1. African Science Academy Development Initiative
U.S. Department of State
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
Improving Biosafety and Biosecurity in Africa
Annual Meeting of the
African Science Academy Development Initiative
UNCLASSIFIED November 4, 2008

2. United States Department of State
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)
Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Engagement Programs
ISN/CTR
Russia- Former Soviet Union
Iraq
Libya
Global
Security
Historic Role: Nunn-Lugar,
WMD scientist engagement
in the former Soviet Union,
Iraq and Libya
Today: Global programs,
combating emerging
bioterrorism threat
15 years of CTR programming
Bio programming since 1998
Distinction from DoD CTR:
DoD CTR has not moved out globally (mostly FSU)
Large scale programs/capacity building/dismantling
DOS CTR more nimble and flexible in threat driven programming
G8 mostly nuke/missile, but expanded bio authority through G-8 under consideration
Bio
Security
10M for G-8 Global Partner
U.S. interested to renew
and expand (+ 10B/10yrs)

3. U.S. National/Homeland Security Presidential Directive
combating the threat
U.S. National/Homeland Security Presidential Directive
Biodefense for the 21st Century, April 2004:
“Biological weapons in the possession of hostile states or terrorists pose unique and grave threats to the safety and security of the United States and our allies.”
Essential pillars of national biodefense program
Threat Awareness
Risk assessment and international engagement
Prevention and Protection
Pathogen security and sustainable lab capacity building
Surveillance and Detection
Strengthen international systems and connectivity
Response and Recovery
Mitigation and outbreak control
Comprehensive engagement through full spectrum of preparedness and response
Biodefense is broadly defined
Surveillance/Detection
AI work in FSU
Response/Recovery
Anthrax prophylaxis
Vaccine development

4. Chronic Disease spectrum of bio-risk Emerging Disease
Addressing dual-use bio threat should be dual-benefit
Chronic
Disease
Emerging
Disease
Misuse of
Dual use
Technology
Bio
Terror
Bio
War
Working together to build global public health capacity will:
1) Reduce the impact of the left end of the spectrum,
2) Reduce the likelihood of the right half of the spectrum,
3) Provide some transparency regarding capabilities and intent, and
4) Undermine the popular support for terrorism. .

5. Emerging Infectious Disease
global biological threats
Recent
Emerging Infectious Disease
in Africa
Monkeypox virus
Ebola/Marburg hemorrhagic fever viruses
Rift Valley Fever virus
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
Novel Arenavirus
Global outbreaks of emerging and reemerging infectious disease
Infectious disease undermines security, stability and peace
Recent Emerging Infectious Disease in Africa
Monkeypox – DRC
Rift Valley Fever – Kenya
Ebola/Marburg hemorrhagic fever viruses – DRC
High Path AI – Nigeria and Egypt
Novel Arenavirus - South Africa/Zambia
Morens, DM et. al. Nature. 8 Jul 2004

6. modern global biological threat
Global outbreaks of infectious disease
Natural outbreaks represent unpredictable sources of dangerous pathogens
Radical/Terrorist threat
Terrorist groups have established intent to do harm; use of BW represents a potential threat
Dual-use biotechnology
Increasing vulnerability of the legitimate bioscience sector for accidental release or intentional misuse

7. combating the threat International Biodefense Goals:
Raise awareness of biological threats
Promote cooperation across human and animal health, research, scientific, and security communities
Reduce impact of biological threats
Strengthen global security
Pave way for peace and security through improved public health

8. DOS-CTR Biological Engagement Worldwide
DOS-CTR global biological engagement
Initial Engagement (Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, India, S. Africa, Sudan, Morocco, Yemen, Libya, Kenya, Brazil )
Preliminary Engagements
(Malaysia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Djibouti, Columbia, Argentina )
Historic Engagement
(Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Ukraine, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Moldova)
In-depth Engagement
(Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, Iraq, Egypt)
Assessments for Future Planning (Africa, Middle East, South America )

9. $26M in partnerships for bio threat reduction
International Foundation for Technology and Investment
U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation
International Science and Technology Center
partnership
types:
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Inspection Service
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
12% Universities
and NAS
17% NGOs
71% USG Agencies
Massachusetts General Hospital Center for Public Health Preparedness and Response
Sandia National Laboratories
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, U.S. Armed Forces Research Institute for Medical Sciences
IAAs useful channel since USDA/CDC etc.. budgets for intl work have been cut
IAAs largely funding scientists and technical experts to work internationally
University partnerships, therefore, a bit higher
Navy Medical Research Center
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
U.S. Geological Survey
Emory University Center for Public Health Preparedness and Response
Johns Hopkins University Program for International Development
The National Academies

10. areas of assistance
Biosafety & Biosecurity Projects Risk assessments, safety and security consultation, design and implementation, pathogen surveys, support for creation of national and regional biosafety associations
Training in Best Practices
Biosafety, biosecurity, lab management, bioethics
Molecular Diagnostics & Surveillance
Lab and human capacity building, research collaboration,
integrated disease surveillance
Other Areas
Drafting legislation, national guidelines, S&T collaboration, forensic epidemiology and first responder preparedness
Comprehensive Engagement:
Training: Biosafety and biosecurity awareness raising and BSS association development
Capacity Building: physical lab inputs, molecular diagnostics, pathogen consolidation
Tech Assistance: Support for diagnostics, disease surveillance, response capability
R&D: Vaccine production

11. value of local input
Critical importance of local expertise and insight
Opportunities:
Identification of needs and gaps
Risk Assessments
Program implementation
Logistical support
Program monitoring and evaluation
Challenges:
Limited funding - prioritization key
Sustainability
Culture of Responsibility
Working through African Science Academy partners for local insight
Engaging locally

12. sub-saharan africa Institutional Capacity Building Efforts
Biosafety/Biosecurity workshop held through Ugandan National Academy of Sciences (UNAS)
UNAS “Good Laboratory Practices” workshop planned for January 2009
Support for development of the African Biosafety/Biosecurity Association (Af-BSA)
WHO-led biosafety/biosecurity awareness raising meetings
Dual Anglophone and Francophone workshops held
Success story of UNAS work – sustainability and progression of programming
Initial BSS workshop through Gates Foundation funding
WHO concept to develop a AfBSA
Support to Kenya Medical Research Institute for Af-BSA development and capacity building
Af-BSA has ____ member countries
All of these initiatives are dependent upon local insight and experience

13. sub-saharan africa Technical Support
Viral diagnostics workshop in Senegal
Assistance for laboratory strengthening in South Africa; ‘sister lab’ relationship
Planned technical support for BSL-3 construction in Nigeria
Global Disease Detection & Response Center – Kenya – to develop biosafety/biosecurity capacity through support for trainings and equipment
BSL-3 Nigeria: Via NIAID to National TB and Leprosy Training Center – initial stages
National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) in South Africa
GDD: 1 of 6 labs globally; support will enable Kenyan GDD to engage in full spectrum of BSS activities

14. north africa Enhancing disease detection and control
Technical assistance for safer lab construction
Biosafety/biosecurity workshops
First survey to assess capacity and identify needs in Yemen
Yemeni researcher
Public health surveillance initiatives in Djibouti planned FY 09 through NAMRU 3
Working through NAMRU-3 in Cairo for technical assistance provision
Safer lab construction work in Egypt
BSS workshops in Morocco and Egypt (Moroccan National Institute of Hygiene)
Yemen survey was at request of Yemeni govt to determine broad capabilities and pathogen collections in country
Photo of lab is Egypt Central Public Health Laboratory in Cairo
Contaminated cow carcass awaiting necropsy
Laboratory facility under construction

15. conclusion Dual-use science… Dual-benefit assistance
Scientific engagement will reduce threat; build collaborations
Strengthen international security and global health
Challenges: evolving threat, limited funding
Exploring partnership opportunities in Africa
BEP Support:
Linking academies to public health stakeholders that require technical assistance
Research and Development collaborations
Trainings and capacity building opportunities

16. contact information
Dan Schar, VMD
Biosecurity Engagement Program
Africa Regional Coordinator
U.S. Department of State