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Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy.

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Presentation on theme: "Process vs. Substance. Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy."— Presentation transcript:

1 Process vs. Substance

2 Foreign Aid, Foreign and Security Policy

3 The Assumptions

4 Change One: Relationship Between Contracts and Projects: Preview of Skills Course Next Semester Key: Not a Grant Grants available to Non-Profits Purpose of Grants is often Sub-Grants Grant: Gift, with conditions but not legally enforceable Can only refuse to give additional Money

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7 Contract Contract Definition Legally enforceable document Purpose Judicial review in event of a disagreement between the parties

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9 Contract A good contract is able to be understood by a member of the judiciary Projects: Contracts and Grants: Both define obligation by time and money. Limited time and limited money

10 How Projects Really Work

11 Judicial Review of Contracts Judge may be assumed to be a lay-person in terms of the technical aspects of the contract

12 Judicial Review For judicial review the contract should strive to make the technical issues as clear as possible Understandable not just to project teams but to lay individuals as well

13 Judicial Review of Contracts Few contracts are in fact brought before the judiciary for determination Nonetheless, it is this ultimate test--against judicial criteria--that sets the pattern for contract administration

14 Contracts Administration

15 Project Planning Documents Help clarify contract elements Consists of the following: A meeting of the minds Specific deliverables Consideration Force Majeure Objectively Verifiable Indictors

16 A Meeting of the Minds “Intent” of a contract Establishes for judicial review "why" the contract was entered into Includes knowing why the two parties have entered into a contract; their long-term objectives

17 Intent

18 Meeting of the Minds Actions consistent with the meeting of the minds are consistent with the contract Actions inconsistent may constitute breach of contract or non-performance

19 A Meeting of the Minds Relates directly to the purpose and goals identified in the project’s planning document Project document always indicates “outputs” in the hope that it will result in an agreement that the task is completed

20 A Meeting of the Minds Contractor is expected to obey “reasonable person” rule contractor is expected to do all the things that any reasonable person would do given the resources available, and

21 Meeting of Minds add to the list of outputs in order to reach the agreed upon purpose contracting agent agrees to modify or add to the inputs in order to reach a modified “meeting of the mind”

22 A Meeting of the Minds Contracting agent has a reasonable right to expect that the contractor will obey the “reasonable person” rule However, contractor expects that the contracting agent will attempt to take all reasonable actions necessary to realize the overall goal of the activities

23 A Meeting of the Minds “Purpose” of Contract Most important project focus Facilitates "meeting of the minds" by clarifying long-term objectives

24 In the Development Context Parties to the Contract: Developing Country Sponsoring or donor agency USAID, the World Bank, UNDP Host Country Contractor NGO, For-profit private firm, University

25 In the Development Context Developing (host) country is usually considered ultimate “client” of the contractor, although this is not legally binding if the contract is made with the donor agency

26 Deliverables of Contract Essentially the “outputs” Things the contractor has agreed to produce

27 Contract Deliverables Important to note that deliverables under a contract should be results, not activities (or inputs) Further, objectively verifiable indicators must be provided for each output with qualitative, quantitative, and time targets

28 Consideration Essence of a contract, particularly in terms of its equity provisions What do a contractor and contracting agent each promise to provide each other?

29 Consideration Minimum guarantee is the inputs Contractor agrees to provide technical personnel, commodities and undertake activities, etc. Sponsor agrees to pay contractor certain fees, and may provide on-site support, etc. as agreed upon in the contract

30 Force Majeure The project framework documents and the contract clarify force majeure by: Identifying factors that require re-analysis of the ability to perform Setting levels at which those factors become important

31 Force Majeure At input level, contractor identifies assumptions that must be made in order to guarantee ability to produce outputs

32 Force Majeure Example: If the contractor assumes that host government will provide ten vehicles and drivers in order produce the project outputs, but in fact only five are provided, then we expect a corresponding reduction in the quantity or quality of outputs produced

33 Objectively Verifiable Indicators Indicators that determine if the terms of a contract have been met To avoid a misunderstanding and provide an objective means for recognizing successful achievement of the project objectives, the contract and associated planning documents must establish “objectively verifiable indicators”

34 Objectively Verifiable Indicators Indicators show the results of an activity Not the conditions necessary to achieve those results Indicators clarify exactly what we mean by our statement of the objectives at each level in the project planning document

35 Objectively Verifiable Indicators At input level: only concerned with consumption of project resources At the purpose level: These are of particular importance and are given a special name: End of Project Status (EOPS)

36 Coffee Break Ten Minutes

37 Change- 2 Focus: For Profits & Non- Profits for Service Delivery After 1975 Contracts vs. Tied Grants

38 Change 3- Old Patterns Long Term Cooperative Agreements (1970s)- Ten to Fifteen Years Land Tenure Center University of Wisconsin Center for Disease Control in Atlanta National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration

39 Grants and Contracts- 1980s Non-Profits- Grants and Sub-Grants- Function like Contracts Contracts- For Profits- Project Driven Cooperative Agreements- Long Term Grant Commitments (Up to 20 years)

40 An Example: 1985- USAID Cooperative Agreement: Performance Management Project National Association of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) DPMC­ Department of Agric. IDMC­ Univ. of Maryland Director: Dr. Louis A. Picard

41 Performance Management Project Research Group Rondinelli­ -Foreign Aid Kerrigan and Luke-­ Training Hague and Finsterbusch­-Orga-nizational Development Kiggundu-­ Managing organizations White­ Program Management White­- Policy Reform Brinkerhoff­ strategic Management Esman-Development Management

42 Field Operations INCAE- Sub-Contract to Catholic University, Paraguay (W. Schaeffer) Swaziland- Rukudzo Murapa Indonesia- David Korten Francophone Africa: David Gould Guinea- Robert Groelsema

43 Technical Assistance Policy Reform S. Morrison, Africa, R. Moore, Guatamala: Barry Ames, Brazil Management FDMS-Gould-sub-contract U. of Pittsburgh SADCC Study­ J. Montgomery, R. Klitgaard, et.al. Business Management- J. McCullough Decentralization: Ed Connerley and Elinor Ostrom

44 Change- 4 Continuities and Change in Financing- 2001

45 Financing Mechanisms Contracts IQCs Cooperative Agreements Projectization of Foreign Aid Categorical Grants with sub-grant mechanisms (more like contracts)

46 Public Private Partnerships: The International Context After 1991 Defined: Partnerships (formal or informal) between: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Governments, Donors (International and Private), Private- Business Sector.

47 Public Private Partnerships Origins- a. International Donors- Way of Dealing with Umbrella Grants and implementation of development policies b. Accepting donor money means accepting donor principles

48 Public Private Partnerships c. Comes out of Structural Adjustment and Policy Reform: Structural Adjustment with a Human Face d. Seen by some as an alternative to Contracting Out- Others as part of it e. Critics see it as detrimental to a market approach to economic change

49 Public Private Partnerships Characteristics- a. Targeted at the expansion of Social Capital and Synergy in the promotion of Economic and Social Development b. Seeks a holistic or Integrated Approach to Economic and Social Development c. Involves informal processes, cultural sensitivities as well as legal norms and contracting principles.

50 Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) PPP Supporting Factors in the International Context 1. Democratic Governance- private sector and NGOs seen as legitimate actors; transparency, accountability and responsiveness 2. Rational Government- Merit Principles, anti- corruption environment, acceptance of non-state actors as service deliverers. Contracting Out

51 Public Private Partnerships- Factors Factors that Support PPPs 3. Decentralization- Subsidiarity: Governance devolved to the lowest levels capable of implementation and contracting out 4. Legal Frameworks- Acceptance of Contractual Agreement as the basic organizational relationship

52 Public Private Partnerships- Factors 5. Institutional Norms, Organizational Capacity and regularized principles of inter-organizational interaction. Requires high levels of capacity building 6. Social and Economic Stability 7. Organizational flexibility across all sectors

53 Public Private Partnerships- Factors 8. Social and Institutional Pluralism- win- win rather than zero sum game across social, ethnic, religious and racial groups 9. Social Networks exist at Grass roots, and intermediate as well as higher levels of government-See diagram

54 Discussion Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, Partnership for International Development: Rhetoric or Results Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002


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