1. Main Requirements on Different Stages of the Licensing Process for New Nuclear Facilities Module 4.5/1 Design Geoff Vaughan University of Central Lancashire, UK Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 1

2. IAEA Safety Standards Specific Safety Requirements Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design SSR-2/1 Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 2

3. Other Relevant Safety Requirements SSR 2/1 is complemented by other Safety Requirements for other types of Installation: NS-R-4 Safety of Research Reactors NS-R-5 Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle SSR-5: Disposal of Radioactive Waste Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 3

4. Technology Neutral? A issue needing consideration is the extent to which Regulations and Guides are technology neutral It is good practice that high level regulations and guides should be technological neutral, with lower level ones becoming increasingly technology based Many of the Requirements in the first part of SSR 2/1 (most of those in Requirements 1 to 42) are equally applicable to other types of installation. All the Requirements in SSR 2/1 are technology neutral in respect of NPP Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 4

5. SSR 2/1 Basics - 1 SSR 2/1 establishes design requirements for the structures, systems and components of a nuclear power plant, as well as for procedures and organizational processes important to safety, that are required to be met for safe operation and for preventing events that could compromise safety, or for mitigating the consequences of such events, were they to occur. Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 5

6. SSR 2/1 Basic – 2 It acknowledges that safety requirements change over time and it reflects the present consensus. It might not be practicable to apply all these requirements to nuclear power plants already in operation or under construction: but it is expected that a comparison will be made with these standards, for example as part of the periodic safety review for the plant, to determine whether the safe operation of the plant could be further enhanced by means of reasonably practicable safety improvements. Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 6

7. SSR 2/1 Basic – 3 In paragraphs 2.1–2.5, SSR 2/1 sets out four basis approaches that the design must meet to comply with the Safety Fundamentals Radiation protection: for all operational states, doses from exposure to radiation within the installation or exposure due to any planned radioactive release from the installation are kept below the dose limits and kept ALARA Safety in design: must prevent accidents with harmful consequences resulting from a loss of control over the reactor core or other sources of radiation, and to mitigate the consequences of any accidents that do occur. Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 7

8. SSR 2/1 Basic – 4 Defence in depth is the primary means of preventing accidents in a nuclear power plant and mitigating the consequences of accidents if they do occur Maintaining the integrity of design throughout the plant: a formally designated entity within the operating organization should take responsibility to maintain the integrity of design of the plant throughout its lifetime Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 8 Regulations and Guides should cover these approaches

9. MANAGEMENT OF SAFETY IN DESIGN Requirement 1: Responsibilities in the management of safety in plant design Requirement 2: Management system for plant design Requirement 3: Safety of the plant design throughout the lifetime of the plant Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 9

10. PRINCIPAL TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS Requirement 4: Fundamental safety functions Requirement 5: Radiation protection Requirement 6: Design for a nuclear power plant Requirement 7: Application of defence in depth Requirement 8: Interfaces of safety with security and safeguards Requirement 9: Proven engineering practices Requirement 10: Safety assessment Requirement 11: Provision for construction Requirement 12: Features to facilitate radioactive waste management and decommissioning Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 10

11. GENERAL PLANT DESIGN - 1 Design basis - 1 Requirement 13: Categories of plant states Requirement 14: Design basis for items important to safety Requirement 15: Design limits Requirement 16: Postulated initiating events Requirement 17: Internal and external hazards Requirement 18: Engineering design rules Requirement 19: Design basis accidents Requirement 20: Design extension conditions Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 11

12. GENERAL PLANT DESIGN – 2 Design basis - 2 Requirement 21: Physical separation and independence of safety systems Requirement 22: Safety classification Requirement 23: Reliability of items important to safety Requirement 24: Common cause failures Requirement 25: Single failure criterion Requirement 26: Fail-safe design Requirement 27: Support service systems Requirement 28: Operational limits and conditions for safe operation Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 12

13. GENERAL PLANT DESIGN - 3 Design for safe operation over the lifetime of the plant Requirement 29: Calibration, testing, maintenance, repair, replacement, inspection and monitoring of items important to safety Requirement 30: Qualification of items important to safety Requirement 31: Ageing management Human factors Requirement 32: Design for optimal operator performance Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 13

14. GENERAL PLANT DESIGN - 4 Other design considerations Requirement 33: Sharing of safety systems between multiple units of a nuclear power plant Requirement 34: Systems containing fissile material or radioactive material Requirement 35: Nuclear power plants used for cogeneration of heat and power, heat generation or desalination Requirement 36: Escape routes from the plant Requirement 37: Communication systems at the plant Requirement 38: Control of access to the plant Requirement 39: Prevention of unauthorized access to, or interference with, items important to safety Requirement 40: Prevention of harmful interactions of systems important to safety Requirement 41: Interactions between the electrical power grid and the plant Safety analysis Requirement 42: Safety analysis of the plant design Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 14

15. Safety Analysis is covered in: GSR Part 4: Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities And supporting Safety Guides : SSG-2 Deterministic Safety Analysis for NPP SSG-3 Development and Application of Level 1 PSA for NPP SSG-4 Development and Application of Level 2 PSA for NPP GS-G-4.1 Format and Content of the Safety Analysis report for NPP Other relevant safety guides include: NS-G-1.5, NS-G-1.6 and NS-G-2.13 on external hazards NS-G-1.7 and NS-G-1.11 on internal hazards NS-G-1.13 on radiation protection NS-G-2.2, NS-G-2.4, NS-G-2.15 and NS-G-2.15 on operations and operational procedures Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 15

16. Consideration should be given to which of these Requirements should be included in Regulations and Guides Regulatory consideration of these whether these Requirements have been met requires that internal procedures are set up to carry them out as in GS-G-1.2 and GS-G-1.3 Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 16

17. Some points from SSG-12: 1 The applicant for authorization for construction should submit a basic design to the regulatory body before construction begins. The regulatory body should review and assess the acceptability of the selected design and should have the authority to approve, agree, comment on, question or reject such designs or parts, as necessary, on the basis of safety concerns. This basic design can be approved or, depending on regulatory framework, frozen (i.e. no change may be made to the basic design without the regulatory body’s review and approval) or partly frozen with a regulatory instrument upon the review and assessment of the regulatory body. Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 17

18. Some points from SSG-12: 2 Safety analyses may be reviewed, assessed and, if appropriate, challenged by the regulatory body at an early stage, pre-licensing. The vendor can also be involved in this pre-licensing step. The operating organization may have an internal process (which could include receipt of independent advice) for review of safety analyses before submission to the regulatory body to ensure that such analyses are appropriate. The regulatory body should review, assess and inspect the information forming the preliminary safety analysis report Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 18

19. Some points from SSG-12: 3 The regulatory body should ensure that the applicant has verified the adequacy of design parameters and site specific data in relation to safety criteria of the specified design basis (e.g. hazard protection, cooling requirements). Before construction begins, the licensee should set up a configuration management programme for updating the design basis of the nuclear installation while ensuring that it remains in compliance with the original agreed or approved design basis Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 19

20. Some points from SSG-12: 4 The regulatory body should ensure that clear and explicit quality requirements are specified by the licensee or applicant for safety related activities. The regulatory body should check, either through the licensee or directly, depending on national legislation, whether all organizations and contractors involved in design and construction adequately implement these requirements, and should take appropriate actions if necessary Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 20

21. Regulatory Requirements Consideration should be given to the extent of documentation needed to provide guidance to the applicant/licensee and to the regulatory body staff in carrying out work associated with the licensing process Drafting School, Vienna, December 2012 - Module 4.5/1 21