1. These were all CRISES from the Cold War.
What links can you make between 2 or more of these images?
Czechoslovakia
Berlin
These were all CRISES from the Cold War.
But what if historians had just discovered another crisis – which was almost as calamitous as Cuba?
PLEASE READ THE TEACHER NOTES THAT ACCOMPANY THIS RESOURCE. YOU WILL FIND THEM VERY HELPFUL!
STRETCH: What were the years of these crises?
Cuba

2. Interpretations of Operation Able Archer
Investigate whether a NATO training exercise genuinely brought the USA & USSR to the brink of nuclear war.
Key Words:
Operation RYaN: A Soviet intelligence-gathering exercise that spied on NATO countries.
Operation Able Archer: A NATO nuclear training exercise in November 1983.
NATO

3. Today’s investigation
Investigate whether a NATO training exercise genuinely brought the USA & USSR to the brink of nuclear war in 1983.
‘Never, perhaps, in the post-war decades has the situation in the world been as explosive and, hence, more difficult and unfavourable as in the first half of the 1980s.’
Mikhail Gorbachev, February 1986
TASK: Try to DISAGREE with Gorbachev’s statement, based on your knowledge of events in the period 1945–80. Choose at least two events.
Today’s investigation
Recently released top-secret information has shed light onto Gorbachev’s grim appraisal of this period. Did Operation Able Archer genuinely bring the world to the brink of nuclear war in 1983?
YOU will be using sources and interpretations to discover how an event that started as a game nearly ended in disaster – or did it?!

4. Does Gorbachev’s quote make sense now?
Investigate whether a NATO training exercise genuinely brought the USA & USSR to the brink of nuclear war in 1983.
Background:
The early 1970s are usually referred to as the era of détente; but that period of improved relations did not last long…
1979: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
1980: Collapse of SALT 2
1980: Carter Doctrine
1980: US boycott of Moscow Olympics
1981: The KGB launch operation RYaN to spy on NATO communications
1981: Ronald Reagan announces plans to spend $180 billion on arms over the next six years
1983 (September): A South Korean Boeing 747 airliner is shot down by a Soviet fighter
1983 (October): US Marines invade Grenada
1983 (November): NATO exercise Able Archer takes place
1983 (November): Andropov announces an increase in the number of missiles aimed at the USA
Does Gorbachev’s quote make sense now?

5. What is the controversy?
Investigate whether a NATO training exercise genuinely brought the USA & USSR to the brink of nuclear war in 1983.
What is the controversy?
Did Operation Able Archer genuinely bring the world to the brink of a nuclear war?
You might think it will be fairly easy to decide whether nuclear war almost happened in 1983…
But only if you have been asleep in your history lessons! You should know by now there are always conflicting views…
In early 1984 Ronald Reagan asked his Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Arthur Hartman:
‘Do you think Soviet leaders really fear us, or is all the huffing and puffing just part of their propaganda?’
DISCUSS: Why might the USSR have wanted to pretend to be worried about Able Archer? i.e. Why might they be ‘huffing and puffing’?

6. Exercise Able Archer took place in November 1983
SOURCE A: Secret CIA directorate, ‘Soviet thinking on the possibility of armed confrontation with the United States’, 30 December 1983:
‘Contrary to the impression conveyed by Soviet propaganda, Moscow does not appear to anticipate a near-term military confrontation with the United States. Moscow is playing up the “war danger” to stop the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles to western Europe, and to deepen cracks within NATO.’
SOURCE B: Secret memo to the President and senior US officials, from William Casey (CIA Director), 19 June 1984:
‘The behaviour of [Soviet] armed forces is most disturbing. From the deployment of submarines to the delayed troop rotations, there is a central theme of not being caught vulnerable.
The military behaviours we have observed [of the USSR] involve high military costs… adding thereby a dimension of genuineness to the Soviet expressions of concern.’
TASK – source analysis
Exercise Able Archer took place in November 1983
Suggest two things you can infer from Source A about the USSR’s reaction to Operation Able Archer.
How useful are Sources A and B for an enquiry into the impact of Operation Able Archer?
How would you follow up Source A or Source B to find out more about the Soviet reaction to Able Archer?

7. TASK – evaluating interpretations
INTERPRETATION 1: Nate Jones, ‘Finding answers to a 1983 nuclear war scare’ (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists), 2013:
‘The Kremlin genuinely did fear the possibility of an imminent onset of full-scale war with the West, and that this fear – and the West’s aggressive policies and postures – greatly increased the risk of nuclear war through miscalculation.’
INTERPRETATION 2: John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (Oxford Press), 2011:
‘… [President Reagan’s advisors] could not convince themselves that Moscow really believed NATO would attack without provocation. Shultz [Secretary of State] took the line that the Kremlin had orchestrated a “war scare” to panic European opinion and pressure the Italian and German parliaments into voting against deploying cruise missiles (in Italy) and Pershing II’s (in Germany).’
TASK – evaluating interpretations
Study Interpretations 1 and 2. They give different views about the impact of Operation Able Archer. What is the main difference between these views?
Suggest one reason why Interpretations 1 and 2 give different views. You may also use Sources A and B to help explain your answer.

8. YES – it was a genuine threat: NO – the Soviets were not worried:
Investigate whether a NATO training exercise genuinely brought the USA & USSR to the brink of nuclear war in 1983.
STEP 1: Card sorting. Arrange the cards into two columns to match the table below…
Please note that most of the sources you are using have only recently been declassified by the American government.
YES – it was a genuine threat:
NO – the Soviets were not worried:
STEP 2: Sort the cards into an order of importance. i.e. Place the strongest arguments/factors at the top of your two columns. Then glue them into your book.
STEP 3: Explain the significance of the top two factors from each side. e.g. ‘Source X suggests that Able Archer was/was not a genuine threat, to a high extent. This was because…’
STEP 4: Write a mini-plenary. What are your current thoughts – ‘Were the Soviets genuinely worried by Operation Able Archer?’ (20–50-word mini-plenary)

9. Method 2: Frankenstein’s body
Plenary: Extended writing
To what extent did Operation Able Archer genuinely bring the world to the brink of nuclear war in 1983?
INTRODUCTION: According to… (give a short quote from one of the interpretations that encapsulates this controversy), Operation Able Archer was… (summarise the event in one sentence). This essay intends to prove that AA did (not) bring the world to the brink of nuclear war. It will achieve this by examining… (list your sources/evidence/events).
BODY OF THE ESSAY: Choose one of these methods…
Method 1: X versus Y
Method 2: Frankenstein’s body
This approach simply involves two main blocks: ‘X’ (strengths/positives/agreements) and ‘Y’ (weaknesses/negatives/
disagreements).
Begin with whichever side (genuine threat/ not) you believe, and use as much evidence as possible to support your argument.
Imagine stitching two halves of Dr Frankenstein’s monster’s torso together! This approach involves counter-referencing everything you say, e.g. ‘X suggests this, but Y disagrees with that because…’ (going backwards and forwards as you stitch the body of your argument together!).
CONCLUSION: In conclusion, the evidence proves, to a ______ extent, that Operation Able Archer did/did not nearly cause World War 3. This was because… (list the main reasons/facts/evidence to support your argument).

10. resources

11. Background:
By the early 1980s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and appointment of President Reagan in the USA had foreshadowed the decline of international cooperation. In 1983, Reagan had described the USSR as the ‘evil empire’, and the Soviets had shot down a Korean Airlines Boeing 747, killing all innocent passengers, after the plane had mistakenly strayed into Soviet airspace – the Russians thought it was an American spy plane. Tensions were rising like they were in the early 1960s.
In 1981, the USSR created a group whose task was to monitor NATO forces, in case of an attempted surprise nuclear missile attack on Russia; the group’s codename was RYaN (an acronym that translates as ‘nuclear missile attack’). In , RYaN learned that NATO forces (led by the USA and Britain) were conducting an extremely realistic ‘nuclear attack rehearsal’.
Operation Able Archer was a military exercise (which didn’t actually involve physical forces) organised by NATO in 1983 to simulate their procedures if the USSR were to launch an attack against them. New evidence has suggested that the USSR misinterpreted NATO’s actions and were preparing to launch a counter-attack themselves, based on the information they had gathered via Operation RYaN.

12. Investigate whether a NATO training exercise genuinely brought the USA & USSR to the brink of nuclear war in 1983.
Key Words:
Operation RYaN: A Soviet intelligence-gathering exercise that spied on NATO countries. RYaN’s task was to discover when/if the USSR’s enemies were going to launch a nuclear attack.
In 1981, the Head of the KGB (Soviet Secret Police), Yuri Andropov, ‘initiated an intelligence- gathering exercise which was based on the belief that the United States and NATO were developing plans for a first-strike nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. KGB stations were tasked to provide details of activities in NATO countries which would support this theory. They focussed particularly on patterns of communications between military headquarters and between the offices of key political players.’ (P. Lever, p. 511)
Operation Able Archer: A NATO training exercise that rehearsed what to do if the USSR launched a nuclear attack.
A military exercise (which didn’t actually involve physical forces) organised by NATO in to simulate their procedures if the USSR were to launch an attack against them. New evidence has suggested that the USSR misinterpreted NATO’s actions and were preparing to launch an attack themselves, based on the information they had gathered via Operation RYaN.

13. These sources are provided to give you a choice of sources for Task G, or as extension activities.
SOURCE 2: Secret report from the Director of the FBI to the US Secretary of State, 28 May 1984:
‘Inadequate information about the Soviet reading of our own military actions may be part of the reason why NATO’s chief historian, Gregory Pedlow, initially reported that no senior participants in Exercise Able Archer “recalled any ‘war scare’ or even unusual Soviet reaction to the exercise”.
In fact, amended versions of official reports removed all references to the Soviet response to Able Archer – despite the fact that the British first reported it.’
SOURCE 1: Ronald Reagan’s diary entry, 18 November 1983 (published in 2009):
‘I feel that the Soviets are so defence minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in any way soft on them we have sought to tell them that no one here has any intention of doing anything like that. What the hell have they got that anyone would want?’
SOURCE 3: Secret CIA directorate, ‘Soviet thinking on the possibility of armed confrontation with the United States’, 30 December 1983:
‘Contrary to the impression conveyed by Soviet propaganda, Moscow does not appear to anticipate a near-term military confrontation with the United States. Moscow is playing up the “war danger” to stop the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles to western Europe, and to deepen cracks within NATO.’
SOURCE 4: Memo to the President and senior US officials, from William Casey (CIA Director), 19 June 1984:
‘I attach a rather stunning array of indicators of an increasing aggressiveness in Soviet policy and activities. These include developments in the media, civil defence sector, the economy, intelligence preparations and political activity.’

14. SOURCE 5: Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography, 1990:
‘During my first years in Washington, I think many of us in the administration took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them. But the more experience I had with the Soviet leaders the more I began to realise that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a fist strike; because of this… they had aimed a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons at us.’
SOURCE 6: Secret memo to the President and senior US officials, from William Casey (CIA Director), 19 June 1984:
‘The behaviour of [Soviet] armed forces is most disturbing. From the deployment of submarines to the delayed troop rotations, there is a central theme of not being caught vulnerable.
The military behaviours we have observed [of the USSR] involve high military costs… adding thereby a dimension of genuineness to the Soviet expressions of concern.
Actions speak louder than words.’
SOURCE 7: CIA top secret report ‘Soviet policy toward the United States in 1984’, published in August 1984 :
‘Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict with the USA…
It is highly unlikely that the USSR would instigate a confrontation similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.’
SOURCE 8: Ronald Reagan’s diary entry, 14 June 1984 (published in 2009):
‘We believe, and with good reason, that the Soviets are plotting against us and mean us harm; maybe they are scared of us and think we are a threat. I’d like to go face to face and explore this with them.’

15. SOURCE 9: Herbert Meyer (Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council) memo to the Director of the CIA, entitled ‘Why is the world so dangerous?’, 30 November 1983:
‘The sharp rise in the level of global violence (including bombings in Lebanon and [US] invasion of Grenada) is tied to the Soviet Union’s shattering descent into history.
They are scared because our Pershing missiles could hit Moscow within ten minutes – roughly how long it takes some of the Kremlin's leaders to get out of their chairs, let alone to their shelters.
The slow demise of the USSR is raising the level of violence, thus making the world a more dangerous place. This is because, in response to the Soviet’s demise, our [US] policies are becoming more reckless.
As a result, there is a low possibility that the Soviets could go for it, and launch a conventional or nuclear bolt-from-the-blue strike on Western Europe or perhaps the US.’
SOURCE 10: President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) review for George Bush, Snr, in 1990:
‘In 1983 the United States may have inadvertently placed our relations with the Soviet Union on a hair trigger during the NATO exercise Able Archer.
There is little doubt in our minds that the Soviets were genuinely worried by Able Archer… it appears that at least some Soviet forces were preparing to pre-empt or counterattack a NATO strike launched under the cover of Able Archer.
The US Intelligence Community’s erroneous reporting made the grave error to assume that since we know the US is not going to start World War III, the next leaders of the Kremlin will also believe that.
The Board is deeply disturbed by the US handling of the war scare, both at the time and since.’

16. INTERPRETATION 1: Arnav Manchanda, ‘When truth is stranger than fiction: the Able Archer incident’ (Cold War History
Vol. 9, No. 1, February 2009):
‘The Soviets somehow believed that there was an impending Western nuclear attack that they had to pre-empt. American rearmament, NATO missile deployment, and the rhetoric of US President Ronald Reagan somehow convinced the Soviets that the nuclear endgame was near. These fears climaxed in November 1983 during an otherwise innocuous nuclear readiness exercise by the West…
The American and NATO build-up of arms was to many in the Soviet establishment a sign that this endgame was near. The Soviets viewed the Reagan administration as capable of a surprise first strike. The Soviet’s strategic response to a possible American launch was to pre-empt, to get in a parting shot in the final steps to a nuclear holocaust.’
INTERPRETATION 2: Sir Paul Lever, ‘The Cold War: the golden age of arms control’ (Cold War History, 2014, Vol. 14, No. 4):
‘The KGB, as we now know from defector accounts and archival material, interpreted the increased communications activity involved in ABLE ARCHER as a sign that an attack was actually being prepared and heightened the actual readiness states of its own nuclear forces. In the event, the NATO exercise came to its natural end and the communications traffic returned to normal before the Soviet Union took any military action. But this was, some commentators have claimed, the most dangerous episode of the Cold War.’

17. INTERPRETATION 3: John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (Oxford Press), 2011:
‘… [President Reagan’s advisors] could not convince themselves that Moscow really believed NATO would attack without provocation. Shultz [Secretary of State] took the line that the Kremlin had orchestrated a “war scare” to panic European opinion and pressure the Italian and German parliaments into voting against deploying cruise missiles (in Italy) and Pershing II’s (in Germany).’ [p. 214]
In other words, the Soviets were not scared; they were simply manipulating the events to scare other countries into rejecting American missiles, fearing that they would be caught in the middle of a US–Soviet nuclear war.

18. INTERPRETATION 4: British newspaper article from The Guardian, ‘How a NATO war game took the world to brink of nuclear disaster’, 2 November 2013:
‘Chilling new evidence that Britain and America came close to provoking the Soviet Union into launching a nuclear attack has emerged in former classified documents written at the height of the cold war.
Cabinet memos and briefing papers released under the Freedom of Information Act reveal that a major war games exercise, Operation Able Archer, conducted in November 1983 by the US and its NATO allies, was so realistic it made the Russians believe that a nuclear strike on its territory was a real possibility.
When intelligence filtered back to the Tory government on the Russians' reaction to the exercise, the prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, ordered her officials to lobby the Americans to make sure that such a mistake could never happen again.’ 
INTERPRETATION 5: Nate Jones, ‘Finding answers to a 1983 nuclear war scare’ (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists), 2013:
‘During the summer and fall of 1983, while NATO rehearsed its slow escalation from a conventional military response to a limited nuclear strike, and finally full nuclear war, the Soviet Union was not rehearsing. For a variety of reasons – including the Reagan administration’s strident rhetoric and the anticipated deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe – the Soviets were actively preparing for an actual surprise nuclear missile attack by the West.
The Kremlin genuinely did fear the possibility of an imminent onset of full-scale war with the West, and that this fear – and the West’s aggressive policies and postures – greatly increased the risk of nuclear war through miscalculation.’

19. Overview of the extract Reason the interpretation was chosen
Historian and source
Brief biography
Overview of the extract
Reason the interpretation was chosen 1
Arnav Manchanda, ‘When truth is stranger than fiction: the Able Archer incident’ (Cold War History, Vol. 9, No. 1, February 2009)
Manchanda is a lecturer at McGill University (Canada). His article was presented at a Conference of Defence Associations Institute, in Ottawa 2009.
Manchanda is one of the strongest proponents of the ‘genuine threat’ argument. He clearly states that NATO forces were responsible for scaring the USSR into planning a pre-emptive strike.
This acts as a fairly straightforward first interpretation. It implies that the threat was real, and directs blame at the USA.
Manchanda is not necessarily the most noteworthy historian on this topic. 2
Sir Paul Lever, ‘The Cold War: the golden age of arms control’ (Cold War History, , Vol. 14, No. 4)
Lever was a senior British ambassador. At the time of the crisis, he was the Vice- President of the European Economic Community. He would later work for the Defence Department and as British Ambassador for Germany (1997–2003).
As the title of Lever’s article suggests, his work focuses on the dangers posed in the 1980s. He is adamant that Able Archer was the ‘most dangerous episode of the Cold War’.
Lever is a strong advocate of the ‘significant’ camp. His full article is worthy of being set as pre-reading for KS5.
His personal experiences (NATO, UN,and British ambassador) add great authenticity to his opinions. 3
John L. Harper, The Cold War (Oxford Press, 2011)
Harper is an American historian (born 1950) and Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
His areas of expertise are American foreign affairs, especially within Europe.
Harper’s book stresses ways in which internal competitions for political power tilted both the US and Soviet systems towards hostility and obsessive preparation for a hot war that no one seriously intended to begin.
Harper states he ‘wrote The Cold War as a way to try to weave [his] lectures into a coherent whole, and bring [him]self up to date on the latest Cold War scholarship’.
Harper supports the ‘not a genuine threat’ camp.
His interpretation provides wider context about the events happening in the early 1980s.

20. Overview of the extract Reason the interpretation was chosen
Historian and source
Brief biography
Overview of the extract
Reason the interpretation was chosen 3
John L. Harper, The Cold War (Oxford Press, 2011)
Harper is an American historian (born 1950) and Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
His areas of expertise are American foreign affairs, especially within Europe.
Harper’s book stresses ways in which internal competitions for political power tilted both the US and Soviet systems towards hostility and obsessive preparation for a hot war that no one seriously intended to begin.
Harper states he ‘wrote The Cold War as a way to try to weave [his] lectures into a coherent whole, and bring [him]self up to date on the latest Cold War scholarship’.
Harper supports the ‘not a genuine threat’ camp.
His interpretation provides wider context about the events happening in the early 1980s. 4
British newspaper article from The Guardian: ‘How a NATO war game took the world to brink of nuclear disaster’ (2 November 2013)
The Guardian is a leftist newspaper (i.e. liberal and politically correct), which tries to be free from commercial or political influence.
The journalist was Jamie Doward.
The article was written in the wake of previously classified documents becoming available.
Doward quotes sources from the Nuclear Information Services that suggest that Britain was caught in the middle of the crisis.
In terms of blame, the whole article (which is easily found online) is fairly neutral. But Doward clearly indicates that the threat was real. As a result, you could discuss ‘reliability’. 5
Nate Jones, ‘Finding answers to a nuclear war scare’ (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2013)
Jones is the Director of the Freedom of Information Act Project for the National Security Archive (USA). He has also produced The Able Archer 83 Sourcebook. His book Able Archer 83:The Secret History of the NATO Exercise That Almost Triggered Nuclear War examines the intersection of Cold War animosity, nuclear miscalculation and government secrecy. 
This particular article encapsulates some of Jones’ arguments from his books and website. He argues that there was a real threat to global peace, because the Soviets were preparing to launch their own pre-emptive strike against NATO forces. He also blames the US for creating this crisis.
Nate Jones has unparalleled access to American documents (he makes the decision about what is going to become declassified).
He provides a convincing argument, from an American government perspective, supporting the ‘genuine threat’ camp.

21. Alternative ‘interpretation activity’
INTERPRETATION 1: Nate Jones, ‘Finding answers to a 1983 nuclear war scare’ (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2013):
‘During the summer and fall of 1983, while NATO rehearsed its slow escalation from a conventional military response to a limited nuclear strike, and finally full nuclear war, the Soviet Union was not rehearsing. For a variety of reasons – including the Reagan administration’s strident rhetoric and the anticipated deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe – the Soviets were actively preparing for an actual surprise nuclear missile attack by the West.
The Kremlin genuinely did fear the possibility of an imminent onset of full-scale war with the West, and that this fear – and the West’s aggressive policies and postures – greatly increased the risk of nuclear war through miscalculation.’
Alternative ‘interpretation activity’
TASK: The interpretation by Nate Jones, above, is most common amongst historians. There are very few arguments, currently, from historians that believe that Able Archer did NOT scare the Soviets. What does that suggest?
Think about (there are few interpretations supporting the ‘not scared’ argument because…):
Access: This information has only recently been declassified, so…
Strength of argument: The ‘scared’ argument is most convincing…
Two sides: Russian historians (and pro-Soviets) have not had access to this information either, so they haven’t formed their views yet…
Sensationalism: Are historians trying to create an argument when there isn’t one?

22. to be taught either as an extension activity or a separate lesson
Part 2
to be taught either as an extension activity or a separate lesson

23. 1962 Discuss with a partner: Why was this year a turning point?
Recap
Discuss with a partner: Why was this year a turning point?
1962
STRETCH: What is a ‘turning point’?

24. Did Able Archer spark the end of the Cold War?
Examine the effects of Operation Able Archer 83, in context of the end of the Cold War.

25. Examine the effects of Operation Able Archer 83, in context of the end of the Cold War.
TASK A: Plot the following events onto a ‘Crisis Graph’ to show how relations changed between the USA and USSR in the 1960s:
HIGH
TASK B: When was the ‘peak’ of tensions?
TASK C: Why do you think relations changed after that time?
TASK D: Therefore, what is the potential advantage of a ‘crisis’?!
Oct ‘69: Brandt’s Ostpolitik
July ‘68: Nuclear non-proliferation treaty
Tensions x
LOW x
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
‘69
1959: Castro’s revolution
May ’60: U2 spy plane crisis
April ’61: 1st man in space
May ’60: Paris conference
Jan ’61: JFK in power
April ’61: Bay of Pigs
Aug ’61: Berlin Wall
Oct ’62: CMC
Aug ’63: Limited Test Ban Treaty
June ’63: Hotline
Nov ’69: SALT 1

26. CAUSES of the end of the Cold War
Examine the effects of Operation Able Archer 83, in context of the end of the Cold War.
TASK E: Complete the bubble map to describe how the various events were responsible for ending the Cold War (max 20 words per event):
Money
Perestroika
SDI
CAUSES of the end of the Cold War
Reagan
Gorbachev
Reykjavik
Glasnost
Solidarity
Add your own…!

27. John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (Oxford Press, 2011), p. 216
Ben Walsh, Modern World History, 2nd ed (Hodder Education, 2001), p. 411
‘Reagan made no secret of his dislike of Communism and the USSR, calling it the Evil Empire. He supported anti-Communist forces in Afghanistan and Nicaragua… His boldest plan was to escalate the arms race in order to end it. He increased US defence spending by $32.6 billion. In 1982 he gave the go-ahead for the Strategic Defence Initiative.’
The American historian John Lamberton Harper, below, noted that by January 1984 (two months after Able Archer), Reagan had adopted a more conciliatory tone towards the USSR. Yet, only four months earlier, the US President had been openly hostile towards the Soviets; what had changed his mind?
TASK F: What do you think is the basic premise of this lesson?
John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War (Oxford Press, 2011), p. 216
‘Reagan’s carefully crafted speech given on January 16, 1984, spoke of “common interests” and called for “genuine cooperation”. Reagan concluded: “Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms, and know in doing so that we have helped fulfil the hopes and dreams of those we represent and, indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.” Soviet observers saw the speech as an election-year event [Reagan was competing against Walter Mondale for the Presidency that year]. But it was a victory for moderates and a little-noticed milestone on the road to the end of the Cold War.’

28. TASK H: What is the significance of Operation Able Archer?
Examine the effects of Operation Able Archer 83, in context of the end of the Cold War.
J.L. Harper described Reagan’s speech in January 1984 as ‘a victory for moderates and a little-noticed milestone on the road to the end of the Cold War’.
TASK G: Use all of the evidence (see resource sheet) to explain how Operation Able Archer was possibly the spark that started the end of the Cold War.
TASK H: What is the significance of Operation Able Archer?
Stretch: Which event was most significant: the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, or Operation Able Archer, 1983?
The Cuban Missile Crisis scared the world into an era of ‘détente’, which lasted a decade, but Operation Able Archer might have scared the USA and USSR into an era that led to the end of the Cold War within six years.

29. resources

30. Resource Sheet: use the following points to help answer the main question.
The relative increase in tensions, from 1979–83, were a lot more sudden and steep compared to the fairly steady rise from 1945–62; historian Christopher Andrew described the 1983 event as ‘one of the most dangerous moments of the Cold War’. Therefore, is it time to reconsider the time of the peak of the Cold War?
It demonstrated how superficial the so-called achievements of détente had been, and ‘certainly showed that whatever reassurance arms control agreements can provide about military capabilities, they cannot remove political suspicion or paranoia’ (P. Lever, p. 512).
The Super Powers were still extremely wary of each other. ‘While the “crisis” of Able Archer was entirely in the minds of the Soviets, these fears were grounded in Western actions that were perceived by the Soviets as preparations for a nuclear first strike.’ (A. Manchanda, p. 112)
As Churchill said in 1954, ‘jaw-jaw is better than war-war’! This event proved that clearer communications were required between the Super Powers. Similarities can be drawn with the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, which sparked improved relations between the USA & USSR.
In conjunction with Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative and Operation Able Archer, the USSR possibly came to the conclusion that they were lagging behind the West – and this heralded the final phase of the Cold War (even before Gorbachev came to power and introduced Glasnost).

31. Resource Sheet, part 2
Unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, this event was not widely known about. Most of the documents about the reactions of the USSR and USA remained classified for 30 years, and even at the time most people were unaware of what had happened.
American cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles were placed in Italy and Germany, respectively, regardless of the USSR’s protests.
President Reagan completely changed his approach towards the USSR after this event. He had been suspicious and aggressive; afterwards, he was considerate and relatively amicable.
Following the 18-year rule of Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov became the leader of the USSR from –84; despite his background as Chairman of the KGB (secret services), he turned out to be relatively progressive. For example, in August 1983, Andropov made a sensational announcement that the country was stopping all work on space-based weapons.
In February 1984, Andropov died from kidney failure; he was replaced by Konstantin Chernenko – who died 13 months later from heart failure. Chernenko’s short rule had little impact on the Cold War. His successor, however, would be the perfect partner for Reagan to work with; Mikhail Gorbachev was described by Thatcher as ‘a man we can do business with’.
Therefore, having had only five different leaders from 1917 until 1982, the USSR had now experienced three within four years. The ‘old guard’ within the USSR had gone, and Gorbachev led the country into a new era of cooperation and compromise with the USA, which resulted in the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War.

32. Resource Sheet, part 3
Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister, had stern words with Ronald Reagan about the need for clearer communications with the USSR in future. Britain had learned a valuable lesson from this episode.
Compare the events before 1983 against those afterwards – spot the difference!
BEFORE: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979), collapse of SALT 2 (1979), Carter Doctrine vows to repel any threat to American influence in the Persian Gulf (January 1980), the USA boycotts the Moscow Olympics (1980), General Jaruzelski takes control of Poland (military government – February ), Reagan announces plans to spend $180 billion on arms over the next six years (November 1981), Reagan announces that US citizens are banned from visiting Cuba (April 1982), A South Korean Boeing airliner is shot down by a Soviet fighter (September 1983), US Marines invade Grenada (October ), Andropov announces an increase in the number of missiles aimed at the USA (November 1983)
AFTER: Ronald Reagan visits China (April 1984), Gorbachev meets Margaret Thatcher in London (December 1984), Reagan announces the tripling of expenditure on the Star Wars research programme (February 1985), Gorbachev announces a freeze on Soviet missile deployments in Europe (April ),  Gorbachev and Reagan agree to open negotiations on arms reductions at the Geneva Summit (November 1985), Gorbachev proposes a 15-year timetable for the elimination of all nuclear weapons (January 1986), Reykjavik Summit (October 1986), Gorbachev proposes reforms including secret ballot and the election of party officials (January 1987), Washington Summit (December 1987)
If you were to place all of these events on a ‘crisis graph’ (like Task A), it would look similar to the events before and after 1962 – which marked a turning point in the Cold War.