
Outcome of perturbation, itself Effect on rest of region (and by implication, the Gap as a whole) (Map, 290) “Rule-Set Reset” can be a dangerous time because “the cure may be worse than the disease” (Blueprint, xviii) Toppling Saddam was a real System Perturbation, but working the insurgency is a serious, long-term horizontal scenario, requiring people who can see across time. A PhD in history has to help on that score. Doesn't mean you're not still killing bad guys, it just means you do it with more care and discretion, making sure you don't simply create more enemies in the process.In the end, you get to leave when their economy is working. Jobs kill insurgencies, not soldiers. (Blog 17 Feb 06) February 2006

4GW Scheuer Doesn’t really consider the subject – for reasons we’ll cover under Grand Strategy. Follows Lind and Hafez al-Assad, should military force become necessary. Because we are so bad at grand strategy, we are only left with one military option: “The piles of dead will include as many or more civilians as combatants because our enemies wear no uniforms. Killing in large numbers is not enough to defeat our Muslim foes. With killing must come a Sherman-like razing of infrastructure. Roads and irrigation systems; bridges, power plants, and crops in the field; fertilizer plants and grain mills … As noted, such actions will yield large civilian casualties, displaced populations, and refugee flows.” ( ) February 2006

John Robb Open Source Warfare
Open source warfare: “relies on networks of peers rather than the hierarchies of command and control we see in conventional militaries. This structure provides an open source movement with levels of innovation and resilience that rigid hierarchies can't match.” Multiple, smaller attacks against “systempunkts” (disruptive leverage points) like power & telecom nodes, water, ports, etc. Iraq appears to be developing a cooperative community among diverse groups that operates like the open source software industry Locally successful tactics are quickly replicated; ineffective ones quickly abandoned – has evolutionary overtones February 2006

Robb: Open Source Warfare
On the tactical level the objective is to undermine and collapse the state by driving people to primary loyalties to meet their needs. On the strategic level it is used to undermine the sentiment of the global financial/trade markets in relation to the target state to cause capital outflows, inflation, spiraling debt, and potentially economic depression. Note: compressing the distance between “tactical” and “strategic” is a feature of (counter-)guerrilla warfare and 4GW. The Marine Corps uses the term “strategic corporeal” to indicate that the actions of low-ranking people may have strategic or grand strategic impact (e.g., Abu Ghraib) February 2006

Other thoughts on 4GW From the US Army War College Strategic Studies Ins. (SSI)
US is “sheriff of the world”; have no choice but to pick up the role and run with it (Colin Gray) strategy is “exporting freedom” Andrew Hoehn Al-Qa’ida or whatever it is now, is having no problem developing future leaders and developing its “franchise” model (Sherifa Zuhur) Successful insurgencies seem to have 4 stages: flight, intense training, operations, control. Mohammad’s creation of the first Muslim state followed this pattern. (Zackary Abuza) Big problem in near term—20 million non-integrating Muslims in Europe; more attacks like 3/11 likely (Peter Bergen) Organized crime will sometimes cooperate with “terrorist” groups; can create dysfunctional governments (Phil Williams; Max Manwaring) Demographic youth bulge will continue to provide fertile recruiting grounds for “terrorist” vanguards—Nepal, for example There are some “irregular” conflicts in any given year (Frank Hoffman) February 2006

Antulio Echevarria’s Critique of 4GW Dr
Antulio Echevarria’s Critique of 4GW Dr. Echevarria is the Director of Research at SSI Uses a version of Hammes’ interpretation (1) Defines 4GW as: “future terrorists would first seek to infiltrate a society and then attempt to collapse it from within by means of an ill-defined psychocultural ‘judo throw’ of sorts” (2-3) “the types of high-technology that 4GW’s proponents envisioned terrorists using includes such Wunderwaffe as directed energy weapons and robotics …” (3) Critiques 4GW as claiming that US forces are: “designed to operate within a nation-state framework” and then gives WW II as a counter example (5) “ … by comparing what essentially amounts to military means or techniques – such as ‘massed manpower,’ ‘firepower,’ and ‘maneuver’ – on the one hand, to what is arguably a form of warfare – such as insurgency – on the other… “ (15) February 2006

Comments on Echevarria
Has somehow confused 4GW with a technological approach to warfare (2) Did not catch that the original paper (1989) proposed two complementary hypotheses – technology-driven and idea-driven (2) Assumes that to be effective, guerrilla warfare must support state-vs-state warfare (echoing Clausewitz) (12-13) Includes “maneuver” with “techniques” (15) This is a major error: “Maneuver” refers to the purpose of the mass or firepower – apparently he’s thinking of “movement.” Overlooks that in 4GW, the “insurgents’ ” primary target is often an outside state power Has a good point in that much of what some people call “4GW” fits neatly within insurgency. February 2006

4GW: One pattern, a la Clausewitz
Failed states 4GW LIC Coup Supporting country 2/3GW Government G The State A P Target (failing state) Army People February 2006

4GW: One pattern, a la Clausewitz
Failed states 4GW Supporting country Government G The State 4GW A P Note that titular government and 4GW movement may be separate – e.g., Taliban and al-Qa’ida Failed state Army People February 2006

Blitz vs. guerrilla vs. 4GW
Blitz/3GW Guerrilla 4GW??? Penetrate Enemy forces Own society Society of supporting country Isolate Non-cooperative CoGs (e.g., penetrated units) Government from people Non-cooperative centers of gravity (e.g., institutions, organizations) Subdue/Subvert Isolated remnants Elements of society Enough NCoGs to cause supporting country moral collapse & withdrawal Reorient Ourselves for next objective Subverted elements Ourselves: for example, expand guerrilla or convert to 3GW in target country Reharmonize Our forces (e.g., shift Schwerpunkt) Elements of society under our control Ourselves: for example to continue fight in target country Content High mental High moral Moral vs. supporting country; All vs. target country February 2006

The “generations of war” model From the viewpoint of Core states and nuclear powers
Nuclear Weapons Proliferate Fall of USSR Peace of Westphalia State-vs-state— only “legal” form of war 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 States & non-states wage war States & non-states wage war state vs. state 1 GW 2 GW Precursor activities – going back to Alexander & Sun Tzu (and before) 3 GW maneuver concepts New commo & trans networks 4 GW Highly irregular / partisan /guerrilla warfare; terrorism; criminal organizations, etc. February 2006

February 2006

! Simply stated ! In other words
As human beings, we cannot exist without an external or surrounding environment from which we can draw sustenance, nourishment, or support. In other words Interaction permits vitality and growth while isolation leads to decay and disintegration. SG 29 February 2006

Illuminating example (continued)
Overall Message The ability to operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than an adversary enables one to fold adversary back inside himself so that he can neither appreciate nor keep up with what's going on. He will become disoriented or confused; which suggests that Unless such menacing pressure is relieved, adversary will experience various combinations of uncertainty, doubt, confusion, self-deception, indecision, fear, panic, discouragement, despair, etc., which will further: Disorient or twist his mental images/impressions of what's happening; thereby Disrupt his mental/physical maneuvers for dealing with such a menace; Overload his mental/physical capacity to adapt or endure; Collapse his ability to carry on. Key point: only at the level of strategy & below SG 44 February 2006

? What’s the point of all this ?
We can’t just look at our own personal experiences or use the same mental recipes over and over again; we've got to look at other disciplines and activities and relate or connect them to what we know from our experiences and the strategic world we live in. If we can do this We will be able to surface new repertoires and (hopefully) develop a Fingerspitzengefühl for folding our adversaries back inside themselves, morally-mentally-physically—so that they can neither appreciate nor cope with what's happening—without suffering the same fate ourselves. SG 45 February 2006

Which carries us to the ? question ?
How do we fold adversaries back inside themselves, morally-mentally-physically … without suffering the same fate ourselves? or put another way How do we physically isolate our adversaries yet interact with others outside ourselves? How do we mentally isolate our adversaries yet keep in touch hence interact, with unfolding events? How do we morally isolate our adversaries yet maintain the trust/confidence of others and thereby interact with them? SG 46 February 2006

Illumination Physically we can isolate adversaries by severing their communications with outside world as well as by severing their internal communications to one another. We can accomplish this by cutting them off from their allies and the uncommitted via diplomatic, psychological, and other efforts. To cut them off from one another we should penetrate their system by being unpredictable, otherwise they can counter our efforts. Mentally we can isolate our adversaries by presenting them with ambiguous, deceptive, or novel situations, as well as by operating at a tempo or rhythm they can neither make out nor keep up with. Operating inside their O-O-D-A loops will accomplish just this by disorienting or twisting their mental images so that they can neither appreciate nor cope with what's really going on. Morally our adversaries isolate themselves when they visibly improve their well being to the detriment of others (i.e. their allies, the uncommitted, etc.) by violating codes of conduct or behavior patterns that they profess to uphold or others expect them to uphold. SG 47 February 2006

Expected payoff Disintegration and collapse, unless adversaries change their behavior patterns to conform to what is deemed acceptable by others outside themselves. SG 48 February 2006

Illumination (continued)
Physically we interact by opening-up and maintaining many channels of communication with the outside world, hence with others out there, that we depend upon for sustenance, nourishment, or support. Mentally we interact by selecting information from a variety of sources or channels in order to generate mental images or impressions that match-up with the world of events or happenings that we are trying to understand and cope with. Morally we interact with others by avoiding mismatches between what we say we are, what we are, and the world we have to deal with, as well as by abiding by those other cultural codes or standards that we are expected to uphold. SG 49 February 2006

Expected payoff Vitality and growth, with the opportunity to shape and adapt to unfolding events thereby influence the ideas and actions of others. SG 50 February 2006

Theme for disintegration and collapse
Synthesize Lethal effort: Tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention and strength as well as (or thereby) overload critical vulnerabilities and generate weaknesses. Maneuver: Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize those vulnerable yet critical connections, centers, and activities as basis to penetrate, splinter, and isolate remnants of adversary organism for mop-up or absorption. Moral: Create an atmosphere of fear, anxiety, and alienation to sever human bonds that permit an organic whole to exist. Idea Destroy adversary’s moral-mental-physical harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse his will to resist. Aim Render adversary powerless by denying him the opportunity to cope with unfolding circumstances. February 2006 136

? Raises question ? How do we connect the tactical and strategic notions, or the theme for disintegration and collapse, with the national goal? February 2006 138

Via a sensible grand strategy that will:
Support national goal. Pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversary resolve, and attract the uncommitted. End conflict on favorable terms. Ensure that conflict and peace terms do not provide seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict. February 2006 139

Grand strategy Essence Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success. February 2006 140

Roughly, the principles of maneuver (warfare)
Insight On one hand … the national goal and grand strategy tend to be constructive in nature. On the other hand, the strategic aim, strategy, grand tactics, and tactics are destructive in nature and operate over a shorter time frame. In this sense, the upper two and the latter four notions, as expressed, appear to be in disharmony with one another. Yet, application of these latter four strategic and tactical notions permit real leadership to avoid high attrition, avoid widespread destruction, and gain a quick victory. This combined with shattered cohesion, paralysis, and rapid collapse demonstrated by the existing adversary regime, makes it appear corrupt, incompetent, and unfit to govern. Under these circumstances, leaders and statesmen offering generous terms can form the basis for a viable peace. In this sense, the first two and the latter four notions can be in harmony with one another. Roughly, the principles of maneuver (warfare) February 2006 142

Further elaboration Up to this point—by repeatedly adding, stripping-away, and recombining many different, yet similar, ideas and thoughts—we have examined the nature of conflict, survival, and conquest in many different ways. A review and further manipulation of the ideas and thoughts that make-up these different ways suggests that, for success over the long haul and under the most difficult conditions, one needs some unifying vision that can be used to attract the uncommitted as well as pump-up friendly resolve and drive and drain-away or subvert adversary resolve and drive. In other words, what is needed is a vision rooted in human nature so noble, so attractive that it not only attracts the uncommitted and magnifies the spirit and strength of its adherents, but also undermines the dedication and determination of any competitors or adversaries. Moreover, such a unifying notion should be so compelling that it acts as a catalyst or beacon around which to evolve those qualities that permit a collective entity or organic whole to improve its stature in the scheme of things. Put another way, we are suggesting a need for a supra-orientation or center-of-gravity that permits leaders, and other authorities, to inspire their followers and members to enthusiastically take action toward confronting and conquering all obstacles that stand in the way. Such a scheme can be portrayed as follows: February 2006 143

Theme for vitality and growth
Unifying vision A grand ideal, overarching theme, or noble philosophy that represents a coherent paradigm within which individuals as well as societies can shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances—yet offers a way to expose flaws of competing or adversary systems. Ingredients needed to pursue vision Insight: Ability to peer into and discern the inner nature or workings of things. Orientation Ability to change our images, views, or impressions of the world in response to changes in the world Harmony: Power to perceive or create interaction of apparently disconnected events or entities in a connected way. Agility: Ability to transition from one OODA state – or equivalently one orientation state – to another more rapidly than any opponent Initiative: Internal drive to think and take action without being urged. (Positive) essence of moral conflict – see Patterns chart 125 Aim Improve fitness as an organic whole to shape and expand influence or power over the course of events in the world. February 2006 144

Boyd’s pattern Unifying Vision Grand Strategy
Domain of the OODA “Loop” Strategy Grand Tactics Tactics February 2006 v 1.4 5/17/2005

Boyd’s pattern Key point: The attractiveness of the unifying vision is not what determines which actions are acceptable. That would be “ends justifying means” – creative writing, in other words. Unifying Vision A “Code of Moral Values”—what van Creveld calls the “war convention” —that determines what actions (“transients”) are and are not acceptable. If you violate these, or are tricked into violating them, you isolate yourself morally and demoralize your own forces. Basis Grand Strategy Strategy Grand Tactics Tactics February 2006 v 1.4 5/17/2005

With these thoughts in mind, let’s look at what our authors have to say about grand strategy
February 2006

Grand Strategy Bill Lind
“Col John Boyd, USAF, America’s greatest military theorist, defined grand strategy as the art of connecting to—while isolating the enemy from—as many independent power centers as possible. The grand strategic question facing the US is how to do that in a 21st century that will increasingly be dominated by non-state, Fourth Generation forces.” Lind’s grand strategy: minimize contact with sources of disorder, while making every effort to connect with sources of order: Control entry and immigration from sources of disorder Learn to live (well) without their products and resources If necessary, retaliate as a “spasm”: massively and immediately “strategic (military) defensive combined with annihilating strategic and tactical counteroffensive” February 2006

Grand Strategy Lind Sources of order: States
Some religions and ideologies Some businesses and other commercial enterprises Mercenary armies Sources of disorder Failed states, including Afghanistan and Iraq Islam Idea is to “fold sources of disorder back inside themselves,” as in Boyd’s military strategy of Interaction and Isolation (Strategic Game) February 2006

Lind’s Grand Strategy Assessment
Idea of “sources of disorder” is similar to Barnett’s “non-integrating gap” (which includes all states with a Muslim majority.) But Lind does not propose trying to integrate the sources of disorder back into the sources of order by means of active involvement Sees two major drawbacks to a (military) offensive in the “War on Terror”: Will be widely viewed as aggression Will involve “sources of order” directly in the midst of “sources of disorder,” breaking their isolation i.e., violation of universal moral code February 2006

Grand Strategy in insurgency/4GW van Creveld
i.e., violation of universal moral code, the “war convention” An armed force that keeps beating down on a weaker opponent will be seen as committing a series of crimes; therefore it will end up by losing the support of its allies, its own people, and its own troops … In other words, he who fights against the weak—and the rag-tag Iraqi militias are very weak indeed—and loses, loses. He who fights against the weak and wins also loses. To kill an opponent who is much weaker than yourself is unnecessary and therefore cruel; to let that opponent kill you is unnecessary and therefore foolish. – “Why Iraq Will End as Vietnam Did” February 2006

Problems with military force van Creveld
… the original goals for which the US went to war included stopping communism and preserving democracy in South Vietnam (147) From the Americans in Vietnam to the Soviets in Afghanistan, the number of those who found their calculations upset and their plans confounded by the enemy’s determination to suffer and endure is legion (148) These are worthy goals. But replace “communism” with the bad ideology du jour (Islamic Fundamentalism or some such) and you get goals similar to those used to justify the invasion of Iraq. February 2006

Core vs. Gap Barnett Agreeing on a written, common rule set builds unity among Core nations (Blueprint 126) “Disconnectedness defines danger” (Blueprint xvi) No safety until “everyone is invited in” with justice (Blueprint 208) Ends can justify means (Blueprint 140, 205) Preemptive war still the best tool (Blueprint 121) February 2006

Barnett’s Grand Strategy Disconnectedness Defines Danger
Core Highly connected Codified rule sets on security High degree of sharing these rule sets 4GW is a law-enforcement issue Agreement on how to handle “terrorists” Share in burden of interventions into the Gap 6 step A-Z rule set for processing failed stated Gap Lack of codified rule sets on security Varying degrees of disconnectivity, oppression Local governments incapable of or unwilling to fight “terrorism” Core states have right to violate Gap “sovereignty” Interventions must have support of main Core states and results must be seen as fair & just February 2006

Blueprint’s Strategy Leviathan: Special Ops for 4GW
Network-Centric Warfare - primarily airpower - as enabler for Sys Admin & reconstruction Systems Administrator Most of Army All of USMC (except special operations) 50% uniformed military; 25% uniformed police; 25% government civilians Highly multinational February 2006

Barnett’s Six Steps UNSC “indicts”
“Functioning executive body” (e.g., Group of 8) sanctions military action US-led force invades, arrests old regime Core SysAdmin force restores stability International organization (TBD) reconstructs Bad guys are tried before the International Criminal Court (Blueprint 51-52) February 2006

Barnett’s Pattern Unifying Vision
Shrink the Gap. A connected world – “disconnectedness” is the enemy. Grand Strategy Utilize networks in Functioning Core, primarily private sector investment, as “pull” mechanism; use Core military to “export” security, “proactively shape a better tomorrow”. System perturbation: put system into play & integrate into the core. “Leviathan” against rogue states & to take out “bad actors.” Sys Admin to integrate. Special ops against “terrorists.” Strategy Six Point A-to-Z rule set for processing failed states. Grand Tactics Airpower, NCW for access, regime change. Tactics February 2006

The grand strategy of al-Qa’ida Scheuer
Osama bin Laden is playing defense (a la Bill Lind.) His grand strategy consists of three parts, one directed towards Muslims, one directed towards the uncommitted, and one directed towards the United States. His intent is to remove US & Western influence from the lands that are traditionally Muslim (including Spain!) and institute a “pure” (Salafist) form of Islam in these areas Scheuer echoes Boyd in deconstructing grand strategy into three messages: To our side / allies (in this case, the Muslim world) To the uncommitted To opponents (primarily the United States) February 2006

Grand Strategy of al-Qa’ida Scheuer
Message to Muslims: Islam is under attack from non-Islamic forces As evidence, he preaches a consistent message: Support for Israel that allows her to oppress the Palestinians Western troops on the Arabian Peninsula US invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan; statements that our goal is to make them “secular democracies” Support for other regimes hostile to Muslims: Russia, India, China, Uzbekistan, etc. US pressure on Arab energy producers to keep prices low, thereby robbing Muslims of their future US & Western support for apostate, corrupt, unjust, and tyrannical Muslim governments (Saudi Arabia, Syria, Gulf States, and until recently, Iraq.) Bin Laden stays on message: It is your duty as Muslims to oppose this attack. You will either succeed or become martyrs “If bin Laden’s argument is accepted, (each Muslim) must take up arms or otherwise support the mujahideen, or face eternal damnation for not performing a duty mandated by God.” IH, 8. February 2006

Message to the uncommitted: We have no quarrel with you, so long as you do not oppress Muslims or assist the US in the six activities mentioned above. If you do, we are capable of striking you and striking hard Madrid railway attack, 4 April 2004 Warning US, January 2006 February 2006

Message to the United States: We hate you for what you do, as noted above. We do not hate “democracy” or “freedom.” We are not going to start a jihad to destroy your theaters, beaches, or taverns (although these are clearly signs that your civilization is depraved.) I (bin Laden) invite Mr. Bush and the American People to embrace Islam; I will be your guide. If you do not, and if you continue in the six practices noted above, we will strike you with ever more massive attacks until you finally leave. Comment: We do not want to connect with corruption and vice. [It is the duty of a Muslim ruler to encourage that which is good and forbid that which is evil. – e.g., Qu’ran 3: , 9:67; 16:90] February 2006

Environment of the Middle East Scheuer
Notes Scheuer maintains that in the Muslim Middle East, a sizable number of people prize many values more highly than “democracy.” Among these are: Survival Order Personal honor Kinship (family & tribal) obligations and above all else: Religion February 2006

Conflict in the Muslim World Michael Vlahos
US has indeed unleashed a system perturbation on the Muslim World Unfortunately it is one we do not understand and can only partially control Rooted in ancient Muslim traditions - freedom from outside Aggravated by 25 years of US support for repressive regimes Possibilities include: Failed state: 27 million person version of Somalia We leave, but the insurgency doesn’t “Iraqoslavia” - partition, then civil war, then regional war In all cases, we’ve trained the next generation of Jihadists Prescription - connect to groups we can live with February 2006

Now, let’s collect up the bits and pieces.
Role & utility of military force Involvement in the Gap Fourth Generation Warfare Grand Strategy What “Winning” means February 2006

Summary Issue Lind Hammes Barnett van Creveld Scheuer February 2006
Military force Massive retaliatory spasm Occasional 4GW efforts on a defensive basis Modernized counter –insurgency Project homeland security 3GW: Access & regime change New “force” to rebuild, play global cop-on-the-beat US to play lead role Conventional armies will rot in this environment Armies will bifurcate into gangs & private services Annihilating attacks in defense of national interest; collateral damage be damned Otherwise, stay out Involvement in Gap No – retaliation only Vital interest only Yes – integrate Gap No choice – it’s coming our way No – vital interest only 4GW Non-state Focus is moral defeat of state Large dose of insurgency Evolved form of insurgency (Social) netwar Persuade decision-makers Included in substate violence by individuals – province of special ops. Non-trinitarian Agrees with Lind, vis-à-vis Israel – Palestinians (wall so high a bird can’t fly over it) Al-Qa’ida is main threat Change policies in ME or follow LInd February 2006

Summary Issue Lind Hammes Barnett van Creveld Scheuer February 2006
Grand Strategic Orientation Breakdown of state system Isolate sources of disorder; Islam Connect with sources of order (state & non-state) Evolution of insurgency into netwar Involves current situation in ME, but also criminal & narco networks Neo-Clausewitzian view of causes of war on state side Eliminate a few bad actors, suppressing universal longing for connectedness. Main tool: cause & manage system perturbations Use economic, social tools to re-integrate Gap Many motivations for non-state actors, including: War is fun Clausewitz can be fatal (rational actor loses) Life in Muslim ME focused on religion, honor, survival, kin obligations; See themselves as under attack Al-Qaida is catalyzing body for some fraction Winning Can’t be done – isolate and hope for best Interagency approach can contain – project “Homeland Security” Be patient Gap is shrunk to manageable level Fix US ME policy; crush residual threats if they cause problems; beacon – not arsenal – of democracy February 2006

Main issue: role of military force
Is ancient wisdom now obsolete: Whoever relies on the Tao in governing men doesn’t try to force issues or defeat enemies by force of arms. For every force there is a counterforce. Violence, even well intentioned always rebounds upon oneself. Tao Te Ching, 30 Is Iraq really experiencing 4GW, or just classical insurgency? In particular, what is the objective of the transnational element? What about large-scale conventional conflict, i.e., with China, Russia, or India? February 2006

Conclusions We’re not going to fight Russia, China, or India (at least not with conventional weapons). February 2006

China China USA Potentially hostile border 13,700 mi.
Restive minorities Tibetans, Uygurs, Mongolians, etc. Breakaway provinces Taiwan 0 (since 1865) Strat nuc weapons 25-50 10,000 Recent invasions Vietnam (29 day incursion, 1979) Grenada, Panama, Iraq Defense budget $70 billion $500 billion February 2006

Conclusions We’re not going to fight Russia, China, or India (at least not with conventional weapons). Therefore we can eliminate most of the non-nuclear forces we now have. What we will face is “evolved insurgency,” for which we have, at the moment, no good solution. The environment will be the failed states of the Gap. Our best strategy is military containment combined with active, non-military measures. Eventually, we should privatize our residual conventional combat forces. February 2006

So, what is 4GW? It’s any way that non-state entities confront the organized power of a state Inside a Core state, it is a law enforcement problem If it is just inside a non-Core state, it is insurgency If it does not fit into either of these categories and if it is severe enough to be considered “war,” then it may be 4GW Transnational - gangs, tribes, corporations, nationalities without states, etc. Sometimes based around religion or ideology May use the methods of guerrilla warfare Focus is on collapsing the will of local states to survive or oppose and of supporting states to interfere May or may not have any grand plans for the future February 2006

Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will the difference between armed forces and civilians (194) Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm (208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211) Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological complexity (cost) of military forces Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today) (225) Ref: Transformation of War, 1991 February 2006

Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will the difference between armed forces and civilians (194) Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm (208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211) Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological complexity (cost) of military forces Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today) (225) February 2006

As a first step, we need to privatize much of our military force
Bankrupt organizations can go out of business Markets unleash competition variety, rapidity, initiative creativity Privatization has a long military history mercenary organizations, including criminal British East India Company ( ) US PMCs today van Creveld’s gloomy tomorrow Nothing less will force the amount of change that we need February 2006

Why not rollback as recommended by Barnett?
Don’t know how to do it February 2006

Rollback, in the heart of NATO
“In Albania and much of ex-Yugoslavia, the forces ranged against the state—crime syndicates and armed nationalists—are often more than a match for legitimate business and politics. Government, in so far as its writ runs at all, is frequently worse than useless: customs barriers and regulations simply obstruct legal business, offer bribe opportunities for bureaucrats and abet crime. “… Albanian gangs spirit people into Britain and Germany; guns are reaching Britain from Croatia and points south; the stolen-vehicle trade in the Netherlands is dominated by Serbs; and Chinese syndicates based in ex-Yugoslavia send illegal migrants to Finland. It was once said of the Balkans that they produce more history than can be consumed locally; it is even more true that the region is a big net exporter of crime.” New York Times Map “Europe's banlieue,” The Economist, Nov 24th 2005 February 2006

Why not rollback? Don’t know how to do it
Military interventions are unpredictable in result, but always expensive nationalism, tribalism, sectarianism, etc. insurgency / guerrilla warfare almost inevitable We never fund the reconstructing phase adequately And then there’s corruption February 2006

If I Were Emperor … If I were Emperor …
Epilogue If I Were Emperor … If I were Emperor … February 2006

Are there alternatives? appropriate bits and pieces
play for shih (position/force/configuration/advantage/energy – title of Chapter 5 in Sun Tzu.) Employ cheng/ch’i Employ timing and force together Develop favorable situations with great potential Take and maintain the initiative David Lai, “Learning From the Stones,” p. 2 pump up the elements on the right side of the “Theme for Vitality and Growth” [Patterns #144; page 143 of this presentation] work on improving connections with as many “sources of order”/Core states as possible continually improve our understanding of how Gap countries actually work – ethnic/tribal, religious, legal, criminal, etc. Version4.01 February 2006 February 2006

recall the ancient wisdom of the Tao te Ching: Violence, even well intentioned always rebounds upon oneself. This represents the distilled wisdom of practical people over thousands of years. if you’re going to do it anyway, exploit Sun Tzu and those thousands of years of experience: best to attack his plans next best attack his alliances third best alternative, attack his army fourth on the list – attack cities Where we should have started Where we in fact did start in Iraq Taking a state whole is superior; Destroying it is inferior to this. Sun Tzu (Denma Trans.) Chapter 3 February 2006

take nothing off the table, so if we feel the need to help things along (e.g., to prevent misuse of nuclear material), use PISRR: Penetrate Isolate Subvert Reorient Reharmonize under this approach, there will often be no need for a large and visible Sys Admin, since most of the people who know how to rebuild and run the system are already there. and there will be no need for an all-American “Leviathan” - the USMC and SOF we have will do just fine (detailed recommendations in A Swift, Elusive Sword). for populations suffering under “big men,” this shouldn’t be that difficult idea is to preserve existing system, but co-opt it (perhaps minus the “big man”) and steer it into the world economy. also, consider the “Theme for Disintegration & Collapse,” Patterns chart 136. February 2006

Evolved SES Strike Force System Administrator
Army Navy Air Force USMC SES Strike Force Reserve Component Heavy forces Special operations forces Tactical air Tactical airlift All Evolved SES Strike Force For Containment SES “Leviathan” System Administrator For Rollback 3GW forces Counterinsurgency / reconstructing forces Political, financial, law enforcement, engineering, etc. Private military companies Potentially Developed world must combine military containment with police, intelligence, and strong preemptive incentives: Personal Financial Commercial Political Diplomatic February 2006

Could it work? If we spent half as much time studying this approach as we now do preparing to fight 2GW (and some 3GW) against Core states and vanished empires, we might get somewhere. The shih of battle do not exceed cheng & ch’i, yet their variations cannot be exhausted. Sun Tzu, Chapter 5 February 2006

Could it work? We integrated:
The entire Soviet Union (except Belarus?) and The entire Warsaw Pact into the global system without invading anybody. (In fact, a proximate cause of the fall of the Soviet system was its successful attempt to invade and remove a “big man,” Hafizullah Amin, in Afghanistan.) 10 are now members of NATO and 8 also belong to the EU February 2006

To flourish and grow in the many-sided uncertain, and
ever-changing world that surrounds us suggests that we must make intuitive within ourselves those many practices we need to meet the exigencies of that world. —John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning & Losing This is from the opening paragraph of the Discourse (all components of the Discourse are available at – go to “Boyd and Military Strategy” and scroll down.) February 2006

Conflict in the Years Ahead

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