1. The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention from the Air: Bosnia

2. Contents Historical Background (i) Pre-Bosnian War (ii) Bosnian War
Failures of the International Community
Threshold Conditions
Non-Threshold Conditions
Bosnia Today

3. Background to the Bosnian War
Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - 6 republics.
Bosnia: Muslims 44 percent, Serbs 31 percent, Croats 18 percent, remainder mixed.
Federation held together by Tito till his death in 1980.

4. Key Tipping Points Election of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia
Milosevic and his idea of a Greater Serbia.
Taking over control of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina.

5. Key Tipping Points Rise of Nationalism in other Republics.
Election of nationalist Franjo Tudjman in Croatia.
Collapse of the Yugoslav Communist Party.
Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in mid 1991.

6. Key Tipping Points Serbia-Croatia war
Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina.
Arms embargo (Resolution 713) imposed in the hope of preventing Croatian conflict from widening.

7. Key Tipping Points Breakdown of relations in Bosnia
Bosnian Serbs left assembly in late 1991, which later voted for sovereignty, declaring their own republic.
Referendum of Feb 29 and Mar
Start of violence.

8. Bosnian War:
A lesson in preventive deployment of a sufficient amount of force (less costly)
Combatants:
Serbs: Army of Republika Srpska 
Croats: Croatian Defense Council 
Bosniaks: Army of Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina
Various paramilitaries & the UN (airstrikes)
Dayton and the belief in the efficacy of the air campaign ~ the Kosovo debacle

9. minimum number of persons killed in the Bosnian war, by ethnicity, status as of mid-2003

10. Action by the international community
UNHCR
Extension of UNPROFOR mandate
Peace plans (4)
Means of intervention:
Humanitarian aid for besieged towns and cities, armed escorts for humanitarian aid convoys & air campaign
In November 1991, UNHCR was designated by the U.N. Secretary General as the lead agency for humanitarian relief in the former Yugoslavia. One of its major responsibilities was to manage an extensive logistics and distribution network to move food and other relief supplies to the populations affected by the conflict. UNHCR maintained large warehouses mostly outside the Bosnian border and arranged convoys to transport the aid to secondary warehouses in Bosnia. It also arranged for monitoring the ultimate distribution of aid.
UNPROFOR’s humanitarian mandate in Bosnia emerged in response to the growing security hazards accompanying the delivery of relief throughout the country. June 1992, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) originally deployed in Croatia had its mandate extended into Bosnia and Herzegovina, initially to protect the Sarajevo International Airport. In September, the role of UNPROFOR was expanded to protect humanitarian aid and assist relief delivery in the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to help protect civilian refugees when required by the Red Cross.

12. Key tipping points UN resolutions Resolution 770 (13 Aug 1992)
Provision of armed escorts for aid convoys
“use all necessary means” to deliver humanitarian aid
Resolution 819 (16 Apr 1993)
Application of “safe areas policy”
Declaration of Srebrenica as safe zone
Resolution 824 (May 1993)
Additions to list of safe areas
safe areas policy: declaring the towns under threat in eastern Bosnia as under UN protection

13. Image of the Western governments at stake
Incidents
Discovery of Serb detention centre for Muslim prisoners by media outlets (Aug 1992)
Image of the Western governments at stake
BS attacks on Srebrenica (1993)
Heavy shelling & heavy civilian casualties
Refusal of access to aid convoys
Collapse of ceasefire (May 1993)
Sarajevo (Aug 1995)
BS attack that killed 37 → intensification of air campaign
Srebrenica
With the media's discovery of the centre, Western governments felt that they could not be seen to be doing nothing, and yet needed to avoid actual troop deployment in a combat role + growing pressure from Muslim states on the SC for tougher action --> Resolution 770

14. Authorization of the use of air support
Resolution 836 (4 June 1993)
Authorization of the use of air support
Extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate “to deter attacks against safe areas”
Empowerment of UNPROFOR “acting in self-defence, to take necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas… armed incursion”
PROBLEM: interpretation of this resolution
Interpretation: member states were empowered to take all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to SUPPORT the UNPROFOR →Insufficient mandate to protect the civilians
Of all the humanitarian aid provided, roughly half did not get to their targets & Serbian army was strengthened

15. BS attack that killed 37 → intensification of air campaign
Incidents
Sarajevo (Aug 1995)
BS attack that killed 37 → intensification of air campaign
Operation Deliberate Force
Air campaign stemming from 3 massacres (e.g Muslim males in Srebrenica)
Operation Storm
Shift in BOP on the ground
With the media's discovery of the centre, Western governments felt that they could not be seen to be doing nothing, and yet needed to avoid actual troop deployment in a combat role + growing pressure from Muslim states on the SC for tougher action --> Resolution 770

16. Vance Owen plan (Jan 1993) – stimulation of ethnic cleansing
Peace plans
Vance Owen plan (Jan 1993) – stimulation of ethnic cleansing
Partitioning of Bosnia (10 semi-autonomous regions), awarding of territories to the groups in control of each area at that point in time
Broke Muslim-Croat alliance & renewed competition over the territories
Weakened military resistance to the Serbs
E.g. area between Vitez and Kiseljak
V&K Contested zone → freelance ethnic cleansing by both Muslim and Croat militias

17. Failures of the international community
Misinterpretation of the nature of the conflict.
Mary Kaldor: defining character of the war was that the violence 'was directed not against opposing sides, but against civilian populations'
Justification for the refusal to commit since outsiders could do little
Lack of protection for the Serb civilians targeted by the Bosniaks and Croats
Neutrality of the UN was identified by the UN as one of its failings in the Bosnian conflict but had the UN taken sides, the not so positive humanitarian outcome might have turned out even less positive than it did
e.g. EU's lead negotiator, Lord Owen, argued that the UN was needed to be seen to be impartial as the route for aid convoys crossed miles of Serb territory
Justified the refusal to commit since outsiders could do little, and would ultimately be stuck in a "Vietnam-style quagmire"

18. Western recognition of the sovereignty of Bosnia encouraged Bosniaks to push for independence
Lack of commitment and in turn, decisive action or troop numbers required for the efficacy of the intervention
Use of an air campaign
Mandate
Authorized strength
Deployment as of Mar 1994
Shortfall
Reopen Sarajevo airport and protect humanitarian convoys
10,110
9,071
1,039
Protect safe areas
7,600
5,000
2,600
Total
17,710
14,071
3,639
Unwillingness to back up such rhetoric with military action until 1995 resulted in significant casualties.
e.g Izetbegovic said in 2000 that he expected that recognition would lead to the international community defending them from the Serbs. US encouraged Bosnia to scupper the cantonization plan and fight for a Bosnian state because they thought that by internationalizing the problem, it would deter the Serbs from meddling. On the Bosnian`s side, they assumed that since the US was urging the defenceless Muslims to pursue a course that nearly everyone in Bosnia would trigger a Serb onslaught, the West was also promising military protection.
Refusal of Security Council members, including the United States, to authorize enough troops
e.g. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali wanted 34,000; the Security Council authorized only 7,400
--> capture of the 'safe area' enclaves by the Serbs

19. Lack of viability of the safe areas
safe areas turned into permanent refugee camps, contrary to the Vance Owen plan
e.g. the '93 'open jail' of Srebrenica & '95 massacre
boxing up of the largest ethnic group into the smallest area
Srebrenica: disarmament of Muslims under a UN- brokered agreement that set up a 15sq km demilitarised zone around Srebrenica, policed by 250 Canadian troops; Serbian cordon around the enclave controlled what went in and out, no permittance of UN forces to take in basic foodstuffs to the inhabitants, or tents to shelter the homeless, or the setting up of a regular water supply --> social problems
Muslims made up 44 per cent of Bosnia's 4.5 million population before the war and the percentage was rising. The birth-rate for Croats and Serbs is very low.

20. What could've been done Lifting of the arms embargo from the start
Fear of escalation from 'leveling the killing field'
UN trusteeship
BUT huge financial assistance and personnel to rebuild industries and the political and legal system
1992: international protectorate
BUT necessity of long term policing role which ultimately was realized with the IFOR and SFOR postwar
protectorate would have protected civilians from ethnic cleansing and established a framework of law and order in which the different political groups could arrive at a lasting settlement
IFOR: Implementation Force
SFOR: Stabilization Force

21. Humanitarian intervention?
Thresholds
Fulfilled?
Supreme humanitarian emergency ○
Last resort
Proportionality ∆
Positive humanitarian outcome
○/∆
Humanitarian motives
Humanitarian justifications
Legality
Selectivity

22. Threshold conditions

23. Supreme humanitarian emergency?
Ethnic cleansing
Arms embargo → Muslims & Croats defenceless & could not be relied upon to end violations
Refugees and casualties
By fall of 1992, almost 2 million refugees (approx half of Bosnia`s population)
By 1994, est 150,000 killed, 150,000 wounded.

24. Last resort? Measures already taken:
Sanctions that called for U.N. members to freeze Serbian assets abroad etc
Undermined by deliveries of supplies which came overland from Greece and up the Danube from Russia & Ukraine.
Arms Embargo

25. Proportionality? One of the largest UN operations at that time.
UNHCR
UNPROFOR
Cost
$697 million
$1.7 billion
Staff in former Yugoslavia
678
30, 000 (from 34 nations)
Staff in Bosnia
263
14, 000 (from 14 nations)
Fatalities in the former Yugoslavia 11
79 (34 from hostile action)
One of the largest UN operations at that time.
Slowed down war machine
Failure to protect safe areas and emboldened Muslim and Croat militias
Any loss of life as a consequence of intervention must be outweighed by the number of lives saved as a result of it

26. Proportionality Benjamin Valentino. No `low-cost` intervention.
Evaluating intervention in terms of dollars per life saved?
nternational expenditures on the four million people of Bosnia came to almost fifty-four billion dollars from The international community has spent billions more since then, easily bringing the total above sixty billion dollars—more than twice Bosnia’s annual GDP. There are no estimates of how many lives the intervention in Bosnia may have saved, but even if we assume that without intervention fully half of the two million Muslims living in Bosnia would have been killed, the intervention would have cost 60,000 dollars per life saved.

27. Positive humanitarian outcome?
Prevented starvation.
Did airstrikes contribute towards the Dayton accords?
Misunderstanding of conflict leading to unrealistic expectations of humanitarian outcomes e.g. failure to protect Serbs as well.
In Bosnia, for example, the international community eventually backed Croatian and Bosnian Muslim forces in an effort to prevent atrocities by Serbs. While these forces were far less brutal than the Serbs, they were implicated in a number of large-scale atrocities. Most infamously, in August 1995 Croatian forces drove more than one hundred thousand Serbs in the Krajina region from their homes, killing hundreds of civilians in what The New York Times described as “the largest single ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the war.”

28. Non threshold conditions

29. Humanitarian motives? Various purposes of the intervention:
Recognition of Bosnia --> Internationalisation of the problem would deter Serbian interference
To ensure the safety of the humanitarian aid convoys & safeguard the safe areas
Maintain the image of the Western governments involved (instrumental prudential concerns)
Issue of misinformation:
Safe areas identified solely for Muslims
Sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a serious violation of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to life of persons, regardless of their nationality, regardless of protection taking place neither upon authorization by relevant organs of the UN nor with permission by the legitimate government of the target state?
Motives behind the intervention/ reasons behind the selection of the means are inconsistent with a positive humanitarian outcome? If yes, not humanitarian
Even if it is motivated by non-humanitarian outcomes, humanitarian, provided the motives, and the means employed do not undermine a positive humanitarian outcome

30. Humanitarian justifications?
UN resolutions
Legality?
Security Council authorization
Selectivity?
Intervention as part of a larger regional commitment to stabilise the former Yugoslav republic
as long as decision makers who justify their actions in humanitarian terms have done everything in their power to ensure that there is no contradiction between their humanitarian motives and the character and conduct of the intervention, then even a failed intervention can be humanitarian
national polls conducted by the news media and other major pollsters: respondentsa pprov-ing of humanitarianai d and allied, as opposed to unilateral, intervention
"post-Vietnam syndrome" was still apparent in the preference of most Americans to stay out of foreignen tan-glement
Yet a larger proportiono f Americans( 49 percent)t hought intervention in Bosnia would be more like the victory in the Gulf War than thought it would end in defeat as in Vietnam (43 percent; Gallup, 5/6/93)
where the risk to U.S. soldiers was low, support was fairly strong. Between 1992 and 1995, there generally was majoritys upportf or U.S. assistancei n providingh umanitariana id and protecting UN peacekeepers. Most Americans were also willing to use U.S. airpower to protect UN troops or Bosnian Muslims in safe havens
On the general question of whether "the U.S. should take military action" against the Serbs, support was low in early 1993 (1/13/93, 27 percent) but grew to 40 percent by April as the war and Clinton rhetoric escalated (ABC/Washington Post; Morin 1993; cf. Morin 1995)
fairly distinct contrasts between public preferences and government actions
Selectivity based on selfish interests or prudential concerns?
Instrumental prudence vs. normative prudence
in the case of supreme humanitarian emergency, state leaders should accept the risk of casualties to end human rights abuses

31. Humanitarian intervention?
Thresholds
Fulfilled?
Supreme humanitarian emergency ○
Last resort
Proportionality ∆
Positive humanitarian outcome
○/∆
Humanitarian motives
Humanitarian justifications
Legality
Selectivity

32. Bosnia Today
Under Dayton Accords, Bosnia structured as confederation comprising of 2 entities, autonomous Serb Republic and a Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

33. Bosnia Today
Return of refugees. Approx half of wartime refugees considered to have returned. BUT
Improved climate security and diminishing presence of peacekeeping forces.
Gradual coordination of the 2 entities of Bosnia.