1. SOCOM CBRN Symposium December 2, 2003
Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense
SOCOM CBRN Symposium
December 2, 2003
On behalf of ADM Mike Mathis, the DDFP, thank you . . .

2. Changes and Evolutions The Way Ahead
Agenda
JRO - Overview
JRO - Today
Changes and Evolutions
The Way Ahead
My agenda for today.

3. CBDP Management & Oversight Structure
Joint Requirements
Office
CBRN Defense
The obligatory line and box diagram . . .
The management structure has changed significantly since the inception of the CBDP. The JRO was created to replace the JSIG and represent the joint force users.

4. Required Capabilities, S&T, and Acquisition
Capabilities Documents
JPEO
JRO
Build POM
Future Operational Capabilities
Transition Technology
Our efforts to support the CBDP are part of a partnership – a triad – with the JPEO and DTRA-CB. Our collective charge is to put the required capabilities, as stated by the COCOMs and the Services, into the hands of the users.
We serve as the ‘button’ for CBRN requirements issues for the COCOMs and Services, and in turn feed their required capabilities as they have prioritized into the S&T and Materiel developer arenas.
ACTD, Analyses
Input for
Priorities
Services
Combatant
Commanders
DTRA

5. JRO-CBRN Defense Current Organization
35 Total Man-years
23 DOD & 12 Contractor
Director
RADM Michael Mathis
Tech Director (SES) -- Mr. Leonard Izzo
Deputy Director – COL Brian S. Lindamood
Analysis and
Demonstration Br
Mission Area
Integration Br
Materiel Rqmts
Coord Br
Doctrine, Tng, and Readiness Br
Develop operational concepts and support rqmts analysis studies
Participate in experiments and demos, ACTDs, and support DOD studies
JS mod & sim POC
Coordinate threat capability assessments, coordinate with intel community
Coordinate on S&T efforts, facilitate O-49 effort, coordinate w/DTRA, DARPA, DOE, etc.
Develop Mod Plan, Operational Capabilities, and Priorities
ICW JPEO lead POM efforts, develop Strat Plan
Coordinate response to external studies (GAO, DSB, DOD IG, etc)
Coordinate on HLS and NORTHCOM
Coordinate AT/FP and CoM offices on CBRND issues
Resource analysis (to include coordination with JPEO, DATSD(CBD), DTRA, Services)
Develop CBRND rqmnts in passive defense, CoM, AT/FP, and HLS
Manage ORDs as JROC Special Interest programs
Service identifies needs, JRO staff facilitates development and coordination; Services validate ORDs
Interface with PMs, T&E agencies, and Service requirements offices as required
Coordinate logistics and sustainment issues,, participate in DOD CBRND operational readiness issues, monitor LD/HD CBRN assets
Coordinate non-medical multi-service doctrine and training issues w/USACMLS and Service doctrine centers
Coordinate medical multi-service doctrine and training issues w/USAMEDD and Service doctrine centers
This is an over view of the functions we perform as our part of the triad.
The A&D Branch is our link to DTRA-CB for S&T issues.
The Materiel rqmts Branch is our link to the JPEO for hardware solutions..
DTR Branch oversees Joint and multi-service . . .
MAI serves as the “S3” section of our office. Their key missions are to build the CBRD POM, staff CBRN-related issues (JQRR, FCB/JROC, etc),

6. JRO – CBRN Defense Charter
Single office within DOD responsible for the planning, coordination, and oversight of joint CBRN defense operational requirements
Develop and maintain the CBRN defense Overarching Operational Concept and the CBRND Modernization Plan
Represent the Services and Combatant Commanders in the capabilities generation process and act as their proponent for coordinating and integrating CBRND operational capabilities for materiel and non-materiel solutions
Develop DOD CBD POM with acquisition community support
Facilitate the development of joint doctrine and training and sponsor the development of multi-service doctrine
Serve as the CJCS’ single source of expertise to address all issues involving CBRN defense within passive defense, consequence management, force protection, and homeland security
Our charter calls on us to be the single entry point on the Joint Staff for CBRN requirements issues . . .

7. Joint CBRN Defense Functional Concept – Operational Attributes
SHAPE – Provides the ability to characterize the CBRN hazard to the force commander - develop a clear understanding of the current and predicted CBRN situation; collect, query, and assimilate info from sensors, intelligence, medical, etc., in near real time to inform personnel, provide actual and potential impacts of CBRN hazards; envision critical SENSE, SHIELD and SUSTAIN end states (preparation for operations); visualize the sequence of events that moves the force from its current state to those end states.
SHAPE
SUSTAIN
SENSE
SHIELD
SUSTAIN – The ability to conduct decontamination and medical actions that enable the quick restoration of combat power, maintain/recover essential functions that are free from the effects of CBRN hazards, and facilitate the return to pre-incident operational capability as soon as possible.
SHIELD –The capability to shield the force from harm caused by CBRN hazards by preventing or reducing individual and collective exposures, applying prophylaxis to prevent or mitigate negative physiological effects, and protecting critical equipment
These four S’s apply to all CBRN mission areas and they form the basis for our functional concept.
While it does not stand out as a separate function or mission, medical CBRN requirements are embedded into each of the four attributes in our operational concept.
SENSE – The capability to continually provide the information about the CBRN situation at a time and place by detecting, identifying, and quantifying CBRN hazards in air, water, on land, on personnel, equipment or facilities. This capability includes detecting, identifying, and quantifying those CBRN hazards in all physical states (solid, liquid, gas).

8. Materiel Requirements
New Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
CJCSM and CJCSI C, 24 Jun 03
Drive “jointness” from the top-down, strengthening joint warfighting capabilities
Links strategic direction to strategic investment decision making and acquisition policy
Enables a more responsive acquisition system
Provides an engine for force transformation
Integrates material and non-material solutions to capability gaps and shortfalls
Frames discussions of alternatives using common language of metrics
In JUN 2003, the new 3170 put in place a new framework for addressing requirements issues.
The 8 JWCAs that existed under the previous construct have been condensed into 5 functional capabilities boards. The focus of the FCBs has moved from providing materiel requirements to providing required capabilities.
CBRN falls under the Protection FCB, and is a subset of a wide range of portfolio items that span traditional force protection, missile and air defense, AT, . . .
Each FCB incorporates members from the Services, JS equities, and – for the first time – our OSD counterparts.
The benefit of the FCB process is that issues now have GO/FO oversight from entry to resolution/decision.

9. CBRN Defense Programs, Concepts, and Missions
PAST
Four Programs – Not One:
Lack an integrated concept
Program centered around principles: Avoid, Protect, Decon
Focus was on systems, not capabilities
FORCE PROTECTION
Force Protection
PASSIVE DEFENSE
Passive Defense
OBJECTIVE
One program
HOMELAND SECURITY
Homeland Security
So, what we’ve seen to date is a collection of processes that did not enjoy high level integration and management. The end result of these processes, traditionally, has been on systems.
Under the new capabilities determination process, all of these programs are brought together under one governing body – the Protection FCB – and focused on the national strategy to combat WMD. In the past our efforts focused on tactical-level objectives. Now we’re focused on a national-level (strategic) objective.
COMBATING
WMD
Consequence Management
Homeland Security
Nonproliferation
Counterproliferation
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
Consequence Management

10. An Integrated CBRND Architecture
National Security Strategy
National Military Strategy
DOD Role in Homeland Security
National Strategy
to Combat WMD
Force Protection
Civil Support
Homeland Defense
Nonproliferation
NORTHCOM Support
Support to OGAs
Consequence Management
Operating Forces
Installations
Counterproliferation
How the operational concept and supporting architecture currently being developed for the Protection FCB will fall out remain to be seen, however, you can count on it to address national-level (strategic) issues.
Before we worked passive defense issues for the warfighter under the auspices of a standing CONPLAN or regional threat. Now we are focused on a global strategy that looks at traditional CBRN defense in new, broader terms – combating WMD.
Our past efforts will served as a solid foundation for the transformation of our portion of the requirements determination process, but we must understand that they are merely a subset – an integrated piece - of a wide-ranging mission area called ‘protection’.
As provocative food for thought, consider this: we have the CBDP that focuses (historically) on passive defense for warfighters; we have the CP program that focuses on active defense and some counterforce issues; treaties and agreements exist in yet another place. All of these efforts are underway, beneath various heads, yet we now have one national strategy to combat WMD. What will the future of these programs be in light of this new strategy?
Overarching Future Operational Concept

11. Consequence Management Counterproliferation
JRO-CBRND Way Ahead
Strengthening the alliance with
DTRA, JPEO, industry
Using/adapting existing methodologies to
address emerging mission areas
JRO for Combating WMD
COMBATING
WMD
Consequence Management
Homeland Security
Nonproliferation
Counterproliferation
Throughout this evolution, you can count on the JRO to provide all of the services and support we’re known for. Titles may change on documents and name plates, but the supporter cast of professionals remains in place.
We’ve already begun to tighten the reigns on oversight and management internally. It’s our mission now to get the message to our partners in industry.
We’re confident that existing methodologies and tools can be applied to address requirements across the national strategy, and more importantly, to support DHS in their efforts to defend the homeland. Defense of the homeland is, after all, our number one national security objective.
United under a common objective. Integrated under an overarching concept and framework. Adaptable to change. There is no misunderstanding the Commander-in-Chief’s intent.
Thank you for your kind attention and, again, for the opportunity to be here today.