1. International Relations
Introduction to
International Relations
Realism vs. Liberalism II
Jaechun Kim

2. REALISM VS. LIBERALISM – PART II
NEO-NEO DEBATE (NEO-REALISM VS. NEO-LIBERALISM)
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Problem of Collective Action in Int’l Relations
Assumptions of the game!!!
Rationalist assumption
One-shot game
No communications between actors…
Mancur Olson, Logic of Collective Action
It is difficult to provide collective (public) goods in the absence of central authority…
Introduction to International Relations

3. John
Prisoner's Dilemma C D -3
-20
-10 C
Jane D
DC > CC > DD

4. Characteristics of collective goods?
Non-excludability (transitivity of usage)
Problem of “Free Riding”
Application in IR
Cooperation between states is “quasi-public goods”
e.g., international disarmament, free trade…
How can we overcome this problem? How can we elicit cooperation among states in the absence of int’l government?
Neorealist – states would seldom cooperate…
Neoliberals – not necessarily… states can cooperate even in the absence of central authority… !!
int’l institutions (or int’l regimes) can replace the role of central authority…

5. (aka., NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM also Regime Theory)
NEO-LIBERALISM
(aka., NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM also Regime Theory)
Emphasizes the independent role of int’l institutions…
Uses realist assumptions
anarchy
assumption of unitary-rational actor; uses game theory
Major arguments
Pathology of anarchy can be mitigated (if not eliminated) by the role of int’l institutions (or international regimes)…Cooperation under anarchy is not easy, but int’l institutions (or regimes) can facilitate it…
Therefore international institutions are independent actors that can compete with states!

6. Why do int’l institutions (or international regimes) matter?
Reduce transaction costs of cooperation
What is “transaction costs”?
the costs and risks associated with carrying out an agreement..
Int’l institutions provide rules of agreement and coordination mechanism  lower transaction costs  induce cooperation
Increase transparency
Int’l institutions provide correct information  this will reassure states that they are not being cheated.. (increase transparency)  induce cooperation

7. Induce participants to make commitments through sunk costs…
You invested a lot of money into a cooperative agreement, then leaving it would impose you additional costs…  induce cooperation
Provide enforcement mechanism
Make sure that defectors are penalized!!
Make explicit threat of retaliation to defection…  induce cooperation
Create and foster norms of reciprocity
Make sure that the game is played as iterated game..

8. If the game is iterated…
You can keep track of past behavior of other states… reputation matters!!
This will create shadow of the future (promise of future gains) … states would not discount the future value of cooperation…  induce cooperation
Neorealist’s answer to Neoliberalist?
Relative gains matter more!
Because “intl relations” is zero sum game!
(Neo)liberal Institutionalism
 Third leg of liberalism

9. DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY
An important liberalist theory
First leg of liberalist paradigm of int’l relations (theory)
Role of liberal political institution; liberal democracy
cf. Second leg of liberalism?
Role of liberal market economy and economic interdependence
Democratic Peace finding is statistically very robust!
Policy implication of DP?

10. Then why Democratic Peace?
Institutional explanation
Restraining effects of public opinion and the checks and balances of democratic political institutions..
Normative explanation
Democratic norms and culture shared by democracies…