1. Land Reform and Violence: Creating a Set of Conditions in Zimbabwe Dylan Ciccarelli Government Department, Colby College, Waterville, ME Research Question This research project attempts to answer the question: under what conditions does land reform become violent? This question will focus on violent land reform in Zimbabwe and why violence occurred during the fast track land reform process of 1998-2002, with a comparison to Kenya. Creating a set of conditions under which land reform becomes violent will work towards improved policies of land related issues and their implementation. Hypotheses In order to determine the conditions under which land reform becomes violent, a set of hypotheses will be tested using previous research, empirical evidence, and quantitative data. These hypotheses are divided into the categories of ethnicity/race/society, economic factors, and politics/institutional factors. Ethnicity/Race/Society: 1.A large number of racial ‘outsiders’ ownership of land creates an easy target for violence to be inflicted upon. 2.The use of violence against racial ‘outsiders’ is justified, as they own the majority of agricultural land. 3.A large number of ethnic ‘outsiders’ occupying jobs in the agricultural sector results in violence between competing land claimants. 4.Violence is used as a means to psychologically decolonize the landless class. Economics: 1.High land pressure in the communal areas (CA) resulted in the use of violence during fast track land reform. Politics/Institutions: 1.Statist land regimes result in greater levels of violence during land reform. 2.Neo-customary land regimes result in less violence during land reform. 3.Previous attempts at land reform perceived as being illegitimate amongst the landless class in terms of outputs produce violence. 4.Violence manifests when governments use land redistribution as a means of supressing political opposition. Comparison to Kenya The Kenyan case study concerns the land reform violence from 1991-1993. Ethnic ‘outsiders’ controlled the most agriculturally productive land of the Rift Valley. Kenya has a statist land tenure regime. Both Presidents Kenyatta and Moi used land as a patronage resource. Kenya was experiencing high land pressure in less agriculturally productive areas. The Zimbabwean and Kenyan experiences of violence during land reform are similar with respect to the hypotheses studied in this research, improving external validity. Conclusions This study established a set of conditions under which land reform becomes violent are as follows: The presence of racial/ethnic outsiders will increase the likelihood of violence. High land pressure amongst the poor to the point where quality of life is compromised is likely to produce violence. A statist land tenure regime will produce greater levels of violence than a neo-customary regime. Violence is more likely when land is used as a patronage resource. The use of anti-colonial/liberation rhetoric and actions increases the likelihood of the use of violence during land reform. This study does not determine which of these conditions is most important nor how many of these conditions need to be present in order for land reform to become violent. Social Conditions HypothesesEvidence Racial ‘outsiders’ White commercial farmers Inequality of land along lines of race Not considered ‘native Zimbabwean’ Ethnic ‘outsiders’ Farm workers on commercial farms Extension of white farmers 1,600 assaulted and 26 killed Psychologically de- colonize Third Chimurenga War Veterans invasion of farms Continuation of colonial rule Economic Conditions HypothesisEvidence High land pressure Growing population in the communal areas Soil erosion Lack of meaningful reform prior to 1998 Political Conditions HypothesesEvidence Statist land tenure regime a system where the central state itself is a direct allocator of land access and use Governs land in Zimbabwe Violence may be localized, but issue is addressed on national level Neo-customary tenure regime a system where traditional/local authorities control land Land reform and conflict is resolved on a localized level Illegitimate Landless poor in Zimbabwe did not benefit from previous land reform policies Violence used to ensure benefits Fast track process as more legitimate Suppress political opposition Land used as patronage resource ZANU-PF faced with rising political opposition, the MDC Upcoming 2000 election