2. The US Presidency and American Foreign Policy The Most Powerful Job on Earth

3. Presidential Powers Article 2, Section 1: Article 2, Section 1: Executive Power in a Prez and VP for 4 years Executive Power in a Prez and VP for 4 years Article 2, Section 2: Article 2, Section 2: Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief Pardons Pardons Make treaties Make treaties Nominate and appoint and fill vacancies Nominate and appoint and fill vacancies

4. Presidential Powers Article 2, Section 3: Article 2, Section 3: Information on State of the Union Information on State of the Union Convene Special Congressional Sessions Convene Special Congressional Sessions Receive Foreign ambassadors Receive Foreign ambassadors Article 2, Section 4: Article 2, Section 4: Removed by Impeachment for treason, bribery, high crimes and misdemeanors Removed by Impeachment for treason, bribery, high crimes and misdemeanors

5. Presidential Powers 20th Amendment: 20th Amendment: Changed term to begin January 20 Changed term to begin January 20 22nd Amendment: 22nd Amendment: 2 terms 2 terms 25th Amendment: 25th Amendment: Presidential succession and disability Presidential succession and disability

6. Presidential Expectations Chief of State Chief of State Chief Executive Chief Executive Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief Chief Diplomat Chief Diplomat Chief Legislator Chief Legislator Party Chief Party Chief Voice of the people Voice of the people Protector of the Peace Protector of the Peace Manager of the Prosperity Manager of the Prosperity World leader World leader ALL AT THE SAME TIME!!

7. Presidential Limitations Congress Congress Courts Courts Bureaucracy Bureaucracy Federalism Federalism Capitalism Capitalism Public Public Time Time Outside Forces Outside Forces

8. Evolution of the Presidency Traditional “Do Nothing” Presidency Traditional “Do Nothing” Presidency “Modern Presidency” “Modern Presidency” greater formal and informal powers for initiative greater formal and informal powers for initiative increased staff and advisory capacity increased staff and advisory capacity Brownlow Commission Report (1937) Brownlow Commission Report (1937) EOP (1939) EOP (1939) agenda setter agenda setter most visible national actor most visible national actor

9. Presidential Leadership No-Win Presidency? No-Win Presidency? Lead by Command or by Persuasion? Lead by Command or by Persuasion? The President’s Helpers The President’s Helpers The One, The Few, or The Many? The One, The Few, or The Many?

10. Advising the President The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly

11. The Good: Brent Scowcroft (?) NSA to Ford and “41” General, USAF (ret.) PhD Columbia (pic courtesy www.scowcroft.com)

12. The Bad: John M. Poindexter (!) NSA to Reagan ’85- 86 Vice Admiral, USN (ret.) convicted in 1990 of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and destruction of evidence in connection with the Iran-Contra affair Overturned on appeal (Don Rypka-AFP)

13. The Ugly: You pick…

14. The “First” McGeorge Bundy JFK and LBJ, 1961-1966 Harvard’s Dean of the Faculty at 34 1919-1996

15. The Current Stephen J. Hadley Stephen J. Hadley Rice’s Deputy Rice’s Deputy CIA called him twice to waive off the Niger uranium story CIA called him twice to waive off the Niger uranium story Lawyer, and worked at the Scowcroft Group Lawyer, and worked at the Scowcroft Group NSC (Staff) in Ford administration (NATO and Europe) NSC (Staff) in Ford administration (NATO and Europe) b. 1947, Toledo, OH b. 1947, Toledo, OH BA, Cornell (’69) ; JD, Yale (’72) BA, Cornell (’69) ; JD, Yale (’72) (Pic stolen from usinfo.state.gov)

16. It’s MY power! National Security Act 1947 National Security Act 1947 NSC NSC JCS JCS SecDef (et al.) SecDef (et al.) CIA CIA Increasing reliance on NSC staff Increasing reliance on NSC staff Centralization of policymaking in the White House Centralization of policymaking in the White House

17. OK, not really all “in” the White House: Eisenhower (Old) Executive Office Building

18. Advising the President Short Run Advantages for the President Short Run Advantages for the President Long Run Disadvantages for the Presidency? Long Run Disadvantages for the Presidency? Principal-Agent Relationships Principal-Agent Relationships

19. Advising the President Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980)

20. Staffing Systems (Ideal Types) Formalistic Formalistic Competitive Competitive Collegial Collegial

21. Formalistic Systems

23. More Formalism

24. Competitive System

25. Collegial Model

26. Decision-Making Tasks Survey Objectives Survey Objectives Canvass Alternatives Canvass Alternatives Search for Information Search for Information Assimilate and Process New and Discrepant Information Assimilate and Process New and Discrepant Information Evaluate Costs, Risks, Implications Evaluate Costs, Risks, Implications Develop Implementation, Monitoring, and Contingency Plans Develop Implementation, Monitoring, and Contingency Plans

27. Process-Outcomes Irving Janis: Groupthink Irving Janis: Groupthink

29. Process-Outcome Link? Herek, G. M., I. Janis and P. Huth, Decision Making during International Crisis: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome? Journal of Conflict Resolution 31 (1987): 203-226. Mark Shafer and Scott Crichlow“The Process-Outcome Connection in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Quantitative Study Building on Groupthink,” International Studies Quarterly 46 (March 2002): 45-68. Figure from John T. Rourke and Mark A. Boyer, International Politics on the World Stage (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004, 5/ed brief edition)

30. CRISIS DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES BY TASK VPP NW VW Task 1. Survey Objectives Task 1. Survey Objectives Tonkin GulfDienbienphuTet 2 Tet 1Suez Jordan October War Task 2. Canvass Alternatives Task 2. Canvass Alternatives Tonkin GulfSuezDienbienphu Tet 1Tet 2 JordanOctober War Task 3. Search for Information Task 3. Search for Information SuezDienbienphuOctober War Tonkin GulfTet 2 Tet 1 Jordan Task 4. Assimilate and Process New Information Task 4. Assimilate and Process New Information Tonkin GulfSuezDienbienphuTet 2 Tet 1Jordan October War Task 5. Evaluate Costs, Risks, and Implications of Preferred Choice Task 5. Evaluate Costs, Risks, and Implications of Preferred Choice Tonkin GulfSuezDienbienphu Tet 1October War Tet 2 Jordan Task 6. Develop Monitoring, Implementation, and Contingency Plans Task 6. Develop Monitoring, Implementation, and Contingency Plans SuezTet 2Tonkin GulfDienbienphu Tet 1Jordan October War Very Well (VW) = 4 or more recognitions of the task Well (W)= 2 or 3 recognitions of the task Neutral (N)= 0 or 1 recognition or omission of the task Poorly (P)= 2 or 3 omission of the task Very Poorly (VP)= 4 or more omissions of the task From Patrick J. Haney, Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan, 2002)

31. Getting it Right George: Multiple Advocacy George: Multiple Advocacy Not sure I can tell you how to guarantee success, but I can tell you how to nearly guarantee failure. And scandal. Not sure I can tell you how to guarantee success, but I can tell you how to nearly guarantee failure. And scandal.