Energy Sector - EU/UK Regulatory and Legal framework, Safety Cases Kevin Myers Director General Regulation Health and Safety Executive, UK EU-US Joint Conference on OSH Fort Worth, Texas 17-19 September 2015

Background principles 28 Member States in EU Each has its own history and OSH legal framework EU OSH Legislation is largely expressed through “Directives”……. Developed from experience of incidents eg Seveso, Deepwater Horizon Which are transcribed into National legislation……… And in doing so inevitably reflect history, legal system, philosophy……… So I will cover this through the UK perspective

Fundamentals of UK’s OSH system A (largely) goal-setting regulatory framework The business/employer is responsible for identifying and managing risk and establishing the appropriate control measures - not the Regulator This outcome-focused approach is underpinned by risk assessment to determine the appropriate controls But the important thing is delivery of the controls – not the piece(s) of paper!

Energy Sector Traditional OSH activities – working with electricity, falls from height etc failures are comparably high frequency, but ‘low’ consequence tend to regulate through core OSH regulations “major hazard” activities - Oil and gas exploration, refining etc failures are comparably low frequency but high consequence tend to regulate through ‘safety case’ regimes Emerging technologies under development?!

‘Traditional’ OSH risks I Covered by a ‘Framework’ Directive setting out general principles of prevention: hierarchy of risks – avoid, evaluate, control at source adapt the work to the individual and prioritise collective over individual protective measures adapt to technical progress developing a coherent overall prevention policy consult/engage with the workforce and provide adequate training workers to co-operate, use machinery and ppe etc correctly and notify employer of shortcomings and /or danger

‘Traditional’ OSH risks II Framework Directive supported by over 20 “Daughter” Directives – either sector or cross-cutting hazard-based ppe, manual handling, display screen equipment, vibration, noise, work equipment chemical agents, carcinogens, asbestos, biological agents, explosive atmospheres construction oil and gas extraction mining

Major Drivers for Change Technology Management Systems Risk Behavioural Human Factors? Accidents At a basic level, changes in occupational health and safety performance are influenced by 3 main drivers: technology, management systems and human factors such as behaviour. While technological controls and processes can minimise physical exposure to risk, health and safety is delivered by people on the ground. Human factors and behaviour are critical to success. Safe systems of work may be technically robust, but they don’t work if people don’t follow them. Technology and process can only take us so far without safe behaviours to back them up. The effectiveness of occupational risk control and management is for this reason heavily influenced by organisational culture. Businesses or organisations that achieve and sustain excellent health and safety records successfully establish a safety culture that exerts a positive influence on attitudes and behaviours. When combined with appropriate technical controls and management systems, this can influence a positive change in performance. That’s the theory, but how does it work in practice? What characteristics define a successful ‘safety culture’ and what are the organisational attributes that can generate it? Time Time

“Safety Case” Regime Businesses need the regulator’s agreement or consent before they can start operation: Safety Cases/Safety Reports /Licences Often this includes the regulator’s agreement on aspects of the design, construction and commissioning of the plant as well Dependant on the business/employer demonstrating that the risks are controlled ‘as low as is reasonably practicable’ - ALARP. Regulator’s role is to assess and verify that the case for safety has been made and the risks effectively managed and controlled.

Inspection Risk based and targeted Takes account of company performance But also topic-based Primary purpose is to verify that the control measures described in Safety Case/Report actually exist on the ground and are resilient

Investigation High public expectations Hold accountable those responsible Establish root causes: Technical Managerial Cultural Learn and share lessons

Hazard Incident

Swiss Cheese Model of Defence Hazard Ideal Reality Incident

Swiss Cheese Model of Defence

Advantages/Disadvantages of Safety Case Regime No prescription - so flexibility and alternative ways of reaching the desired outcome Enables – indeed encourages - innovation Need for good guidance, industry codes and standards to establish good practice in achieving compliance Need for an on-going dialogue with industry and its involvement in developing and owning guidance and standards The role of the regulator The business value of the safety case It is no guarantee of safe production/operation

Key Lessons from UK experience It’s often the routine day to day tasks and activities that go wrong not the unusual/obscure There are no new incidents just new people repeating the same mistakes Tomorrow’s major accident is lurking in the organisation today. A seismic quake is always preceded by warning signs Importance of leading indicators No clear sense of vulnerability. Belief in the infallibility of control system Regulatory Codes can at best only be a imperfect fit to risk management – not a guarantee of safety

HSE publication HSG254 What can go wrong? Where within the facility will these challenges to integrity be most critical? What systems are in place to manage those challenges? What does success look like? What are the critical activities which must work right to deliver the intended outcome?

Thank you for listening!