MPP 4 th March - 1v0 CERN MPP CERN MPP SMP Team 3.

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Presentation transcript:

MPP 4 th March - 1v0

CERN MPP CERN MPP SMP Team 3

CERN MPP Menu Introduction Hardware Testing and Testers Software User Interface B. Todd M. Kwiatkowski S. Gabourin I. Romera M. Audrain 4 Status & FutureI. Romera

CERN MPP SMP 3v0 Introduction

CERN MPP SMP 3v0 - Introduction 6 *fast *safe *reliable *available generates flags & values afe achine arameters SM P and / ordirectly transmittedbroadcast receives accelerator information injection procedureprotection configuration CERN = System Safety Beam Interlocks Collimation Beam Loss Monitors … Extraction Interlocks

CERN MPP CERN MPP Two Controllers 7

CERN MPP SPS Parameters

CERN MPP SPS Probe Beam Flag 9 Fail-Safe = FALSE Fail-Safe = e15

CERN MPP SPS Setup Beam Flag 10 Fail-Safe = FALSE Fail-Safe = e14

CERN MPP Probe / Setup Timing 11

CERN MPP SPS Energy Flags 12 Fail-Safe = FALSE Fail-Safe = GeV

CERN MPP SPS Energy Flags 13

CERN MPP SPS Energy Flags 14

CERN MPP LHC Parameters

CERN MPP LHC Energy 16 Fail-Safe = GeV

CERN MPP LHC Intensity 17 Fail-Safe = e15Fail-Safe = e14

CERN MPP LHC Set-up Beam Flag 18

CERN MPP LHC Set-up Beam Flag 19 Fail-Safe = FALSE

CERN MPP LHC Set-up Beam Flag 20

CERN MPP LHC Set-up Beam Flag 21

CERN MPP LHC Beam Presence Flag 22

CERN MPP LHC Beam Presence Flag 23 Fail-Safe = FALSE

CERN MPP Squeezing Factors 24 Fail-Safe = 0m

CERN MPP Moveable Devices and Stable Beams 25

CERN MPP Moveable Devices and Stable Beams 26 Operator: <10 GeV window between LIMITs

CERN MPP Moveable Devices and Stable Beams 27

CERN MPP Moveable Devices and Stable Beams 28 Operator: <1m window between LIMITs

CERN MPP Moveable Devices and Stable Beams 29

CERN MPP Moveable Devices and Stable Beams 30

CERN MPP Dependable Electronics Basis

CERN MPP VME Chassis & Generic Circuit - CISX 32 Receiver – CISR Generator LHC – CISGL Generator SPS – CISGS Arbiter – CISA or

CERN MPP VME Chassis & Generic Circuit - CISX 33 Receiver – CISR Generator LHC – CISGL Generator SPS – CISGS Arbiter – CISA Monitor FPGA Control FPGA VHDL implementation Safety approach?

CERN MPP Hardware Dependable Design

CERN MPP Design flow

CERN MPP Requirements 36 Requirements requested by operators and/or approved by MPP. E.G. Set-up Beam Flag equation normal relaxed very relaxed ion

CERN MPP Specification and formalisation English + diagramspredicate logic vs English languageformal language Unlike the English, there is only one way to understand formal language.

CERN MPP Specification and formalisation English + diagramspredicate logic vs English languageformal language Unlike the English, there is only one way to understand formal language.

CERN MPP Functional blocks 39

CERN MPP Design flow

CERN MPP Implementation VHDL is not a programming language. It is a Hardware Description Language Must understand expected synthesis result comments and naming convention important for the code review Critical code = strict Non-Critical code = engineer has freedom High % code reuse

CERN MPP Design flow

CERN MPP Simulation Unit Under Test Bus Functional Model Register Transfer Level

CERN MPP Simulation Test-bench = software wrapped around model Simulation tool can examine code coverage response should be correct for all stimulus

CERN MPP Design flow

CERN MPP Hardware tester DeviceUnder Test

CERN MPP Hardware tester similar to simulation but real hardware embedded logic analyzers provided by FPGA vendors Chip Scope, SignalTap, … Hardware response should be correct for each stimulus

CERN MPP Hardware tester vs. simulation Complementary Software simulation:Hardware tester: source code tracking code coverage real time real distortions

CERN MPP Hardware Dependable Design Summary Our approach – dependable PLD design goes on top of dependable electronics design exhaustive source code simulation full code coverage hardware testers formalisation of the specification split critical – non-critical reduction to minimum function code reviews external reviews

CERN MPP System Testing & Testers The “V” Approach

CERN MPP SMP Development: the “V” approach 51 English Specification used for the Tester Determine Tests needed to verify each function Developed Independently of Controller Validation of Controller versus Tester versus English Specification

CERN MPP What is the SMP Tester? 52 Definition : Ensure the SMP controller works as specified Roles : Simulates the inputs Analyzes the outputs

CERN MPP Functionalities of the SMP tester 53

CERN MPP Test of the SPS Probe-Beam Flag 54 Control of the test coverage Excel input files Both A and B intensities valid PROBE_BEAM_LIMIT TRUE FALSE

CERN MPP SPS Probe-Beam Flag: Test Protocol 55

CERN MPP SPS Probe-Beam Flag: Display Results 56 LabVIEW SubPanel Excel file Text File

CERN MPP Tester Summary 57 What it does: - Replaces all elements connected to the SMP - Tests automatically many input combinations - Validates the boards for the operation

CERN MPP Software FESA – RBAC – MCS – Checks - GUI

CERN MPP Introduction 59 FESA class RBAC protection and MCS Operational checks SMP-GUI

CERN MPP FESA class 60 FESA class provides access to hardware registers no complex logic behind, just valid range checks Different type of access read-only access for everyone write access for experts trough dedicated expert properties write access for critical registers for operation

CERN MPP FESA class 61

CERN MPP RBAC and MCS configuration 62 SPS PropertyRolesApplicationsLocationMCS ProbeBeamLimitLHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMPSEQUENCERX PropertyRolesApplicationsLocationMCS SqueezingFactorLHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMPSISSIS-HOSTS SqueezingFactorLimitsLHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMPSEQUENCERX PhysicsEnergyLimitsLHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMPSEQUENCERX BeamModeLHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMPSEQUENCER ForceSetupBeamFlagLHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMPSMP-GUI SetupBeamFlagNormalLHC-OP, LHC-EIC, MCS-SMPSMP-GUI SetupBeamFlagSpecialSMP-THRESHOLD-EXPERTSMP-GUI ExpertRegisterSettingSMP-EXPERTSMP-GUI LHC

CERN MPP Operational checks 63 Pre-operational checks to ensure system ready for operation HW consistency vs DB, Test mode to ensure critical paths working to spec…

CERN MPP Operational checks 64 DIAMON checks to detect infrastructure issues PS, Timing, Communication problems…

CERN MPP Operational checks 65 Post-Mortem for post-operational check sequence Role played in last dump, Redundancy, Safety for next mission…

CERN MPP GUI Demonstration

CERN MPP SMP-GUI 67 GUI to monitor status of the systems (SPS and LHC) Send commands to the controllers Logged data viewer Useful tool for diagnostics Same tool used for Operators and Experts

CERN MPP Status & Future Plans

CERN MPP Q1/ study intensity logic + ongoing documentation + 10 trivial issues in monitoring and diagnostics + beta Pre-Op + beta DIAMON + beta Post-Mortem

CERN MPP Q3/ Cross-checker tester + Cross-checking hardware

CERN MPP Q3/

CERN MPP Q3/ Cross-checker tester + Cross-checking hardware + VME Transmitter + VME Receiver

CERN MPP Q3/

CERN MPP Q3/

CERN MPP Q3/ Cross-checker tester + Cross-checking hardware + VME Transmitter + VME Receiver + Pre-Op + DIAMON + Post-Mortem

CERN MPP In Closingfin – thank you!